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 Social movement participants define themselves and their movements historically 
although current social movement theory tends to ignore this phenomenon  This study explores 
how and why social movement participants reconstruct the past as a part of their movement and 
how this reconstructed history, or counterpast, stands in opposition to the official history 
constructed by the dominant group in society.  Specifically, the study relies on George Herbert 
Mead’s theory of time in seeking to understand how the Frente Sandinista de Liberación 
Nacional reconstructed Nicaraguan history and the historical figure of General Augusto César 
Sandino in order to drive their revolution against the Somoza regime in the 1960s and 1970s.  A 
feature of that reconstruction is that the Sandinistas attributed posthumous charisma (a variation 
of Max Weber’s concept of charisma) to Sandino. Four constructions of history are explored - 
those by Sandino himself and his supporters, by North Americans, by Anastasio Somoza and his 
 vi
supporters, and finally, the contemporary Sandinista reconstruction of the past presented in the 
revolution that was victorious in 1979.  The method of investigation is historical research using 
documents produced by proponents of the four views of history during the respective time 
periods. 
 vii
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 After eighteen years of struggle, after the Frente Sandinista de Liberación 
Nacional (FSLN)was victorious and after the Sandinistas had been in power for eleven 
years, President Daniel Ortega commissioned Ernesto Cardenal to sculpt the image of 
Augusto César Sandino.  The sculpture stands fifty-four feet tall, towering above much of 
Managua in its place on a hill.  It may seem a bit peculiar to those who do not know 
Nicaragua that the sculpture is metal, black and flat instead of three-dimensional and, 
perhaps, bronze.  But for Nicaraguans, and especially Sandinistas, a fifty-four foot, black, 
flat Sandino is perfect. 
 There truly is no other like Sandino.  Ernesto Cardenal (1991:  x), the sculptor, 
explains: 
I believe that Augusto César Sandino is the only hero in history who is 
recognized by his people by his silhouette alone.  The silhouette of 
Sandino is seen everywhere in Nicaragua - on walls, on ramparts, on 
fences, on curbs, on columns, on bridges, and even on electric and 
telephone posts. 
Furthermore, Sandino is a unique historical case:  an assassinated hero 
who fifty years later rises again incarnated in an entire people and defeats 
those who had assassinated him.  And thus he continues to live. 
 
So, it is the silhouette, the flat, the sometimes red, sometimes black Sandino that people 
use as a shorthand for a world of meaning about themselves, their leaders, their enemies, 
and their history.  And the people that create the Sandino silhouettes are his, as Cardenal 
says.  It is somewhat irrelevant that he is dead. 
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 The Sandinista National Liberation Front looks back to a time when United 
States Marines occupied Nicaragua as the US State Department, in concert with US 
multinational companies, directed Nicaraguan politics and the Nicaraguan economy with 
one lone patriot and his followers standing against the overwhelming power of the 
aforementioned forces.  According to this construction of reality by the FSLN, Sandino 
and his Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua were the Nicaraguans 
who loved Nicaragua enough and believed in themselves enough, even in the face of 
enormous odds, to risk and sacrifice their lives for the homeland.  
 The contemporary Sandinistas provide a dramatic case study for the exploration 
of the role of the past in social movements.  The leadership of the Sandinistas recovered 
the example and thought of General Augusto César Sandino, dead for twenty years when 
they began, and reconstructed him into an historical figure that was much more than just 
an example.  Sandino is not just a national hero.  Sandino is more akin to a phenomenon.  
The contemporary Sandinistas write about him, write to him, sing about him, sing to him, 
praise him, and pledge loyalty to him and to his memory and mission; and they have done 
all those things an unknowable number of times since they began to study his thought 
almost fifty years ago.  Most importantly for this study, they made him an integral part of 
their social movement.   
 Social movement theory tends to ignore the role that the past plays in movements 
in terms of how movement participants understand the past.  Theorists have spent a lot of 
time and effort placing specific movements into history, but that activity is performed by 
the theorists and researchers without an appreciation for how participants view the 
situation.  Therefore, this study will explore new theoretical ground in understanding the 
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reconstruction of the past by movement participants.  Preliminary development of a 
theory of the counterpast will, hopefully, contribute to the impressive body of theoretical 
work explaining social movements. 
 George Herbert Mead’s theory of time contributes to explaining how movement 
participants understand history as it allows individuals to reconstruct the past in light of 
the present.  Mead’s theory aids in explaining the process of reconstructing the past and 
the need for it.  His ideas shed light on movement participants’ understanding of the past, 
the enlistment of that reconstructed past in movement ideology and action, and also on 
the relationship of that reconstructed past to the movements’ opponents.  The participants 
in a social movement will understand history in a fundamentally different way than will 
their opponents.  If they agreed with the history put forth by their opponents, there would 
be no need for a movement. 
 As movement participants construct and present their reconstruction of history, 
they will encounter resistance to that reconstructed history because it will not serve the 
interests of the dominant group.  In fact, the social movement’s reconstruction of the past 
will be a counter-past.  The dominant group has a powerful edge in that it has already 
constructed, disseminated and maintained its official history and, by virtue of its 
dominant status, has the power to discourage or censor any other proposed histories.  
Therefore, the movement enters into a struggle over socio-cultural patterns as well as a 
struggle over its particular concerns such as more equal distribution of economic or 
political resources.  Since Mead’s theory does not address the reconstruction of history 
with regard to power relationships, Alain Touraine’s contributions addressing control of 
the production of knowledge, in this case historical knowledge, is extremely useful.  
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Within the phenomenon of reconstructing the past by social movements, Weber’s theory 
of charisma is useful in beginning to explain the Sandinistas’ treatment of Sandino long 
after his murder. 
 A crucial feature of the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua is their 
reconstruction of Nicaraguan history that constitutes a counterpast to the official past 
maintained by the Somoza regime.  Within this counterpast, the Sandinistas reconstruct 
Sandino as not only an historical hero figure, but also reconstruct him as if he were 
charismatic even though he is long dead.  Just the invocation of Sandino’s name is 
counter to the Somoza government.  Yet the Sandinistas do more than simply use his 
name in their revolution and manage, ultimately, to overthrow the dictatorship as the 
“descendants of Sandino” (Fonseca, 1981:  38). 
 The goal of this study is to understand how members of social movements, 
specifically the Frente Sandinista Liberación Nacional, define themselves and their 
movement historically.  In order to explore this question, the study considers how the 
FSLN reconstructed history in opposition to the history constructed by the Somoza 
regime and how both of these histories relate to histories constructed by the early 
Sandinistas and the United States.  A related goal is to explore the possibility of the 
existence of posthumous charisma by studying the recovery of General Sandino’s image 
by the FSLN and employment of that image in their movement. 
A Preview of the Study 
 Chapter Seven will investigate the FSLN’s construction of Sandino’s image.  
However, first, it is very instructive to understand the images with which the FSLN’s 
understanding of Nicaraguan history, and Sandino specifically, compete.  The three 
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constructions of Sandino that precede the FSLN’s reconstruction are presented here in a 
historical, narrative form.  It is necessary to let Sandino and his followers, the United 
States and the Somoza regime act as speakers telling their own respective stories about 
Sandino.  Their narratives, from their perspectives, are data in themselves for purposes of 
this study.  The stories each speaker tells contributes to the ultimate reconstruction of 
history offered by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional.  Therefore, presentation 
of the first three constructions of history will be offered with little interpretation or 
analysis so that the speakers’ voices are allowed to communicate what the contemporary 
Sandinistas would have also heard when they began their reconstruction of the past. 
 Chapter Two offers a review of social movement theory as well as sociological 
theory regarding charismatic leadership.  More specifically, the discussion centers on the 
necessity of social movement theory to consider Mead’s theory of time as it relates to 
how movement participants reconstruct history in such a way as to give their movement 
meaning, continuity and a future.  Within this discussion, there is also the possibility that 
charisma, in the Weberian sense, may be reconstructed for a deceased person. 
 Chapter Three provides an overview of Nicaraguan history.  This rendition of 
Nicaragua’s history focuses on the period 1926 through 1979 although there is some 
discussion of pre-1926 and post 1979.  The information is largely about the Nicaraguan 
political and economic situation during the period in question because the original and 
contemporary Sandinistas focus on those institutions.  It is included in this work to 
provide a brief orientation to the sweep of Nicaraguan history as several scholars 
understand it. 
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 Chapters Four, Five and Six will allow three constructions of Sandino and 
Nicaraguan history to unfold chronologically and in narrative form.  The multiple images 
of Sandino and Nicaragua from his time period present a complex construction of reality 
and a foundation for the Sandinistas of the 1960s and 1970s to construct a counterpast to 
drive their revolutionary movement.  Persons of every view regarding Sandino either 
assign charismatic qualities to or, at least, recognize the charismatic relationship he has 
with his followers.  The following narrative relies heavily on documents originally 
produced by the characters or entities named above and is supplemented by information 
from secondary sources. 
 There are, at least, three constructed images of Sandino and Nicaraguan history 
to which the contemporary FSLN responds as it reconstructs the past.  These three 
images were constructed at the time Sandino was living and leading his revolt and then 
just after his death.  Chapter Four allows Sandino to present an image of himself.  
Sandino’s image of himself is that he is of the people and is a defender of the oppressed, 
no matter what the cost.  He wrote many letters, statements, manifestos and gave several 
interviews that included remarks about himself as well as his view of Nicaraguan history. 
Flowing from Sandino’s self-image, Sandino’s followers and those who sympathize with 
his struggle construct a Sandino who is courageous, nationalistic, loyal and deserving of 
respect if not devotion.  These persons include not only Nicaraguans but Latin Americans 
from a variety of nations.  Both the detractors and followers/sympathizers have left 
documents produced in the 1920s and 1930s, and from time to time, are also quoted in 
the New York Times. 
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 Chapter Five recognizes that persons from the United States present a variety of 
Sandinos to the American public.  The US military, the US State Department, and US 
businesses label him a bandit and an outlaw.  Some private citizens, members of 
academia, and members of Congress treat him and his revolt as a Nicaraguan concern that 
is not an appropriate concern for US marine intervention.  The New York Times 
(especially reporter Harold Denny) usually, but not always, presents Sandino as the 
bandit that the Coolidge and Hoover administrations say he is.  However, Carlton Beals 
of The Nation constructs a more sympathetic and romantic image of Sandino.   
 Lastly, Chapter Six addresses how Sandino’s Nicaraguan opposition paints him 
as wholly traitorous and dangerous.  Most notable among his Nicaraguan detractors is 
General Anastasio Somoza García, who is, of course, his principal Nicaraguan political 
and military foe.  It will be Somoza’s constructed image of Sandino and Nicaraguan 
history that will become the official history after Sandino’s murder.  However, the 
Somozas generally do their best to ignore Sandino.  Theirs will be the history against 
which the contemporary Sandinistas will construct their counterpast. 
 Chapter Seven allows the members of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación 
Nacional to reconstruct Nicaragua’s history and to reconstruct General Augusto César 
Sandino.  Unlike the original Sandinistas, the contemporary Sandinistas produced a 
multitude of documents in their process of reconstructing the past.  Key documents 
demonstrate that they not only recovered Sandino from Nicaraguan history but used this 
history as a tool in making their revolution.  In this sense, the construction of a 
counterpast was necessary to the Sandinista movement’s existence and ultimate victory. 
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Methodological Note 
 The Nicaraguan revolution of 1979 and Augusto César Sandino’s role as a major 
“participant” in that event provide a case study to generate theoretical principles useful 
for interpretations of social movements.  The theoretical question concerns the 
reconstruction of the past and the use of it and charisma in these movements.  The 
empirical question then becomes one of discerning which data will provide the necessary 
insights.  Of particular concern in this study is the imputation of charisma to a deceased 
man by living revolutionaries and the present need to reconstruct that part of Nicaragua’s 
past to provide meaning for their revolution. 
 Nicaraguan history and Sandino’s place in it have been reconstructed by persons 
other than himself.  Because charisma is a relationship between leader and followers, we 
must consider Sandino’s presentation of self as well as to his followers’ image of him.  
However, we must look to his contemporary Sandinista followers to determine the role of 
the historical Sandino and his charisma in the revolution of 1979.  In order to accomplish 
this task, the imputations of charisma must be demonstrated at two distinct points in time.  
First, there must be evidence that Sandino was charismatic during his struggle against 
foreign intervention in the 1930s.  Second, there must be discussion of the reconstruction 
of the historical Sandino and his charisma by the contemporary Sandinistas. 
 My treatment of how the early Sandinistas viewed their leader and how the later 
Sandinistas presented him to the Nicaraguan population will be preceded by an historical 
overview of Nicaragua.  Admittedly, I am subject to Mead’s phenomenon of spreading 
the present backward in order to provide meaning.  Nevertheless, it is important to 
understand something of the foreign intervention that Nicaragua has experienced.  
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Secondary sources were used to compile this history and then integrated into a 
sociological framework. 
 In order to understand the Sandinista revolutionaries’ reconstruction of history, it 
is necessary to first provide the three principal historical constructions with which their 
history must contend.  Each of these three constructions - Sandino’s, the North 
Americans’ and Somoza’s - will be from their respective points of view using their 
words.  As stated previously, these three histories will be narrative with little analysis so 
that the three “speakers” may present their own constructions.  Thus, I am generally 
identifying the beginning point for this reconstruction at the beginning of Sandino’s 
military career in 1926.  The end point will be the victory of the Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional in 1979. 
 Sandino, a few of his followers, and some sympathizers will tell the story of 
Sandino in Chapter Four.  In order to understand how Sandino views himself and how his 
contemporaries view him, documents written by him and his contemporaries are used.  
Numerous letters and manifestos written by Sandino are available in several collected 
works and provide a wealth of data in which Sandino describes himself and his struggle.1  
In addition, Sandino revealed himself in a few interviews and, in some cases, formally 
endorsed works written about him.  Weaving together Sandino’s comments about 
himself, as they appear in the various letters, manifestos and interviews in these 
                                                 
1 The most comprehensive collection of Sandino’s writings is Sergio Ramírez’ edition of El 
pensamiento vivo, 1981 in two volumes.  Other collections of Sandino’s writing include Sandino:  
The Testimony of a Nicaragua Patriot, 1921-1934, 1990, edited by Robert Edgar Conrad;  
Sandino es indohispano y no tiene fronteras en América Latina,1984, edited by the Institute for 
the Study of Sandinism;  Escritos literarios y documentos desconicidos, 1980, edited by Jorge 
Eduardo Arellaño and Sandino Without Frontiers, 1980, edited by Karl Bermann. 
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collections provides a narrative of Sandino.   The documents are examined in the 
chronological order in which they were written in order to capture Sandino’s self image 
over time, but they do not, in any way, constitute a narrative as they are.  A few works 
written by people who knew Sandino but who wrote after his death, were used to furnish 
a bit more of the story of the General.2  Sources cited by Carlos Fonseca and Tomás 
Borge, two of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional’s founders, are key sources 
because they note that the sources were key to their understanding of Sandino.  Most of 
the same documents used here have been used extensively in other studies but not to tell 
exactly this story.  Secondary sources fill in a few gaps in the story told by Sandino and 
his contemporaries.3 
 At the same time that Sandino was writing and presenting an image of himself,  
United States officials were also constructing an image of him.  As they fought a war 
against him, US diplomats and military leaders provided statements to the press about 
Sandino, which the press then reported to the North American public.  In addition, 
reporters on the scene in Nicaragua contributed to the North American construction of 
General Sandino.  As the “paper of record” the New York Times had the resources to get 
the Nicaragua story and deliver it to more than a local readership.  The Times even 
maintained a reporter in Managua.  Therefore, all Times stories that were about  
                                                 
2 The great majority of documents for the chapters about Sandino, Somoza and the contemporary 
Sandinistas were written in Spanish. Translations of works cited that are written in Spanish are 
mine.  When citing English translations of works originally written in Spanish, the English 
version is cited. 
3 Neill Macaulay’s The Sandino Affair is an informative history of Sandino’s struggle.  Also very 
helpful are Gregorio Selser’s works Sandino, General de los hombres libres and El pequeño 
ejército loco. 
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Nicaragua or Sandino and that appeared between 1926 and 1934 were examined and the 
highlights used to tell the story of the US War in Nicaragua and of Sandino as it was 
presented to the American public.  Other sources such as The Nation, a few journal 
articles, and books written by US diplomat Henry Stimson and Marine General Smedley  
Butler supplement the information from the Times.  As with the documents used to 
discuss Sandino, the documents used to understand the construction of Sandino in the US 
are dated between 1926 and 1934. 
 In order to outline the official history maintained by the Somoza regime, Somoza 
García’s book about Sandino is clearly used as a principal source in Chapter Six.  Quotes 
from Nicaraguans about what they remember knowing about Sandino and what they 
knew of official history provide another view.  Since media and education are important 
ways in which official history is spread and maintained throughout a population, data 
regarding the messages offered by media and education in Nicaragua during the Somoza 
period are presented.  Included in these data are history books endorsed by Somoza 
himself and a school textbook of the period.  These works not only discuss Nicaraguan 
history, and perhaps Sandino, but also present an official construction of Somoza.  
Secondary data regarding the state of media and education in Somoza’s Nicaragua are 
included.  In addition, works by non-Sandinista opponents of the Somoza regime are 
presented in order to provide another picture of Somoza and his official history.  The 
works used in this chapter were all written and/or published between 1936 (the year of 
Somoza’s ascent to the Nicaraguan presidency) and 1979.4 
                                                 
4 The exceptions are two histories written prior to 1936 but formally endorsed by the Somoza 
regime as presidentially approved histories of Nicaragua. 
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 Finally, the contemporary Sandinistas and their reconstruction of history appear 
in Chapter Seven.  As the key figure in the recovery and reconstruction of Sandino, 
Carlos Fonseca and his works are the focus of the chapter.  Many of his works appear in a 
collection compiled by the Institute for the Study of Sandinism, but various works also 
appear in other edited books or are available as individual booklets.5  Other key 
documents written by Sandinista leaders include books by Tomás Borge, Humberto 
Ortega, Sergio Ramírez, and Jaime Wheelock.  In addition to works by these leaders are 
works by Sandinistas Germán Pomares, Omar Cabezas and an interview with Francisco 
Rivera.  The great majority of works used in this chapter were written between 1955 and 
1979 with only a few exceptions.  Sandinista propaganda (newspapers, flyers) produced 
during the revolutionary period are used here to illuminate how the Sandinistas 
communicated their reconstruction of Sandino to a broader audience in Nicaragua and 
outside the country.  During two trips to Nicaragua, informal conversations with a few 
Sandinistas were crucial in the process of identifying most of the key documents used in 
this study to weave the stories of Sandino’s image of himself and the contemporary 
Sandinista reconstruction of him. 
 In all four cases of the construction of history, the presentations here of those 
four histories is based on the four “speakers” writings.  Therefore, it will be their view  
and testimony of what happened and why.  Given that stories may change in the telling, 
memories are re-interpreted with time and original information upon which they base 
their constructions may have been faulty, there are periodically some factual errors in the  
                                                 
5 Fonseca’s works include letters, speeches, articles, manifestos, research and booklets. 
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various presentations.  However, this study does not seek any objective truth about 
Nicaraguan history but how various actors construct it.  So, from time to time, 
discrepancies in information will be noted, but only to give more information to the 
reader.  Any discrepancies simply become part of the story of the reconstruction of 
history, and they make it even more interesting. 
A Word About Style 
 This study is unusual in that it permits historical figures to tell their stories in 
narrative form, using data they themselves produced in various documents.  This 
approach allows the reader to see the stories build upon one another, or contradict one 
another, over time so that the reader understands to some degree what the contemporary 
Sandinistas understood of Nicaraguan history when they undertook their reconstruction 
of the past.  This method of data presentation also demonstrates some of the messiness of 
history, which is the reality when historical evidence is not organized into neat, analytical 
categories by the social scientist.  In fact, the stories of Sandino as told by Sandino and 
the North Americans seem quite messy because the stories are told as events are 
happening.   Furthermore, Sandino, in particular, is not writing in narrative format and so 
is not telling a smooth, flowing story.  The collections of his letters and manifestos are 
not meant to tell a narrative.  Therefore, to some degree, I reconfigure an abundance of 
quotes into story form, although not quite of the literary sort.  Again, I do smoothe the 
story somewhat by providing background information from secondary sources. 
  In contrast, the stories told by Somoza and the Sandinistas are somewhat 
simpler, more ordered and shorter because they benefit from looking back and 
summarizing events of the past.  On the other hand, given the amount of data available, I 
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too have certainly done significant winnowing of material to bring brevity and some 
order to the story.   Only light threads of sociological analysis run through Chapters Four, 
Five and Six in contrast to the discipline’s norm of immediate and extensive analysis of 
each construction of history.  Summaries of each story end these three chapters, as well 
as a very brief analysis. More extensive analysis appears in Chapter Seven about the 
contemporary Sandinistas and in the conclusion since, after all, the focus of the study is 
how a movement reconstructs history for movement purposes. 
Building on the Body of Work 
 Numerous fine studies of the recovery of Sandino by the contemporary 
Sandinistas have been written, particularly during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  In fact, 
this study builds upon two brief works that I wrote in the late 1980s.  With increasing 
distance in time from the revolutionary victory in 1979, the volume of studies on this 
revolution may have decreased somewhat.  On the other hand, the distance is bringing 
fresh perspectives and analysis.6  The theory of George Herbert Mead, coupled with the 
theory of Alain Touraine, and then that of Max Weber provide a new theoretical foothold 
in understanding and explaining the Sandinista Revolution and other social movements.  
It is not the purpose of this study to ferret out the objective truth of who Sandino was, but 
to understand how a reconstructed General Sandino and reconstructed Nicaraguan history  
illustrate that the past is contested terrain in the social movement arena. 
                                                 





MOVEMENTS AND THE PAST 
 
 
 Tomás Borge (1984:  163) calls him the "lamp of national dignity and the sower 
of irreversible dreams."  Incredibly, Borge is speaking in the 1980s of a man whom the 
Sandinistas of Nicaragua consider to be their leader, but who died in 1934.  The man was 
or is Augusto César Sandino.  Contemporary Sandinistas bestow upon him several other 
names such as "the General of Free Men" (Sandino, 1981:  43), "a redeemer" (Sandino, 
1981:  52), "the most outstanding founding father" (Fonseca, 1981:  26), "a banner in all 
Latin America" (Sandino, 1981: 42), "the immortal patriot" (Fonseca, 1981: 412), "the 
greatest hero" (Pérez-Valle, 1980:  7), "the most illustrious son of the Nicaraguan people" 
(Fonseca, 1980:  13), and "our beloved founder" (Borge, 1980:  15). 
 The interesting element in the recurrent Sandinista references to this deceased 
person is that the contemporary Sandinistas are committed to a man and his cause even 
though the man is long dead. Only one of the founders of the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) knew Sandino in the 1930s.  Yet their attitude appears to be 
more than one of respect for a deceased national hero.  In fact, the Sandinistas' references 
to a Sandino who died a generation earlier are similar to remarks followers might make 
about a living charismatic leader.  This phenomenon becomes all the more interesting 
since the Sandinistas initiated a social movement - a revolution - in the name of Augusto 
César Sandino and his ideas, and they succeeded in the overthrow of the Somoza 
government in 1979. 
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 The incorporation of Sandino, a figure from the past, into the strategy of the 
FSLN raises questions concerning the relationship of the past to the present.  To date, 
scholars have given considerable attention to how past events led to or caused social 
movements/revolution.  Scholars also address the movement's place in history.  However, 
little scholarly attention has been given to the question of how movement participants 
view their own history and how their historical understanding affects the course of their 
movement and the larger society. This study will explore the theoretical issues regarding 
the interaction of past and present in social movements and the substantive case of 
Sandino and the Nicaraguan revolution. 
Statement of the Problem 
 The relationship between the contemporary Sandinistas and the deceased 
Sandino provides a case study for generating theoretical principles concerning the role of 
the past in social movements.  This role is largely ignored in the social movement 
literature.  Maines, Sugrue, and Katovich (1983) make a sketchy attempt to discuss the 
utility of the creation of a past by social movement participants in order to gain a power 
advantage.  Otherwise, social movement theorists do not explore the relationship of the 
past to present movement strategy and success or failure.  For example, traditional 
collective behavior theory treats movements as temporally isolated and certainly does not 
consider historical understanding on the part of the movement's participants (Smelser, 
1962).  Symbolic interactionists such as Zurcher and Snow (1981) and Snow, et al (1986) 
neglect the possibility that individuals as well as collections of individuals in movements 
form and re-form their perceptions of the past as a result of social interaction and that this 
past has a profound impact on the movement.  The post-structuralist Alain Touraine 
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(1981) argues that entire societies reflect and, employing their systems of knowledge, re-
shape and change using social movements as the primary agents of this change.  
However, he does not address the same process of "historicity," as he calls the process of 
reflection and change, within the social movement.  Neither does resource mobilization 
theory consider that movements must reconstruct a past that is meaningful on a personal 
and on a group level.  Charles Tilly (2004) argues strenuously that each social movement 
must be understood in historical context and, furthermore, social movements as a socio-
political phenomenon must be placed in historical context.  Although necessary and 
extremely useful, it still does not consider the participants’ understanding of history.  The 
political process model (McAdam, 1982) does not consider collective historical 
understanding but is perhaps the model best suited to consider such understanding as it 
emphasizes the subjective understanding by movement participants of political processes 
as well as emphasizing forces in the larger social structure. 
 The emergence of the resource mobilization perspective constituted an alternative 
to and critique of other forms of collective behavior theory such as the contagion (LeBon, 
1982; Blumer, 1937), emergent norm (Turner & Killian, 1957), and value-added 
(Smelser, 1962) perspectives.  Each of these earlier theories assumed that social 
movements tend to occur during times of social stress.  Yet these theories could not 
specify the amount of stress necessary to cause collective behavior/social movements nor 
why collective behavior episodes occurred during some periods of stress and not during 
others.  Resource Mobilization provided a remedy to many of the shortcomings of earlier 
theories.  However, as McAdam (1982) argues, the weakness of the Resource 
Mobilization model lies in its vague definition of resources and its failure to allow for 
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variation among people regarding their subjective assignment of meaning to their 
situations. 
Traditional Collective Behavior Theory 
 Early collective behavior theories assumed that collective behavior episodes, 
including social movements, occurred during times of social stress or strain and were 
rather spontaneous, unconventional responses to that stress.  Theories such as contagion 
(LeBon, 1960; Blumer, 1937), emergent norm (Turner & Killian, 1957), and value-added 
(Smelser, 1962) also assumed that collective actions were somewhat of a social 
pathological response to perceived problems in the social structure.  Nevertheless, these 
theories (especially value-added and emergent norm theories) did make some important 
contributions to the understanding of movements. 
 Smelser’s value-added theory (1962) provided a much more complex analysis of 
collective behavior than had been offered by the early theories.  Of primary importance 
was Smelser’s acknowledgment of elements in the social environment that influenced the 
potential for collective behavior.  The impression given by early theories was that 
collective behavior participants were suffering from a mental disorder or, at least, a 
momentary mental lapse which led them to act collectively in an emotional and 
destructive way.  Smelser, on the other hand, allows that structural elements, such as 
whether or not a societal structure is open or conducive to collective behavior and 
whether or not there is a disruption or strain in the social structure, are central to 
understanding the collective behavior phenomenon.  His value-added theory also outlines 
the importance of how participants perceive the structural strain and its specific 
manifestation in their lives and then how participants perceive a solution to the problem.  
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Even though Smelser implies that the participants’ perception of the problem and choice 
of collective behavior as the solution are not generally the best or correct perceptions and 
solutions, the generalized belief concept as a determinant of collective behavior does 
begin to address the benefits of understanding the participants’ definition of the situation 
rather than the observer simply declaring how participants’ must be viewing the problem. 
 In their discussion of crowd behavior, Turner and Killian (1957) argue that 
crowd behavior arises from cultural conflict, or a conflict between normative systems, 
rather than an absence of culture as implied in earlier theories.  This view tends toward 
allowing that collective behavior participants are rational actors.  In fact, crowds adopt a 
normative system of their own as they act together.  However, while giving a nod to the 
rational behavior of crowd members, Turner and Killian still suggest that crowds are 
essentially destructive and hint at contagion theory when they write that crowd members 
are highly suggestible.  Finally, neither Smelser nor Turner and Killian give attention to 
the notion that collective behavior participants interpret the past in specific ways that 
color their participation in collective behavior. 
Resource Mobilization 
 The resource mobilization perspective has been widely used by social movement 
scholars in the United States.  The resource mobilization approach proposed by Zald and 
Ash in 1964 differs greatly from the aforementioned "breakdown" theories (Tilly, 1975).  
The new theory focuses on how social movements gain resources, how social movements 
are organized, how the movements acquire participants, and how movement participation 
is maintained.  In contrast to earlier theories, resource mobilization assumes that there is 
constant and sufficient social stress to allow for the emergence of a social movement. 
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 While resource mobilization theory does address some of the deficiencies of 
earlier movement theory, its utilitarian analysis exaggerates the role of self-interest in 
movement participation and ignores the role of interpersonal commitment (Zurcher & 
Snow, 1981; Gamson, 1988).  Even though resource mobilizationists admit that the 
opinions and beliefs of participants are to be considered in their analysis, these elements 
are subsumed under the organizational component of social movements.  Consequently, 
resource mobilization analysis is of little value in understanding how a movement begins 
and coalesces, but is of great value as an analysis of how movement organizations are 
maintained or disappear. 
 The identification of the abovementioned difficulties with the resource 
mobilization approach is certainly not exhaustive.7  In addition to other weaknesses of the 
theory, this perspective does not account for a reconstruction of the past by movement 
participants. Resource mobilization theorists sometimes discuss the importance of 
understanding social movements in historical context, but fail to realize that the past must 
be personally meaningful to movement participants (Gamson, 1975; McCarthy & Zald, 
1977; Tilly, 1978).   
 Since the theories do not address the reconstruction of history as part of a 
movement, they certainly do not explain a phenomenon such as the relationship of living 
movement participants to deceased leaders such as Sandino.  Resource mobilization may 
consider leaders to be resources and might even look upon the movement's dead as 
"resources," but even this consideration does not capture the relationship between  
                                                 
7 For more thorough critiques, see McAdam, 1982 & Gamson 1988. 
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followers and a dead leader as the relationship of present to past.  For scholars like 
McCarthy and Zald, the relationship of present participants to what they perceive as their 
past is not necessary to the initiation or success of a movement.  Thus, a central purpose 
of this study is to address this theoretical inadequacy by documenting the reconstruction 
of Nicaragua's past by social movement participants and in opposition to the official 
history offered by Nicaraguan institutions during the reign of the Somozas.  Within this 
larger purpose, there is the particular instance of the Sandinistas' historical reconstruction 
of a once charismatic leader for their own revolution. 
Frame Alignment 
 Unlike resource mobilization theory, frame alignment gives much attention to the 
meaning that individuals attach to social movements and to participation in social 
movements.  Snow and his colleagues (1986: 464) argue that frame alignment is "the 
linkage of individual and [social movement organization or] SMO interpretive 
orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO 
activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary" and that "frame 
alignment is a necessary condition for movement participation."  Therefore, frame 
alignment makes strides in explaining the role of grievance interpretation in 
micromobilization. The perspective allows for varying interpretations of the grievance 
and the social movement's role across individuals and social movement organizations as 
well as allowing that participation in a movement is constantly subject to reconsideration 
and renegotiation.   
 In spite of its strengths regarding the role of individual interpretation in 
movement participation, frame analysis lacks an understanding of the relationship 
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between participants, movements, and history.  Benford and Hunt (1992: 37) mention 
that the dramaturgical approach focuses on "social acts and emergent meanings."  In 
other words, the authors recognize that the social construction and communication of 
meaning are dynamic processes rooted in social interaction.  However, these scholars 
generally do not allow social movement actors, whether they be individuals or 
organizations, to have a sense of history or historical meaning.  There is some mention of 
religious movements and some secular movements having some consciousness of 
themselves as linked to “some grand prophecy or moment in the past” (Hunt, Benford, & 
Snow, 1994; 195).  However, the discussion is brief and ends with the idea that such 
“framings...mark and bound a movement and its activities in space and time” as part of 
the construction of movement identity (Hunt, et al, 1994; 195).   
 The concept of collective identity as outlined by Hunt and Benford (2004) has 
some potential for explaining a movement participant’s sense of history, but consistently 
misses the opportunity.  They do mention Mead in their latest work but only regarding 
how his theory of self and society relates to collective identity construction with no 
mention of his theory of time.  Snow (2004:  404) also approaches Mead’s ideas as he 
states that “imputed or constructed meanings are not fixed or static but are subject to 
change as the social context changes.”  Again, though, the approach falls short of 
considering time.  Certainly, the scholars do not place the actors in historical context, and 
they only recently allow the actors themselves to consider and explain their personal 
histories in the context of the grievance or the need for the social movement.  
Nevertheless, these actors only give scant consideration and explanation to their histories 
in the frame analysis scheme.  The actors in frame analysis are largely present oriented;  
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they assign meaning based on present needs and circumstances and play their roles 
without much consideration for what has gone before and the meaning attached to the 
past.  Indeed, it seems that they have no past.  Neither do they necessarily have a future 
even though Benford and Hunt (1992: 38) mention that dramaturgy may also "be used to 
analyze...the ebb and flow of social change."  As framing and dramaturgy have been 
developed thus far, they cannot explain social change because they do not incorporate 
social construction of past and future in their interpretative categories with regard to 
movement participation.  This perspective only addresses how actors may alter their 
interpretations of the grievance, situation, or power from moment to moment based upon 
their interactions.  The perspective does not give attention to the Meadian understanding 
of the reconstruction of the past and to actors as historical beings in relation to social 
movements. 
Political Process Model 
 The political process model of social movements offers an alternative to the 
aforementioned movement theories by emphasizing the waxing and waning political 
opportunities available to collectivities with political or social grievances.  The model 
also allows that collectivities may or may not perceive and, therefore, act upon political 
opportunities.  As stated by Marx and McAdam (1994: 84), "The basic idea is that social 
movements develop in response to an increase in the 'structure of political opportunities' 
available to a particular challenging group." 
 Particularly crucial to political process theory is this idea that there must be a 
"significant transformation in the collective consciousness of the actors involved" 
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1988: 713).  The idea is not new.  In fact, it follows in the 
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tradition of such concepts as class consciousness (Marx, 1986), generalized beliefs 
(Smelser, 1962), and frame alignment (Snow, et al, 1986).  The political process version 
of the phenomenon explicitly recognizes that structural problems and opportunities are 
not enough to create movements.   Furthermore, "mediating between opportunity and 
action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations" (McAdam, 
1982; 48).  The actors, also known as challengers (Gamson, 1975), may perceive a 
political shift in their favor and, if there is to be a social movement, must collectively 
define situations as unjust and subject to change through collective action.  Critical to the 
initiation of collective action is the requirement that challengers must make "system attri-
butions" in order to explain their grievances (McAdam, 1982). At this point, the actors 
are "adopting an injustice frame" (Gamson, et al 1982) and achieving "cognitive 
liberation" (McAdam, 1982). 
 The political process model has several strengths.  First, it recognizes that the 
political opportunities for challengers rise and fall over time, but that opportunities alone 
are not sufficient to initiate a movement.  Second, political process theorists recognize 
that actors' interpretation of social and political phenomena is crucial to movement 
emergence and movement participation.  Third, the model recognizes that the actors' 
interpretations are dependent upon interactions with others.  The focus is upon 
interactions among groups of people such as organizations.  Fourth, the model argues that 
the process of cognitive liberation is more likely to occur in times of strong social 
integration as opposed to the assertion of earlier models, such as the mass society theory, 
which argued that collective behavior emerges in times of social disintegration 
(McAdam, 1988). 
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 While political process theory provides a very useful explanation of movements 
as political actors who attach meaning to political phenomena, there are areas which lack 
clarity.  For example, McAdam (1988) identifies "cognitive liberation" as a necessary 
component of movement emergence.  However, it is unclear from what challengers are to 
be liberated.  Borrowing from Smelser (1962), McAdam says that in order to achieve 
cognitive liberation actors must collectively define situations as unjust and subject to 
change through collective action.  Then, in his contribution to movement theory, 
McAdam (1982) says that as actors make system attributions in an effort to define unjust 
situations, these actors are likely to initiate a movement.  Again, this definition for 
cognitive liberation is a bit vague.  Are movement actors to be liberated from a sense of 
personal responsibility (or the acceptance of personal responsibility) for unjust situations 
as in the Marxist concept of moving from false consciousness to class consciousness?  Is 
cognitive liberation the political process equivalent of frame alignment (Snow, et al, 
1986)?  It is unclear. 
 Another issue to be resolved in the political process model is that of why actors 
collectively define an injustice.  Proponents of the model, such as McAdam, argue that 
potential challengers interpret a given shift in political opportunities as favorable because 
they perceive that the shift decreases power disparity between challengers and the 
dominant group.  This perceived shift is more important in explaining the movement than 
are the “internal characteristics of the movement organization and the social base upon 
which it drew,” according to Jenkins and Perrow (1997:  37).  McAdam (1988:  49) also 
identifies these interpretations as the "crucial impetus to the process of cognitive 
liberation." Additionally, Gamson (2004) considers the relationship between the 
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construction of injustice frames and the media as it presents those constructions but also 
contribute to them.   From this perspective, it seems that collective definition of injustice 
in the political process theory is somewhat like Davies' (1979) relative deprivation.  As 
we will see in the analysis of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, this explanation 
explains well the last year of the Sandinista revolution when there was widespread 
popular insurrection.  However, the Sandinista movement was formally founded and then 
maintained (of course, at varying degrees of strength) for over fifteen years before there 
was a widely perceived political shift that decreased power disparity.  Therefore, it is 
unclear whether McAdam's cognitive liberation applies only to widespread insurgency or 
to any degree of movement activity.  It would also be helpful if, in the discussion of 
injustice and system attributions, there were a clear linkage of these concepts to negation 
(Sjoberg, et al, 2003). 
 A third issue that requires more specific attention from political process theorists 
is the fact that movement emergence is mediated by the type and availability of 
communications technology as well as the availability of information to challengers.  
McAdam (1982) fully discusses the value of strong organizational and interpersonal 
networks to the emergence and maintenance of a social movement.  However, the nature 
of communications is also an important variable in the evolution of a movement. For 
example, the availability of such things as reliable mail service, telephones, facsimile 
machines, telegraphs, computers, television, radio, video, printing presses and 
photocopiers greatly enhance a movement's ability to reach constituents and opponents.  
Availability of such technologies is dependent not only upon their physical presence but 
also on whether or not challengers have access to them.  In the case of the Sandinistas, 
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many of these things were absent or few in number in a Third World country, but others 
were controlled by the dominant group against whom the Sandinistas led their movement.  
Nevertheless, the Sandinistas were eventually successful in toppling the group that 
controlled the technology.  McAdam's model could easily incorporate issues of 
technology as well as discussion of the availability of information useful to the 
movement.  Issues such as secrecy, volume of information, physical location of 
information, and bureaucratic controls on information all may either expedite or hinder 
movement activity. 
 Lastly, and most importantly for this study, the actors, challengers or movements 
in the political process explanation are ahistorical.  As is the case with other theoretical 
models of social movements, McAdam's actors may or may not perceive their grievance 
as an historical problem and they do not perceive themselves as historical beings.  
Certainly, McAdam recognizes that the social movement exists in an historical context.  
He also discusses at length the idea that actors must perceive a problem and political 
opportunities.  However, he does not allow that actors must make sense of their current 
personal and societal situation by reconstructing a past that provides an orderly 
explanation for it.  Tarrow (1988:  435) suggests that scholars engage in comparative 
study of collective action cycles giving attention to “the macrohistorical pace of change 
between cycles and the rapid spread of new forms of collective action within them,” but 
that interest in history is, again, the researcher’s idea of history rather than the 
participants’ view. 
 Noonan (1997) argues that political opportunity models usually fail to consider 
cultural opportunities.  The construction of cultural concepts such as heroes, villains, and 
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history are then unexplained and unexplored.  Young (2002: 666) draws attention to the 
utility of extensive and intensive cultural schemas in explaining how participants “make 
sense of bewildering circumstances” and “provide coherent meaings and motivations.”  
Certainly, there is plenty of room for these meanings to be rooted in history as Young’s 
study of confessional protest may include participants reconstructing a sinful past.  
Actors must attach meaning to their situation, as McAdam says, but I argue, the meaning 
has to be historical.  The historical meaning constructed by actors subsumes cognitive 
liberation, ideology, selection of tactics, and proposed solutions.  
 McAdam (1994) does begin to explore the cultural roots of movements as well as 
the emergence and development of a movement culture. Later, political process theorists 
undertook the task of synthesizing “political opportunities, mobilizing structures and 
framing processes” (McAdam, et al, 1996:  2).  Within this discussion is some attention 
to how “the flow of history” can expose cultural contradictions that then inspire 
mobilization (Zald, 1996:  268).  Additionally there is consideration of the role of media 
in the framing process.  However, the discussion of media assumes a certain level of 
available technology and then how tightly or loosely it is controlled.  Thus political 
process theorists turn in the direction of solving the problems of more clearly defining 
and incorporating into their model the participants’ view of the world mediated by how 
that view is communicated through media.   Nevertheless, while the political process 
model moves toward addressing movement participants' understanding of their past, these 
theorists do not actually consider it and certainly do not consider it as crucial to 
movement building and success. 
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 In a surprising turn of events, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001:  18) admit that 
the political process model is “overly structural and static,” that it is limited to focusing 
on a single actor, and that it “serves poorly” as an explanation for non-Western polities.  
They then argue in favor of more emphasis on dynamic analysis and extending the idea 
of framing beyond its use by movement leaders to include use by members, opponents, 
media and others.  Most importantly, they say, they will “place social construction at the 
center of our analysis” (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001:  51).  The authors even use 
Nicaragua as an example of one of their points. 
 It is very good news that the political process theorists recognize the model’s 
over emphasis on structural analysis and that the model must give more attention to 
dynamic social construction.  It is also encouraging that McAdam and his colleagues 
realize that the model is much less useful in non-Western societies.  I have already argued 
variations of these points to some degree.  However, the model still does not account for 
participants reconstructing a past and employing it to drive their movement.  The authors 
do mention time.  First, they mention that the origin of a social movement is a 
“temporally limited concept” and therefore, they propose viewing mobilization as a series 
of episodes (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001:  50).  Later, they note that the historical 
and cultural details of an episode influence movement dynamics.  However, in both 
comments about time, they are speaking of it as something that the researcher 
understands and not something the movement participants construct. 
The Reconstruction of the Past and Posthumous Charisma 
 In order to explain the Sandinista National Liberation Front as a social 
movement, sociologists must explain the role of the history of Nicaragua.  However, we 
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do not need yet another book on the role of the Sandinistas in Nicaraguan history as 
determined by social scientists.  Instead, the understanding of Nicaraguan history by the 
Sandinistas is crucial to a proper explanation of movement processes.  While this study 
focuses on the case of the FSLN, reconstruction of the past by movement participants is a 
necessary element in any movement.  As stated previously, none of the current movement 
theories adequately addresses the reconstruction of the past as necessary to movement 
emergence and maintenance.  Therefore, we must look outside movement literature for 
theoretical support in understanding this phenomenon. 
Mead's Reconstruction of the Past 
 The reconstruction of the past as a sociological phenomenon is a well developed 
theoretical theme in the work of George Herbert Mead (1932; 1934; 1936; 1938; 1964).  
Mead (1932:  1) proposes in the first sentence of his principle work regarding time - The 
Philosophy of the Present - that "reality exists in a present."  Past and future can only be 
conceptualized in terms of the present.  In Mead's view, the natures of the past and future 
are extensions of the present.  Mead (1964:  348) states, "The past is an overflow of the 
present.  It is oriented from the present."  Therefore, the nature of the present is critical to 
an understanding of the past and its function. 
 The present consists of emergent events that are unique and that serve to order 
the passage of time. The present, constituted by events or moments, is marked then by its 
own emergence and disappearance.  The past appears as we identify the conditions that 
preceded the present and thus become "engaged in spreading backward what is going on 
so that the steps we are taking will be a continuity in the advance to the goals of our 
conduct" (Mead, 1964: 347).  
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 The emergent event is that which is novel or unpredicted.  Emergent events may 
be scientific discoveries, as Mead discusses, or accidents, tragedies, or triumphs among 
other things.  The importance of emergent events lies in the fact that they are exceptions 
to standard interpretative categories.  These exceptions require a change in those 
categories so that the exception is explained, is the culmination of a temporal order, 
reflects continuity of process, and becomes rational.  Hence, the emergent requires a past. 
 Mead is not saying that the reconstructed past is pure fantasy.  Even though the 
emergent calls for a new past, that new past must rest upon some form of evidence.  In 
other words, evidence allows us to know that something happened.   However, just as 
reflection belongs to the present, so does knowledge.  This knowledge and the 
accompanying truth about what happened will be reconstructed "from the standpoint of 
[their] own emergent nature[s]" (Mead, 1932:  31). It is the meaning of the something 
that occurred in the past and its relation to the emergent that is given to interpretation and 
re-interpretation.  It is in this sense that "there is...the past which is expressed in 
irrevocability, though there has never been present in experience a past which has not 
changed with the passing generations.  The pasts that we are involved in are both 
irrevocable and revocable" (Mead, 1932: 2).  
 The search for meaning is the critical element in the reconstruction of the past as 
it is in all facets of social life.  Mead (1938:  515) asserts: 
Metaphysically, things are their meanings, and the forms they take on are 
the outcome of interactions which are responsible for the appearance of 
new forms, i.e., new meanings.  In a single phrase, the world is 
ceaselessly becoming what it means. This is true in thinking because 
thought is simply the communication to ourselves or others of what is. 
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The new past provides causal explanations for the emergent and is useful in making 
predictions about the future.  Therefore, the emergent has meaning with reference to a 
meaningful past.   
 In addition to providing causal explanations for the emergent, time becomes 
psychologically and socially manageable as the reconstruction imposes temporal order.  
While Mead does not necessarily believe that time is linear, he suggests that we find 
some comfort in conceptualizing it as ordered in a linear fashion.  Such a temporal order 
also implies continuity.  One emergent event blends into another instead of occupying 
discrete positions in time.  In this sense, the past does, to some degree, shape the present.  
Nevertheless, Mead's central thesis remains that the past is reconstructed in order to 
explain the current unpredicted problem. 
 Mead's theory of time is useful in the explanation of social movements as will be 
explained in the following pages.  However, Mead's explanation is limited in that it does 
not address power.  The reconstruction of any past is highly dependent on the power 
relationships in a society.  In order to explain any given emergent event, actors must have 
access to information regarding the current emergent event and information about events 
that preceded the emergent.  Access to such information is often subject to the control of 
the dominant group.  In addition, any dissemination of a reconstructed past by actors 
outside the dominant group is subject to the control of the dominant group.  Therefore, 
while Mead's reconstruction of the past is crucial to a theory of social movements, such a 
theory must address counterpasts constructed by movements existing in and attempting to 
manipulate power relationships. 
 Mead's theory of time has received minimal attention in philosophical literature 
and has been largely ignored in sociological and anthropological writings with only a few 
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exceptions (Tonness, 1932; Fen, 1951; Natanson, 1953; Lee, 1963;  Miller, 1973; Joas, 
1980; Cronk, 1987; Katovich, 1992).  There has been only one attempt to link Mead's 
ideas to the study of social movements (Maines, Sugrue, and Katovich, 1983).  Maines, 
Sugrue, and Katovitch (1983) identify four dimensions of the past in Mead's theory of 
time.  The "symbolically reconstructed past," the "social structural past," and the "implied 
objective past" constitute the dimensions in which people find meaning in the present 
through attaching meaning to the past.  Fourth, there is a "mythical past."  The authors 
call these mythical pasts "creations rather than re-creations, because they are not 
empirically grounded.  They are fictitious" (Maine, et al, 1983: 164).  The mythical past 
is created solely for purposes of manipulating behavior in social situations so that the 
creator might acquire or maintain a power advantage.   They argue that this type of past is 
especially useful to social movements as they must discredit or destroy the official past of 
the power structure and replace it with their own past thereby legitimizing the 
movement's purpose.  These authors' concept of the mythical past is problematic and will 
be addressed later in this chapter. 
 Historian Thomas Benjamin (2000) has recently addressed the role of collective 
memory and mythmaking in the institutionalized Mexican Revolution. His focus, though, 
is on how Mexican writers, intellectuals, journalists and politicians presented the 
revolution in its immediate aftermath.  He mentions that this “remembering” involves 
“the reconstruction of the past in the light of the present” (Benjamin, 2000:  20).  
However, he does not ground his comment Mead’s theory nor even cite Mead.  He does 
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mention in passing that versions of memory that resist the official memory of the 
Revolution constitute counter-memory in Foucault’s sense of the term.8 
 Benjamin’s work provides a fascinating picture of how image is constructed and 
presented thus creating La Revolución (as he calls the collective memory version of the 
Revolution) as a dominant memory.  The ideas are useful in that they highlight the 
ramifications of evolving and ever-changing memories and histories.  However, he is not 
discussing how counter-memory was used by revolutionaries before victory or how 
participants’ understanding of their own historical place affects social movements.  In 
some sense then, even this work is discussing how actors place the social movement in 
history after the fact, just as social scientists do.  This study of the Sandinista revolution 
is interested in how the Sandinistas understood their place in history while they were 
making revolution and how that understanding drove their movement. 
 
 Recently, there has been growing attention given to the roles of narrative and 
emotions in social movements.  Polletta (1998:  139) argues that  the construction of a 
narrative within a social movement has “a temporally configurative capacity” that 
“equips it to integrate past, present, and future events...” She further argues that narrative 
is not the same as a frame because, unlike frames, it is constructed over time, keeps actors 
engaged as movement participants or potential participants as it requires “interpretive 
participation,” and narrative recognizes that there are constraints on which narrative plots  
                                                 
8 Foucault's discussion of counter-memory is a discussion of the nature of the recovery of history.  
“Traditional history” is generally considered 'true' yet “effective history” is abrupt, unexpected 
and perhaps, unwieldy, not following a linear path and not conforming to historians’ categories.  
For a detailed discussion of Foucault's idea of history and memory, see Language, Counter-
Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, 1977. 
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will resonate given “dominant cultural understandings” (Polletta, 1998:  142).  Polletta 
(1998:  142) also mentions that “oppositional meanings must always contend with more 
conventional ones.”   
 While Polletta’s analysis leaves much room for the reconstruction of the past by 
movement participants, she has yet to incorporate it in her analysis.  Davis (2002:  12) 
mentions that stories “configure the past in light of the present and future.”   However, 
when delving into the meaning of that statement, these movement theorists are generally 
not addressing the reconstruction of a full history by participants of how history brought 
them to this point.  For example, Polletta’s (2002) study of lunch counter sit-ins in the 
South focuses on how the civil rights activists told the story of the sit-ins themselves and 
does not address the civil rights movement’s reconstruction of a history that explained 
white domination and race discrimination. In this way, her analysis is quite similar to 
Benjamin’s analysis of the Mexican Revolution.  Her argument also seems to distinguish 
between stories or narratives, which is the focus of her analysis, and arguments based on 
actual evidence.  She does briefly mention the relationship of construction of a narrative 
to power but only says that the social movement narrative must contend with other 
narrative.  However, she is generally discussing the idea that narratives are created within 
dominant cultural patterns and are, therefore, themselves subject to those patterns.  
Mention of George Herbert Mead in the analysis of narrative is extremely rare and then 
only the most brief mention is made to establish a theoretical connection between 
understanding at the individual and communal levels (Rice, 2002:  79).  Unfortunately, 
movement theorists have not yet employed Mead’s theory of time to more deeply analyze 
narrative and to establish narrative as part of the reconstruction of history process. 
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Weber and Charisma 
 Unlike Mead's reconstruction of the past, Weber's concept of charisma is very 
familiar to sociologists.  However, the possibility of posthumous charisma has been 
mentioned, under other names, by only a handful of scholars.  Therefore, it is an area of 
theoretical and empirical interest ripe for exploration and discussion.  Following is an 
outline of Weber's idea of charisma and, interestingly, Weber does not preclude a leader's 
charisma surviving beyond the leader's physical life. 
 In The Sociology of Religion, Weber (1922) presents his concept of charisma.   
Weber (1922: 2) classifies charisma as either " a gift that inheres in an object or person 
simply by virtue of natural endowment" or that which is "produced artificially in an 
object or person though some extraordinary means."  He also notes that charisma may be 
either a permanent or occasional condition.  Weber begins to establish the most important 
aspect of charisma - that it is socially constructed and not simply a personal quality. 
 Weber (1947: 358) begins to explain that charisma is a social construction in The 
Theory of Social and Economic Organization when he describes the charismatic 
individual as "set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities."  The charismatic 
individual then becomes a leader when he gains followers who grant him/her leadership 
status by virtue of his/her charisma.  It is in this context that charisma and leadership 
become linked for Weber. 
 Weber (1958:  245) expands on this idea of charismatic leadership by explaining 
that charismatic leaders are unique and rise to leadership in unique times: 
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...the 'natural' charismatic leaders - in times of psychic, physical, 
economic, ethical, religious, political distress - have been neither 
officeholders nor incumbents of an 'occupation' in the present sense of 
the word, that is men who have acquired expert knowledge and who 
serve for remuneration.  The natural leaders in distress have been holders 
of specific gifts of the body and spirit; and these gifts have been believed 
to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody. 
Therefore, charismatic leaders answer a call to remedy widespread distress, and they 
originate from outside the institutionalized system of the status quo. 
 There are several other important aspects of charisma.  First, Weber's use of the 
term charisma is value-neutral, meaning that charismatic leaders may or may not be 
admirable characters.  Second, the charismatic individual immerses himself/herself in 
his/her mission and perceives that those persons to whom he/she directs the mission are 
bound by duty to recognize the leader's charisma.  Third, charisma does not seek 
"pecuniary gain that is methodical and rational," and it "is never a source of private gain 
for its holders in the sense of economic exploitation by the making of a deal" (Weber, 
1958:  247).  Fourth, the charismatic leader does not subscribe to abstract legal codes.  
The charismatic leader provides necessary direction and is the one to settle disputes 
(Weber, 1968:  24).  Lastly, because charisma arises in times of distress and depends 
upon the performance of miracles, it is extremely unstable.  As charismatic authority is 
granted through the recognition of it by followers and their devotion to it, any perception 
of failure of the charismatic leader by the followers diminishes that authority (Weber, 
1968:  22).  However, until that time, the charismatic leader's authority is freely accepted 
by the followers who consider the leader to be their master.  They do not enjoy monetary 
gain for their devotion, and it is not a devotion born of fear.  The devotion springs from 
love and enthusiasm for the leader and his/her cause. 
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 Weber (1947:  364) next addresses the problem of status of a movement after the 
disappearance of its charismatic leader.  He notes that charismatic authority is opposed to 
bureaucratic structures.  Yet, if the disciples are to form a stable and continuous 
community, they must organize themselves.  At this point, charismatic authority becomes 
rationalized or traditionalized.  The followers may meet the problems of continuity and 
succession in one of several ways: 
 
1. The search for a new charismatic leader on the basis of criteria of the 
qualities that will fit him for the position of authority. 
 
2. By revelation manifested in oracles, lots, divine judgments, or other 
techniques of selection. 
 
3. By the designation on the part of the original charismatic leader of his 
own successor and his recognition on the part of the followers. 
 
4. Designation of a successor by the charismatically qualified 
administrative staff and his recognition by the community. 
 
5. By the conception that charisma is a quality transmitted by heredity: 
thus that it is participated in by the kinsmen of its bearer, particularly  by 
his closest relatives. 
 
6. The concept that charisma may be transmitted by ritual means from 
one bear to another or may be created in a new person. 
(Weber, 1947:  364-366) 
 Numerous social scientists have discussed and elaborated Weber's list of 
characteristics of the charismatic leader (Tucker, 1968; Roth, 1975; Shils, 1975; Wallis & 
Bruce, 1986; Lindholm, 1990).  While using different terms, these scholars agree that the 
essence of the charismatic leader is a person who is thoroughly committed to his/her 
vision and mission and who can effectively communicate that vision using personal 
magnetism and miraculous performance as well as empowering others to achieve the vi-
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sion.9   Conger (1989:  29) argues that the charismatic leader has a unique sensitivity to 
the constituents’ needs, is able to articulate an “extraordinary vision rather than ordinary 
goals,” is able to build trust in his/her vision among constituents and then convince 
followers that they can achieve the vision.  Most importantly, these must “be seen by 
followers as relevant to their situation” (Conger, 1989:  23). 
 
 In addition to discussing charismatic characteristics, social scientists discuss the 
followers' response.  Apter (1968) and Tucker (1968: 736) agree that while a follower 
would not consider contradicting the charismatic leader or question the leader's 
infallibility, absolute obedience to the leader is not necessary but rather that the leader 
"exercises a kind of 'domination' over the followers" by virtue of his/her extraordinary 
qualities.  However, Willner (1984) and Katz (1972) argue that the followers see the 
leader as omnipotent.  According to Smelser (1963:  356), followers wish for a return to 
certain values.  Apter (1968) finds charisma to be especially appealing in the Third World 
as an increase in modernity is not met by a proportionate decrease in traditionalism thus 
leaving a vacuum and confusion.  Both Apter (1968) and Willner (1984) view the role of 
charisma as important to the growth or independence of a nation and in promoting a 
sense of national unity.  Apter and Willner also agree that charisma inspires political 
activism leading to social change, especially a change toward greater social equality.  
Kimmel (1989: 506) argues that "charisma is both a consequence and cause of a 
revolutionary situation." 
                                                 
9 Millenarianism is another way of understanding Sandino’s leadership.  For examination of 
Sandino as millenarian, see Marco Aurelio Navarro-Genie, 2002.  Also see a study of 
millenarianism in revolution in James F. Rinehart, 1997. 
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 Though some scholarly attention is given to followers of the charismatic leader, 
other scholars point out that followers have been woefully neglected while the study of 
leaders is rather extensive (Madsen & Snow, 1991;  Platt & Lilley, 1994).  This emphasis 
on the leader may be somewhat understandable since charisma “is an influence 
relationship marked by asymmetry...Asymmetry means that the leader has profound 
influence on attitudes and behavior of the following but that the opposite is not true” 
(Madsen & Snow, 1991:  5).  True enough, but charisma is a relationship, and charisma 
in the Weberian sense exists only as it is recognized and granted by followers.  
Furthermore, Platt and Lilley (1994) are concerned that scholars treat followers as a 
homogeneous group who are unquestioning, dutiful, docile, and adoring with regard to 
the leader.  Instead, Platt and Lilley argue that followers are not at all homogeneous in 
motive or interests but submit to coordination and cooperation to achieve movement 
goals or the charismatic vision.  Charismatic leaders assist in this process by narrowing 
focus, giving hope, defining interests and providing rhetoric and courses of action (Platt 
& Lilley, 1994). 
 While work on charismatic leadership does not directly consider the 
leader’s understanding of history and his/her place in it, there is a place for such 
consideration as the work does not preclude it either.  As the leader articulates the 
problem to followers and then articulates the vision or mission that will remedy 
the problem, there is a clear opportunity for theory to allow for and analyze the 
leader’s injection of historical understanding into those projects.  Furthermore, 
interaction between leader and followers is likely to demand historical 
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explanation because followers must be able to explain why they are involved by 
citing an ongoing problem or a problem that has gone before.  Then as the leader 
articulates the remedy, followers accept it as an historical answer to the historical 
problem. Even though a charismatic leader dies or leaves, his or her work or 
movement may continue.  Tucker (1968) writes that with the passing of a 
charismatic leader, charisma is not routinized but transformed into another type of 
authority.  However, Tucker also allows that charisma does not necessarily die 
with the leader.  "On the contrary, it appears to be a phenomenon that can and 
often does live on after the individual is gone," argues Tucker (1968:  754).  
Willner (1984:  199) names this phenomenon "the charismatic myth."  Willner 
also writes that the charismatic myth can be extraordinarily resilient even when 
successors try to destroy it. 
The Immortality of Leaders 
 The idea that charisma may live on after the charismatic leader's death is 
particularly relevant to some social movements.  However, only a few scholars have 
considered the topic empirically, in sociological literature generally and social movement 
literature specifically (Anderson, 1982; Tumarkin 1983).  Robert Jay Lifton (1967:  69), 
based on his studies of Mao Tse Tung, conceptualizes "revolutionary immortality" as "a 
shared sense of participating in permanent revolutionary foment, and of transcending 
individual death by 'living on' indefinitely within this continuing revolution."  Lifton 
(1967) also believes that people have a need for a sense of immortality in order to feel a 
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connection to the past and future.  Within this "symbolic immortality," the revolutionary 
"becomes a part of a vast 'family' reaching back to what he perceives to be the beginnings 
of his revolution and extending infinitely into the future" (Lifton, 1967:  70).  Lifton 
(1967:  97) links revolution to death symbolism and writes that revolutionaries see their 
activities as a means to transcend death by "achieving an eternal historical imprint."  In 
Revolutionary Immortality, Lifton (1968:  31) continues that the response of activists or 
revolutionaries to the thought of death is "a quest for rebirth."  Berger (1969) suggests 
that immortality or rebirth occurs within the group or the followers.  “The individual's 
innermost being is considered to be the fact of his belonging to the collectivity...This 
identification of the individual with all others with whom he interacts makes for a 
merging of his being with theirs...” (Berger, 1969: 60). 
 In summary, charisma is not a personal quality, but a relationship between a 
leader and his/her followers.  This relationship is likely to arise in times of distress 
thereby sometimes resulting in revolution.  The followers perceive the leader as uniquely 
qualified to handle their distress - lead their revolution.  The impact of charisma may be 
sweeping and lasting social change.  Not only may the impact of charisma remain for 
many years but the charisma itself may outlive the charismatic individual and/or be used 
by successors to renew or continue a social movement. 
A New Direction 
 Mead and Weber present useful ideas for explaining specific aspects of social 
movements.  Mead believes that we reconstruct the past in light of present emergent 
events.  Therefore, reconstruction is a continuous process as one present melts into 
another.  Reconstruction provides meaning and continuity for the present as well as a 
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sense of order.  In addition, some sort of evidence always supports the reconstructed past, 
thus giving the past a certain legitimacy.  This legitimate past may serve to gain or 
maintain a power advantage.  Hence, it would be useful to both the institutionalized 
powers and those seeking power.   
 Weber's conception of charisma is decidedly applicable to many leaders who 
work to bring social change.  A combination of Weber's idea and Mead's idea of the past 
yields the possibility of reconstructing a past leader and attributing to him or her 
posthumous charisma for the purpose of providing meaning and continuity to a 
contemporary social movement.  In this case, the social movement is the Sandinista Na-
tional Liberation Front, and the charismatic leader is Augusto César Sandino. 
Theory of the Counterpast 
 It is a given among many social movement theorists that conditions that could be 
understood as structural strain are a constant in society (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; 
McAdam, 1982).  As individuals and groups experience this structural strain, they may 
identify it and construct a problem or grievance.  These actors may understand the 
grievance as the responsibility or fault of individuals such as the actor him/herself, a 
political leader, an employer or a criminal and may understand it as affecting an 
individual or individuals.  In this case, the actor may be suffering from false 
consciousness or an analogous phenomenon (Marx, 1986).  If the actor does fault 
individuals for the grievance, then the grievance does not inspire collective 
reconstruction of the past nor collective action. 
 An alternative scenario to the previous one is that actors may understand the 
problem or grievance as a problem negatively affecting a well-defined group to which 
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they may or may not belong.  They may also believe that  the grievance is caused or 
perpetrated by specific forces external to the group whether these external forces be 
individuals, organizations, institutions, or the social structure itself.   Therefore, the actors 
perceive a struggle between the negatively affected group and the identifiable, external 
causal entity over the stake of whatever the grievance may be (Touraine, 1981).  As 
actors collectively construct the grievance and identify the oppressed and mistreated 
group, they engage in system attributions (McAdam, 1982), and they adopt and spread 
generalized beliefs to explain their situation (Smelser, 1962).  At this point, social 
movement theorists argue that individuals are ready to act collectively to bring about 
social change in their favor. 
 The abovementioned theoretical argument is reasonable but is limited by its 
ahistorical nature.  In all social movements, the definition of the problem or grievance 
and identification of the aggrieved group occur in the present.  Proponents of current and 
previous social movement theories do not consider that the actors view their problem as 
an historical problem nor do they allow that the actors understand themselves as part of a 
historical process.  The theorists may set the aggrieved group in historical context but do 
not allow the actors to have personal or collective perceptions of their autobiographies 
nor of the history of their situation or society.  Therefore, the definition of the problem 
and the identification of the aggrieved group must be set in historical context, not only by 
social movement theorists such as Marx (1986), Gamson, et al (1982), Skocpol (1979), 
Tilly (1978), and McAdam (1982), but by the social movement participants and potential 
participants.  The grievance and the actors' relationship to the grievance must have 
historical meaning for the actors in order for them to act collectively.  In other words, the 
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aggrieved will reconstruct a past that makes sense of the grievance and that makes sense 
of the actors' potential and actual collective response to the grievance.   
 Of the social movement theories reviewed in this chapter, frame analysis and the 
political process model do provide some useful tools in moving toward reconstructing the 
past.  Framing’s emphasis on considering the meaning that social movement actors attach 
to their participation and consideration of emergent meanings is certainly a part of 
reconstructing the past.  In addition, framing contributes an explanation for grievance 
interpretation in micromobilization.  Political process theory also gives attention to 
subjective meaning derived from social interaction.  Yet this model also considers what it 
calls system attribution thus giving consideration to some structural factors.  However, in 
spite of these strengths with regard to the focus of this study, these models do not answer 
the questions posed here. 
 In order to understand why and how social movement participants reconstruct a 
past for themselves and their movement, I propose a theory of the counterpast.  Included 
in this understanding of movements is a focus on subjective meaning rooted in 
interaction, emergent meaning and system attributions of a sort.  However, Mead’s theory 
of time, coupled with Touraine’s concept of power as it relates to the production of 
knowledge, provides explanation for construction of meaning and system attribution that 
goes beyond existing movement theory.  Current movement theory regarding narrative 
informs the reconstruction of the past but is subsumed by the theory of the counterpast. 
 Actors collectively reconstruct the past in order to explain an emergent event and 
to give meaning to the event and to their own behavior.  An integration of Mead's ideas 
into an explanation of social movements requires that movements reconstruct a past to 
 46
explain their identification of a grievance and adoption of an "injustice frame" (Gamson, 
et al 1982) and that reconstruction occurs within a particular societal power structure.  
Therefore, the counterpast is a history constructed by social movement participants that 
explains and elaborates the antecedents of the participants’ particular grievance and that 
stands in opposition to the official, consensual history put forth by the dominant group in 
the society.  The counterpast is supported by historical evidence that counters the 
historical evidence that justifies existing power arrangements.  This evidence is not 
necessarily objective fact with which many will agree, but it is evidence that will satisfy 
whatever the criteria are for reconstructing a particular history.10  Included within the 
construction of a counterpast are likely to be various narratives and negations. 
 The reconstruction of the past by movement participants serves several purposes.  
First, the counterpast clarifies and elaborates the original grievance.  As the reconstructed 
past becomes more detailed and complex, the grievance is brought into sharper focus, and 
other grievances may be added.  In this sense, grievances are dynamic.  Within the 
reconstruction of their past and identification of the grievance, participants will exercise 
negation of some other group or entity that they perceive to be at odds with them. 
 Second, the reconstructed past provides the movement with a sense of historical 
continuity and temporal order.  Movement participants know that their grievance is part 
of a continuous, historical process as is their struggle against the cause of the grievance.  
Their oppression and struggle also become part of a process that occurs in an identifiable, 
                                                 
10 As stated previously, the reconstructed past is not a set of lies nor outright manipulation of the 
truth for self-interest.  However, the evidence to support that past may include errors, may be 
selective, and may be subject to re-interpretation later.  None of these issues changes the idea that 
the way in which actors construct history is relevant to the development of social movements. 
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chronological order - perhaps in stages.  While this counterpast is disagreeable to 
movement participants, it provides a certain level of control to participants because they 
may feel that they now have an overview of the problem and can begin to solve it through 
collective action.   
 Third, the reconstruction of the past provides the movement with an ideology.  
As movement participants construct the counterpast, an ideology evolves that explains 
their current predicament in value-laden terms.  Therefore, the counterpast not only uses 
evidence to outline an event-by-event chronology, but also explains why events happened 
as they did and whether events and their causes or purposes were good or bad according 
to movement definitions.  Additionally, included in this reconstructed past will be 
“accounts” that justify movement behavior as having positive value in spite of opponents 
claiming movement behavior is illegitimate (Scott & Lyman, 1968).  Furthermore, the 
counterpast allows participants to engage in “critically evaluating or negating what is and 
then use their critique to push forward their alternative suggestion” (Sjoberg, et al, 2003:  
218). 
 Fourth, the reconstructed past allows the movement to project a future.  As the 
movement outlines the history that led to the current situation, it also prescribes an 
historical remedy.  Movement participants present, at least, two possible futures based on 
their reconstruction of the past.  The first possible future consists of continued oppression 
of the aggrieved group through means such as enslavement, co-optation, threats, or 
socialization, and, possibly, eventual annihilation of the group.  The second possible 
future is that the aggrieved group and its allies will act collectively and force power 
relationships to change in their favor.  The change may involve limited change in these 
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power relationships such as in the case of reform, or it may involve extensive change as 
is the case in revolution. 
 With the reconstruction of a past that explains how the grievance came to be and 
why the collectivity is responding in the way that it is, the movement enters into a 
struggle over the control of socio-cultural patterns (Touraine, 1971; 1977; 1988).  The 
socio-cultural patterns of concern here particularly involve the production of knowledge 
about the history of a given subject and the dissemination of knowledge and information 
about that subject.  Movement actors struggle with the dominant group over the control 
of the production of history and the spread of knowledge about history because 
movement actors have reconstructed a history that is counter to previously known or 
widespread histories.   
 The production of history and the dissemination of knowledge about history 
generally occur in and through organizations, and the largest and most powerful of these 
organizations are likely to be controlled by the dominant class.  In contemporary 
societies, knowledge is often produced within large, powerful organizations.  In any 
given society, knowledge is a product and the controllers of this product constitute the 
dominant class (Touraine, 1977).  Each new bit of knowledge that is produced requires 
reconstructions of history to explain the place of the new information in human 
experience (Mead, 1959).  As knowledge is produced within organizations such as 
governmental agencies, universities, or corporations, these organizations retain 
significant control of the dissemination and meaning of that knowledge/information.  
Therefore, as universities produce historical research or government agencies produce 
reports of the history of some event, leaders of these organizations produce policy that 
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determines which information is made public and when announcements are made or not 
made.  Therefore, they have significant power over which bits of knowledge become part 
of a society's consensual history and over the historical meaning of the knowledge.  For 
example, until the advent of the contemporary women's movement and women's studies 
programs, the role of women in US history was generally either not a topic of research or 
researchers limited study to women's roles as wives and mothers of great men.  There-
fore, the consensual history of the United States has emphasized the history of men in 
politics, business, religion, and the military.  Only recently has there been a widespread 
effort within the academy to reconstruct US history with both women and men playing 
pivotal roles (Bart, 1971; Degler, 1975; Lerner, 1976; Scott 1986). 
 Through interaction with individuals and with the social structure, movement 
participants and potential participants reconstruct the past in such a way that their "past" 
challenges the "official," consensual history and provides meaning for their movement.  
In other words, the movement's reconstructed past stands in opposition to an "official" 
past.  The official past is a consensual history understood, at a societal level, as the 
relatively accurate and complete account of how and why any given social phenomenon 
came to be as it is.  Furthermore, this official past is largely constructed by and will serve 
the interests of the society's dominant group or groups in terms of the growth and/or 
maintenance of the dominant group's power.  The dominant group has the power to 
maintain their version of history through control of the production of knowledge and 
distribution of information.  Control of the production of knowledge includes general and 
specific control of research agenda, school curricula, and media thereby managing the 
ideological socialization of society's members in order to legitimize the socio-cultural 
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system and the dominant group's place in that system (Habermas, 1973; Touraine, 1977).  
For example, school history texts in this largely Christian nation have often discussed the 
role of Christian belief in the building of the United States but have not routinely and 
broadly discussed or even mentioned the role of specific minority religious beliefs. 
 Given that the dominant group has wide-ranging control of the production of 
consensual history, it is necessary for the aggrieved group to reconstruct this consensual 
history in order to demonstrate the historical injustice of the grievance.  The aggrieved 
group or challengers (Gamson, et al 1982) will view the problem as historical, but they 
must also view themselves (at the movement level) as historical beings in the context of 
the historical problem.  The movement is then an historical answer to the historical prob-
lem.  For instance, a collectivity defined the custom of African-Americans sitting in the 
back of buses or standing while white persons got the best seats as an unjust situation.   
The adoption of such a grievance requires an explanation for how the situation came 
about and why the situation is unjust.  As challengers, the African-American's historical 
explanation will contradict the explanation offered by the dominant white group and will 
serve to delegitimize the existing socio-cultural system and its power structures.  While 
many whites explained these types of customs as "natural" results of white persons' 
biological, mental, and spiritual superiority, African-Americans reconstructed a history 
that cited slavery and its legacy as the historical problem feeding institutional racism, 
which served to maintain the dominance of white Americans at the expense of black 
Americans. 
 The reconstruction of the past by movements is mediated by the ability of 
movements to learn of and communicate the past.  The counterpast is based, as is the 
 51
official version  of the past, on facts regarding historical events.   Such facts must first be 
available to the movements through personal testimony, books, documents, newspapers, 
or other forms, in order for them to reconstruct a past.  While the facts used to reconstruct 
the past, whether by the movement or by the dominant group, may be selective, they are 
not necessarily mythical as is argued by Maines and his colleagues (Maines, et al, 1983).  
Certainly, movement actors and elites may create "facts" to support their position, but I 
argue that the reconstruction of the past for movements is largely based on verifiable 
facts that are comprised of new information or are linked together and/or interpreted in a 
new way. Movements must then be able to communicate that reconstructed past to an 
audience of potential supporters as well as to the oppressor.   
 The ability of the social movement to reconstruct a counterpast is dependent 
upon the level and type of social control exercised by the dominant groups.  In other 
words, if the social movement can find no "facts" with which to reconstruct a factual 
counterpast, then movement activity will be stillborn, severely hampered or halted.  No 
matter which facts become available, the movement's reconstructed past will, as is also 
the case with the dominant group's official past, support its own contentions.  In addition, 
public and private discourse about competing histories will continually shape and reshape 
movement and official versions of the past.  In essence, the past is dynamic.  In Meadian 
terms, the present is continually spread backward as new emergent events occur.   
 In summary, no matter what a movement's particular grievance, the movement 
must reconstruct a history that opposes the official version of history in order to clearly 
separate itself from the dominant group and, therefore, legitimate collective action as a 
proper means to address the grievance.  If a group were to agree with official history or to 
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generally agree with it, then that group would not initiate collective action.  At best, the 
group may become a special interest group using conventional means of achieving its 
interests.  For example, the Republican and Democratic parties (non-movement political 
groups) will generally subscribe to official versions of US history, but at any given 
moment will push for reform of one type or another through the conventional legislative 
processes.  On the other hand, members of the American Indian Movement (a movement 
organization) will cite the continuing oppression, cultural domination, and genocide of 
American Indians by European Americans and the US government in direct contrast to 
the official history in school textbooks of white settlers pioneering the American 
wilderness and bringing civilization and progress to this nation.  In any case, it is crucial 
to understand that the reconstruction of the past and past figures is more than simply a 
difference of opinion on what or who should be included or not in history texts.  
Movements understand the history of their country, group, or situation in a fundamentally 
different way from official, consensual understanding.  Therefore, movement 
understanding of history and historical figures, given the purpose of social movements in 
general, will be at odds with the dominant group's understanding. 
Posthumous Charisma 
 Within the process of reconstructing a past, movement actors may reconstruct 
individual histories or biographies as important components of the larger history.  In the 
history reconstructed by movements, the meaning of figures from the past will likely 
differ from their meaning in consensual history.  For example, a revered business leader 
in consensual history may be reinterpreted by movement actors as a profit-mongering 
murderer because he or she approved development and sale of environmental toxins.  
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Alternatively, a relatively nondescript figure in consensual history may become a folk 
hero in movement history.   
 The reconstruction of charisma and charismatic leaders is certainly possible 
within a movement context.  This study only addresses the reconstruction of a 
charismatic leader who was charismatic when he was living.  Therefore, it is unclear 
whether a person who was not  considered charismatic when living can then be imbued 
with posthumous charisma.  Nevertheless, the following paragraphs outline posthumous 
charisma as an important, but not necessarily required, component of a movement's 
reconstruction of history.  Posthumous charisma is similar to charisma in that it is a 
relationship between a leader and followers that is characterized by 1) a belief that the 
leader is exceptional, even divine; 2) fairly thorough submission to the leader’s authority 
(but not blind obedience); 3) followers’ deep commitment to the leader’s original 
mission; and 4) a sense of emotional commitment of the followers toward the leader.  The 
followers do likely understand that the leader is dead, but treat the leader’s personal 
characteristics and mission as relevant to the current situation.  Posthumous charisma 
differs from charisma in that the leader, obviously, cannot participate in any emotional 
relationship with followers.  Furthermore, the posthumous charismatic leader will only 
arise in situations of distress similar to the original distress and the leader’s posthumous 
charisma will be dependent on a living person(s) to communicate his/her message. 
 The leader who has posthumous charisma is endowed with many of the same 
qualities as the living charismatic leader.  However, it is obvious that these qualities and 
the relationship with followers cannot be exactly the same as if the leader were alive.  For 
example, the leader cannot be actively and personally involved with followers or with the 
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movement.  Nevertheless, followers will reconstruct the historical leader with charismatic 
features.  First, the deceased leader will still personify or symbolize certain values 
important to followers and will symbolize opposition to the status quo.  The leader has 
special gifts that are not accessible to most people.  He/she is still trustworthy and is the 
object of the followers' devotion.  As is the case with the living charismatic leader, the 
leader with posthumous charisma remains the champion of an important and viable 
mission or vision.   
 Followers are most likely to reconstruct this historical figure during times of 
widespread distress because they believe the leader to have solutions to the distress.  The 
followers see the leader as one who sacrificed and sacrifices for the cause or mission that 
they pursue.  In fact, the followers may indeed believe that the death of the leader was the 
leader's ultimate sacrifice.  The deceased leader and his/her sacrifice may symbolize the 
righteousness of the cause and movement actions (Kearl & Rinaldi, 1983; Cobb & Elder, 
1972).  Lastly, because the followers believe that the leader has all these characteristics, 
the leader who is posthumously charismatic seems to have a type of authority over the 
followers.  Obviously, the quality of the authority is not that of a living leader, but the 
followers will invoke the leader's words and example as being authoritative in terms of 
directing their lives and that of the movement.  His/her words and example may even 
dominate their lives as is the case in deceased religious charismatic leaders.  In the case 
of political charismatic leaders, followers may form a political religion around the leader 
(Anderson, 1982; Tumarkin, 1983).  In any event, the followers are likely to understand 
that the leader is dead. 
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 The passing of a charismatic leader may not necessarily bring attributions of 
posthumous charisma.  Instead, the death of the leader may bring the weakening or 
disappearance of the movement.  The death may accompany the victory or success of the 
movement in terms of reaching its goals.  The leader's passing may also signal the 
institutionalization of the movement. 
 If the leader's charisma is reconstructed posthumously by followers, at least two 
factors are required.  First, movement participants must perceive some type of 
widespread distress.  Further, participants must perceive this distress as being the same or 
very similar to the distress to which the charismatic leader responded during his/her life.  
The leader held the solutions once and still has the wisdom and knowledge to remedy the 
distress again but, this time, through hands other than his/her own.  In addition, there 
must be a living person or persons who communicate the leader's vision and maintain the 
communication.  Of course, these persons' ability to communicate the leader's qualities 
and vision is subject to the availability of information about the leader and his/her 
personality, words and actions.   
 In summary, charisma and posthumous charisma cannot be the same social 
phenomenon.  The interactions between a living leader and living followers cannot equal 
qualitatively the "relationship" between a deceased leader and living followers.  
Nevertheless, the two phenomena are extremely similar as followers attribute most of the 
same qualities to posthumously charismatic and charismatic leaders. 
 In spite of the qualitative difference, participants in some movements may 
reconstruct a deceased charismatic leader as part of an overall reconstruction of the past 
that must occur in movements.  Because the leader's charisma is being reconstructed as 
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part of a more general reconstruction of history to make sense of an emergent event, only 
those qualities, words, and examples of the leader that contribute to an explanation for 
and answer to the present situation will be featured in the reconstructed leader.  Again, 
while the facts used in the reconstruction of this historical figure are selective, the 
posthumously charismatic leader and the followers' reconstruction of him/her is not nec-
essarily a web of lies nor an effort at conscious manipulation of movement participants or 
the public.   
 
Conclusion  
 Social movement participants are actors who are aware of their grievance as an 
historical problem.  The problem may have a very brief history in participants’ minds or 
it may be centuries old.  As a group, they will reconstruct a past that counters the past put 
forth by the dominant group (as it relates to the aggrieved group) as the generally 
accepted history of the group, situation, or condition.  Any group that views the past in 
accordance with the dominant consensual history will not become a social movement 
because it will not believe there is a need for social change.  A social movement must 
reconstruct the past in such a way as to provide for itself meaning, a sense of continuity 
and order, an ideology and a sense of a future.  Included in this reconstruction may be the 
reconstruction of an individual biography as one means of providing the qualities 
mentioned above.  Though perhaps not necessary to movement success, the 
reconstruction of a “hero” and the construction of posthumous charisma in this movement 
figure provides an interesting case study of the phenomenon of the reconstruction of a 
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counterpast.  Sandino and the Sandinista National Liberation Front provide a fine 







 In 1522 Spanish conquistador Gil González Dávila arrived in Nicaragua and 
claimed it for Spain.  Chief Diriangén led thousands of warriors against the Spaniards to 
prevent conquest.  In 1912 Benjamín Zeledón led a revolt against Conservative Adolfo 
Díaz’ regime as it allowed US political and banking interests to dictate Nicaraguan 
policy.  Finally, Augusto César Sandino mounted a revolution in 1927 against the 
occupation of Nicaragua by United States Marines and US interference in the politics and 
economy of Nicaragua.  During that struggle, Sandino linked himself historically to 
Diriangén and Zeledón as well as to Simón Bolívar, liberator of the Americas.  Later, the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front made Sandino the historical center of its revolution.  
Therefore, understandings of Nicaraguan history by General Sandino and the 
contemporary Sandinistas also drive that history.   
 In preparation for examining the various constructions of history by the principle 
players in Nicaragua’s twentieth century revolutions, this chapter will provide an 
overview of the history of Nicaraguan politics and economics.  A focus of this overview 
is the intricate relationship between Nicaragua and the United States because that 
relationship is a focus of both Sandino and the Sandinista Front.  Admittedly, this author 
is guilty of reconstructing a little history in order to summarize hundreds of years into a 
few pages here. 
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Nicaraguan Politics and Sandinismo 
 Through military conquest, disease, Christianization and slavery, the Spanish of 
the sixteenth century conquered the indigenous peoples of what is now Nicaragua.  Until 
independence, Nicaragua was a Spanish colony and part of the Captaincy General of 
Guatemala.  As did other Latin American countries in the 1820s, Nicaragua tired of 
several decades of supplying Spain with raw materials and Indian slaves, and 
Nicaraguans declared independence.  For one and one-half years, Mexico and all of 
Central America were joined in one empire.  Later, the Central American Federation 
separated from Mexico and formed a single republic.  Finally, after war among the five 
Central American provinces, the Republic of Nicaragua was established in 1838 (Booth, 
1985; Walker, 1991). 
 The regional war left Nicaragua in an economic depression.  Additionally, Booth 
(1985) states that population dispersal due to the war, extreme regional loyalties, and 
recurring political unrest combined with foreign pressures to frustrate Nicaraguan 
decision-makers in their attempts to fuel economic growth. Foreign interests in Nicaragua 
focused principally on the desires of Great Britain and the United States to construct an 
interoceanic canal through Nicaragua connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.  
Nicaragua offered the best route for such a canal because navigable waters stretched from 
the Atlantic almost to the Pacific, and a canal needed to be constructed only a short 
distance.  Even so, the difficulty and cost of such an undertaking was substantial. 
  Meanwhile, American railroad magnate Cornelius Vanderbilt established the 
Accessory Transit Company to transport passengers and freight from the US west coast 
to its east coast through Nicaragua and in 1849 obtained concessions to build the prized 
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Nicaraguan canal.  A year later, the US and British governments agreed to joint control of 
passage across Nicaragua through the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.  Neither government 
consulted the Nicaraguans about this agreement (Diederich, 1981).  Then in 1855, Wil-
liam Walker, a North American from Tennessee who had fought in Mexico and who was 
an advocate of manifest destiny, invaded Nicaragua with fifty-seven men.  He was hired 
by Nicaraguan Liberals, with financing by Vanderbilt's company, to oust the 
Conservative government which was dominated by a few aristocratic families.  The 
Conservatives surrendered, and Walker installed himself as president of the republic.  
The US government did not object to Walker's administration and officially recognized it.  
By 1856, the southern slave states in the US saw Nicaragua's plantation potential as an 
opportunity for slavery expansion and threw their support to Walker as he legalized 
slavery in Nicaragua.  Nevertheless, strong Nicaraguan sentiment against the Liberal-
supported Walker presidency, opposition in other Central American countries, in addition 
to Vanderbilt's influence in Washington, served to topple Walker's regime in 1857 and 
bring Conservatives back into power.  Interestingly, Vanderbilt later declined to build the 
Nicaraguan canal and became a major shareholder in the Panamanian canal.  Stung by 
Vanderbilt's abandonment of a Nicaraguan canal project and by US support of Walker in 
spite of Nicaragua's historical support of Vanderbilt and US interests, Conservatives 
became hostile toward US policy (Booth, 1985; Walker, 1991). 
 From 1857 to 1893, Conservatives dominated the Nicaraguan government.  The 
Conservatives reconciled their differences with the US and attempted to emulate the US 
economic system but did not include the liberal reforms adopted in the US system.  The 
wealthy landholders took Indian lands by force for coffee plantations and lumbering, and 
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the Indians worked on these plantations in a debt patronage system.  US companies 
moved into Nicaragua and paid extremely low wages to peasants while exporting large 
amounts of Nicaraguan produce and raw materials (Rius, 1982). 
 At this time a Liberal, José Santos Zelaya, became president and champion of 
reform as he abolished the death penalty, separated church and state, initiated free public 
education, challenged the power of the landed elite, and canceled concessions to US 
businesses while encouraging investment by other foreign powers. Conservative 
resistance to Zelaya resulted in governmental retaliation against its opposition.  The 
United States government and US businesses, as well as other foreign investors, grew in-
creasingly hostile toward Zelaya as he demanded that foreign business adhere to 
Nicaraguan law and regulations.  Therefore, the United States supported two 
Conservative generals to fight Zelaya.  Additionally, four hundred US Marines landed on 
the eastern coast to protect American interests.  The US government then demanded 
Zelaya's resignation.  Zelaya did resign in 1909, and the Conservatives ultimately 
regained power (Walker, 1991).  Lake (1989:  48) argues that the US intervened (in 
Nicaragua as well as other Central American and Caribbean nations) for a variety of 
reasons in addition to economic motivations: 
...Washington's growing (and sometimes nearly paranoid) fears of 
domestic instability or foreign (other than American) influence in the 
region; habits of the American mind, including a belief in a manifest 
mission, even responsibility, to bring order and democracy to the lesser 
nations of the hemisphere; and the desire of Nicaraguan political leaders 
of all stripes to put the power of the United States behind their own 
political fortunes. 
 
 Lake (1989) emphasizes the US government's obsession with stability in the 
region.  Apparently, Zelaya was making overtures to the British and Japanese in regard to 
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building a Nicaraguan canal.  The potential competition of a British-owned canal with the 
American canal in Panama rekindled US fears of British meddling in the hemisphere.  At 
the same time that Zelaya was threatening the stability of North American business 
interests, he was attacking Honduras.  Therefore, the US concern was to insure regional 
stability in addition to protecting its investments.  This particular concern "was joined in 
the minds of American policy makers with the view that Central American peoples 
lacked the traditions and the power to preserve their own domestic and international 
peace" (Lake, 1989: 49).  Additionally, Theodore Roosevelt and the British signed the 
Hay-Pauncefote treaty in 1901 allowing the US sole rights to build a trans-isthmian 
canal. Roosevelt also announced in 1905 that the United States would bear the 
responsibility of policing the Americas to maintain order. In 1914 the Bryan-Chamorro 
treaty increases and solidifies US canal rights and control of Nicaraguan policy.  Hence, 
control and intervention were the North Americans' preferred means of relating to 
Nicaragua (Booth, 1985). 
 Conservative leaders began to fight among one another, and Minister of War 
Mena revolted against President Adolfo Díaz in 1912.  Benjamín Zeledón, a Liberal 
supporter of Zelaya and a lawyer and teacher, also mounted an insurrection against the 
Conservative government.  In order to once again restore stability, the US Marines landed 
and finally captured and shot Zeledón.  The Díaz government survived.  This time, the 
Marines stayed until 1925 (Booth, 1985; Walker, 1991). 
 By 1925, the US government was ready to withdraw the Marines for a variety of 
reasons.  However, the American concern with stability was cause for hesitation.  At the 
time, a Conservative-Liberal coalition government was in power in Nicaragua.  The US 
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announced its intention of withdrawing the Marines, and Conservative president 
Solórzano agreed to create a national police force to replace the departing Marines.  This 
arrangement satisfied the North American desire for stability and the Nicaraguan 
president's desire to maintain his personal political power.  The National Guard, headed 
by a retired US Army major, filled the void left by the Marines and quickly became a 
major political actor in Nicaraguan politics for years to come (Booth, 1985; Kamman, 
1968). 
 The absence of US Marines from Nicaraguan soil was short-lived.  By the spring 
of 1926, they had returned to protect American investments and lives in the wake of first, 
a Conservative revolt in late 1925 and then a Liberal rebellion in 1926.  The rebellion 
was becoming a civil war, and Marines were stationed in all parts of Nicaragua.  In 1927, 
the US sent Henry L. Stimson to Nicaragua to negotiate with the Liberal rebels.  Stimson 
offered inducements to the rebels but also implied that, if they did not come to a peaceful 
agreement, the Marines would fight them.  Hence, Stimson succeeded in negotiating a 
peace treaty.  The subsequent Liberal-Conservative peace treaty also allowed a US 
supervised presidential election in 1928.  In spite of Stimson's best efforts, the fighting 
did not stop.  One rebel named Sandino refused to lay down his arms and a guerrilla war 
ensued (Kamman, 1968). 
 Augusto César Sandino was born in 1895 and grew up in Niquinohomo, a small 
town in Nicaragua largely populated by Indians.  The region in which he lived was the 
most densely populated in Nicaragua, and most of the people worked on the coffee 
plantations.  Sandino’s mother was a plantation worker, and his father was the owner of 
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the coffee plantation on which she worked.  His parents never married one another.  
Sandino lived first with his peasant mother and later, with his father. 
 Apparently, Sandino's political awareness began while living with his father, who 
was a devoted Liberal.  At seventeen, Sandino saw the body of the insurrectionist 
Zeledón being taken to the cemetery.  Sandino would say years later, "The death of 
Zeledón gave me the key to our national situation opposite the North American piracy, 
for that reason; the war in which we have been engaged, we consider it a continuation of 
that [Zeledón's death] " (Sandino, 1981a:  306). 
  Sandino left his father's house and Nicaragua at age twenty after wounding a 
man in a fight and took a series of jobs in Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico.  While 
working for a North American oil company in Tampico, Mexico, Sandino grew 
increasingly angry at US intervention in Nicaraguan affairs.  Years later, he would relate 
a story about how a fellow worker shamed him into returning to Nicaragua to fight 
foreign interests.  Sandino claims he was reading a newspaper and telling his fellow 
workers that the Nicaraguan situation was so grave that he was considering a return to his 
country to take up arms against foreign intervention.  One of the men responded, "All of 
you Nicaraguans would just as soon sell out your country" (Ramirez, 1981: 26).  This 
comment piqued Sandino's conscience as he decided that non-involvement was 
tantamount to actively betraying his country.  Therefore, Sandino returned to Nicaragua 
and joined the rebels fighting US occupation. 
 The rebel army was composed of liberal land- and business-owners as well as 
workers and peasants.  As previously stated, the United States intervened in 1927 and 
supervised an armistice and peace agreement with rebel leader General Moncada and the 
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revolutionaries (Jung, 1983).  The terms of the Espino Negro peace plan involved 
adhering to US demands of maintaining Díaz in the presidency, general disarmament and 
amnesty for both sides, elections supervised by the US, a cabinet that included Liberals, 
and the organization of a National Guard by the US and commanded by US officers with 
the continued occupation of Nicaragua by the Marines (Bermann, 1986).  The workers 
and peasants under Sandino's leadership rejected the terms of the peace settlement as 
another example of Yankee imperialism and of Nicaraguans "selling out" their country.  
Thus, began Sandino's six-year guerrilla war against foreign intervention in Nicaraguan 
affairs.  Sandino's aim was the ouster of all US military presence and the establishment of 
true national sovereignty (Lozano, 1985). 
 Initially, Sandino was ignored or considered only an irritant by Nicaraguan 
political leaders and US officials. They belittled him by calling him a "bandit" (Beals, 
1932: 306).11  These elites were also occupied with preparing for the 1928 Nicaraguan  
elections and with reorganizing the National Guard.  US Marines provided training and 
leadership for the Guard.  Consequently, the US again withdrew many of its forces as the 
Nicaraguan National Guard showed promise of being an effective substitute for the 
Marines (Booth, 1985; Kamman, 1968). 
                                                 
11 American journalist Carlton Beals interviewed Sandino and then reported the visit to US 
Marine General Feland.  The following exchange (Beals, 1932:  306) reveals the vulnerability of 
the official labeling of Sandino as a bandit: 
 Feland - "What do you think of Sandino?" 
 Beals - "He is not a bandit, call him a fool, a fanatic, an idealist, a patriot, according  
  to your point of view, but certainly he is not a bandit." 
 Feland - "Of course, in the army, we use the word 'bandit' in a technical sense,   
  meaning the member of a band." 
 Beals - "Then [John Phillip] Sousa is also a bandit?" 
 
 66
 Nicaraguan and United States’ officials began to take Sandino more seriously as 
Sandino's determination showed no signs of waning during the passing months.  
However, the soldiers in Sandino's army only numbered, on average, between three 
hundred and five hundred men, peaking at perhaps one thousand (Booth, 1985).  To 
compensate for its small number and to avoid direct confrontation with the Guard and US 
forces as well as US airplanes, Sandino's Army for the Defense of the National 
Sovereignty of Nicaragua (EDSNN) adopted guerrilla tactics.  They moved in small 
numbers in areas sympathetic to their cause (generally the northern departments) and 
used the local people for intelligence gathering (Booth, 1985; Macaulay, 1985). 
 The war continued until 1933.  Despite the Guard's best efforts and the Marines' 
presence, the government never gained control over Sandino's forces.  In addition, 
Liberal candidate General Moncada won the 1928 presidential election.  This event 
represented an important victory for the Liberals even though Sandino and many Liberals 
believed the General to be a traitor for agreeing to Stimson's peace treaty.  Another 
Liberal, Juan Batista Sacasa, won the 1932 election.  In spite of the US government's 
historical preference for conservative Nicaraguan presidents, US officials were, by 1928, 
comfortable with Liberal presidents as the US expanded its influence in Nicaragua 
through economic, political, and military agreements (Walker, 1991). 
 Finally, Herbert Hoover decided to withdraw US troops from Nicaragua in 1933.  
Booth (1985) argues that the withdrawal was due to the severe financial drain on the 
Nicaraguan government, the effects of the worldwide Depression which increased 
peasant support for Sandino's struggle against the status quo, the expansion of the war 
into previously unaffected areas, and rising disapproval of the intervention by the US 
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Congress.  The withdrawal not only meant victory for Sandino but a power vacuum in the 
National Guard as the American officers left also.  Therefore, President Sacasa, with 
advice of the US ambassador, appointed Moncada's ambitious, thirty-seven year old aide 
- Anastasio Somoza García - as new commander of the National Guard. 
 As Sandino had promised, Sandino entered into peace negotiations with Sacasa 
upon the US withdrawal.  Sandino's men received land and amnesty, and Sacasa 
appointed one of Sandino's advisors, Sofónias Salvatierra, to his cabinet.  In spite of the 
war's end, the Guard's suspicion and hatred of Sandino did not diminish.  This hatred 
ultimately led to Sandino's death (Booth, 1985; Salvatierra, 1934). 
 Sandino, his father, Salvatierra, and two of Sandino's generals visited the 
presidential palace in Managua one evening in February 1934 to further discuss terms of 
peace.  Upon leaving the palace, their car was stopped at the palace gate by Somoza's 
soldiers in an apparently stalled National Guard vehicle.  Sandino's generals sensed 
trouble and drew their guns, but Sandino convinced them not to fire.  A major dressed as 
a corporal then arrested the five men and took their guns.  A witness rushed to the palace 
to tell Sacasa of the arrest, and Sacasa called the guard-post.  His call was unanswered.  
Sandino asked to speak with Somoza but was denied.  Ultimately, Salvatierra and 
Sandino's father were jailed, and Sandino and his generals were driven to the airfield on 
the outskirts of Managua where they were shot and killed (Selser, 1981). 
 The assassination of Sandino exemplifies Somoza's ruthless determination to 
seize power in Nicaragua.  The Guard killed not only Sandino and two generals that night 
but Sandino's brother and about three hundred of Sandino's followers.  Apparently, the 
murders of Sandino and his followers helped Somoza consolidate his already growing 
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power over the National Guard.  He then used this power to constitutionally clear his way 
to the presidency and then to force Sacasa's resignation.  Somoza won the subsequent 
election- that he arranged - and became Nicaragua's president (Millett, 1966). 
 The National Guard became Somoza's instrument for controlling almost every 
facet of Nicaraguan life.  Of course, the Guard was Nicaragua's army and acted as its 
police force.  It managed the prisons and controlled the communications networks, the 
postal service, and immigration service. The Guard also operated railroads, the National 
Health Service, collected taxes, and spied on dissident Nicaraguans.  Not surprisingly, 
repression became synonymous with Somoza and the Guard (Crawley, 1979).  Somoza 
used the Guard to kidnap, torture and kill his enemies as well as to harass the opposition 
press and to corrupt elections in his favor. 
 In addition to being personally charming, Somoza (nicknamed Tacho) endeared 
himself to the United States by becoming an ardent anti-fascist as US officials worried 
about Axis activities in the late 1930s.  Later, when US President Eisenhower helped to 
depose Arbenz - a socialist constitutionally elected to Guatemala's presidency - Somoza 
became an ardent anti-communist.  The US ambassador to Nicaragua in the 1950s 
became especially close to Somoza, thereby cementing the relationship between Somoza 
and the US (Booth, 1985; Walker, 1991).12 
 Not only did Somoza control his own people and ingratiate himself into  
                                                 
12  An often repeated story reflects the close ties between Somoza and the US President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt.  Roosevelt was reviewing a list of Heads of State to be invited to the White House.  
Roosevelt picked Somoza's name and said, "Isn't that man supposed to be a son of a bitch?"  
Secretary of State Cordell Hull replied, "He sure is, but he is our son of a bitch!"  (Crawley, 1979: 
99) 
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American favor, he also managed to become extremely wealthy during his tenure as 
president-dictator.  During World War II, Tacho confiscated German and Italian 
properties and auctioned them - making sure that he purchased the most desirable 
properties at bargain prices.  He enjoyed an extraordinary income as president and Na-
tional Guard chief and acquired other vast landholdings and ample returns on investments 
in the country's major exports.  He also received kickbacks for granting of concessions to 
foreign and domestic interests and from gambling, prostitution and alcohol operations.  In 
addition, he passed import restriction laws and then created a contraband organization to 
circumvent the law as he sold the goods in his own stores.  By the time of his death, 
Somoza owned coffee plantations, textile factories, a huge diary, a merchant marine, and 
the national airline among other businesses (Booth, 1985; Diederich, 1986; Walter, 
1993). 
 In spite of Somoza's stronghold on the country, he was subject to several attempts 
to oust him from power.  Conservative General Emiliano Chamorro tried to spark the 
revolutionary overthrow of Somoza in 1947, but the plan was aborted when Mexican 
police seized the revolutionaries' weapons that had been collected in Mexico and were en 
route to Nicaragua.  Former Sandinistas tried as well.  The last attempted ouster was 
successful.  A young Nicaraguan poet, Rigoberto López Pérez, returned to Nicaragua  
from years in El Salvador plotting to topple Somoza's regime.  In September 1956 he 
attended a political celebration given in Somoza's honor and shot and killed the dictator 
at close range.  Of course, López was shot instantly by Somoza's body guards (Walker, 
1991). 
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 Somoza's oldest son Luis became president and initiated a somewhat softer style 
of governing Nicaragua than that of his father.  The younger son, Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle, headed the National Guard and seemed to inherit his father's penchant for 
ironfisted rule.  Luis distanced himself publicly from the Guard's sordid activities under 
Anastasio.  However, he seems to have privately supported his brother's use of the Guard 
in acts of repression such as torture, kidnapping, and murder (Booth, 1985).  Therefore, 
Walker (1991:  30) calls Luis’ rule one of “cosmetic liberalization.” 
 Luis ruled either as President or from behind the scenes until his death in 1963 
when Anastasio became president. Tachito had close ties to the US.  He graduated from 
Lasalle Military Academy in New York and West Point, and he spoke excellent English.  
These credentials, in combination with his political skills, allowed him to become fast 
friends with US officials.  Under his regime, US economic and military aid to Nicaragua 
rose as the US increasingly feared communist influence in the region spurred by Castro's 
revolution in Cuba (Diederich, 1991). 
 In virtually every way, Tachito’s term paralleled that of his father.  Nicaraguan 
society became even more stratified than before as the agricultural sector industrialized 
leaving thousands jobless.  These people migrated to the cities creating enormous slums.  
The December 1972 earthquake in Managua aggravated the situation by killing ten 
thousand persons and destroying thousands of lower-class homes and businesses.  
Somoza's response to the disaster was to pocket foreign emergency aid, sell emergency 
relief supplies of food, medicine and building supplies on the blackmarket, invest in 
construction industries and real estate, and generally ignore the misery of his own people 
(Kinzer, 1991). 
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 The earthquake and Somoza's attitude toward it proved to be the salt applied to 
an already festering wound.  At this point, the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN) rose to the forefront of the Nicaraguan political opposition.  Since Sandino’s 
death, there had been various attempts at a coups de etat. , but all had failed.  The FSLN 
had been formed in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca, Tomás Borge, Silvio Mayorga, and Santos 
López (one of Sandino's generals who escaped the Guard the night of Sandino's murder).  
Fonseca was responsible for collecting and reworking Sandino's ideology to serve as the 
basis for the new movement.  Fonseca mixed the populism and patriotism of Sandino 
with Marxism-Leninism (Hodges, 1986).  The result was an ideology that carried the 
Sandinistas through the next eighteen years of revolution. 
  While Sandino's original war against Yankee imperialism had been a war of the 
peasantry, the FSLN cultivated a multifaceted strategy aimed at building a popular 
revolution. In addition to depending upon the peasantry for support, the Sandinistas 
organized university student unrest in Nicaragua's major cities. They formed small 
clandestine study groups in order to learn of Sandino's work and thought (Cabezas, 
1985).  In addition, Fonseca began to disseminate Sandino's thought and to prepare the 
populace for armed struggle against Somoza and the National Guard.  The Sandinistas 
also allied themselves with Nicaraguan labor unions and with liberal theological circles 
(Booth, 1985; Hodges, 1992).   
 The contemporary Sandinistas adopted Sandino's guerrilla tactics and saw their 
struggle as a continuation of Sandino's guerrilla war against foreign intervention in 
Nicaragua (Lozano, 1985).  As compliments to the day-to-day guerrilla attacks on 
National Guard units and other strategic sites, the FSLN engaged in some spectacular 
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operations.  In 1974, the Sandinistas invaded a party given by Nicaragua's former 
Minister of Agriculture and took all the guests hostage.  Guests such as the Nicaraguan 
ambassador to Washington and the Foreign Minister were finally exchanged for $5 
million and several imprisoned Sandinistas, one of which was Daniel Ortega.  Then in 
1978, the FSLN staged an assault on the National Palace capturing many members of the 
Nicaraguan Congress.  In exchange for the lives of the hostages, the FSLN received a 
half million dollars in ransom and the freedom of sixty imprisoned Sandinistas, including 
Tomás Borge (García Márquez, 1979).  
 As Somoza's repressive tactics and corruption intensified, the FSLN gained 
widespread support.  Among other things, Somoza's behavior in the aftermath of the 1972 
earthquake spurred widespread discontent with the regime as evidenced by the 1978 
formation of Los Doce (the Group of Twelve).  Los Doce consisted of twelve Nicaraguan 
business leaders, clergy, and intellectuals who issued a public statement calling for the 
overthrow of Somoza and endorsing the inclusion of the FSLN in Nicaragua's post-
Somoza government and reconstruction effort. The murder of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, 
long-time opposition leader and member of Los Doce, spontaneously brought thousands 
of Nicaraguans to participate directly in the revolution.  Chamorro had been publishing 
the only opposition newspaper (La Prensa) in Nicaragua and was a bitter political enemy 
of Somoza.  One morning in 1978, he was shot multiple times on the streets of Managua.  
Riots erupted in Managua only hours after the shooting, and the rioters blamed Somoza 
for the murder of Chamorro (Lake, 1989).  Bloody urban insurrections arose in virtually 
every major Nicaraguan city and continued throughout the next year.  Somoza used tanks 
and machine guns purchased from the US to quell the uprisings.  Eventually, Somoza's 
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behavior became reprehensible even to Conservatives within the US government.   In 
1979, President Jimmy Carter, the US Congress and the American public were repulsed 
by the execution on June 20 of an unarmed American journalist (Bill Stewart of ABC 
News) by a Nicaraguan National Guardsman - an event captured on videotape by 
Stewart's cameraman.  The tape was smuggled out of Nicaragua that day and broadcast 
all over the world that night.  Shortly thereafter, President Carter sought Somoza's 
resignation (Diederich, 1991; Kinzer 1991).  Somoza did step down in July 1979 and was 
exiled from Nicaragua only to be murdered the next year in Paraguay. 
 On 19 July 1979 the Sandinistas claimed an unconditional victory.  They had 
never been interested in simply ridding the country of Somoza but instead intended to 
reorganize the political, social and economic structures of Nicaragua.  Toward those 
ends, the Sandinistas chose to create a new government that would encourage the 
participation of all sectors of society, usually on a proportional basis.  They installed an 
executive branch called the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction (JGRN), which 
had been organized shortly before victory.  The Junta consisted of two wealthy 
Conservatives (Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro and an 
owner of La Prensa and Alfonso Robelo Callejas, an industrialist, leader in the business 
community, and head of the National Democratic Movement),  one pro-Sandinista 
intellectual from the Group of Twelve (Sergio Ramírez Mercado, a US-educated 
novelist), and two members of the FSLN (Daniel Ortega, one of the nine-member FSLN 
National Directorate and Moíses Hassán, US-educated scientist and leader of the FSLN-
affiliated United People's Movement).  The JGRN executed decisions by consensus and 
generally followed guidelines set by the National Directorate of the FSLN. The new 
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Council of State was the representative legislative body including parties that were pro-
Sandinista as well as opposition parties.  The revolutionary government also revamped 
the judicial system and created a fourth branch of government (the Supreme Electoral 
Council) to oversee election and voter registration and education.  The first nationwide 
election in 1984 under the revolutionary government was heavily scrutinized and 
approved by international observers and brought the election of Daniel Ortega as 
president and Sergio Ramírez as vice-president (Walker, 1991). 
 After their sweeping victory, the Sandinistas encouraged, in addition to the 
political pluralism indicated above, a mixed economy with significant participation from 
the private sector, foreign relations with as many nations as possible in spite of 
ideologies, and a wide variety of social programs for the formerly oppressed Nicaraguan 
people.  For example, the Sandinistas nationalized and redistributed all Somoza property 
and nationalized the banking and insurance industries while simultaneously providing 
large loans to the private sector and access to foreign currency at low exchange rates.  
They also left most of the productive and commercial sectors in private hands but with 
increased government oversight (Conroy, 1985). Examples of the Sandinistas' foreign 
policy are that the revolutionary government chose to honor Somoza's $1.6 billion 
foreign debt in order to maintain Nicaragua's international credit and expanded its array 
of trading partners so that it might depend less on the United States for trade but still 
hoping for positive economic relations with the US.  New social programs included 
labor-intensive public works projects to decrease unemployment, enforcing minimum 
wage laws, and transferring confiscated land to private farm cooperatives, individual 
landless peasants, and state farms.  The government also improved hospitals and clinics, 
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instituted an ambitious program of preventive health care, made food staples available at 
controlled, reasonable prices, promoted more affordable housing through government 
construction, giving deeds to the homeless and rent controls, and reduced the rate of 
illiteracy in the country from fifty percent to thirteen percent in just five months through 
a national literacy crusade (Walker, 1991). 
 In their first one and a half years in power, the Sandinistas made significant 
strides toward their original goals for Nicaragua. However, the election of Ronald Reagan 
to the US presidency more than exacerbated a reconstruction situation of more than 
overwhelming obstacles such as years of looting by the Somocistas and the devastation 
brought by the revolutionary war.  The Reagan administration was adamantly opposed to 
Sandinista rule in Nicaragua.  Many of the Sandinista officials were indeed Marxists and, 
thus, in Reagan's eyes, threats to the United States.  Therefore, by the end of 1981, 
Reagan had approved a joint effort by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 
Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries (contras) to attempt to militarily destabilize and 
eventually overthrow the Sandinista government.  The CIA provided weapons, uniforms, 
supplies and training for the contra army and arranged for the contras to have their bases 
just across the Nicaraguan border in Honduras (Kinzer, 1991).  
 The contras never came close to military victory but did manage to frustrate 
Sandinista efforts to rebuild Nicaraguan society.  The contras targeted infrastructure and 
Sandinista programs such as farm cooperatives and rural electrical projects.  The 
Sandinistas were obligated to divert precious resources to a massive defense buildup and 
away from programs intended to raise the standard and quality of living for Nicaraguans. 
 76
 Meanwhile, the Sandinistas domestic political situation began to worsen as they 
responded to the national emergency brought about by the contra war.  The decrease in 
social spending and accompanying lack of economic recovery meant that the Sandinistas 
could not deliver on many of their promises to the populace, and their domestic 
opposition capitalized on the worsening social and economic conditions.  Some 
censorship of the national media and periodic government closure of media such as La 
Prensa brought much domestic and international criticism.  Human rights organizations 
criticized Nicaraguan government as the Sandinistas, in an effort to move people out of 
the war zone, initiated the forced migration of several thousand Miskitu Indians from the 
Río Coco to inland camps.  The opposition also attacked the Sandinistas as economic 
sanctions against Nicaragua by the US meant that Nicaraguans were without US aid as 
well as spare parts for their US-made goods among other things.  In addition, the sanc-
tions caused the Sandinistas to rely ever more heavily on other countries, including the 
Socialist bloc, for economic and militarily aid as well as consumer goods.  Of course, the 
increasing reliance of Nicaragua on countries like the Soviet Union and Cuba fueled 
Reagan's case for overthrow of the Sandinistas and further angered and frightened the 
restive Nicaraguan private sector. 
 Even as the Reagan administration escalated its economic and military attacks on 
Nicaragua, the Sandinistas continuously expressed a willingness to negotiate with the US 
but refused to negotiate with the contras.  While expressing the desire for a diplomatic 
solution, Nicaragua continued to maintain its military defenses and also opened a legal 
front against the US.  The Nicaraguan government complained to the United Nations on 
several occasions about the US-sponsored contra aggression.  It also brought charges 
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against the United States government in the International Court of Justice in 1984.  The 
charges involved treaty violations, in particular CIA involvement in the mining of 
Nicaragua's harbors in 1983.  In 1986 the justices, in a vote of 15-0, condemned US sup-
port of the contras (Kinzer, 1991). The Court also decreed that the United States should 
pay Nicaragua over $17 billion in restitution for damages. In response, the Reagan 
administration claimed that the World Court no longer had jurisdiction over the US in 
matters involving Central America. 
 In 1982 Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Mexico joined together to attempt to 
find a peaceful resolution to the war in Nicaragua as well as resolutions to other Central 
American conflicts.  Nicaragua agreed to participate in what came to be called the 
Contadora process, and the United States stated publicly that it supported Contadora.  
However, the US continued to fund the contras and strongly criticized Contadora and 
refused to support the process after Nicaragua made several concessions and agreed to 
sign the draft Contadora peace accord.  Finally years later, due to the work of President 
Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, the presidents of the countries of Costa Rica, Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua drafted and signed an agreement in 1987.  In addition 
to many provisions of the agreements, one highly important aspect of this treaty was that 
all five countries agreed that external aid to irregular military forces must cease, thus 
condemning US aid to the contras and committing Honduras to disallow contra bases 
within its borders.  Essentially, the aim was to end the war.  With the signing of the Arias 
peace plan, conditions did slowly begin to stabilize in Nicaragua.  Then in 1988, the 
Sandinistas and the contras entered into negotiations with Cardinal Obando y Bravo as 
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mediator and agreed on a peace treaty.  Nevertheless, the war continued through 1989 
(Kinzer, 1991). 
 The Nicaraguan elections of February 1990 resulted in the electoral defeat of the 
FSLN's presidential candidate Daniel Ortega and brought Violeta Barrios de Chamorro to 
the presidency as the candidate of the National Opposition Union (UNO).  Many 
Nicaraguan voters came to believe that the only way to stop the contra war and US 
economic sanctions was to vote the Sandinistas out of power.  While stunned by the 
election results, the Sandinistas accepted them, submitted to constitutional law and 
delivered the presidency to Chamorro (Brentlinger, 1995).  Chamorro did not have a 
political background but had great symbolic appeal as the widow of Pedro Joaquín 
Chamorro, and she enjoyed the support of the Bush administration.  Thus, her election 
did bring easing of US military, economic, and diplomatic pressure on Nicaragua (Close, 
1999).   
 The new government did make many changes, including the reversal of several 
Sandinista initiatives. Chamorro, in response to US pressure, emphasized privatization by 
delivering formerly confiscated somocista property to the private sector and illegally 
firing government employees in order to downsize the public sector.  Additionally, US 
Senator Jesse Helms stalled the delivery of $300 million in much needed already 
appropriated US economic aid by insisting that confiscated property be returned to its 
original owners or their family members and that Sandinista military and police officials 
be fired.  The United States also pressured the Chamorro government to forgive the 
payment of restitution ordered by the World Court for the mining of Nicaraguan harbors.  
Even though UNO intensely disliked the Sandinistas, Chamorro retained several 
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Sandinistas in the government in order to avoid angering the largest political party in the 
country (Close, 1999). 
US Multinational Corporations and Nicaragua  
 United States businesses began entering Latin America in earnest during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century.  Latin Americans often decry this expansion as 
imperialist.  Swansbrough (1976:  13) states that while the US did acquire territory in the 
late 1800s, its principal thrust was to create an "informal empire."  This type of empire 
called for economic penetration into foreign territories or nations through trade with them 
or manufacturing or commercial ventures.  
 At the turn of the century, the people of the United States adhered to an ideology 
that characterized the foreign expansion of American business as patriotic, benevolent, 
and good for business.  It is also an ideology that viewed the hemisphere as belonging to 
the US.  Adams (1914:  9, 13) provides an example of North American attitudes toward 
the subject during the late 1800s and early 1900s: 
There is one dominant reason why the American tropics have not par-
ticipated in the stupendous progress of all other tropical sections, and that 
reason is this:  Instability of their governmental conditions has estopped 
[sic] the capital and the enterprise of the world from undertaking the 
development of their wonderful tropical resources.  For this state of 
affairs the United States is largely to blame.  Our national sins are not 
those of commission, but of omission.  We have paid no attention to the 
welfare of our tropical neighbors for the purely selfish and ignorant 
reason that we did not consider the matter worth our while. 
  
It has not yet dawned on our political leaders that our tropics are a great 
but unused asset...  [my italics] 
 
[The story of the development of the United Fruit Company] is a story of 
the peaceful and honorable conquest of a portion of the American 
tropics, and one of which every citizen should be proud. 
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American rhetoric of the day included terms that suggested militaristic or imperialistic 
intentions. Highly successful industrialization in the United States and the subsequent 
search for raw materials and new markets in the 1890s spurred the US expansion into 
Latin America and into Nicaragua specifically.  Weber (1983:  102) notes, "The strong 
links between United States big business and the country's foreign policy were forged in 
these years." 
 Nicaragua began extensive coffee production in the 1860s. Exports of and profits 
from coffee increased greatly, and by 1890, coffee was the country's most important 
export.   At this time, coffee exports represented fifty percent of all Nicaraguan exports 
(Weber, 1983).   A critical result of the extensive coffee production was the integration of 
Nicaragua into the world capitalist system. 
 In the early 1890s, Liberals sought increased economic development in 
Nicaragua and further integration into the world economy.  Liberal president Zelaya 
initiated policies that were largely successful in achieving these goals.  Zelaya used 
revenues from coffee production to finance improvements in Nicaraguan education, 
transportation, and communication systems.  He also encouraged foreign investment.  
Even though Zelaya courted foreign capital, he expected foreign investors to follow 
Nicaraguan law.  He imposed stiff penalties on any company that failed in this regard. 
Obviously, North American business resisted Zelaya's efforts. After canceling several 
North American concessions, Zelaya was deposed by Conservatives allied with the US 
government (Booth 1985). 
 As noted previously, the serious interest of the US government and American 
business in Nicaragua had historically centered on finding a shortcut from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific via a canal through the country.  And while the canal was never built in 
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Nicaragua, large amounts of North American capital penetrated the Central American 
nation in the 1890s.  During this period, North American companies such as United Fruit 
Company and the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company established operations on 
Nicaragua's eastern coast and became major actors in the Nicaraguan economy (Crawley, 
1979). 
 The foreign policies of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft 
served to tie Nicaraguan economic and political systems to the wishes of Wall Street and 
the State Department.  Most importantly, "dollar diplomacy" was instituted by Taft's 
Secretary of State Philander C. Knox in the first decade of the century.  Knox believed 
that a stable economy led to a stable political environment and that a stable Latin 
America was critical to US hegemony in the hemisphere.  Specifically, Taft and Knox 
feared European intervention and worried about any threats to North American 
investment if the Panama Canal were completed.  US government officials also worried 
about large loans made to Nicaragua by British bankers during Zelaya's regime and the 
British intervention that might accompany such financial relationships. Therefore, the US 
made large loans to countries such as Nicaragua and encouraged US business to locate 
there (Bermann, 1986).  The principal banks involved in this activity were Brown 
Brothers & Company, J. & W. Seligman & Company, and, later, Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company. 
 The first significant involvement in Nicaragua by Brown Brothers and Seligman 
occurred in connection with the Knox-Castrillo treaty of 1911.  In his efforts to secure 
US interests in Central America, Secretary Knox and Nicaraguan representative to 
Washington Salvador Castrillo signed a treaty arranging an American loan to Nicaragua 
to fund Nicaraguan debt.  The terms of the agreement stated that the loan would be 
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secured by customs receipts.  Nicaraguan customs would be collected and administered 
by a Collector General (a US citizen) selected by American bankers and the US State 
Department, approved by the US president, and then appointed by the Nicaraguan 
government.  Nicaragua could not alter duties without permission from the United States.  
In return, Brown Brothers and Seligman would make the fifteen million dollar loan at six 
percent interest.  The purpose of the loan was to reform the currency, re-fund Nicaragua's 
debt and build railroads (Denny, 1929.   
 President Taft supported the treaty, and the Nicaraguan Assembly ratified it.  
However, the US Senate refused to ratify Knox-Castrillo.  When the treaty failed in the 
US Senate, the banks agreed to make a small loan, on a contract basis, of $1.5 million 
that soon became a series of small loans.  The terms of the Knox-Castrillo treaty became 
part of the small loan contracts.  The bankers reformed the currency by creating the 
National Bank of Nicaragua and making it the sole depository of Nicaraguan government 
funds and the sole bank of issue.  The new National Bank was a US corporation (as it was 
incorporated in Connecticut) and its board of directors, consisting entirely of Brown 
Brothers' representatives save one Nicaraguan, met in New York.  The US bankers 
appointed two North American financial experts to design the currency reform, and these 
experts replaced the Nicaraguan peso with a new córdoba note (Denny, 1929).  The 
signature of the President of the National Bank of Nicaragua appearing on the paper 
córdoba is that of James Brown, senior partner of Brown Brothers & Company 
(Kouwenhoven, 1968). 
 In addition to instituting currency reform, the US bankers assumed management 
of the repayment of loans originally made by England to Nicaragua.  The bankers used 
customs receipts to repay this loan as well as to repay themselves. Brown Brothers also 
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collected customs receipts to pay claims brought against the Nicaraguan government for 
concessions cancelled by the Zelaya regime and/or for damage suffered during civil wars 
- the majority of claims filed by United States companies.  Incidentally, the validity of 
claims were decided by commissions with majority membership held by US citizens.  
Lastly, customs receipts could be used for the ordinary purposes of government, such as 
salaries.  Another loan made by the North American bankers to the Nicaraguan 
government was secured by a lien against the Nicaraguan railroad granting fifty-one 
percent of the railroad's stock to the bankers who hired a US company, J.G. White 
Engineering Corporation, to manage the operation (Denny, 1929). 
 Loans to Nicaragua from US banks continued into the next US administration, 
despite President Woodrow Wilson's rhetorical opposition to dollar diplomacy.  Also 
during Wilson's term, Brown Brothers and Seligman opened their first branch bank in 
Nicaragua in 1915 after Congress passed legislation in 1914 making it legal for US banks 
to open foreign branches.  Also in 1915, the two US banks, with Morgan Guaranty Trust, 
organized the Mercantile Bank of the Americas with affiliated corporations throughout 
Latin America. The Latin American branch banks were managed by joint Mercantile 
Bank and local management, but Mercantile Bank held all or, at least, fifty-one percent of 
the stock.  One of those affiliate corporations was the National Bank of Nicaragua.  
However, US banking interests suffered in the 1920s as the end of World War I brought a 
worldwide postwar economic crisis and brought England and Germany back to Latin 
America to compete with the US banks.  As a result of these pressures, Mercantile Bank 
was dissolved and then reorganized in 1922 as the Bank of Central and South America 
but failed in 1924 and was sold to the Royal Bank of Canada (Stallings, 1987).   At that 
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time, Brown Brothers sold its shares of stock to Guaranty Trust and left Nicaragua 
(Phelps, 1927).   
 It was also during Wilson's administration that the Bryan-Chamorro treaty was 
signed by Nicaragua and the United States.  This agreement granted the US the exclusive 
rights to build a canal through Nicaragua, to ninety-nine year leases on Nicaragua's Corn 
Islands, and to the construction and maintenance of a naval base off Nicaragua's Pacific 
coast.  Most importantly, the treaty gave the United States the right to control Nicaragua's 
foreign policy and to participate in its internal affairs at the discretion of US officials. 
Costa Rica and El Salvador, believing the treaty threatened their independence, opposed 
it and brought suit against Nicaragua in the Central American Court of Justice. The Court 
decided in favor of the plaintiffs.  However, Nicaragua, with the support of the US, 
ignored the Court's decision.  The Central American Court, a precursor for the 
International Court of Justice, never recovered from the act of the Wilson administration 
in disregarding the decision of the very tribunal that the US had helped to form in 1907.  
The Court dissolved a few years after its ruling against Nicaragua (Bermann, 1986). 
 During the first twenty years of the century, North American companies that had 
been established in Nicaragua during the 1890s were becoming giant conglomerates.  US 
business interests, especially fruit and mining concerns, built company towns.  Their 
Nicaraguan employees performed grueling work for long hours, shopped at company 
stores, and utilized company infirmaries/hospitals.  Virtually all management personnel 
were US citizens and lived very well by Nicaraguan as well as North American standards.  
Division managers wielded great power over not only their towns but over Nicaraguan 
politics as well.  Kepner (1967:  209) likens the fruit companies' to "vast feudal estates" 
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or "quasi-foreign settlements" run by "banana dictators" who enjoyed close ties to 
officials in the national government. 
 The United States' hold on the Nicaraguan political and economic systems was 
not lost on the Nicaraguan people.  The omnipresence of North American businessmen, 
diplomats, and Marines engendered hostility among the populace.  Nicaraguans also 
understood the advantages of foreign capital and did benefit from social improvements, 
such as some health care, provided by the companies.  However, many Nicaraguans 
resented the country's financial predicament, the consequent need for foreign investment, 
and the foreigners who provided the "solution" (Kepner, 1967).   
 It was amidst this political and economic climate that Augusto César Sandino left 
Nicaragua and found employment with several North American conglomerates.  After 
leaving Nicaragua in 1920, Sandino began work for the Standard Fruit and Steamship 
Company in La Ceiba, Honduras - Standard's base of operations in Central America.  He 
worked at the company's Montecristo sugar mill as a mechanic and warehouseman until 
he got into some legal trouble and left Honduras.  He arrived in Quiriguá, Guatemala in 
1922.  He was once again employed as a mechanic.  This time he worked on a banana 
plantation for United Fruit.   
 In 1923 Sandino traveled from Guatemala to Mexico finding work as a mechanic 
in the Veracruz and Tampico oil fields of John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company 
and for the Edward L. Doheny oil group.  As previously noted, Sandino claimed to have 
formed his political and social philosophy condemning Yankee imperialism while 
working in the oil fields.  Consequently, he returned to Nicaragua in 1926 with the 
express purpose of ridding his homeland of US intervention.  Upon his arrival, he again 
was employed by a North American company.  American owner Charles Butters hired 
 86
Sandino as a bookkeeper for San Albino Gold Mines.  Unknown to Butters, Sandino had 
sought work at the mine with the intention of organizing miners to rebel against US 
domination (Román, 1979). 
 Even though there is little available material chronicling Sandino's relationship to 
these US-owned companies, there is much history written about their Latin American 
activities during Sandino's time.  Knowledge of the historical situation of the industries 
with which Sandino had experience yields some understanding of Sandino's eventual 
attitudes and acts against the United States and its representatives. 
 Central America gained the reputation as "the Banana Republics" largely due to 
the tremendous amount of banana production maintained by North American fruit 
companies such as United and Standard.   These two companies were foremost among 
banana growers and exporters/importers (Crawley, 1979).  Because of their size, wealth, 
and influence, they were also the objects of Central American feelings of anti-Yankee 
imperialism.  In fact, United Fruit gained with its notoriety the name El Pulpo (the 
Octopus). 
 United Fruit Company was the result of a partnership forged in 1899 by two 
Americans who were already involved to some extent in bringing bananas from Central 
America to the United States.  Standard Fruit, under its original name of Vaccaro 
Brothers, first entered Honduras in the same year.  United soon became the largest 
importer of bananas to the United States.  Both companies concentrated their Central 
American efforts in Honduras and Guatemala.  Nicaragua was never an important source 
of banana production for either company although both companies owned plantations 
there.  In fact, Vaccaro Brothers' major interest in Nicaragua was the country's mahogany 
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harvested by Vaccaro's subsidiary the Bragman's Bluff Lumber Company  (Karnes, 1978; 
Lafeber, 1984). 
 In 1920, the same year that Sandino reported for work at Vaccaro's sugar mill in 
La Ceiba, Honduras, Vaccaro Brothers was in the throes of a labor strike.  Strikers 
claimed that Standard had illegally imported black Americans to work on the plantations 
and was paying them more than the amount paid to Honduran workers.  After almost two 
months, the strike finally ended when the arrival and continued presence of a US naval 
vessel threatened the strikers with North American military intervention (Karnes, 1978).   
 The years 1920 and 1921 were a time of great expansion for the Vaccaro 
Brothers'  Honduran interests.  The company built more railroads to bring its bananas 
from plantations to awaiting ships, gained more concessions, and entered the lumber 
business in Honduras.  The Honduran government was also receiving loans from 
Vaccaro's bank - Banco Atlántida.  Terms of these loans included having Vaccaro's 
representatives supervise Honduran customs collections and withholding each month's 
loan repayment (Karnes, 1978).  
 United Fruit and Vaccaro Brothers employed probably hundreds of Nicaraguans 
in their Honduran operations by 1921.  Most of the Nicaraguans had been exiled by the 
Nicaraguan government.  The exiles demonstrated fierce anti-Yankee attitudes as a result 
of their resentment toward the Marine occupation of Nicaragua since 1912 (Karnes, 
1978).  Therefore, Sandino's experience in Vaccaro Brothers' (Standard Fruit) employ 
was probably one of intense exposure to the power wielded by North American business.  
 By 1922, when Sandino gained employment with the United Fruit Company in 
Guatemala, the company had been cultivating and shipping bananas in that country for 
sixteen years.  United's first contract with Guatemala received 50,000 acres and paid the 
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government $14,000 annually plus an export tax of one cent per banana stem (May & 
Plaza, 1976).  Originally, United Fruit, like its competitors, bought bananas from 
individual planters.  However, United's vast landholdings were soon cultivated and 
became very productive.   
 Large scale banana production required railroads and docks.  While Guatemala 
already had some railroads, United built and maintained its own extensive railroad 
system. The company also built port facilities as did Standard in La Ceiba.  The ties 
between the fruit companies and Central America's railway systems and ports cannot be 
overemphasized.  The companies financed the projects and, even though they gained the 
concessions by agreeing to allow use of the facilities by the host country, virtually 
monopolized usage of the rails and ports.  By 1922, United was not only running 
Guatemala's railroads, ports, and shipping, but was also operating the communications 
system.  United Fruit also provided loans to the Guatemalan government and collected 
payment by sitting in Guatemala's customs houses (as did Standard Fruit in Honduras).  
The company also enjoyed a monopoly on the banana trade in Guatemala - a situation 
which engendered much resentment among Guatemalans (LaFeber, 1984). 
 Sandino spent the next three years (1923-26) in the Mexican oil fields in 
Tampico and Veracruz.  His employers were the Huasteca Petroleum Company and the 
South Pennsylvania Oil Company owned by California oilman Edward Doheny and 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, respectively.  Doheny began Mexican operations in 1900, 
and was the largest oil producer in Mexico by the time that Standard acquired oil 
producing properties there in 1917 (Gibb & Knowlton, 1976).   
 By the time of Sandino's arrival, the Mexican government and the US oil 
companies had been locked in a vigorous dispute for several years.  The post-
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revolutionary Mexican constitution adopted in 1917 called for nationalization of 
Mexico's subsoil.  At that time, and throughout the dispute, the US companies were 
enjoying enormous production rates and profits from their Mexican operations. The com-
panies refused to recognize nationalization and fought imposition of the new law.  
Standard Oil urged Washington to send warships to Mexico and to sever diplomatic 
relations.  Protests from Washington succeeded in causing the Mexican government to 
delay the deadline set for the companies to adhere to measures beginning the na-
tionalization process.  Finally, executives from several US oil companies and Mexico's 
Minister of Finance agreed that lands leased before 1917 were not subject to 
nationalization, but lands leased after 1917 were subject to constitutional constraints.  By 
1928 Standard had liquidated almost all of its interests in Mexico (Gibb & Knowlton, 
1976). 
 Hodges (1986: 5) notes that at the time of Sandino's arrival in 1923 "Tampico 
was a hotbed of political agitation among oil workers."  Strikes by Mexican workers 
against the US oil companies were common.  Macaulay (1985:  52) notes, "The anarchist 
Industrial Workers of World dominated the Tampico labor movement until seriously 
challenged in the 1920s by newly formed communist groups, by purely Mexican radical 
unions, and by a more conservative, government-backed labor federation."  Sandino 
could not have avoided exposure to all this anti-foreign business and anti-Yankee activity 
although it is unknown whether he participated in it.  As previously mentioned, it was 
during Sandino's tenure in this environment that he decided to return to Nicaragua and 
fight Yankee imperialism.   
 Upon hearing news of the Liberal uprising in Nicaragua, Sandino left Mexico 
and traveled to Nicaragua.  He found work as a bookkeeper in the San Albino Gold Mine 
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in the department of Nueva Segovia.  North American mining companies first gained 
concessions in Nicaragua during the 1890s.  The list of companies operating in the 1920s 
included the Bonanza Mines Company of Philadelphia, Cuje Gold Mines of California, 
La Luz & Los Angeles Mining Company of Pittsburgh, San Albino Gold Mines of 
California, and Tonopah Nicaragua Company of Nevada (Rand & Sturgess, 1931).  The 
companies mined gold and silver which constituted major export items for Nicaragua 
(Mineral Industries of Latin America, 1981). 
 
 Mining interests ran their operations in much the same manner as did the fruit 
companies.  They created company towns that were essentially isolated from other 
communities.  A strict hierarchy of authority was in force.  For example, many miners 
lived in company barracks, and the North American managers lived in houses provided 
by the company in a separate portion of the mining town.  The two parts of town were not 
only separated geographically but visually as well.  In the mining community of Siuna, 
hills hid the North American neighborhoods from the view of the Nicaraguan 
neighborhoods (CIERA, 1981:  174).  The companies also exercised police powers 
within their towns and were supported in this activity by the Nicaraguan military. 
 Given the autonomy and power available to business interests in Latin America 
and Sandino's exposure to the situation, it is not surprising that Sandino made their 
operations targets of his guerrilla attacks.  At various times during the war, Sandino 
ordered attacks on both United Fruit and Standard Fruit property.  He also targeted US-
owned mines.  Sandino even attacked his former place of employment, the San Albino 
Gold Mines.  The Mines Handbook of 1931 (Rand & Sturgess: 2804) relates the 
following observation about the San Albino mine:  
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This mine was extensively developed and a mill was in profitable 
operation.  Latest reports indicate that property is now idle due the 
damage done by the rebels under Sandino who for a time operated the 
mine but who wrecked the property when they left the vicinity. 
 Initially, Sandino launched his struggle from the San Albino mine and later made 
it one of his targets during the war.  Upon gaining employment at the mine, Sandino 
convinced the miners that they were suffering great injustice at the hands of their North 
American employers and that they should demand higher pay.  Ultimately, he organized 
them into a band of about thirty armed men and attacked a National Guard garrison.  
Sandino's men were easily repelled.  He was thus convinced that he must join with the 
Liberal forces in order to be effective (Macaulay, 1985).  The attacks from and on North 
American property supported Sandino's anti-imperialist rhetoric and clearly signaled that 
he intended to rid Nicaragua of not only political and military domination by the United 
States but economic domination as well. 
 Sandino's death brought the struggle against Yankee imperialism to a halt.  After 
Sandino's murder and Somoza's rise to the presidency of Nicaragua, Somoza became fast 
friends with US government officials.  Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy 
was wholly accepted by Somoza.  Under the policy, the Export-Import Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Commission were instituted to promote development in 
Latin America.  Bermann (1986:  232-33) summarizes the effects of the policy: 
 
[Nicaragua's agreements with these agencies] obliged [Nicaragua] to 
pledge itself to shun 'economic nationalism' by reducing or eliminating 
tariffs, encouraging foreign (which meant US) investment, and refraining 
from the use of customs protection to foster new industries...Nicaragua 
became an economic satellite of the United States, its role to supply raw 
materials, buy US industrial products, and absorb a portion of excess US 
investment capital when required. 
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 During World War II, the US built three military bases in Nicaragua thus 
infusing more cash into the Nicaraguan economy.  After World War II, Nicaragua 
enjoyed rapid economic growth.  The government encouraged cotton production due to 
the increase of cotton prices on the world market.  Yet the expansion of cotton production 
resulted in the demise of numerous small farms.  Jobs in the cotton industry did not 
absorb all the displaced farmers, and urban migration led to swelling slums in Nicaragua's 
cities.  The disappearance of so many independent farmers also meant that land and the 
wealth from cotton exports was concentrated in a few families.  Meanwhile, North 
American investors were expanding their ties to Nicaraguan business and government 
(Jarquín & Barreto, 1986). 
 From 1955 to 1969, capital investment in Latin America by United States 
business interests more than tripled in comparison to the preceding fifteen years.  Loans 
from the US government also increased during this period.  Countries such as Nicaragua 
were compelled to fulfill the obligations of the Good Neighbor era.  The US insured 
fulfillment as it channeled assistance funds through the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and the Inter-American Development 
Bank as part of the Good Neighbor policy's successor, the Alliance for Progress.  This 
new effort by the Kennedy administration was akin to dollar diplomacy in that it 
emphasized an infusion of financial assistance in order to promote a stable environment.  
However, Kennedy added significant military aid to the package because of his principal 
concern in containing the Cuban revolution (Stallings, 1988). 
 Kennedy's Alliance for Progress program embraced the Central American 
Common Market initially formed by the United Nations.  The Common Market's original 
purpose was to encourage Central American industries to produce a greater quantity and 
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a wider variety of goods in order to reduce dependence on imported goods.  The United 
States government viewed this organization as a vehicle for stemming communist 
influence in the isthmus.  It was also an opportunity to encourage North American 
investment in Nicaragua.  US investment in Nicaragua increased as North Americans 
began production in new enterprises and to enter the service industries.  In sum, US 
investment accounted for seventy to eighty percent of total foreign investment in the 
country.   In short, Bermann (1986: 248) writes, "Under American tutelage, the [Central 
American Common Market] became little more than a mechanism for encouraging 
foreign investment." 
 In spite of Nicaragua's economic growth during the 1960s, the economic 
condition of the average Nicaraguan remained unimproved.  In contrast, Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle and his elite supporters were enjoying extraordinary wealth.  Somoza 
gained much of his wealth through a variety of questionable activities; much of it came 
from joint ventures with North American multinational corporations. 
 North American capital dominated Nicaragua during the Somozas' reign. In 1969 
United States companies owned eighty-six percent of all multinational businesses 
operating in Nicaragua (Castillo, 1980).  The Somoza family turned this fact to its own 
advantage by using their powerful positions and their friendship with US officials and 
business interests to enlarge their personal bank accounts rather than the public coffers.  
Somoza Debayle, like his father Somoza García, used some of that wealth to acquire and 
monopolize Nicaraguan industries such as the dairy industry.  He also entered into many 
joint ventures with US companies as mentioned above.  For instance, seventy-four 
percent of Aceitera Corona S.A. (a vegetable oil company) was owned by United Brands 
(formerly United Fruit) and the remaining twenty-six percent belonged to the Somoza 
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family (Selser, 1981).  In light of Somoza's strong economic and political ties to the 
United States, it is not surprising that he became known in Nicaragua as "the last Marine" 
(Bermann, 1986). 
 Multinational corporations from the United States were still dominating 
Nicaraguan economics and politics as the Sandinista revolution gathered force throughout 
the 1970s.  FSLN Commander Jaime Wheelock (1977) argues that the Somoza family 
and North American banking interests controlled Nicaragua by controlling the country's 
primary industries including the cotton industry.   In addition to banks, a wide variety of 
North American companies remained in Nicaragua.  In spite of the devastation and 
danger of the war, US multinational corporations still constituted seventy-seven percent 
of all multinationals in Nicaragua by the time of the FSLN victory in 1979 (Castillo, 
1980).  
 Sandinista rule obviously brought significant change to the Nicaraguan economy.  
Booth (1985:  239) mentions that the new government had three primary economic goals.  
First, the economy must simply be rebuilt after the long war.  Second, there must be a 
redistrubution of income and economic power in order to reduce class inequality.  Third, 
the economic base of the somocistas must be dismantled.  Of course, the obstacles and 
problems were legion.  One unforeseen problem was a sudden and severe lack of 
managers to run businesses as many were somocistas and fled the country.  Nevertheless, 
the Sandinistas persevered and, for a time, surmounted many of those obstacles. 
 The reforms were wide-ranging and succeeded in varying degrees.  The 
government instituted agrarian reform and encouraged peasants to organize on their own 
behalf.  Food production increased, and coupled with the institution of price controls, 
food availability also increased.  Tax revenues also increased, and the government 
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reduced the trade deficit.  Investment in the public sector brought more jobs, and the 
Sandinistas enforced a minimum wage requirement.  Workplace health and safety 
regulations were also enforced, and a health care program was introduced.  All of these 
reforms became compromised with US efforts to damage the Nicaraguan economy and 
with the diversion of Nicaraguan government funds to fight the contra war (Booth, 1985; 
Walker, 1991). 
 After the Sandinista victory, foreign investment declined.  Some of the decline 
was due to the Sandinista nationalization of business interests.  The government 
nationalized mines, banks, insurance and transportation in addition to others.  However, 
the government attempted to pay private owners for their companies.  Nicaragua agreed 
to pay Neptune Mining Company of New York (majority owned by American Smelting 
& Mining Company) $3.7 million, plus interest, for minerals seized during 
nationalization of the company’s gold mine (Audette & Kowalewski, 1983).  In another 
sign of cooperation between the Sandinistas and US business, Bank of America and other 
Western banks loaned Nicaragua $25 million to help pay its foreign debt.  On the other 
hand, in October 1982 Standard Fruit, exclusive marketer of Nicaraguan bananas for 
twelve years, pulled all of its banana operations out of Nicaragua in violation of its 
contract with the revolutionary government.  Standard Fruit and the Sandinistas had 
agreed that Nicaragua was to purchase the Standard operation for $13 million and the 
company was to provide technical assistance and marketing over a five year period 
(Maxfield & Stahler-Shold, 1985). 
 In short, the Reagan administration’s efforts to undermine the Nicaraguan 
economy and, therefore, the Sandinista government were fairly successful.  As the US 
government blocked investment and trade in Nicaragua and mounted a war that drew 
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funds away from Nicaragua’s internal social and economic programs, the revolutionary 
government was unable to fulfill all of its own hopes and its promises to the Nicaraguan 
people.  Many people, even if they supported the revolution, grew tired of the economic 
pressure and voted the Sandinistas out of office in 1990.  The new president, Violeta 
Chamorro, was much more palatable to the North Americans.  In 1991, the Directory of 
American Firms reported Standard Fruit to again be operating in Nicaragua along with 
Citibank, American Life Insurance and Pan-American Life Insurance, among other US 
multinationals. 
Conclusion 
 This overview has served to set the stage, in some sense, for the four histories of 
Nicaragua and Sandino that follow in the next four chapters.  Clearly, the United States 
and Nicaragua have a history of strong political and economic ties.  The relationship 
between the two countries has been asymmetrical, and many Nicaraguans have resented 
the power advantage held by the US.  In addition to coping with the anger and frustration 
toward a foreign power, Nicaraguans were faced with the daily task of living under the 
rule of repressive dictators and national police forces supported by North Americans.  
Under these conditions, Nicaraguans were experiencing what Weber calls distress when 
Sandino led them in the struggle against US economic and political domination and, later, 
when the Sandinista National Liberation Front assumed leadership.  The interpretation of 
these conditions as distress and cause for action by Nicaraguans constituted a 
reconstruction of Nicaragua's past that seriously challenged the story of Nicaragua's past 




SANDINO’S EMERGENCE:  THE LIVING SANDINO 
 
 
 Sandino introduced himself to Nicaragua at the age of thirty-one during his 
unsuccessful first military attack on the Nicaraguan National Guard.  “In November 1926 
the name of Augusto C. Sandino sounded for the first time in Nicaragua,” writes Gustavo 
Alemán Bolaños (1934:  3).  Until that year, documentation of Sandino’s existence is 
extremely sketchy to non-existent.  Information about his life prior to 1926 is provided 
by Sandino in later years as he looks backward in interviews and in written 
correspondence. The story that Sandino tells about himself provides a foundation for his 
legend and charismatic status but also a peek into his image of himself.  
Sandino on His Childhood and Youth 
 “I opened my eyes in misery and grew up in misery,” remembers Sandino 
(Román, 1979:  36).  Virtually all of his recollections of childhood are cast in tragic, 
desperate terms.  While acknowledging his father’s financial success and nobility as well 
as his “markedly indohispanic” roots, Sandino also always identifies his mother, 
Margarita Calderón, as an employee of the Sandino family and his own status as a “love 
child and a bastard according to social convention” (Román, 1979:  36).  Sandino leaves 
the impression that, until he was eleven years old, Gregorio Sandino apparently ignored 
his son, and Augusto lived with his mother under desperate conditions.  He recalls, 
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“...there were...many days...that I had to go out at night to steal...to keep [my mother] 
from dying from hunger” (Román, 1979:  37).13 
 The importance of Sandino’s stories of his early childhood – “the great tragedy 
of my life” - seems to be that he can use them to mark a decisive turning point for himself 
on his path to being a revolutionary (Roman, 1979: 37).  He tells a story of being jailed 
with his mother due to her financial debt.  She was pregnant at the time, and “the anger 
and brutal mistreatment caused a miscarriage that brought a copious hemorrhage, almost 
deadly.  And it was up to me only to help her...I was nine years old” (Román,, 1979:  37). 
This experience leads to some bitterness about the contrast of his miserable situation with 
that of his half brother, Socrates, who lives comfortably in their father’s house.  He 
confronts his father at eleven years old, and his father takes him in and allows Augusto to 
help in his business.14 
 Sandino is reconstructing his childhood in a way that makes sense of his 
revolutionary determination and activities.  He tells the preceding stories of his childhood 
to interviewers or in letters after he is well-known for his revolutionary activities.  As 
stated previously, these stories serve to identify a turning point for him with regard to his 
revolutionary thinking.  He successfully casts himself as a tragic figure - due to no fault 
of his own - who turns tragedy to fierce determination.  The enormous suffering and 
injustice of his youth cause him to transform into a resolute, defiant, and enormously 
hard-working young man with a keen sense of justice.  In charismatic terms, he 
                                                 
13 Other sources say that Gregorio Sandino did provide some financial support during those 
earliest years (Macaulay, 1985). 
14 At this time, Augusto begins to call himself Sandino rather than Calderón. 
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characterizes his beginnings outside the status quo by calling them humble, shameful, and 
poor and by calling himself a bastard.  He also pinpoints a moment in time when he just 
begins to formulate a mission for himself as he rejects the injustices of that period. 
 The next turning point, identified by Sandino as “an incident of great 
transcendence in my life,” was the occasion that led Sandino to leave Nicaragua (Román, 
1979:  47).  The story that he tells Román is that a rumor had begun that the betrothed 
Sandino was seeing another woman. Accused, insulted and assaulted by the other 
woman’s brother, Sandino shoots the man in the leg.  He quickly leaves Niquinohomo to 
avoid punishment.15 
Sandino on His Political Awakening 
 After leaving Nicaragua in 1920, Sandino is on his way to, perhaps, the most 
significant turning point of his life - his experiences with oilfield workers in Mexico.  
Accounts vary about exactly where Sandino went after the shooting in Niquinohomo, but 
                                                 
15 Other sources say that Sandino actually killed the man, and the reasons mentioned for the 
shooting do not always match what Sandino told Román (Maraboto, 1980;  Alemán, 1932;  
Selser, 1981).  There are discrepancies in claims of  when Sandino first left Nicaragua.  Maraboto 
(1920) says that Sandino left Nicaragua when he was 16 years old, which would have been 1911-
12.  He continues that Sandino traveled to Panamá, Mexico, the United States, back to Mexico, to 
Guatemala and then again to the US.   He says that Sandino learned English in the United States 
“and in Mexico he learned the doctrines of revolution” (Maraboto, 1980:  8).  Curiously,  this 
itinerary, particularly the stay in the United States, does not appear in other first-hand accounts 
such as Román, Alemán, or Beals.  Even more curiously, Sandino (1981a:  69) himself, in a letter 
to his foreign representative in 1928, claims that “at twelve years old, I left my parents and went 
in search of adventure.”  He says that he traveled to the major cities of Central and North America 
but spent the most time in Mexico and may have returned to Nicaragua at age 12.  It is generally 
agreed that he left Nicaragua at age 25 after shooting the man in Niquinohomo. Carlos Fonseca 
(1984:  7) takes Sandino’s word in his brief biography of Sandino, Sandino, Guerrillero 
Proletario, saying that Sandino left Nicaragua in 1912 and traveled to various countries including 
the US and Mexico. 
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all agree that he spent time in Honduras and then Guatemala, working for US companies 
in both countries.  While in Honduras, reports Alemán (1932), Sandino had to take the 
law into his own hands to capture a criminal that local law enforcement did not have the 
manpower to pursue.  Leaving Honduras, Sandino goes to Mexico where he finds a job 
and also becomes a member of the Masonic order.  Eventually, Sandino arrives in the 
Mexican oilfields and takes a job with Huasteca Petroleum Company (a US interest) in 
Tampico.  It is there that Sandino again notes that he experienced another 
“transcendental” incident.   
 Sandino tells two versions of this incident.  In a 1926 version, Sandino explains 
that he had surrounded himself with spiritualist friends.  This group would discuss Latin 
American submission to Yankee imperialism.  One day, Sandino tells his friends that if 
he could find 100 men who love Nicaragua as much as he does, they could restore 
Nicaragua’s sovereignty.  In 1933 Sandino tells another story to José Román (1979:  50): 
It was the beginning of 1926 and the first revolutionary movement was 
just beginning on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua...One night...reading 
with some friends the cables of the daily press, I expressed certain wishes 
of returning to Nicaragua to fight for my party...but a Mexican that was 
drinking liquor said to me: 
‘No, friend, you’re not leaving.  Nicaraguans are all a bunch of 
sellouts...’ 
...that phrase danced in my head all night...even though it was a drunk 
who said it, it was my fault and all Nicaraguans’ lack of patriotism.  And 
in truth, through the fault of the Bryan-Chamorro treaty, they call us 
Nicaraguans everywhere sellouts. 
 
 According to Sandino, his sense of shame resulting from this incident moves him 
to return at once to Nicaragua.  “Without a firm idea...swept away by a magnetic force, 
blind and irresistible...,” says Sandino, he leaves Mexico and arrives in Nicaragua 
(Román, 1979:  50).  He gets a job in the San Albino gold mines (also a US company) 
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and begins political work among the miners.  There, he says that he is appalled by the 
company’s failure to pay workers in currency but with a coupon system of payment that 
workers must use in company stores.  Sandino then begins his newly accepted mission of 
liberating Nicaraguans from the exploitation of “capitalists and the large foreign 
businesses...” (Román, 1979:  49).  He explains to the miners how systems more 
favorable to workers function in other countries and insists that they should receive 
benefits such as medical care and should be able to form workers’ unions.  “Little by 
little I was gaining popularity and control among the men of the mine, among them some 
that followed me faithfully...” (Román, 1979:  49).  Sandino’s influence among these 
miners had grown sufficiently enough that he is able to use $3000 of his own savings to 
buy arms in Honduras and lead twenty-nine of the men into battle against 200 of 
Chamorro’s soldiers (Sandino, 1981a; Maraboto, 1929;  Alemán, 1932;  Román, 1979).16  
This battle is the moment in which Alemán said that Sandino’s name first sounded in 
Nicaragua. 
 The workers at the San Albino mine understood that Sandino was not just 
another Nicaraguan joining the Liberal revolution.  They understood that he was indeed 
on a mission.  A follower from those early days, Domingo Pérez, says, “Many joined the 
fight because of hatred...Sandino rose up in arms because we knew that the conservatives 
had sold themselves” (Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo, 1986:  29).  Another early 
follower identifies Sandino’s undisputed leadership, “It was from there [San Albino]   
                                                 
16 Sandino states in an interview that he had $3000.00 while Maraboto and Alemán both report 
that it was $300.00.  Sandino endorsed Maraboto’s publication as true except for two errors - one 
relating to Sandino’half brother, Socrates, and one about Aldolfo Díaz. 
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where our rebellion set out and it was when we revolted, with Sandino at the head” 
(Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo, 1986:  30).  Colonel Juan Colindres told Carleton 
Beals (1928c: 261), “I worked alongside Sandino in the San Albino mines in Nueva 
Segovia some years ago...even then Sandino had ideas about freeing his fatherland from 
foreign control.” 
 Sandino and his twenty-nine men lose this first battle at El Jícaro.  “Sandino 
himself confesses the defeat.  But he was not disheartened by that setback,” says Alemán 
(1932:  7).  His men are discouraged by the failed attack and began to disband, so 
Sandino goes to join forces with the Constitutionalist Liberal government, politically 
headed by Juan Bautista Sacasa and headquartered in the Atlantic coastal town of Puerto 
Cabezas.  There, Sandino’s request for war materiel is denied by Sacasa and his Minister 
of War, José María Moncada.  So, “Sandino embarked in a primitive canoe...” even while 
Sacasa receives several tons of munitions and other equipment from Mexico (Alemán, 
1932: 8). 
 Moncada leaves Puerto Cabezas and heads for another battle while Sandino 
remains in Puerto Cabezas arguing for his own command.  Meanwhile, the US navy lands 
there and orders Sacasa and his supporters to vacate the town, which they do in such a 
hurry that they leaves many of their munitions.  Sandino and six of his men, along with 
some local prostitutes, collects the arms for themselves.  Once again, he seeks out 
Moncada and asks for a command and, once again, is denied (Maraboto, 1929; Macaulay, 
1985).  These first experiences with Moncada leave Sandino bitter toward him - a feeling 
that probably leads to the great mistrust Sandino continues to harbor against Moncada.  
Regardless of Moncada’s personal lack of appreciation for Sandino’s offers to fight, 
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others in the Liberal hierarchy argues that he be given a command, and Moncada finally 
acquiesces (Macaulay, 1985). 
 Sandino’s forces win two hard-fought battles - including a battle at Jinotega in 
March - and then, with two other generals, move to aid Moncada, who had been stopped 
by Conservative troops.  Once Moncada’s situation improves, he orders Sandino to a 
Conservative troop stronghold.  Sandino apparently believes that Moncada’s purpose is 
to ensure Sandino’s defeat and probable death in battle.  It seems that Moncada may have 
been jealous.  After Sandino wins the battle at Jinotega, many soldiers wants to transfer 
to his column.  “Moncada read the order of the day, prohibiting the transfer of soldiers 
from one column to another, as prevention of a great part of the Liberal army...that was 
wanting to belong to my Segovian column,” says Sandino (Alemán, 1932:  13).   
 Not long after the above incident, Moncada meets with US Marine Captain 
Frisbie and then with Henry Stimson and Adolfo Díaz (Román, 1979).  He signs the 
peace agreement with Stimson at Tipitapa on May 4, 1927 and tells Sandino of the terms 
of this agreement the next day.  Moncada asks Sandino and his other generals to lay 
down their arms in exchange for some political concessions from the US to the Liberals, 
for US supervised elections and for some material and political reward to individuals, 
including Sandino.  Sandino is suspicious but says he will consider the terms.  By May 
12, all Liberal generals but Sandino had accepts the Tipitapa terms, and Sandino informs 
Moncada on May 24 that he will not surrender.  “I will not sell myself, nor will I 
surrender.  I must be conquered,” Sandino tells him and dares Moncada to come disarm 
him (Sandino, 1990:  79).  That same day, Sandino signs a letter to the Marine 
commander saying that he proposes that the US provide a military governor who will 
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supervise a presidential election.  Years later, he tells José Román about the frustration he 
felt that day.  So much property and so many lives had been destroyed, he recalls 
thinking, “And for what?  In order to again bring the North American Marines to trample 
down Nicaragua? NO! NO! I SAID TO MYSELF! NO; WHILE SANDINO LIVES, 
THERE WILL BE SOMEONE TO PROTEST!” (Román, 1979:  66) [Román’s 
emphasis]. 
Sandino on His Struggle 
 Thus begins Sandino’s armed struggle against US intervention and against the 
Nicaraguans, including Moncada, who supported it.  Alemán (1932:  19) writes, 
“Sandino is the thunderbolt that descends, he is the gunpowder that explodes, he is 
simply the punishment for the greed that has been developing in Nicaragua like a leper.”  
Sandino will view himself, and his followers will come to view him, as Nicaragua’s great 
hope for national pride and self-determination as he fights to defeat the Yankee invader. 
 Of course, Sandino is obliged to inform his troops of Moncada’s agreement with 
Stimson and of his own plans to continue fighting.  Luisa Cano Aráuz tells of how 
Sandino asks the soldiers to raise their hands if they will continue with him (Instituto de 
Estudio del Sandinismo, 1986).  Many say they will continue to follow him, but many 
say they will not, and he returns to his base with a small group.  On the other hand, those 
who follow were extremely faithful as illustrated by Tomás Jarquín Velázquez, “General 
Sandino was the guide and we are the heritage;  whatever he said, we approved” because 
Moncada’s selling of Nicaragua so enraged Sandino and many of his men (Instituto de 
Estudio del Sandinismo, 1986:  65). 
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 After Sandino breaks with Moncada and launches his own revolution, he begins 
to speak to the Nicaraguan public, North Americans and Latin Americans with his own 
voice.  Therefore, it is not until July 1927 that Sandino begins to publicly present a 
construction of himself.  Throughout the coming years as revolutionary leader, he 
attributes characteristics of charisma to himself.  Most importantly, though, Sandino’s 
presentation of self includes as he presents himself as a nationalist, as an historical 
answer to a historical problem, and finally, as a divine instrument of justice. 
 Only a few weeks after breaking with Moncada, Sandino issues two manifestos - 
one on July 1 and the other in mid-July.  In each of them, Sandino casts negative images 
of his opponents as he expresses disgust with United States’ financial grip on Nicaragua 
and links Moncada to those US interests.  He then establishes himself as a patriot and 
describes himself as a man of humble roots - one of the common people.  For Sandino, 
the United States is the “dastardly invader,” and the Marines are “morphine addicts” and 
“miserable servant[s] of Wall Street” (Sandino, 1990: 75).  In his statements about US 
financial interests, Sandino specifically names the owner of the San Albino mine as a 
man who commits labor abuses and “thinks himself authorized by his nationality to 
commit such abuses” (Sandino, 1981a:  124).  Moncada receives biting criticism from 
Sandino as a Nicaraguan who “naturally failed in his duties as a soldier and a patriot” and 
who does not understand the plight of the working people of Nicaragua because he is 
accustomed to privilege (Sandino, 1988:  49).  
 Perhaps most importantly, Sandino establishes his identity as a common 
Nicaraguan who selflessly loves his country.  The manifestos not only sketch a 
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nationalistic identity but claim that his common roots justify his struggle and leadership.  
In his manifesto of 1 July 1927, he writes: 
I am a Nicaraguan and proud that American Indian blood, more than any 
other, flows through my veins, for it contains the mystery of loyal and 
sincere patriotism.  The bond of nationality gives me the right to assume 
responsibility for my actions in matters regarding Nicaragua, and hence 
Central America and the entire continent of our language, unconcerned 
that the pessimists and cowards call me whatever name best suits their 
character as eunuchs (Sandino, 1988:  48). 
 
Two weeks later, the next manifesto emphasizes those themes and adds that his cause is 
universal.  He is also beginning to reveal charismatic characteristics, such as a lack of 
interest in financial or political gain and his mission to resolve distress, as he writes:  
I want nothing for myself;  I am a mechanic, the sound of my hammer on 
its anvil echoes at a great distance, and it speaks every language in 
matters of labor.  I aspire to nothing.  I desire only the redemption of the 
working class (Sandino, 1990:  80). 
 
 Only two days after the second manifesto is issued, Sandino launches his doomed 
attack on the Marine garrison at Ocotal.  Sandino’s attack force consists of about sixty 
officers and soldiers armed with guns and several hundred peasants armed with machetes.  
His forces attack an enemy composed of “eight hundred pirates [US soldiers] and two 
hundred renegades [Nicaraguan National Guardsmen]”  (Maraboto, 1929:  14).  The 
attack begins in the early morning hours, long before dawn, and proceeds very much in 
the favor of the Sandinistas - so much so that Sandino offers the opportunity of surrender 
to the Marine commander, Captain Hatfield.  Of course, Hatfield refuses.  Then, at mid-
morning, Marine planes appear over Ocotal and machine gun fire rains down on the 
Sandinistas.  By late afternoon, all Sandinistas have either been killed or evacuated the 
town.  When the Sandinistas suffer two more defeats in the next two weeks, Sandino 
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retreats to his mountain fortress, El Chipote (Macaulay, 1985).  Perhaps as a sign of the 
perception of Sandino as a serious threat, a price of $10,000 is then placed on his head for 
anyone who delivers him dead or alive (de Belausteguitoitia, 1985). 
 Sandino’s analysis of Ocotal, as told to Román (1979) provides quite a peek into 
his sense of his own leadership.  First, he says that the Yankees only won the battle 
because of the use of airplanes.  Then he notes that somehow he was able to convince his 
men that “it is a thousand times more preferable to die than to be slaves,” and so they 
followed him into battle17 (Román, 1979:  72).  He is quite pleased as he notes that, until 
Ocotal, everyone had thought the United States had complete authority in Nicaragua.  
Even Sandino confesses that he believed he would die as part of the effort to rid 
Nicaragua of US influence.  However, the lessons of Ocotal are, first, to “always stand on 
the side of honor and justice because that makes one invincible” (Román, 1979: 72).  
Second, “the invincibility of the American Marines is pure myth” (Román, 1979: 72).  
Third, the introduction of “military aviation against us introduced an element of surprise” 
that the Sandinistas will have to avoid.  Finally, he came to understand the “immense 
value of publicity with regard to world opinion” (Román, 1979:  72). 
 General Sandino makes some crucial decisions following three military defeats - 
Ocotal and two others. First, he decides that his army must turn to guerrilla warfare as 
their principal strategy (Macaulay, 1985).  Secondly, he and his army formally organize 
the Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua (EDSNN).  The 
guidelines for the EDSNN are written and then signed by Sandino and hundreds of his 
                                                 
17 This quote will be used repeatedly by the contemporary Sandinistas. 
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followers, who swear that they will die before becoming traitors or surrendering to the 
proposals of “the invaders oligarchs and traitors...” (Sandino, 1981a:  142).  The 
guidelines speak to the purpose of the Army and outline the required behavior of its 
soldiers.  They also clearly establish Sandino’s role as undisputed and charismatic leader.  
The “Defenders of the National Law of Nicaragua...recognize as their Supreme 
Commander the patriot General Augusto César Sandino, who, with loyalty and  
sincerity, has known how to defend with complete self-denial the Nation’s honor, as a 
legitimate Nicaraguan...,” and “every order emanating from the Supreme Commander of 
the Revolution will be obeyed with the highest spirit of discipline...” (Sandino, 1981a:  
142).  Furthermore, the guidelines establish the relationship between Sandino’s 
charismatic authority and his followers: 
The Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua, made up 
of selfless patriots, does not receive a daily wage...it being understood 
that every truly patriotic Nicaraguan is obliged to defend voluntarily the 
nation’s honor; however, the Supreme Commander of the Revolution 
commits himself to providing everything that is indispensable to the 
army in the form of equipment and clothing” (Sandino, 1990:  96). 
 
 Sandino then turns his attention to another battle - the battle of Telpaneca - and 
makes a better showing for his army.  Sandino reports, “The attack was a total success” 
(Sandino, 1990: 106).  The Sandinistas not only fight well and inflict significant damage 
on the Marines and National Guard but put new tactics into practice that will frustrate the 
enemy’s efforts to assess Sandino’s strength.  The Sandinistas begin to remove their dead 
from the battlefield immediately so that the Marines can not achieve an accurate count, or 
even an estimate, of Sandinsta casualties (Macaulay, 1985). 
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 At this same time, Sandino begins to make a focused effort to communicate his 
purpose to the broader Central American, and even Latin American, population through 
correspondence with Froylán Turcios, Sandino’s official foreign representative of the 
EDSNN based in Honduras and editor of the periodical Ariel.18  Turcios publishes 
Sandino’s letters and manifestos so that Latin Americans may know about Sandino’s 
“opposition to my country’s invaders” and “my obsession to repel with dignity and pride 
the imposition that...the assassins of weak nations are imposing upon our country...” 
(Sandino, 1990: 100, 105).  On the other hand, Sandino complains to Turcios about 
apparent Latin American indifference to his struggle.  Nevertheless, Sandino exhorts 
Turcios to tell all that “...there will be no human power to stop Sandino and his army, no 
gold in the world that will arouse ambition in the hearts of the defenders of the national 
sovereignty of Nicaragua...” (Sandino, 1990: 144). 
 Sandino implies above that only divine power may stop him, and in a remarkable 
letter to one of his colonels, the hint is stronger.  In the letter, Sandino criticizes the 
Liberal party for its compromise at Tipitapa.  He then seems to refer to himself when he 
says, “...he that becomes a redeemer has to die crucified and should imitate Jesus Christ 
in resignation saying: ‘Forgive them Father that they know not what they do’” (Sandino, 
1981a:  199). 
 One of the last documents written by Sandino in 1927 is the “Manifesto to the  
                                                 
18 Former National Guardsman Domingo Ibarra Grijalva (1973:  34) credits Turcios’ efforts on 
behalf of Sandino as being a flash of “lightening which shone and reverberated over the world.”  
He also says that it did not matter that the President of Honduras silenced Ariel in 1928 because 
Turcios had already planted ideas and “ideas perdure as they germinate and reproduce in the 
consciences of those who love liberty” (Ibarra, 1973:  34).   
 110
Nicaraguan People” that expresses the General’s position on the presidential elections to 
occur in November 1928.  Sandino condemns the elections for, at least, two reasons.  
First, he argues that Juan B. Sacasa is already the constitutionally elected president and 
should be allowed to fulfill his term.  Therefore, any election that occurs before Sacasa 
completes his term is unconstitutional and will be opposed by the EDSNN.  Second, 
Sandino and his army will oppose the election because it will be organized by the “the 
conquerors” (the US Marines), and the traitor Moncada is likely to be the presidential 
candidate (Sandino, 1990:  113).   
 As the year 1927 comes to a close, Augusto César Sandino has begun to present 
himself as a charismatic figure, and he begins to hint that he plays a divine role.  He has 
described himself as a nationalist, a patriot and then an internationalist.  He has declared 
himself to be humble, indigenous, a member of the working class and one of the 
oppressed.  He seeks only freedom and justice for Nicaraguans, is willing to fight and 
sacrifice for his cause, is determined and cannot be stopped, and does none of it for 
personal gain.  Furthermore, he has cast the US military and US business as evil doers 
bent on exploiting Nicaragua, and the Nicaraguans who collaborate with them, such as 
Moncada, as traitorous sellouts.  The followers who continue with him after Moncada’s 
surrender absolutely see the world as Sandino presents it. 
 The Pan-American Conference in Havana, Cuba opens the new year of 1928.  
Representatives of the various governments in the hemisphere are there, including those 
of Nicaragua’s Díaz administration.  Not only is the US government represented, but 
President Coolidge thought it important that he come himself, largely due to the 
controversy regarding Sandino’s fight to oust US Marines from Nicaragua.  Sandino 
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writes to the conference attendees exhorting them to formally protest the presence of the 
“illegal delegates” of the Díaz government (since Sandino considers Sacasa to be the 
constitutionally elected president) and to protest the United States’ “murder” of 
Nicaraguans (Sandino, 1990:  158).  While outwardly the delegates seem supportive of 
President Coolidge, the body passes a resolution that states, “No state has the right to 
intervene in the internal or external affairs of another” (Selser, 1981:  104). 
 Throughout November and December of 1927, Marines and the National Guard 
mount various attacks against the Sandinista mountain fortress, El Chipote.  By January 
1928, the attacks are beginning to take their toll on Sandino’s forces.  As Sandino 
(Maraboto, 1980:  17) tells it: 
During sixteen days that we were besieged, we had a daily visit from the 
pirates’ aerial squadrons.  At six in the morning the first squadron of four 
airplanes appeared and started bombing.  Of course, we were shooting 
back at them as well and a lot of birds [planes] were mortally injured.  
After four hours of shelling, a new squadron relieved the first and 
continued the fire;  until, four hours having passed, another one came.  
And so it was continuously, without stopping, until night fell. 
 
Sandino also reports that the conditions on El Chipote become so unsanitary with the 
decomposition of dead horses and other animals that he feared an epidemic.  Therefore, 
the Sandinistas remove their dead, as had become their custom, and replaces the corpses 
with straw bodies to fool the Marines.  The army then abandons El Chipote at night.  
Apparently, the Marines are completely fooled for they continue the bombardment for 
two days after the Sandinistas had evacuated (Maraboto, 1980). 
 Sandino leaves El Chipote and goes to San Rafael del Norte, which he is easily 
able to occupy since the Marines had left it unguarded to attack Sandino’s mountain 
fortress  At San Rafael del Norte, Sandino receives Carleton Beals, reporter for the North 
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American publication, The Nation.  Beals arranges the meeting through Froylán Turcios 
and is the first American to be granted an interview by Sandino.  Since Beals’ series of 
articles is published in the United States and not in Nicaragua and contributes to the 
North American construction of Sandino, they will be discussed in the next chapter.  
However, Sandino’s presentation of himself in this four and one-half hour interview is 
certainly worth mention here. 
 General Sandino repeats to Beals statements that he has made before.  He 
demands that the Marines leave Nicaragua, that an impartial civilian president head the 
Nicaraguan government and that Latin Americans supervise the coming elections.  He 
repeats that he will not accept a government position, a salary, a pension or any other 
personal reward.  He tells Beals that he is an honest man, keeps his word and is debt free.   
 Beals notes that Sandino refers to God often.  “There is a religious note in his 
thinking,” says Beals (1928d:  289) as the General tends to sprinkle his speech with 
references such as “‘God and our mountains fight for us.’”  Furthermore, he is firm about 
not fearing death.  “‘Death is but a tiny moment of discomfort not to be taken seriously,’” 
is a phrase that he often repeats to his soldiers (Beals, 1928d:  289).   
 Lastly, Sandino talks to Beals about the Sandinista mission.  He explains that the 
Sandinistas fight because they are the only Nicaraguans who love their country; the 
others have betrayed it and are cowards.  His army is one of workers and peasants while 
the intellectuals are the traitors.  He is working for all Nicaraguans, and all Central 
America is morally obliged to help him throw out the invaders.  “...eighteen years of 
American meddling in Nicaragua have plunged the country deeper into economic 
misery,” says Sandino (Beals, 1928f:  341).  Beals’ (1928f:  341) article concludes with 
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Sandino explaining, “...sooner or later, every nation, however weak, achieves freedom 
and that every abuse of power hastens the destruction of the one who wields it.” 
 The image of Sandino presented in his interview with Carleton Beals is that he is 
friendly, honest, trustworthy, and spiritual.  From his followers, he demands complete 
loyalty, order and discipline, and he is quite proud of them.  He is selfless in his love of 
Nicaragua and is thoroughly committed to freeing Nicaragua from Yankee meddling.  
Sandino also sees his struggle as obviously morally correct. 
 In the latter part of March 1928, Sandino’s forces move eastward and seize, first, 
the La Luz and Los Angeles gold mines and, later, the Bonanza mine.  All are owned by 
North Americans.  These seizures occur amidst reports in the United States that Sandino 
has been killed on El Chipote.  There is some symbolic meaning for Sandino in seizing 
the mines since President Díaz had worked at the La Luz and Los Angeles company, and 
former US Secretary of State, Philander Knox apparently had financial interests in the 
company.  The Sandinistas sack and destroy the mines.  As Sandino reports it: 
Of course, receipts were issued to [Knox and Díaz] that I sent to the 
damned ones in order that they charge the Treasury of the United States, 
for this reason:  ‘SO THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
KNOW THAT YOUR MARINES ARE INCOMPETENT TO 
GUARANTEE THE LIVES AND PROPERTIES OF THE 
NORTHAMERICANS IN NICARAGUA” (Román, 1979:  92). 
[Román’s emphasis] 
 
Sandino then sends a letter to the manager of the mine explaining that the mines have 
been destroyed and that North American lives and property will be in danger until the 
Marines leave Nicaragua.  He further explains that the US government’s reason for the 
Marine occupation, to protect US lives and property, is only a pretext for imperialistic 
interests since Sandino has obviously proven that the Marines are ineffective at their 
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stated purpose.  Sandino also suggests that the manager collect damages from President 
Coolidge (Sandino, 1990:  192).  Maraboto (1980:  18) quotes Sandino as saying, “the 
Yankees charge us several million, that’s fine...they owe us for their stay in the 
homeland, for the lives that the invasion has cost and other damages, a billion.” 
 At this time, Sandino is beginning to clearly understand himself as an historical 
agent and to present himself as such.  “...I have accepted the unjustified challenge [of the 
Yankees] that strikes our sovereignty to the ground, ascribing to my acts responsibility 
before History,” he writes to Froylán Turcios (Sandino, 1981a:  70).  He takes this 
responsibility because he loves justice and is willing to sacrifice himself for it as he does 
not value the material world but the spiritual.  The General continues, “To remain 
inactive or indifferent, as the majority of my fellow citizens, would be to join the rude 
crowd of mercenary assassins of their own country” (Sandino, 1990: 26). 
 While Sandino is fighting various battles, he is also mindful to garner support 
among Latin Americans generally.  Numerous letters to Froylán Turcios, which will later 
be published in Ariel, exhort Central Americans and Latin Americans to join together 
against Yankee imperialism across the Americas and, specifically, in Nicaragua.  In a 
June 1928 letter, he argues that North Americans use the Monroe Doctrine to say 
‘America for the Americans,’ but they really mean ‘America for the Yankees.’  “All right 
then,” Sandino submits, “so that the blond beasts don’t continue to be deceived, I will re-
write the sentence in the following terms:  The United States of North America for the 
Yankees.  Latin America for the Indo-Latins” (Sandino, 1981a:  271).  He further writes 
to Turcios, “...the Yankees can come to our Latin America as guests, but never as lords 
and masters...It will not be strange if I and my army are found in any Latin American 
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country where the murderous invader treads in a posture of conquest” (Sandino, 1981a:  
271).  He ends this particular letter with a phrase that has become one of his most famous 
statements:  “Sandino is Indo-Hispanic and he has no frontiers in Latin America” 
(Sandino, 1981a:  271). 
Sandino’s Followers 
 News of Sandino’s revolution and his own efforts to garner support are bearing 
some fruit.  He is receiving vocal support, and sometimes material and financial support, 
from various quarters.  He has supporters in Costa Rica, Mexico, Venezuela and Peru.  
Gabriela Mistral, the Chilean poet, urges widespread Latin American support of 
Sandino’s struggle and said, “General  Sandino bears on his vigorous shoulders of a 
rustic man...the honor of all of us” (IES, 1985:  213).  Anti-imperialist troops in China 
carry a poster of Sandino and name one of their divisions after him (Macaulay, 1985).  At 
home, his soldiers are becoming more loyal to him and to his cause. 
 Sandino is the source of rules and discipline in his army, as are charismatic 
leaders.  For example, Sandino issues a decree to his troops outlining policy on the 
procurement, ownership and treatment of animals.  It seems that some Sandinistas were 
stealing animals thus giving foundation to the bandit label, and Sandino put a stop to it.  
Neither would Sandino tolerate any of his men stealing, molesting or raping women, or 
drinking.  A  Sandinista officer, previously in very good standing, became drunk and 
raped a woman.  He is immediately executed on Sandino’s orders (Maraboto, 1980).  
When the writer de Belausteguigoitia asks Sandino how many executions Sandino has 
ordered, he answers five.  “Two generals, one captain, a sergeant, and a soldier,” he 
responds (de Belausteguigoitia, 1934:  189). 
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 On the other hand, Sandino’s soldiers are very devoted to him and are likely to 
sing his praises, sometimes quite literally.  There are several songs and poems of the 
period that tell of the Nicaraguan struggle against the Yankee invaders or pirates, as 
Sandino calls them.  A portion of the last verse of the Hymn of the Army is one example: 
Here are the warriors... 
Nicaragua, Nicaragua... 
that are going to liberate you, 
because it has been your destiny 
that Augusto César Sandino 
take us on the road 
where we are going to triumph. 
 (Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo, 1985a:  139) 
Verses from two other songs reinforce the point: 
Long live the patriot, gentlemen, 
That always joyfully fights; 
With pride he has confronted 
The ambitious Gringo 
 (Composer unknown, de Belausteguigoitia, 1934: 164) 
We were powerful weapons  
In order to follow the destiny 
That Augusto César Sandino 
Taught us to defend 
(Composer unknown, de Belausteguigoitia, 1934:  166) 
 
Sofonias Salvatierra (1934: 133), who later becomes President Sacasa’s Minister of 
Agriculture and Labor, reports as well that when visiting Sandino’s encampment, 
“Sandino’s people were talking and singing since dawn and repeated without ceasing 
‘Long live General Sandino...’”  
 De Belausteguigoitia (1934) marvels at the devotion of Sandino’s army.  He 
describes the army as lacking proper food and clothing and as not being paid anything.  
Yet, he sees an army with “spiritual power so great” that it is the most powerful army in 
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all America as it follows Sandino (de Belausteguigoitia, 1934:  133).  Even National 
Guardsmen recognize that Sandino’s men love him.  Ibarra (1973:  121) writes, “These 
men were loyal, as faithful dogs to their master.  They sincerely loved the Supreme Chief 
and Sandino repaid them with his affection and trust.” 
 One of Sandino’s officers, Colonel Santos López, will eventually become a 
founder of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional.  He will write his story well 
after Sandino’s struggle.  However, it is appropriate to mention here that López entered 
Sandino’s army at the age of twelve.  He became a member of the Coro de los Ángeles 
(Choir of Angels), a group of children whose job it was to use cans, sticks and other such 
items to make a racket in order to startle an enemy patrol so that the Sandinistas could 
attack it.  López says that he volunteered for the Sandinsta army, apparently, because he 
was attracted to the soldiers, and it seemed that it was an alternative to the near starvation 
that he was enduring with his single mother and siblings.  In addition, López noticed that 
there were other children his age in Sandino’s army.  He had not yet met Sandino when 
he joined the army.  Throughout López’ book, it is clear that he has great respect and 
admiration for Sandino and great disdain for the Marines, noting their cruelty against 
“defenseless peasants” such as putting women and children in their homes and then 
burning the homes (López, no date:  21).  However, he does not write about Sandino in 
charismatic terms, but simply recounts events and conversations. 
 An abundant collection of followers’ quotes edited by the Instituto de Estudio del 
Sandinismo (IES - Institute for the Study of Sandinism) (1985, 1986) illustrate the 
previous comments well.  Numerous quotes describe Sandino’s physical appearance, and 
almost every one mentions that he was short, about five foot five.  They also mention that 
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he was slender, clean-shaven, rather unremarkable in terms of attractiveness, very clean 
and well groomed and meticulously dressed with boots always polished and a large 
Stetson slightly tilted to his forehead.  Most focus on the type of man that he was and 
regularly begin with the observation that he was very kind.  For example, one soldier 
said, “But dealing with him was as if one were dealing with your father” (IES, 1986: 
278).  Another soldier added, 
General Sandino was a man that exceedingly treated us with every 
affection, with every kindness and for that reason we all followed him, 
because he was a very generous man (IES, 1986:  280). 
 
 Such comments continue for pages and pages in the collection.  Another type of 
comment speaks to how Sandino personalized his leadership and mission.  He was leader 
and family at the same time as evidenced by one soldier, “When one of us was killed, he 
felt it as if a son or brother of his had fallen.  Sandino said that he felt the loss of a soldier 
in his heart” (IES, 1986:  278). Similarly, another said, “General Sandino came around to 
all the reserve corps every morning;  he greeted each one, embraced us, because he was a 
very popular man with everyone” (IES, 1986:  283).  Yet, the mission was always clear:  
“He was always explaining to us that his struggle was to get the Yankees out of 
Nicaragua, because the Yankees are not the owners of Nicaragua”  (IES, 1986:  282). 
 Such commitment is not limited to Sandino’s army.  Pavletich (1983) relates the 
story of a seven-year-old boy who hid himself, terrified upon hearing that General 
Sandino was coming to town.  By dusk, the boy was giving rapt attention to Sandino’s 
explanation of Yankee imperialism.  When Sandino and his men left town the next day, 
the boy was yelling, “Long live General Sandino!”   
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 In addition, his soldiers sense a presence or power in Sandino greater than the 
man himself.  In various ways, their comments indicate that Sandino was either a 
historical force of a divine instrument.  Their observations include: 
There was the influence of Bolívar in Sandino in the continental sense, 
because Bolívar wanted to unite all the American states, including the 
North Americans, against Europe...The plan to realize the Supreme 
Dream of Bolívar, Sandino wanted to execute an agreement with the rest 
of the Indohispanic, Latin American governments, to confront North 
American imperialism (IES, 1986: 287). 
 
Sandino, now, is listening to me in immortality; to me he is like a demi-
god (IES, 1986:  288) 
 
General Sandino was every hope for Nicaragua, complete guardian of 
national sovereignty.  General Sandino has not died, he will live eternally 
in the heart of those who knew him and worked with him, because we 
knew who he was and we value him as a great hero (IES, 1986:  288).  
 
Sandino Abroad 
 General Moncada is elected to the presidency on November 4, 1928.  With 
Moncada’s election, the United States government begins to believe that Sandino’s days 
are numbered.  The US military begins to withdraw those troops deployed to supervise 
the election.  The Sandinistas had tried to disrupt the elections for the previous month, 
but it seems that enough Nicaraguans turned out to vote that non-Sandinistas consider the 
election legitimate.  Additionally, Sandino had suggested that the elections be supervised 
by Latin Americans, an idea clearly rejected (Macaulay, 1985). 
 The election of Moncada, a traitor in Sandino’s eyes, is problem enough in itself.  
Another problem arises when Sandino’s principal foreign representative begins to 
disagree with Sandino’s plans.  Froylán Turcios writes to Sandino in late November 
asking that he issue a manifesto that he will lay down his arms as soon as the Marines 
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leave Nicaragua.  Turcios believes that Sandino should not demand the removal of 
Moncada whether Moncada is a traitor or not.  To do otherwise, for Turcios, would 
amount to civil war rather than a war against Yankee imperialism (Maraboto, 1980; 
Macaulay, 1961; Hodges, 1990).  Sandino responds that he disagrees with Turcios’ 
proposal because following Turcios’ advice would mean that Sandino recognizes the 
Moncada government and the elections as legitimate, which he does not.  He further 
implies that issuing the manifesto that Turcios suggests would be lazy and would cede the 
moral authority that he has accumulated (Maraboto, 1980).  By late December 1928, 
Turcios resigns over what he sees as impasse with Sandino, and Sandino accepts his 
resignation in January 1929 (Sandino, 1981a). 
 The year 1929 begins with Sandino rejecting a proposal made by US Admiral 
Sellars that Sandino surrender.  Sandino writes to Moncada on New Year’s Day 
providing Moncada with a copy of the letter to Sellars and informing him that Sandino 
will only discuss peace with Moncada himself because Nicaraguan peace must be 
achieved by Nicaraguans.  Five days later Sandino issues “Fundamental Principles of an 
Agreement Proposed to General José María Moncada.”  The purpose of the principles is 
to offer Moncada the chance to make himself accountable to the Nicaraguan people. 
Contained within the first thirteen of fifteen principles are two essential messages.  First, 
the US government is to not only remove its occupation forces from Nicaragua, but 
Moncada’s administration will reject any future efforts by the US to usurp Nicaraguan 
sovereignty whether through political or economic means and will nullify the Bryan-
Chamorro treaty.  Second, the Nicaraguan government must initiate certain social and 
economic programs that benefit average citizens.  These programs include worker’s 
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compensation, eight-hour work days, paying workers in cash rather than coupons, 
employers providing schools, equal pay for women,  regulation of child labor, the right to 
organize unions and the establishment of a national department of labor.  Point Fourteen 
then insists that Nicaragua lead in the formation of a Central American union, and Point 
Fifteen requires that guarantees be made to the people of the four departments where the 
EDSNN has been most active (Sandino, 1990).  Maraboto (1980) reports that Moncada 
did not consider these proposals and had not responded to them by July 15. 
 The early part of the year brings some significant changes for Sandino.  Upon the 
previously mentioned resignation of his chief foreign representative, Sandino decides to 
act as his own foreign representative and visit the President of Mexico.  Toward this end, 
he appoints Juan de Paredes, a captain in the EDSNN, as his special envoy to Mexico. Dr. 
Pedro José Zepeda, a Nicaraguan living in Mexico City, had already long been Sandino’s 
representative in Mexico and had worked in concert with Turcios in communicating 
Sandino’s messages to the world.  De Paredes and Zepeda are to prepare the way for 
Sandino’s visit (Macaulay, 1985). 
 Other changes involve the nature of the war that is always raging while Sandino 
writes and makes plans in addition to overseeing battles.  In February Sandino’s chief of 
staff, General Girón, is captured by Marines, turned over to Nicaragua’s new volunteer 
army, and then executed after a trial.  In addition, the new US president, Herbert Hoover, 
is inaugurated and wants to evacuate the Marines from Nicaragua and Haiti.  On March 
6, 1929, Sandino sends a lengthy open letter to Hoover.  First, he informs Hoover that it 
is due to the efforts of the Sandinistas that Coolidge and Secretary of State Kellogg have 
been removed from office.  He then puts Hoover on notice that the Sandinistas are 
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prepared to “punish implacably every abuse of the United States of America in the affairs 
of our country” (Sandino, 1990:  239).  Sandino links the dollars of Wall Street bankers 
to the deaths of Nicaraguan citizens, and he explains that the actions of the Coolidge 
administration “have produced an enormous wave of hatred and distrust for you...” 
(Sandino, 1990:  241).  Sandino concludes by indicating his charisma and historical 
influence and continuity:  “As long as you continue the policies of Coolidge and Kellogg, 
you will continue encountering Sandinos” (Sandino, 1990: 242). 
 Sandino continues to emphasize his struggle for Nicaragua’s history.  A month 
after writing to Hoover, Sandino writes to Chilean poetess Gabriela Mistral that he is the 
one to continue the struggle of General Benjamín Zeledón, killed in 1912 during a 
Yankee attack.  Sandino tells her, “...that fraternal patriot had been the first to lift the 
stone that, with its great weight, would someday drive the dynamo that would bring the 
light of freedom to our peoples, and I would carry that stone as far as I could and, even 
after I had fallen in battle, others would come to carry it wherever it had to be taken” 
(Sandino, 1990:  63).  Sandino, in the course of his revolutionary career, will refer many 
times to his sense of place in Nicaraguan history and that, just as he is a link in this chain, 
others will continue his historical work as well. 
 Sandino departs Nicaragua for Mexico in May 1929.  Before leaving, he issues 
his “Plan for the Realization of Bolivar’s Highest Dream” on behalf of the Army in 
Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua.  The forty-four point plan invokes 
Bolivar’s image and argues for an alliance of the twenty-one Latin American nations to 
stand against the imperialism of the United States and to establish their own pan-Latin 
American governing bodies such as a Congress and a Court of Justice.  The alliance 
 123
would also have its own armed forces.  Throughout the document, he mentions the need 
to forge a Latin American nationality “thereby assuring our domestic freedom and 
independence, now threatened by the most voracious of all imperialisms, to fulfill in time 
the great destiny of the Latin American nationality...as a land of promise for people of 
every nation and race” (Sandino 1990:  262). 
 Sandino arrives in Mexico on June 25 expecting, based on information given him 
by the Sandinista envoy de Paredes, that Mexico’s president Portes Gil will provide him 
with aid in finances and materiel.  When Sandino enters Mexico, he is met with great 
fanfare but is asked to wait in Veracruz until he receives word calling him to Mexico 
City.  Word does not come, and he is invited to stay in a house on the Yucatán peninsula 
that is provided by the Mexican government. After months of waiting to be called to the 
capital, Sandino suspects de Paredes of treachery and fires him.  Otherwise, Sandino has 
comparatively little to do in Mexico.  In July Sandino grants an interview to Emigidio 
Maraboto, a Mexican journalist who interviews him in Veracruz (Macaulay, 1985). 
 Maraboto’s work, cited elsewhere in this chapter, is a booklet called Sandino ante 
el coloso (Sandino Before the Colossus) and is one of the most notable documents of 
Sandino's time.  The booklet is notable because it is one of the first lengthy, published 
studies of Sandino and is written and published in 1929 during the first half of Sandino’s 
struggle and while Sandino is still alive. Maraboto, a Mexican journalist, writes the piece 
while Sandino is in Mexico for the purpose of informing the world of the situation in 
Nicaragua. The book claims to present the true image of Sandino against the image of a 
bandit as presented by the United States press.  While the book is not a formal interview 
with Sandino, Sandino himself confirms the authenticity of the document and that, except 
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for two errors, it contains correct information19 (Maraboto, 1980).  Therefore, Maraboto’s 
work does, in some sense, convey Sandino’s image of himself.  The Sandino presented in 
this work is strong-willed, driven, principled, unschooled but intelligent, successful and 
democratically-minded.  As mentioned previously, it is also one of the few sources that 
gives Sandino’s version of his childhood and youth. 
 The striking title of the book - Sandino ante el coloso - casts Sandino in mythic 
and biblical terms in the tradition of David and Goliath.  Most of the references to 
Sandino in this booklet include adjectives which portray him as a charming, intelligent, 
and determined warrior.  However, it also includes other glowing comments that link him 
to the divine.  For example, "destiny reserved for him [Sandino]  the role of supreme 
commander of the Army for the Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua" 
(Maraboto, 1980: 9).  Similarly, the booklet reprints a letter to Sandino from a Honduran 
journalist and representative of Sandino.  The journalist writes to Sandino that "your 
honor and glory will remain immortalized in the highest civic conscience and in freedom" 
(Maraboto, 1980: 21).   This comment does not directly attribute divinity to Sandino, but 
it is strikingly similar to a word of praise that might be uttered in a religious context. 
 Maraboto is clearly impressed by Sandino and declares, “Augusto César Sandino 
is not the man that everyone imagines” (Maraboto, 1980: 8).  It is unclear what Maraboto 
believes the public image of Sandino is, but he argues against it by describing the 
General as “...an improvised warrior, but every bit a warrior,” “a humble, ignorant 
                                                 
19 According to Sandino, the two errors are “that of saying that Socrates Sandino and I are 
brothers by father and mother, and that the sellout Díaz is the Minister of Nicaragua in 
Washington...Outside of those two errors, all the rest is authentic” (Maraboto, 1980: 2). 
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mechanic,” and “a man of little instruction, but of enormous natural intelligence, astute 
and...nice and pleasant...” (Maraboto 1980: 8).  Sandino is also impressed by Maraboto’s 
product.  In September Sandino sends a copy of the Sandino ante el coloso to Gustavo 
Alemán Bolaños recommending it to Alemán as essentially correct. 
 While Sandino waits in the Yucatán, the Sandinista revolutionaries are suffering 
their own troubles.  General Pedro Altamirano is commanding largely because a handful 
of other generals did not want the job.  The Sandinistas are winning the occasional 
victory, but there is a general demoralization among the troops with the absence of their 
charismatic leader.  Battles are also less numerous since it has become the primary task of 
the Marines to train the National Guard.  Additionally, the Marines have largely taken 
responsibility for policing the cities while the Guard patrols the countryside.  As 
mentioned previously, Hoover was not fond of the war in Nicaragua and training 
guardsmen to shoulder more of the burden was a way to ease the Marines’ responsibility 
(Macaulay, 1985).  
 October brings the advent of worldwide economic depression.  A few weeks 
before the stock market crash, October brings a replacement for Turcios as Sandino’s 
chief foreign representative.  He appoints Dr. José Zepeda, a Nicaraguan physician living 
in Mexico City,  and mentions that he considered Gustavo Machado for the position.  
Machado, a Venezuelan, is the head of the Hands Off Nicaragua Committee, 
headquartered in Mexico City.  However, Sandino complains that Machado has not acted 
responsibly in terms of communicating in a timely fashion or in completing promised 
work on Sandino’s behalf (Sandino, 1990).  Then in December, Machado accuses 
Sandino of accepting and then misspending money from the Mexican Communist party 
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and of accepting a bribe from the US to leave Nicaragua and go to Mexico.  Sandino, of 
course, has to spend considerable time and diplomatic effort to counter those charges 
(Macaulay, 1985; Sandino, 1990).  The rift will ultimately lead to a parting of the ways 
between Sandino and the Communists.20 
 Sandino is finally able to go to Mexico City in January 1930 to meet with 
President Portes Gil.  Apparently, the meeting accomplishes more in terms of adding to 
Sandino’s prestige by meeting with a head of state than it did in terms of acquiring 
tangible help for the Sandinista revolution.  Yet Sandino stays in Mexico for a few more 
months, gives some interviews and continues to try to mend fences with the Communist 
party even though he does not fully accept their political position (Macaulay, 1985; 
Hodges, 1986).  
 During some of those interviews in Mexico, Sandino admits to some unseemly 
practices of his army while criticizing the immorality of the US government. In one 
interview, Sandino (1990:  301) calls Coolidge and Kellogg “moral wretches” and yet, in 
another on the same day, admits that his troops practice the corte de chaleco - or “vest 
cut” - on Yankees.  The vest cut is the decapitation of the victim along with cutting off 
the arms at the shoulders.  In his interview with Maraboto (1980:  20), Sandino also 
mentions that he gives no quarter to prisoners of war - he “loses his prisoners” - out of 
necessity.  On the other hand, he says that he knows it is important to North Americans to 
recover the remains of the dead so he plans to return the remains of US dead - “who die 
fighting the cause of bankers” - to their families (Maraboto, 1980:  20). 
                                                 
20 This break will also include Sandino losing his Salvadoran secretary, Communist Farabundo 
Martí, who will also become the namesake for the contemporary revolution in El Salvador. 
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 The General recalls a specific incident in his Mexico trip for interviewer Román 
(1979) in 1933.   It reveals Sandino’s popularity outside Nicaragua and his own 
satisfaction with it.  Sandino wanted to see a bullfight.  He continues, “We arrived, 
intentionally, in the middle of the first bullfight, in order to not call attention to ourselves.  
I was dressed as a civilian with dark glasses...but...someone shouted, ‘Mexicans, General 
Sandino is with us in this plaza.  Long live General Sandino!’ and...the entire plaza stood 
up shouting ‘Viva Sandino!’”  Román (1979:  107) says that he talked to a Mexican who 
was there, and that person confirms Sandino’s story and adds that the fight was 
suspended for several minutes due to the noise and ovation and “hats flew into the ring 
and it seemed that the whole world had gone crazy.” 
Return to Nicaragua & Becoming Divine 
 Sandino writes a remarkable letter to General Altamirano in January 1930.  The 
purpose of this brief letter seems to be encouragement.  However, it also contains an 
extremely noteworthy passage regarding Sandino’s view of himself.  Sandino (1990: 
287) writes, 
“...I am nothing but an instrument of divine justice to redeem this nation, 
and that if I am in need of some of the miseries existing on this earth it’s 
because I had to come before you also born of a woman and to offer 
myself to you full of the human miseries common to all of us in this 
earthly world, because you would not have been able to believe me if I 
had not spoken and been the same as you.” 
 
The comment is more than strikingly similar to the story of Jesus Christ in every aspect 
except that Sandino is to save a nation and not humankind in general. 
 In April Sandino leaves Mexico and returns to Nicaragua in May.  Just before 
leaving Mexico, Sandino writes a letter to Estéban Pavletich (member of his staff and 
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representative of the Peruvian American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) vowing that he 
will never again leave Nicaragua while the “miserable Yankee invader remains on 
Nicaraguan soil”  (Sandino, 1990:  327).  Furthermore, Sandino promises to remain 
fiercely determined to oust the invader.  He (1990:  327) invokes the words of Bolívar, 
“If the elements are against us, we will be against the elements, and if God is against us, 
we will be against God” [Sandino’s emphasis].  In the first months of 1930, Sandino has 
linked himself to the hero of the Americas, Bolívar, has spoken of himself in Christ-like 
terms and has expressed a willingness to battle God for the righteousness of his cause. 
 On June 18 Sandino personally leads four hundred men to take possession of 
Mount Saraguazca near Jinotega.  A battle ensues early on June 19, and Sandino claims 
that his men have routed the enemy by noon.  However, Marine planes arrive and begin 
bombing and firing machine guns.  An enemy bomb explodes, wounding Sandino in his 
left leg.  In mid-August Sandino tells Zepeda that his wound has improved, but the leg is 
stiff, he walks with a limp, and he uses a cane.  He also mentions that the wound has not 
“had any effect on our moral cause because it will only disappoint those timid people 
who are in the habit of slandering us” (Sandino, 1990:  349). 
 During the last three months of 1930 and then through February 1931, the 
General shares his views on spiritual matters and his firm belief that he and his cause are 
directly linked to divine will.  Sandino sends letters to Abraham Rivera, a Sandinista 
officer, that speak of  “the law of love” (Sandino, 1981b:  145).  He explains to Rivera 
that it is love from which all material substance, known as ether, is formed.  Ether “is the 
life demonstrated by electricity, which is the life of mankind, that is to say, all light (the 
spirit)” (Sandino, 1981b:  146).  Justice also springs from love and, therefore, injustice 
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occurs when there is ignorance of the divine law of love, and it is contrary to love.  In his 
“ ‘Light and Truth’ Manifesto” Sandino further explains that injustice will disappear 
from the earth when the “refractory spirits” are “flung upon other planets that are less 
advanced than the earth” (Sandino, 1981b:  147).  The Last Judgment of the world is the 
destruction of injustice and the Reign of the Spirit of Light and Truth, also called Love.  
Sandino (1981b:  160) outlines what will happen: 
...the oppressed people of the earth will break the chains of humiliation, 
with which the imperialists of the earth have sought to keep them in 
backwardness.  The trumpets that will be heard will be the bugles of war, 
intoning the hymns of the freedom of the oppressed peoples against the 
injustice of the oppressors...Love, the kingdom of Perfection, will 
remain... 
 
He links the Last Judgment to his revolution, “The honor has fallen to us, brothers, that in 
Nicaragua we are the ones chosen by Divine Justice to begin the judgment of injustice 
over the earth” (Sandino, 1981b: 160).  The “spirits of Light protect our army and the 
black spirits are those that favor the White House...” and “our cause will triumph because 
it is the cause of justice, because it is the cause of love,” he says (Sandino, 1981b:  162).  
Sandino further writes that his purpose in sharing these things with Rivera is to convert 
Rivera and to prove to him that “we are not in this struggle merely by accident, but rather 
in fulfillment of the law of Justice (the law of love)” (Sandino, 1981b:  154).  Later, in 
early 1933, Sandino will tell an interviewer that he and his army are so thoroughly aware 
of their mission that he can communicate his thoughts to the soldiers very directly:  
 “Magnetism of thought is transmitted.  The waves flow and are grabbed 
by those who are disposed to understand them.  In combat, with the 
nervous system in tension, a voice with magnetic feeling has an 
enormous resonance” (de Belausteguitoitia, 1985:  177). 
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 By the end of 1930, Sandino has significantly changed his presentation of 
himself from previous years.  Previously, he has emphasized that he is indigenous, one of 
the oppressed and working class.  He is Pan-American, Latin American and Indo-
Hispanic.  Sandino seeks freedom and justice, is willing to fight and sacrifice, and cannot 
be stopped.  His struggle is driven by his patriotism, nationalism and internationalism.  
The General makes it clear that he does not seek public office, salary or other personal 
reward, that he loves spiritual rewards and not material ones.  Furthermore, he sees 
himself as representative of the true feelings of his fellow citizens and is in spiritual 
union with Nicaraguans.  However, in late 1930 and early 1931, he is saying that he and 
his army are all those things and also instruments of divine justice and that they are 
apparently part of a cosmic plan to usher in a new world.   
 During the same period that Sandino is outlining his spiritual beliefs to Rivera, 
Secretary of State Stimson has decided to withdraw all but a few Marines by June 1, 1931 
and withdraw the rest after the 1932 elections.  However, a terrible earthquake strikes 
Managua on March 31 killing almost 1,500 people.  Sandino sends a message to all of his 
soldiers that through the earthquake “Divine Justice is herself punishing the enemy” and 
that his army must finish the job (Somoza García, 1936:  219).   
The Yankees Go Home 
 The EDSNN is launching offensives in early 1931 in spite of Stimson’s planned 
troop withdrawal.  Sandino has always clearly stated that he will fight until all US troops 
are withdrawn from Nicaragua, so Stimson’s plan is not sufficient to stop the Sandinista 
attacks.  Sandino’s men burn the Bragman’s Bluff Lumber Company and raid Standard 
Fruit Company in mid-April.  Tropical Radio is put out of commission by Sandinista 
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attacks.21  On April 16 Stimson says that the United States cannot protect Americans and 
recommends that they depart Nicaragua.  Furthermore, Stimson admits that he considers 
the Marines’ work with the National Guard to be a failure.  This policy change is a 
surprise to many Americans but a rather welcome one since the use of Marines to protect 
American business property in Nicaragua was becoming unpopular in the States 
(Macaulay, 1985). 
 Throughout the summer and fall of 1931, the Sandinistas mount various 
successful raids.  However, the EDSNN suffers two blows with the deaths of Sandinista 
Generals Blandón and Ortéz.  On the other hand, Generals Altamirano and Umanzor 
(who replaces Ortéz) have several successes.  Sandinista columns seem to be everywhere, 
and the guerrilla attacks are well organized.  According to Sandino, the army is well 
organized and disciplined because “it is conscious of its elevated historical role” 
(Sandino, 1981b:  187).  In November, President Hoover reaffirms the plan to pull out the 
Marines after the elections in 1932. 
 Sandino launches another manifesto in January 1932 criticizing the form of the 
elections to be held in November.  “What the gringos are seeking is the humiliation of 
our homeland until they are able to leave,” says Sandino (1981b:  213).  He elaborates 
that the Yankees support the Conservative candidates and have even ordered Moncada to 
make Sacasa the Liberal candidate.  In addition, the Marines are to once again supervise 
the elections.  Sandino reminds his followers that the Yankees only want to control them 
                                                 
21 Interestingly, New York Times reporters tended to file their reports from Managua by way of 
Tropical Radio.  Tropical Radio Telegraph Company incorporated as a subsidiary of United Fruit 
in 1913. (Wilson, 1947). 
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and instructs them to frustrate the election process. 
 Meanwhile, the war continues, and much of Sandino’s communications during 
this time are orders to his generals, battle reports, notices of political activities, and 
messages meant to inspire and motivate his troops.  Sandino also remains steadfast in his 
resolve not to ally himself with Communists even though they both struggle against the 
Yankee domination.  He makes his position clear to de Belausteguigoitia (1985:  181), 
“This movement is national and anti-imperialist...this movement is popular and we 
propose an advanced interpretation of social aspirations,” but the movement will not 
yield to attempts to influence it by various groups, including the Communists, says 
Sandino. 
 Most of his communications continue to drive the point that US interference in 
Nicaragua, the Marine occupation and foreign supervised elections are absolutely 
unacceptable.  A news bulletin released by Sandino (1981a) in May to Indo-hispanics 
lauds the numerous military victories won by his generals and uses casualty statistics to 
demonstrate the superiority of Sandinista forces.  Nevertheless, the Marines gain some 
surprise as they introduce the new autogiro - the precursor to the helicopter - into the 
fight.22 
 The presidential elections occur on November 6, 1932, and Sandino writes to 
General Altamirano on November 9.  “The elections are over already, and we are now 
waiting to learn whether it is with Sacasa or with the Conservatives that we are to 
continue our struggle, because no matter who it is, the pirates are leaving on January 2,”  
                                                 
22 Unfortunately for the Marines, its performance was disappointing (Macaulay, 1985). 
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Sandino (1990: 416) tells him.  The results show Sacasa the winner, and Sandino issues 
his peace proposals on November 12.  The proposals require that the Nicaraguan 
government seek and obtain the immediate withdrawal of US military forces and accept 
the support of the Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua (EDSNN) 
in maintaining order in the country.  The government must also accept and support a pan-
American conference that includes not only the twenty-one Latin American nations but 
also the United States, with Sandino as Nicaragua’s representative.  Conferees would 
discuss US business and military interests in Central America and the paternalistic 
attitude of the US toward Latin America (Sandino, 1990).  A few days after Sandino 
submits his proposals, Anastasio Somoza García is appointed chief of the National Guard 
by Sacasa.  The next month, the Marines begin to leave Nicaragua. 
 Gustavo Alemán Bolaños, a Nicaraguan journalist and writer, publishes Sandino! 
Estudio completo del héroe de las Segovias (Sandino!  A Complete Study of the Hero of 
Las Segovias).23  The booklet presents a very positive picture of Sandino.  The General is 
humble and has the best intentions as exemplified by a quote from one of Sandino’s letter 
to the author, “My good faith, my worker’s simplicity, and my patriotic heart...” 
(Alemán, 1932: 9).  The list of Sandino’s demands on behalf of workers are included and 
show that Sandino is sympathetic to their plight.  He is popular with his men and, though 
not formally trained in military sciences, “Sandino has military intuition and...is a soldier 
                                                 
23 Alemán was an exiled Nicaraguan writer who supported Sandino. He does not interview 
Sandino for the booklet but relies on documents apparently given to him by Sandinistas between 
1929 and 1932 as well as some letters exchanged between him and Sandino.  It is originally 
published in Guatemala and then in Mexico with the title Sandino, the Liberator (Snarr, 1989; 
Ramírez, 1985).  In 1945 Alemán will publish a book critical of Somoza entitled Un 
Lombrosiano: Somoza 1939-1944. 
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by nature” (Alemán, 1932:  21).  He is also the right person to challenge the Yankee 
invader because he accepts this responsibility and because it is his responsibility as a 
Nicaraguan.   However, the most striking description of Sandino and his charisma come 
not from Sandino but from Alemán.  Alemán (1932:  38) compares Sandino to other 
historical figures as he writes, 
And in Central America there is not enough bronze to cast the figure of 
Sandino;  only going...for that material to the statue of Bolívar, to the 
statue of Sucre, to the statue of San Martín, to the statue of Hidalgo, to 
the statue of José Martí, could enough be found to cast the figure of 
Sandino.  Not only through him and no one else is Central America 
saved from a danger that was hanging over the isthmus...but offered with 
the pain of a handful of men - the Sandinsta bandits - and of a man that 
took them to triumph through the road of struggle - Sandino the bandit. 
 
He lauds Sandino as a man who defied and conquered the United States and says, 
“Whoever will try to deny this truth, that he reread the preceding pages, that he place his 
hand on his heart and that he lift his eyes toward the effigy cast in bronze of General 
Augusto César Sandino!” (Alemán, 1932:  81). 
 In early spring, before the elections, various elite members of the Conservative 
and Liberal parties begin discussing and forming a plan to end the struggle between 
Sandino and Nicaraguans who were not Sandinistas.  The committee is called the 
Patriotic Group and appoints Sofonías Salvatierra as their spokesperson.  The Patriotic 
Group develops a plan in which the presidential candidates would pledge, before the 
elections, to respect the losing party afterward.  The candidates agree.  In late November 
Salvatierra writes to Sandino on behalf of the Patriotic Group asking that Sandino enter 
into talks with a joint commission consisting of Liberals and Conservatives for the 
purpose of moving toward the “full exercise of sovereignty” (Selser, 1981: 156).  He also 
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commends Sandino for leading the struggle against interventionism and acknowledges 
that Nicaraguans are ready to adjust and accept their new freedom and are “turning 
toward you with the open arms of a brother” (Selser, 1981:  157).  Sandino closes the 
year by accepting Salvatierra’s proposal (with a few provisos) and appoints as his 
delegates Salvador Calderón Ramírez, Dr. Escolástico Lara, Dr. Pedro José Zepeda and 
General Horacio Portocarrero.24 
 Juan B. Sacasa is sworn in as Nicaragua’s president on January 1, 1933, and the 
last Marines leave Nicaragua on January 2.  Salvatierra is appointed by the president to 
head the delegation to negotiate with Sandino. Salvatierra’s impression of Sandino is that 
the General has been in complete command of his troops for seven years and will not 
tolerate argument but will relax when treated with kindness.  Furthermore, Salvatierra is 
quite impressed by the devotion of Sandino’s men to him.  He comments that the men 
have had no clothes, medicine or blankets for years yet have fought on and remained 
loyal as evidenced by their repeated chants, during the negotiations, of ‘Long Live 
General Sandino!’ (Selser, 1981). 
Sandino on Peacemaking 
 Blanca Arauz de Sandino (Sandino’s wife) and Salvatierra make the 
arrangements to bring Sandino and President Sacasa together.25  On February 2 Sandino 
arrives in Managua to meet with Sacasa.  However, he has some misgivings about the 
truce as he tells one of his generals that, if by February 5, “there is no news of me, it is a 
                                                 
24 One of President Sacasa’s negotiators is Crisanto Sacasa, the president’s brother.  Crisanto 
Sacasa will become Somoza García’s Minister of Education. 
25 In fact, Blanca plays a pivotal role in negotiating the truce between the Sandinistas and the 
National Guard. 
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sure sign that I am dead” (Sandino, 1981b:  276).  He also announces to his troops that he 
goes to Managua to reach a peaceful understanding with Sacasa but “if Dr. Sacasa 
decides to have me arrested, I will kill myself, and if I do not do it each of you is 
authorized to spit in my face as a traitor”  (Sandino, 1981b:  277). 
 Sandino’s arrival at the Managua airport was supposed to have been secret, but 
word somehow spread, and there was a fairly large crowd there to greet the General.  
According to José Román (1979:  13), who was there and would interview Sandino in a 
few weeks, “everyone there shouted and were like crazy people.”  Sandino then gets into 
the limousine provided by Sacasa, but just then Somoza arrives, and both men step from 
their cars.  Somoza and Sandino embrace, and he invites Sandino to ride into his car, an 
invitation which Sandino accepts.26  As the car drives through the streets of Managua, 
people cheer the General.  Late that night, Sandino and President Sacasa sign the peace 
agreement. 
 The peace agreement calls for the disarmament of Sandino’s troops, except for a 
100 man security force, at San Rafael del Norte.  The document also makes provisions 
for aiding Sandino’s troops to return to normal lives and become productive members of 
Nicaraguan society.  For example, a large area of uncultivated land is set aside for them, 
and public works projects will give preferential consideration to Sandino’s men with 
regard to employment.  Interestingly, the agreement mentions in its first point that 
Sandino and his army have served the homeland well and reaffirms that Sandino neither 
expects nor will he accept any wealth or material advantage that might cast suspicion on 
                                                 
26 A famous photograph taken of the embrace between Sandino and Somoza is generally used to 
highlight Somoza’s lies and treachery. 
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his past or present motivation.  The second point emphasizes the signers’ reverence for 
and commitment to the Constitution and Nicaraguan law (Sandino, 1990).  Sandino 
(1990:  445) tells a reporter the next day, “I want peace in Nicaragua and I’ve come to 
establish it.”  The Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua complies 
with the agreement on February 22, 1933 and lays down its arms. 
 It is during the month of February and during the disarmament that Sandino 
grants an interview to Ramón de Belausteguigoitia, a Spanish journalist.  From those 
interviews, de Belausteguigoitia publishes Con Sandino en Nicaragua (With Sandino in 
Nicaragua) in 1934.  In considering only what the author says about Sandino, the work is 
a very positive presentation of Sandino.  The author’s assessment is that “Sandino is a 
man of absolute good faith” (1985:  206).   The book presents General Sandino as a 
nationalist and a link in a historical chain.  Of course, as a nationalist, Sandino fought and 
succeeded on behalf of his beloved Nicaragua.  However, de Belausteguigoitia mentions 
more than once that Sandino is historically linked to Bolivar’s war for independence a 
century earlier.  Sandino is “the successor of Bolívar, the new hero of America” and the 
“fulfillment of Bolívar’s program” (de Belausteguitoitia, 1985: 132, 159).   Moreover, 
Sandino is linked to the future.  “The work of Sandino has not ended,” says de 
Belausteguitoitia (1985:  139), “but that ordinary force will continue in one form or 
another.  It is an arrow launched to the horizon, endowed with an invincible moral 
momentum.” 
 Perhaps most importantly, de Belausteguigoitia speaks numerous times of 
Sandino in charismatic terms.  First, he says that his purpose in writing the book is to 
“take back the great rebel Sandino, that is lifted above the panorama of his people...”  (de 
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Belausteguigoitia, 1985:  37).  A soldier in Sandino’s army tells the author, “...upon the 
ending of a rain, [we] saw that over Sandino’s head was perched a double rainbow” (de 
Belausteguigoitia, 1985:  145).  De Belausteguitoitia (1985:  171, 178) describes General 
Sandino as “a man of action and a prophet...he is an extraordinary personality...”  and 
later says, “It is Sandino, the hero and brilliant Sandino, the visionary.”  The devotion of 
Sandino’s followers is mentioned as well.  The author notes that the soldiers are all 
volunteers and do not get paid but also notes that there is something unique in the 
discipline of the troops.  The discipline seems to spring, not from lectures or threats but  
that “the strange and profound soul of General Sandino had created in his army a 
religious sect and had imbued in it the fire of a new revelation,” according to de 
Belausteguigoitia (1985: 130). 
 There are some more personal details about Sandino noted by the author.  
“Sandino speaks with a slow, persuasive, precise voice...and at times gives the impression 
of extracting with anguish the concepts at the bottom of his brain,” observes de 
Belausteguigoitisa (1985:  134).  He also mentions that Sandino always uses “we” when 
speaking and that he, at one and the same time, “expresses youthful happiness” and “pain 
and worries” (de Belausteguitoitia, 1985: 134).  The author finds the General kind and 
“of a great spiritual height” noting that he practices yoga and is a “disciple of the East” 
(de Belausteguigoitia, 1985: 170). 
 All of the above discussion is preceded by de Belausteguigoitia attributing 
negative values to and casting Nicaraguan politicians as sellouts.  Interestingly, he does 
not focus at all on North Americans except as those to whom the old politicians are 
beholden.  The old politicians have submitted to the Americans due to greed and personal 
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ambition.  Moncada, Chamorro and Díaz, in particular, are culpable. The reason to focus 
on these Nicaraguans is to then present Sandino in contrast to their selfishness.  Sandino 
appeared to redeem Nicaragua from the submissive state into which the greedy politicians 
had sold it.  Additionally, de Belausteguigoitia (1985:  58) explains why the old 
politicians hate Sandino so: 
...the old politicians would never forgive Sandino his consecration as 
hero of outrageous patriotism. 
Because all those who have helped or have consented to the American 
penetration see in Sandino...a symbol that reminds them of the duties that 
they did not fulfill, the patriotic sentiment that they postponed for their 
individual egos...Sandino is like an accusatory conscience, and because 
of that there are many of his countrymen who continue calling him, 
although in a weaker voice, the title of bandolero. 
 
De Belausteguigoitia mentions that the politicians have put Nicaragua in the hands of the 
American colossus.  Therefore, “the appearance of Sandino and his banner of freedom 
have been necessary to redeem this people and these Republics from the state of servitude 
into which their politicians have dragged them” (de Belausteguigoitia, 1985: 46). 
 It is also in February and March of 1933 that José Román, a Nicaraguan 
journalist, interviews Sandino.27 The resulting book, Maldito Pais (Damned Country), is 
one of the longest works recording firsthand experience with Sandino.  Román worked as 
a secretary on behalf of Sacasa’s government-in-exile in the Washington DC office and  
                                                 
27 Román originally conducted his interviews with Sandino in February and March of 1933.  
However, the book was not published until 1979.  According to Román (1979), it was not printed 
until then because Román had promised Sandino that the book would be published in Nicaragua.  
Román was finally ready to return to Nicaaragua from New York in February 1934 to publish the 
book.  However, Sandino was murdered about that time, and it became impossible to keep the 
promise.  Instead of breaking his promise and publishing the book in another country,  Román 
waited until the Somozas were defeated.  Román assures the reader that he has made no changes 
in the manuscript except to correct typographical errors. 
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then as Sacasa’s personal secretary.  Therefore, Román had the opportunity to see US 
news coverage of the war in Nicaragua and to hear talk of the war and of Sandino among 
Americans. He notes that poets like Neruda, Barbusse and Mistral wrote about Sandino.  
Román also frequented a speakeasy that attracted such artists as Diego Rivera, Edna St. 
Vincent Millay and the painter Siqueiros.  Apparently, one topic of much conversation  
among these intellectuals was General Augusto Sandino.  “The figure of Sandino took on 
mythological proportions...for the public he was a semi-god of a great, living epic poem,” 
writes Román (1979:  8).28 
 With Sacasa’s election and inauguration, Román is now in Managua, and as 
Sacasa’s personal secretary, has a unique opportunity to observe Sandino.  Román is 
taken to the airport to meet Sandino’s plane on February 2, 1933.  This first experience 
with Sandino is quite impressive to young Román.  Sandino’s plane arrives, the area 
suddenly fills with all kinds of people, and “someone yelled ‘Fellow Nicaraguans, here is 
Sandino and he brings you peace”  (Román, 1979:  13). 
 The next morning after Sacasa and Sandino have signed the peace agreement, 
“the entire town of Managua was madly asking for Sandino” because they want to mount 
a demonstration for him.  Sandino replied,  
Demonstrations are for political propaganda and for promising 
something to the people.  I have nothing to promise them.  I have worked 
and struggled for the people without telling them and without them 
looking at me.  I don’t like to call attention to myself.  I am grateful in 
my soul to the people of Managua but now is not the time for that.  
Another day. (Román, 1979:  22) 
 
                                                 
28 Indicating his international fame if not popularity, Sandino will tell the author Salvador 
Calderón Ramírez that he has received over 7,000 letters in the course of 6 years (Calderón, 1934:  
75). 
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 Sandino, Sacasa and their delegates, with Somoza also in attendance, then hold a 
type of press conference at the Presidential palace.  The General demonstrates quite a 
sense of humor as he seems to poke fun at himself but is really taking a jab at US press 
coverage of him.  Sandino, standing with Sacasa and in front of various North American 
journalists says to Sacasa, “Doctor, this short, stubby, muddy person is the same that was 
in the mountains fighting seven years, only now to become a soldier of peace... This is 
the terrible bandit Sandino” (Román, 1979: 22).  Sacasa, moved and amused, embraces 
him and says “General Sandino, You are a bandit - sublime and glorious!  You are the 
greatest hero of all the continent...” (Román, 1979: 22). 
 Sandino leaves the presidential palace, and thousands of people are at the airfield 
and have been waiting there since early morning.  Román (1779:  23) writes,  
The tumult was incredible and before taking the airplane, hundreds of 
cameras flashed and everyone wanted to embrace Sandino and since the 
people were asking for a few words, he stopped on the ramp...while the 
multitude was listening reverently, his words resounded: 
‘Brother Nicaraguans...I have brought peace.  From now on it depends 
only on you Nicaraguans to know how to maintain this independence 
that has cost us so much blood and sacrifice.’ 
 
Sandino then leaves for las Segovias as the crowd erupts in a storm of applause and ‘Viva 
Sandino!’ 
 Sandino sends for Román on February 23, the day after his army surrenders it 
weapons. “Lower your head,” commands Sandino when Román enters.  Román (1979:  
29) then relates the following story: 
I lowered my head and he began to touch me on the skull...Finishing the 
exam he told me very seriously..., 
 
‘In you is incarnate the spirit of...one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece.  
When were you born?’ 
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‘May 8, General.’ 
 





‘Aha!  Let me see...’  And he consulted a little book he was carrying. 
‘Incredible!’ he said. ‘In the Chinese calendar..., we are also the same 
sign.  The horse.  I don’t know another person that has my same 
signs...Look Román, I have faith in you.’ 
  
Later in the interview, Sandino will speak of the Magnetic-Spiritual of the Universal 
Community, reincarnation, Rosicrucians, spiritism, yoga, theosophy and intuitive 
inspirations (Román: 1979).  The General also mentions that, in spite of the danger to 
himself, he will not leave Nicaragua because he must pursue “a resolution that is rational 
and intuitively inspired by cosmic vibrations...It’s my destiny!” (Román, 1979). 
 Román spends twenty-seven days in Sandino’s camp and has numerous lengthy 
conversations with the General.  The purpose of the book seems to be to allow Sandino to 
tell his own story with periodic comment from Román.  Sandino tells much of his story in 
chronological order beginning with his childhood and youth, and much of that narrative 
is included in the first part of this chapter.  Additionally, he relates the story of the 
dawning of his political awareness and stories of battles, also previously noted here. 
 One of the most interesting features of Román’s interview with the General is 
that Sandino spends much time talking about his officers and troops as well as about 
support from non-combatants.  For example, Sandino describes each of his senior staff at 
some length.  The apparent natural recall of detail that Sandino is able to relate is 
remarkable.  He describes their skill and knowledge as soldiers and officers, their 
 143
commitment to their struggle and may even include personal facts like their birthplace, 
their families or comments about their physical appearance.  Sandino gives special 
attention to those officers who are not Nicaraguan and says that Nicaragua owes them a 
special debt of gratitude (Román, 1979). 
 One of Sandino’s most endearing qualities is that he seems to personally identify 
with followers as he expresses understanding of their lives and appreciation for their 
work.  For example, he goes into great detail explaining the suffering that his soldiers 
experience.  Insects, snakes, bad weather, disease, hunger and anxiety are all things that 
Sandino notes as difficulties that his soldiers endure.  Of particular interest is the amount 
of time Sandino spends singling out the women in his army for praise.  The General notes 
that women from all social classes supported the cause in a variety of ways including 
delivering mail, recruitment, nursing, and domestic work.  The greatest appreciation for 
women is reserved for the work they did in espionage.  Sandino (Román, 1979:   142) 
boasts:   
Women were in charge of the greater part of the secret service...Many of 
them were from the richest and oldest families and passed information 
through their servants.  Many ambushes were due to the precise 
information provided by these women. 
 
The methods they use include sewing messages into hatbands and carrying mail in their 
underwear.  Such praise for women was rather rare in this period. 
 In talking about the advantage that the Marines might have had through their 
airplanes, Sandino implicitly links himself to an indigenous symbol of resistance to 
outsiders.  He mentions that the Marines call Nicaragua a god damned country.  He 
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insists that Román call his book “Damned Country!”  Then Sandino (Román, 1979:  160) 
goes on to say: 
In truth poor Nicaragua has been a damned country.  First, the Spanish 
gave it its name taking it from a cowardly chief...If it had not been for the 
traitorous help of Nicarao, Diriangén would have thrown them in the lake 
and finished with them.  Nicaragua should have been called Diriangén or 
Diriamba. 
 
He continues that recently Nicaragua has been a damned country for the North 
Americans. 
 Sandino’s presentation of himself in Román’s work is that he is humble, 
indigenous, a hard worker, a patriot, determined, spiritual, disciplined, proud of and 
connected to his troops, and grateful to his followers.  In contrast, he even admits that his 
troops practice brutality but speaks of his confession of the brutality as a virtue as 
compared to the failure of the Yankees to admit that they practice it as well.  Román is 
largely sympathetic to Sandino, offering some praise for the General, some neutral 
comment and some mild criticism.  One particular sentence seems to summarize Román’s 
view of Sandino.  “Only one soldier of the revolution took the national flag and 
continued the war...against the United States intervention in Nicaragua.  That soldier was 
General Augusto César Sandino,” writes Román (1979:  7) at the beginning of his book. 
 On March 13, 1933 Sandino issues the “Manifesto to the People of the Earth and 
Especially to Nicaragua.”  The manifesto pledges Sandino’s support to Dr. Sacasa’s 
presidency while making a point of saying that he, Sandino, is politically independent.  
The document also criticizes the continuing influence of Wall Street bankers in Central 
America and calls for a Central American federal district.  The federal district is to one 
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day be created from over 36,000 acres that the Sandinistas are converting into a farming 
cooperative at Wiwilí under Sandino’s leadership.29 
 Sandino also makes it clear in this document that he does not necessarily 
perceive the struggle against Yankee imperialism to be over.  He likens the problem to a 
casting net and says that, in order to untie one knot of the net, one must also untie others.  
Therefore, Latin Americans must continue to resist Yankee interference until the Yankees 
have ceased to interfere and respect Latin American sovereignty.  In making these points, 
Sandino twice emphasizes his arguments with the Biblical phrase “He who has ears, let 
him hear.  He who has eyes, let him see” (Sandino, 1990:  464). 
 Even though Sandino has pledged support to Sacasa, he is expressing his 
disenchantment with some of the government’s activities.  In a letter to Alemán Bolaños, 
Sandino complains that while Nicaraguans are pleased with the military withdrawal of 
the US, they fail to recognize that the political and economic intervention continues.  
Apparently, the Sacasa government was preparing to accept a multi-million dollar loan 
from US bankers.  He contrasts these Nicaraguans with himself and his soldiers noting 
that they fought a seven year war without receiving compensation.  Furthermore, he says, 
“...I was never a soldier, but merely a campesino fighting for the Autonomy of our 
people” (Sandino, 1988:  102). 
 General Sandino goes to Managua a second time in May to meet with Sacasa.  A  
                                                 
29 Notably, Sandino has never demonstrated an interest in agricultural policy or agrarian reform 
and is not now interested in it either as he does not demand or even suggest it for Nicaragua.  
Apparently, he sees no need for it since there “is a lot of land to distribute” without reform (de 
Belausguigoitia, 1985:182). 
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press release issued by Sandino says that the purpose of the trip is to respond to the hopes 
of many groups who wish to organize a new political party called the Autonomist Party.  
However, Sacasa delays the meeting, and Sandino suspects that it is because the president 
does not want a third party (Sandino, 1981b). 
 The Sandinista’s tenuous relationship with the National Guard is souring through 
the rest of 1933.  Sandino criticizes the Guard in several writings beginning in June.  
First, he writes that President Sacasa has a historic opportunity to constitutionally restore 
Nicaragua’s political and economic independence.  He then goes on to complain that 
some of his men have been murdered by the Guard since the EDSNN surrendered its 
arms.  Several times, he calls the Guard unconstitutional and, therefore, irresponsible.  
The Guard operates outside the nation’s laws and must immediately turn to support 
President Sacasa and the Constitution.  If it does not, then he says that the president is 
obligated to arm the civilian population and disarm the Guard.  Sandino sees this problem 
as urgent (Sandino, 1990).  He then writes to Sacasa in August that his army has once 
again taken up arms upon hearing the news that government arsenals were burned.  He 
suspects that Somoza is behind the sabotage.  Therefore, he decides to go a third time to 
meet with Sacasa to discuss, among other things, the National Guard’s treatment of 
Sandinistas, particularly “the unjust imprisonments that the Sandinistas are suffering in 
[the northern] departments” (Sandino, 1981b:  356).  However, Sacasa also wants to 
speak with Sandino as the president worries about the Sandinistas rearming and even 
requesting more arms from the government.  Somoza demands that the president totally 
disarm the Sandinistas (Macaulay, 1985). 
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 At the close of 1933, Nicaragua has enjoyed almost a full year of relative peace.  
Sandino is describing himself as a peacemaker and lover of peace.  He is still casting 
himself as one of the common people - a peasant, citizen, working class, humble, and not 
a politician.  He repeatedly calls himself independent, a patriot, and disinterested in 
political or financial reward.  He still has a historical destiny, a divine calling and is the 
redeemer of the Nicaraguan people.  Now, he is predicting his own murder but not at the 
hands of Yankees.  In his interview with Román (1979:  99), Sandino tells him: 
I will not leave here [Nicaragua].  I know that because of these ideas they 
will kill me.  Not the Marines, but Nicaraguans.  I know it but it doesn’t 
matter because that is my destiny, the same that brought me here.  At 
least I will leave a seed planted and some day it will bear fruit. 
 
Similarly, Sandino predicts his death in conversations with Sofonías Salvatierra.  On 
February 13 - days before his murder - Sandino tells Salvatierra that the National Guard 
has been surrounding his men for the last month at the Sandinista farming cooperative in 
Wiwilí.  “General Somoza wants to destroy me,” he says (Salvatierra, 1980:  234).  These 
comments come after Salvatierra has suggested several times that Sandino leave the 
country for his own safety.  Sandino refuses each time.  President Sacasa believes that 
Sandino must stay to help consolidate the peace and then can leave in two or three years 
(Román, 1979). 
“There Was a Hero” 
 Sandino arrives in Managua on February 16, 1934 to discuss disarmament and 
meets with Sacasa and Somoza at the presidential palace on February 18.  In an interview 
on February 18, Sandino says that his men will not disarm until the Guard becomes an 
organization that is constitutional.  In Salvatierra’s (1934:  197)  view, “the great obstacle 
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to disarmament and for pacification in general was some elements of the Guard...”  Until 
the Guard is constitutional, Sandino’s men will remain armed, acting as an emergency 
force under President Sacasa’s orders.  In a letter to Sacasa the next day (February 19), 
Sandino again terms the Guard unconstitutional and urges Sacasa to rectify the situation 
and to guarantee the safety of Sandino’s men (Sandino, 1981b).  Sacasa somewhat 
vaguely agrees to reform the Guard in the next six months and to protect the men who 
fought under Sandino’s command, but he still wants to “collect all arms now outside the 
Government’s control...” (Selser, 1981: 173). 
 The stream of letters, manifestos and interviews that has flowed for seven years 
from Sandino stops with his February 19 letter to Sacasa.  On February 21, Sandino dines 
at the Presidential Palace with President Sacasa, National Guard chief Anastasio Somoza 
and several others, including two of Sandino’s generals.  General Sandino leaves the 
gathering at around ten o’clock that evening, and his car is stopped by Guardsmen while 
trying to exit the palace gate.  Minister of Agriculture and Labor Salvatierra, Sandinista 
generals Umanzor and Estrada, and Sandino’s father, don Gregorio are also in the car.  
The Sandinistas are ordered out of the car, and Salvatierra and don Gregorio Sandino are 
taken to jail.  The Guardsmen drive Sandino and his generals to the airfield.  Guardsmen 
open fire on them with machine guns. Upon hearing the shots that kill his son, Don 
Gregorio Sandino remarks to Salvatierra, "Now they are killing them; he who sets 
himself up as a redeemer, dies crucified"  (Selser, 1981:  177).  Meanwhile, other 
Guardsmen go to the home of Minister Salvatierra as Sandino’s brother, Sócrates, and 
two of the General’s aides were to be there.  The Guardsmen kill Sócrates and two other 
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young occupants of the house.30  Sandino’s body and the bodies of Sócrates, General 
Umanzor, General Estrada and the two young victims are brought together.  The bodies 
are stripped of valuables and then buried near Lake Managua  (Salvatierra, 1934;  Ibarra, 
1973;  Selser, 1981).  The next day the National Guard moved on the Sandinista 
cooperative at Wiwilí and killed hundreds.  Salvatierra takes refuge in the Presidential 
Palace and then leaves for Panama on March 11, 1934 and, ultimately, self exile in Spain. 
 Sofónias Salvatierra writes one of the more interesting accounts of Sandino's role 
in Nicaraguan history soon after leaving Nicaragua in 1934.   Because he was something 
of  a confidante to Sandino, but not quite a follower, and was in the car with Sandino on 
the evening of his murder, he brings an eyewitness account like no other.  He tells the 
story of Sandino’s entrance into the Liberal revolt in 1926, and Sandino’s rejection of the 
Tipitapa agreement.  The author implies that the Yankees are out to conquer and 
subjugate native peoples.  Salvatierra expresses his admiration for Sandino in that it was 
an extraordinary feat that Sandino and his banner became recognized and saluted 
internationally.  However, much of the book is devoted to the troubles of 1933 and 1934, 
which is after the peace agreement was signed.  The Guard seems to continue to search 
for a way to sabotage the armistice.  According to Salvatierra, the one who uses the word 
“peace” most in the peace talks is Sandino, and he is also the one who tried to erase 
political divisions saying he would even embrace Moncada out of patriotism.  
Nevertheless, Salvatierra (1934:  218) says, “It is the Guard that declared irreconcilable  
                                                 
30 Neither of Sandino’s two aides that were to be at Salvatierra’s house were killed.  Colonel 
Santos López escaped but was wounded and Colonel Ferreti had changed his plans and had not, in 
fact, been there (Macaulay, 1985). 
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war...” 
 Salvatierra was sympathetic but not a full-fledged follower of Sandino and was 
part of Sacasa’s administration.  Therefore, Salvatierra's account seems somewhat 
objective, but he still views Sandino as a charismatic person.  For example, Salvatierra 
(1934) compares Sandino's struggle to those of Bolívar, Lincoln, and Joan of Arc.  His 
point is that each encountered unwarranted hatred, sacrificed themselves for their 
countries and asked forgiveness for their opponents.  Another attribution of exceptional 
or divine characteristics by Salvatierra claims that Sandino could understand as no one 
else could the problems of America.  Salvatierra (1934: 192) writes, ". . . in the soul of 
the warrior of Las Segovias there was a clear vision of the central problem [foreign 
intervention] on our continent."  He also places Sandino historically as a continuation of 
others who fought nobly for freedom in the Americas.   Sandino is “...a mestizo...in 
whose hands it was foretold the accurate and flexible arrow of Diriangén,31 or the George 
Washington’s creative sword of the people...” would be placed (Salvatierra, 1934:  44).   
 Salvador Calderón Ramírez, a Nicaraguan journalist and educator, also wrote of 
Sandino just after his death in Últimos días de Sandino (Sandino’s Last Days), published 
in 1934 in Mexico.  Although Calderón was not a follower of Sandino, he admired the 
General and served as one of Sandino’s representatives at the peace talks.  He was not 
initially impressed with Sandino but gravitated to him because of his own intense dislike 
of the North Americans.  At first, he thought of Sandino as a false liberator, “a conceited  
                                                 
31 At the time of conquest, Diriangén was an indigenous chief in the area of the current 
Department of Carazo.  He battled against the Spanish military leader Gil Gonzalez Dávila in 
1522 while another chief, Nicarao, surrendered to the Spanish (Meyer, 1972: 142). 
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and sinister figure,” whose purpose was to gain riches and power (Calderón, 1934: 10).  
He was also disgusted by the cruelty of some of Sandino’s subordinates.  The two did not 
meet one another until the peace talks began but began corresponding in late 1932. 
 Calderón begins to change his opinion as he realizes that many people have a 
favorable impression of the General.  The author was living in El Salvador for most of 
the years of Sandino’s war and heard news second hand from supporters and enemies of 
Sandino.  One day, he asked a history class of thirty-four students to identify the most 
beloved warrior in America.  Twenty-eight of the votes were cast for Sandino.  Calderón 
(1934:  16) comes to conclude, “...Sandino beats in the heart of everyone.”  In addition, 
he says that “the belief became firmer and firmer in my brain that Nicaraguans should 
give glory, splendor and praise the devotion to the hero:  his glory, there was no doubt, 
was the remission of our national faults, the shining purifier of our falls” (Calderón, 
1934:  16).  It seems that in those last days, Calderón was becoming somewhat frustrated 
with Sandino’s performance in the disarmament talks (Macaulay, 1985).  Calderón 
himself admits that, at times, he did not think very highly of Sandino’s intellectual 
capabilities.  Then came “the sinister night” when Sandino was murdered (Calderón, 
1934: 156).  When writing his book soon after that night, Calderón (1934:  67) can say, 
“...when our grandchildren ask...there was a hero - Sandino - who our countrymen called 
demented;  in his divine madness stole the sacred fire from the stars of heaven, and...lit a 
torch and with its light destroyed the darkness...”  
Sandino on Himself 
 According to Augusto César Sandino, he came to understand misery and 
oppression during his childhood.  Therefore, he also understood what social justice must 
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be, and that understanding drove him to wage war on behalf of justice.  As presented in 
Chapter Four, Sandino left a wealth of material that constitute a presentation of self.  
There is also a lot of material written by others that was either approved by Sandino or 
based on interviews with him.  Additionally, the material addresses a history of 
Nicaragua presented that includes its relationship to the United States.   
 According to Sandino and those sympathetic to him, General Sandino was 
humble, working class, a peasant, and indigenous.  He was also honest, hard-working, 
loyal, sincere, and confident.  Sandino had a sharp wit.  Selflessness and self-denial and a 
disinterest in personal gain characterized the General.   He seeks only justice for 
Nicaragua. 
 A keen sense of right and wrong drew Sandino into the Constitutionalist War in 
1926 and then kept him from laying down his arms with the traitor Moncada.  He was not 
only principled but willing to stand alone against the Yankees and became more 
determined in spite of any setbacks.  Sandino was unafraid; he was unimpressed and 
unintimidated by either Yankee military or economic power.  Although unschooled, he 
was extremely intelligent and was a natural leader and a natural military strategist.  As a 
leader, Sandino was very kind to his followers and very caring about them as individuals.  
Thus, he enjoyed their love, loyalty and personal devotion.  Sandino was enormously 
popular with his own followers, other Latin Americans and ultimately, most Nicaraguans.  
On the other hand, he demanded a strict adherence to his behavioral codes and was quite 
intolerant of betrayal. 
 Sandino’s image of North Americans is that the United States government 
operates from not simply self interest but at the behest of Wall Street bankers.  The US 
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Marines, who have periodically invaded Nicaragua, are tools of Wall Street who use the 
pretext of protecting American lives in order to control Nicaragua on behalf of Yankee 
profits.  Nicaraguan sellouts like Moncada were complicit in Yankee domination.  
Sandino could be cold regarding this enemy, admitting to some torture, mutilation and 
executions of Yankees by his troops but all due to the US leaving no alternatives to 
oppressed Nicaraguans.  On the other hand, he could be quite considerate of a Yankee 
soldier’s family. 
 Sandino was a spiritual man and was quite conscious that he was the tool of 
divine justice.  He also understood that he was playing a historical role as Nicaragua’s 
redeemer.  Bolívar and Zeledón were his precursors, and it was his calling to carry on and 
finish their work.  Sandino was not only a nationalist and anti-imperialist but an 
internationalist who had a pan-American vision.  His role as visionary not only included 
the idea of a united Latin America, but a socially progressive national policy that 
recognized the rights of  workers and women.  He became a peacemaker because he was 
a man of his word.  He made peace but expressed his disquiet about the developing role 
of the National Guard and his suspicions about Somoza.  Sandino even assumed his own 
martyrdom at the hands of Nicaraguans.  Most importantly, Sandino beat the military of 
the most powerful nation in the hemisphere and, perhaps, on earth.  Upon his death, he 
became a hero forever. 
Sandino’s Construction of History and His Living Charisma 
 The presentation of Sandino, as provided by himself, places him firmly in the 
sweep of Nicaragua’s history and defines charisma in the sociological sense.  The study 
is concerned less with Sandino’s reconstruction of history than that of the contemporary 
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Sandinistas.  However, brief discussion is useful.  For example, he and his followers refer 
to him as Simón Bolívar’s equal as well as the continuation of Bolívar’s Latin American 
legacy.  Furthermore, Sandino is continuing the resistance of the ancient Nicaraguan 
warrior Diriangén, who stubbornly fought the invading conquistadors.  He mentions 
numerous times that it is his historical destiny to rid his homeland of the newest invaders.   
 In addition, Sandino practices negation as he clearly identifies the enemy, the 
invaders, the blond beasts.  He continually hammers the point about links between 
Nicaragua’s desperate economic situation, the exploitation of it by Wall Street bankers, 
the role of the Marines as Wall Street’s enforcers and then the replacement of the Marines 
by the National Guard.  In doing so, he is reconstructing a past of, at least, several 
decades.  Even when he does not mention the Yankees or National Guard by name, he is 
regularly calling himself and/or his struggle nationalist and anti-imperialist. 
 Sandino is a visionary who can clearly see the source of Nicaragua’s distress as a 
historical problem.  He can also envision the solution to it as he states a multitude of 
times that he is a nationalist and patriot who is willing to sacrifice himself to fulfill his 
destiny for the sake of his country. Furthermore, he can project a strong future for 
Nicaragua, without foreign interference, and a similar future for a Central American 
union.  Yet, he is more than a great patriot and visionary.  He is charismatic. 
 As a charismatic leader, Sandino appears in a time of distress in Nicaragua, has 
the answer to the distress, is not an elite, has exceptional or divine qualities and enjoys 
the obedience and extraordinary affection of his followers.  The distress is US Marine 
occupation and political turmoil, and his answer is to expel the Marines.  Sandino arises 
from outside the status quo of Nicaraguan political or military tradition.  The General 
 155
admits to a lack of formal training for his task.  In fact, he makes a point of often 
mentioning that he is one of the common people and the oppressed class, and that point 
of humility endears him to his civilian supporters as well as to his army.  His followers 
are certain that he is exceptional and is, in fact, destined to lead them out of their 
desperation.  Their willing devotion is also because of and rewarded by Sandino’s 
uncanny ability to know them and treat each one as a special individual.  A Honduran 
who joined Sandino’s army writes to Froylán Turcios and captures the thoughts of many 
of Sandino’s followers: 
...God guides us illuminating us with the sublime patriotism of General 
Augusto César Sandino, invincible hero who marches from triumph to 
triumph...We are fighting at the side of the symbol of Liberty General 
Sandino, champion of the Race (Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo, 
1985a:  169). 
 
Somoza García (1976:  549) even writes that Sandino is “considered an apostle” by his 
followers. 
 Sandino’s followers also willingly submit, themselves to his authority, though 
not blindly.   For example, Colonel Santos López reports that women fought with their 
husbands and had their babies on the battlefields, “following Sandino in his call to the 
struggle” (López, nd:  21).  In another instance, Sandino ordered all the peasants of a 
town to leave and build elsewhere.  They complied.  In addition, the rural population 
defied the National Guard and surreptitiously provided food, clothing, and shelter to 
Sandino’s guerrillas (Sandino, 1981b). 
 Again, Sandino’s enemies also recognized the authority he had over his 
followers.  A National Guard lieutenant who helped bury Sandino remarked on the 
obedience of the peasants to Sandino’s orders:  “It would be difficult for a leader to 
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repeat the feat of having the opportune and valiant cooperation of the peasants of 
Segovias, which they gave to General Sandino” (Ibarra, 1973:  20). 
 The emotional commitment of Sandino’s followers toward him again 
demonstrates his charisma.  In reading the accounts written by and about Sandino and his 
followers, the depth of the followers’ love and personal loyalty is quite impressive.  It is 
perhaps this feature of his leadership that provides the clearest evidence of his charisma, 
living and posthumous.  They do not speak of him in a simply respectful fashion as North 
Americans might speak of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson or even more recent 
men recognized as great leaders such as Franklin D. Roosevelt.  As stated previously, his 
followers believed that he was extremely kind, cared for each one of them and that he 
was like a father.  He was exciting, smart and interesting and they relished being a part of 
his mission.  One of his soldiers remembers:   
Speaking of General Sandino is for me an exciting memory of a stage in 
my life;  a stage in my youth, the most glorious and at the same time 
happy and satisfactory that I have had...he was a genius...Sandino, now, 
is listening to me in immortality:  for me he is a semi-god (IES, 1986:  
286).  
 
 The North Americans did not find Sandino to be particularly kind or fatherly.  
Some US observers did recognize his charismatic qualities, but the State Department and 
the Marines appeared uninterested in this feature of his leadership.  Instead, they too 




SANDINO'S EMERGENCE:  THE NORTH AMERICAN VIEW 
 
 
 Philander Chase Knox, Secretary of State appointed by President William 
Howard Taft, toured the countries of the Caribbean in 1912 and made a stop in 
Nicaragua.  There he delivered a speech lauding the creation and purpose of the Central 
American Court of Justice, which is to adjudicate disputes between the five Central 
American republics, to reform constitutions, to refrain from intervention in any country 
in case of civil war, and to refuse to recognize revolutionary governments until 
constitutionally recognized in the country where the revolution is occurring.  Knox 
implies that the United States will support the Court's work and then attempts to soothe 
Central American fears about the "the true motives and purposes of the United States 
toward [the republics of Latin America] under the Monroe Doctrine.  I beg to assure 
you...that my Government does not covet an inch of territory south of the Rio Grande," 
Knox assures the President of the Nicaraguan National Assembly (Knox, 1913:  57).  The 
Secretary then makes a rather emphatic statement that seems full of irony just a few years 
later as the Liberal rebellion begins and as Sandino emerges.  "...I do wish to avail myself 
of the opportunity," states Knox, "to repeat that the Government of the United States does 
not propose in any way to interfere in the internal affairs of this country" (Knox, 1913:  
67). 
 A few years later, author Mary Williams (1916:  315) in her analysis of US 
policy toward Central America notes: 
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The large investment of American capital in Central America and the 
proximity of the region to the Panama Canal Zone was bound greatly to 
increase American interest in the Central American states...In 
consequence, a system of interference in Central American matters, 
resembling tutelage, developed.  Nicaragua, because of her disorganized 
condition, has received the largest share of attention." 
 
She cites Knox's visit as his attempt "to explain that the United States wished merely to 
establish such condition of peace and security as would remove all necessity for direct 
intervention" (Williams, 1916:  317).  However, by that time, Williams notes that there 
was a growing controversy in the US regarding the implementation of the Monroe 
Doctrine as many believed that its use was no longer helpful to the US and inspired 
resentment toward the United States in Latin America. 
 Contributing to the controversy, authors Nearing and Freeman publish in 1925 a 
stinging critique of "American imperialism" in their book Dollar Diplomacy.  They select 
several case studies to demonstrate that US economic penetration of countries such as 
China, Mexico, Haiti, the Philippines, and Nicaragua is the "opening wedge of 
imperialism" (1925:  19).  In the case of Nicaragua, they argue that "the strategic interests 
of American diplomats and the financial interests of American bankers combined to 
produce first diplomatic and later military intervention" (1925:  151).  Specifically, these 
interests are the canal route and the control exercised over the Nicaraguan economy by 
Brown Brothers and J & W Seligman. 
 While there was an argument in the United States about the propriety of US 
intervention and economic penetration in other countries, the pro-intervention and pro-
penetration side of the argument reigned.  Government officials espoused these policies 
as either necessary to protect US lives and property or to stabilize an uncertain situation 
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in order to protect US interests.  The way in which these policies and situation were 
reported in periodicals, such as the New York Times, usually cast administration and 
business policy in a positive light and other views as disruptive, illegitimate or, at least, 
odd. 
Civil War:  Nicaragua’s “National Sport” 
 By the summer of 1925, the US Marine occupation force disembarked from 
Nicaragua leaving behind a new national constabulary to replace themselves and headed 
by a retired United States army major, Calvin B. Carter.  His job was to direct the training 
school for this national police force in addition to managing the force itself.  Before 
Carter could build what would become the National Guard into an organization of 
strength, volatile Nicaraguan politics once again erupted, and there was a Liberal uprising 
in late 1926 that includes Juan Batista Sacasa declaring himself President in abstentia.  
The Guard grew in strength with heavy support from the US State Department, and the 
uprising was temporarily quelled.  However, with Mexican financial support and 
Mexican arms, Liberals again revolted.   On January 4, 1927 the US Marines returned to 
Nicaragua, at President Diaz' request, to repel the Liberal threat to the government 
(Booth, 1985). 
 Published in July 1927, an analysis of the generation-long strife between 
Nicaraguan Liberals and Conservatives is written by Major Carter (1927) and entitled 
"The Kentucky Feud in Nicaragua:  Why Civil War Has Become Her National Sport."  In 
spite of its somewhat patronizing title, Carter has some interesting insights regarding the 
extreme economic stratification in Nicaragua and the lack of popular participation in 
political life.  Just as interesting is the fact that he does not include US involvement in 
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Nicaragua's economy or government as anything but the occasional reaction to 
Nicaraguan requests.  Neither does he make any mention of Sandino. 
 Soon after this latest landing of United States Marines in the country of 
Nicaragua, heated debate on the topic begins in the US Senate.  On January 26, 1927 an 
exchange takes place between Senators Edge of New Jersey and Wheeler of Montana 
regarding the propriety of the marines once again occupying Nicaragua.  Senator Edge 
argues that "the Government of the United States should...move to protect the rights and 
property of American citizens" in Nicaragua and not wait until lives or property have 
been lost (Congressional Record, 1927: 2292).  He also argues that the Senate should 
support the actions of the government rather than criticize, "unjustifiably harass and 
embarrass it" (Congressional Record, 1927:  2293). 
 Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana, harsh critic of this administration policy, 
first expresses his frustration regarding reasons given by administration officials for the 
latest intervention.  He also suggests that the administration's motive had, perhaps, more 
to do with its Mexican policy than with Nicaragua itself (Congressional Record, 1927:  
2284):   
First we learned that the marines were sent to the little Republic to 
protect American lives and property; then they were sent there to protect 
the paper canal which we wrung from the people of Nicaragua by 
questionable means:  at the end of the week we were there to protect the 
Americas from Bolshevism...They knew that this cry of Bolshevism and 
the protection of lives and property in Nicaragua is but an effort of this 
administration to justify war with Mexico. 
 
In addition, Wheeler notes that Nicaragua's President Díaz previously worked for La Luz 
& Los Angeles Mining Company, an American company represented by its attorney and 
former Secretary of State Philander Knox.  He scolds US mining and railroad interests 
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operating in Nicaragua but reserves the most severe criticism for American bankers.  "But 
the State Department policy is built around the exploitation of Nicaragua by Brown Bros. 
and J. & W. Seligman" and that active intervention in Nicaragua is "in the interest of 
profitable investments for [these] bankers," argues Wheeler from the Senate floor 
(Congressional Record, 1927:  2290). 
 By the spring of 1927 the New York Times was informing the American public 
of a peace agreement between President Adolfo Díaz' Conservative government of 
Nicaragua and the Liberal revolutionaries there.  The agreement was mediated by Henry 
L. Stimson, "President Coolidge's special emissary" ("Truce...," 1927:  1) with support 
from Senator Borah, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ("Threat 
Confirmed...", 1927).  While both Conservative Nicaraguan President Díaz and Liberal 
revolutionary General José María Moncada were willing to talk to Stimson, the Times 
reports on May 5, 1927 that Stimson's conference with Moncada at Tipitapa "ended today 
in deadlock" and that "nearly 100 marines were on guard" around Moncada and Stimson 
as they talked ("Moncada Rejects..." 1927: 16).  Also in attendance at that meeting are 
other Liberal party representatives, as well as Charles Eberhardt (US Minister to 
Nicaragua), and Rear Admiral Julian Latimer (commander of US naval forces in 
Nicaragua).  The stalemate resulted from Moncada's unwillingness to sign any peace 
agreement that included the continuation of Adolfo Díaz as President of Nicaragua.  After 
warring against Díaz and the Conservatives for so long, the Liberals could not abide 
another minute of the Díaz presidency.  Nevertheless, the Times reports the next day that, 
due to Stimson's efforts, General Moncada and the Liberals have reluctantly agreed to lay 
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down their arms in spite of their continued objection to Díaz.  In fact, the page one 
headline declares that the "Truce in Nicaragua is Won by Stimson" ("Truce..." 1927). 
 Henry L. Stimson is one of the primary figures responsible for constructing the 
reality of the Nicaragua of the 1920s and the story of Augusto César Sandino for the 
North American public. Stimson is primarily known as Secretary of War under Presidents 
Roosevelt and Truman during World War II.  However, his career of governmental 
service began long before.  After graduating from Harvard Law School in 1890, Stimson 
went to work for the New York law firm of Root and Clarke.  Senior partner Elihu Root 
had been Secretary of War in McKinley's administration and Secretary of State under 
Theodore Roosevelt.  Root and Stimson became close friends, and Root advised Stimson 
for over fifty years.  During the Roosevelt years, Stimson was appointed New York 
district attorney at Root's suggestion.  While in office, Stimson successfully prosecuted 
several large corporations for violation of anti-trust laws and for corporate fraud.  After 
waging an unsuccessful campaign for governor of New York in 1910, Stimson accepted 
President Taft's appointment of him as Secretary of War until 1913.  He briefly served in 
the military during World War I and returned to the US to help defeat US membership in 
the League of Nations. He returned to private law practice during the Harding 
administration. Henry L. Stimson's mission to seek a solution to Nicaragua's civil war 
marked his return to public service in 1927 (Stimson & Bundy, 1947;  Ferrell, 1963;  
Hodgson, 1990). 
 Stimson leaves a remarkable record of his perspective regarding Nicaragua and 
US policy.  His book, American Policy in Nicaragua, as well as his quotes in the New 
York Times, provide much of the official US construction of Nicaragua and Sandino as 
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presented to the American public.  Before Stimson explains his own presence in 
Nicaragua, he begins with a discussion of the "geographical, racial and historical 
conditions" of Nicaragua (Stimson, 1927: 2).  Stimson sees the country as politically and 
economically unstable and in need of US guidance in order to resolve these problems.  
He argues that the country has no true democracy since the President of Nicaragua 
appoints the governors of the departments (analogous to states) from within his own 
party.  Therefore, the system promotes revolts because revolution is the only way for the 
dispossessed party to assume power.  Stimson (1927:  10) notes that "the United 
States...has in many ways endeavored to lend its assistance to the five Central American 
countries in their progress along the difficult road to orderly self-government."  In 
discussing US recognition of Adolfo Díaz as Nicaraguan president, he explains US policy 
regarding granting recognition to another nation's government and instructs the reader 
that "the American officer who is vested by our American Constitution with the duty of 
determining which claimant in a foreign government is legitimate is the President of the 
United States and no other" (Stimson, 1927:  28). 
 In spite of Stimson's apparent success in Nicaragua, the New York Times reports 
a rather serious charge lodged by Moncada against Stimson. Moncada explains to the 
press, "'Mr. Stimson told me that the United States Government intends to restore peace 
in Nicaragua immediately and use force if necessary to do so...We are forced by a greater 
power to cease our fight...'" ("Nicaragua Rebels Give Up..." 1927:  1).  In the face of 
Moncada's charge of a threat of war by Stimson if the General did not agree to the terms 
of peace, the paper also reports that there is no evidence that Stimson was empowered to 
make such a threat on behalf of the United States.  According to the Times, Stimson was 
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only to investigate the situation and encourage peace.  Stimson's understanding of his 
mission varies from that of the New York Times in that he says he "was expressly given 
the utmost latitude with reference to observations on the policy theretofore adopted" and 
that he was to "investigate and report" as well as "if I should find a chance to straighten 
the matter out he [President Coolidge] wished I would try to do so" (Stimson, 1927:  43).  
On May 8, the Times confirms that "a threat of force was used in order to accomplish the 
purpose of [the United States] Government"  but quickly says that the threat "should not 
be taken too literally" (Oulahan, 1927: 1).  A Times editorial printed the next day states 
that the armistice was fair and that the Coolidge administration and Stimson acted 
properly under the circumstances but also admits that those difficult circumstances were, 
in part, created by the US.  The editorial notes that "Uncle Sam does not think of himself 
as an overbearing Imperialist, but too many South Americans do" and that his 
"blundering method" is partly to blame for the imperialistic image ("The Nicaragua 
Settlement," 1927:  20). 
Sandino:  The “Disturbing Element” 
 On May 12 Henry Stimson sends a message to the State Department heralding 
the surrender of the Nicaraguan Liberal generals and the end of the insurrection.  That 
message and the one following from Admiral Latimer are generally upbeat and business-
like.  However, Stimson's note contains one interesting sentence.  "[The agreement] was 
signed by Moncada and eleven Generals, including all his prominent chiefs except 
Sandino" writes Stimson in his first public acknowledgment of Sandino and the Times' 
first mention of Sandino ("Nicaragua Revolt...," 1927:  4).  The Times article about 
Stimson's report seems to characterize Sandino as a local problem that "will occupy the 
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attention of the native constabulary...and the American marines, who are to stamp out by 
force, if necessary, banditry in the country" ("Nicaragua Revolt...," 1927: 4).  From the 
initial US official recognition of Sandino, he is not labeled as a revolutionary but as a 
criminal - "bandit" - though a criminal of no great significance. 
 Through May, Stimson spends much time explaining to President Coolidge and 
the press how horrific the Nicaraguan revolution had been.  He describes the large death 
toll, the failure on both sides of the conflict to take prisoners, killing them instead, and a 
condition of anarchy in the country.  The New York Times reports Stimson's descriptions 
as well as Stimson's contention that the current peace in Nicaragua was due to 
Nicaraguan faith in the ability of the United States to supervise and produce a fair 
election in 1928.  Further, Stimson states that "this situation is now practically entirely 
ended" and that "each of the bands of semi-independent rebel chiefs who were engaging 
in guerrilla warfare on their own account has also delivered up its arms" ("War was 
Barbaric...," 1927:  9).  There is no mention of Sandino in the statement presented in the 
Times.  The article does mention that Stimson has a very high opinion of General 
Moncada and has little respect for Dr. Juan Sacasa, the political head of the 
revolutionaries.  The newspaper also notes Stimson's opinion that American forces will 
soon be leaving Nicaragua.  
 Until July 1927, the New York Times coverage of the Nicaraguan situation has 
involved articles of about twelve or more column inches, each placed rather prominently.  
On July 2 a two-inch column appeared at the bottom of page ten and carried the headline 
"American Mine Seized by Nicaraguan Liberals."   This obscure article reports Sandino's 
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initial act of seizing the gold mine of Charles Butters32 and Butters' request for immediate 
protection from the US government of his $700,000 investment.  "General Sandino's 
avowed purpose in seizing the property is said to be to destroy American influence," 
states the Times ("American Mine...," 1927:  10).  
 By mid-July the New York Times is printing characterizations of Sandino that 
call him "the only disturbing element in Nicaragua at the present time..." ("Ultimatum..." 
1927: 10).  The paper reports that Major G.D. Hatfield of the US marines is demanding 
the surrender of Sandino and promising a joint attack on Sandino's forces by US and 
Nicaraguan soldiers if Sandino does not comply.  Furthermore, Brigadier General Feland 
sends a detachment of marines to recapture the Butters mine.   As Sandino rejects 
Hatfield's ultimatum, he is characterized as defiant and as a "usurp[er]" of governmental 
authority.  On the other hand, General Feland also says that Sandino is of no particular 
concern and that "the situation...will soon be adjusted" ("Nicaraguan Rebel..." 1927:  28). 
 While reporting the perspectives of US State Department and military officials, 
the New York Times also publishes a feature article analyzing the relationship of the 
United States to Nicaragua.  The article is written by Whiting Williams, a sociologist who 
pioneered the study of working class people in different industries in the 1920s by using 
the participant-observation method.  He also worked as a consultant to leading industrial 
corporations advising them how to improve labor-management relations.  More 
specifically, Williams worked for some of the largest US corporations with operations in 
Nicaragua and Latin America.  Guaranty Trust, United Fruit and Standard Oil are  
                                                 
32 Butters’ mine is often called “the San Albino mine.” 
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examples.  He advised Standard Oil and Shell Oil that the companies were contributing to 
social unrest in Cuba by paying and treating workers poorly.  Williams told United Fruit 
that "the company needed to provide more worker recognition and security, better 
housing and medical care, more rewards for effort, and promotions of qualified local 
workers to supervisory positions..." (Wren, 1987: 76). 
 In his professional activities, Williams generally points toward the corporations' 
poor treatment of workers as a cause or contributor to social unrest.  He continues the 
theme in the Times feature "Our Ways and Wares in Nicaragua" (Williams, 1927a).  
Williams blames US "commercial and cultural penetration into Central America" for 
much of the Nicaraguan resentment of the US and for Nicaraguan unrest.  He notes the 
Nicaraguan dilemma of needing outside capital but insists that it is the same importation 
of capital that has been the target of Nicaraguan anger.  The issue of US bankers 
collecting import and export duties in Nicaraguan customs houses has been particularly 
contentious. 
 On July 12, just more than a week after Williams' article explaining the local 
effects of US penetration into Nicaragua, Sandino rejects a demand for surrender from 
US marine captain GD Hatfield.  The Times calls Sandino's answer to Hatfield "defiant" 
("Nicaraguan Rebel Defiant," 1927: II.1).  Hatfield immediately casts Sandino as "an 
individual outside the law, in rebellion against the government of Nicaragua...." and that 
the governments of Nicaragua and the United States cannot be held liable for any death 
or physical injuries resulting from the efforts of Nicaraguan and US military actions used 
to stop Sandino (Sandino, 1990: 78). 
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 Casting Sandino as a rebel and criminal worthy of being the target of military 
action provides a logical prelude to the Times' extensive report the next day of the bloody 
defeat of Sandino's forces at Ocotal on July 17.  The front-page story reports on July 18 
that "United States marines and Nicaraguan constabulary severely repulsed General 
Sandino, recalcitrant Liberal, who attacked Ocotal yesterday afternoon and again today" 
and that the marines killed  fifty Sandinistas and used planes to bomb Sandino's army 
("Marines Repulse Nicaragua Rebels..." 1927).  In the same issue of the New York 
Times, there is a two-column inch report on page nineteen that Admiral Latimer returns 
to the United States from Nicaragua aboard a United Fruit ship.  Latimer's opinion is that 
there are only a very few persons in Nicaragua who want the US to remove its military 
from Nicaraguan soil ("Admiral Latimer Back," 1927). 
 When the New York Times reports the details of the battle at Ocotal, it casts the 
outnumbered US marines as immensely successful in defeating Sandino and portrays 
Sandino as isolated, an outlaw, braggart, and bloodthirsty coward.  The adjective for 
Sandino is "recalcitrant" while Hatfield is called "heroic."  The article reports that forty 
marines supported by forty-plus of the Nicaraguan constabulary defeated 500 Sandinistas 
with only one marine death compared to 300 Sandinista deaths.  During the seventeen 
hour battle, the paper reports that Sandino was heard to tell his men that they could loot 
at will and drink Yankee blood if they were victorious.  It also notes that Sandino was not 
involved in the fighting but "directed his forces from a distance" ("Nicaraguan Battle 
Raged..." 1927:  1).   
 Another story on page ten of the same issue outlines the response of US 
Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg to Sandino and the battle of Ocotal.  The Secretary 
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attempts to further solidify the image of Sandino as an outlaw isolated among his own 
people.  Kellogg's perspective is that Sandino was the lone revolutionary commander 
who refused to cooperate with the peace treaty at Tipitapa and that he "resorted to 
banditry, preying on the country and terrorizing the inhabitants, and that his activities 
have no political significance" ("Kellogg Justifies Defense," 1927:  10).  The article 
continues that Sandino's cause is simply a matter of "private vengeance" aimed at 
punishing his former employer, the San Albino Gold Mining Company ("Kellogg 
Justifies Defense," 1927). 
 It is interesting to note that Secretary Kellogg first drew national attention in the 
United States when President Theodore Roosevelt appointed Kellogg to head the legal 
team devoted to trust-busting.  Kellogg won cases against General Paper Company, 
Union Pacific Railroad and then Standard Oil in the most famous Sherman Anti-trust 
case.  Additionally, Kellogg reportedly had a distaste for the habit of US interventionism 
in Latin America.  Appointed in 1925 as Coolidge’s Secretary of State, he oversaw the 
end of direct US intervention in Mexico and the removal of US marines from Nicaragua 
in 1925 (Ferrell, 1963).  However, in the eyes of Latin Americans like Sandino, 
Kellogg’s idea of retreating from an imperialist foreign policy still involved implicit and 
explicit efforts to bend Latin American countries’ policies to North American will.  After 
all, it was Coolidge and Kellogg who sent Henry Stimson to negotiate the Tipitapa treaty. 
 The next day, the Times paints an even less flattering picture of Sandino in 
defeat.  The front page declares that he is a "hero to [a] horde of malcontents" who are 
deserting him after the defeat at Ocotal and is left with a "small group" of "bandits and 
assassins" to continue wreaking havoc in the Nicaraguan countryside ("Sandino in 
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Hiding..." 1927:  1).  In spite of the reports of Sandino’s sound defeat at Ocotal,  the 
paper reports that Sandino is calling himself “the Wild Beast of the Mountains.” 
Accompanying the previous article is one that lauds the performance of the US marines 
in the battle.  Rear Admiral David Foote Sellers is quoted as saying that "Marines and 
Guardia...conducted themselves with distinguished gallantry, magnificently supported by 
our planes..." ("Chief Praises Marines," 1927:  2).  The tone of the article changes 
dramatically as it quotes Sandino supporter Salomon de la Selva's comments critical of 
US policy in Nicaragua and saying that "the marines would 'have to destroy the entire 
population' if they did not leave Nicaragua" ("Chief Praises Marines," 1927: 2).  
Meanwhile, on the floor of the US Senate, Senator Walter F. George of Georgia is 
reportedly denouncing the marine action at Ocotal as the “shooting down of several 
hundred natives.”  In this three-column-inch article buried in the middle of page two, he 
also warns that South Americans will view US activity in Nicaragua as the US taking 
sides in internal politics and that “it is hazardous in another way because the minority of 
today may become the majority of tomorrow”  (“Senator Scores Warfare,” 1927:  2). 
 One month after US military officials laud their victory at Ocotal, sociologist 
Whiting Williams writes again of Nicaragua.  While his previous article criticizes US 
business and government for their activities in Nicaragua, he delves further into local 
causes and contributors to Nicaraguan unrest.  Williams lays most of the country's 
troubles at the door of the old feud between the Liberals and Conservatives.  He tells of 
the forced recruiting by both factions of soldiers who do not understand the cause for 
which they are forced to fight.  According to Williams, the perennial revolution interrupts 
the nation's productivity as the revolutionaries forcibly draft able-bodied laborers and 
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loot a business' tools, equipment, supplies, fields and livestock.  Obviously, potential 
investors shy from this uncertainty.  The upper class find instead that there is money to be 
made in politics and turn away from business.  The undereducated masses are then 
uncertain of work and impoverished.  Williams also cites the lack of taxation and roads as 
significant problems.  Without taxation "every town and city must depend for its 
expenditures on the good will of the Central Government..." fueling the financial and 
sectional concerns of both parties (Williams, 1927a:  5.2).  Williams argument then turns 
to the lack of roads and railroads.  He highlights the isolation of communities and regions 
pointing out that increased contact among Nicaraguans would bring increased 
understanding.  Interestingly, Williams never mentions Sandino's efforts. 
 Meanwhile, news coverage for the rest of 1927 about Nicaragua and Sandino 
focuses on three topics:  the defeat and relative unimportance of Sandino's resistance, US 
support of General Moncada as the next president of Nicaragua, and increased ties 
between Nicaragua's finances and US supervision of them.  Through September 1927, 
New York Times stories concentrate on General Feland's opinions that Sandino is hiding 
with only a handful of men or has perhaps left the country in fear.  Feland's depiction of 
Sandino as weak and isolated is coupled with the image of him as "cold-blooded," 
"cruel," and a predator, as he is described by Charles Butters, owner of the San Albino 
Mine destroyed by Sandino's forces ("Sandino, Rebel..." 1927:  25.7). 
 After the marine victory at Ocotal, the Times publishes an article relating 
Admiral Latimer's view of the Nicaraguan situation.  He repeats the routine claims of 
military superiority over Sandino's forces and again applies the negative labels to 
Sandino and his cause.  Most interesting here is that Latimer provides a very brief 
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biography of Sandino that includes misinformation.  For example, he says Sandino is 
between forty and fifty years old although Sandino is in his mid-thirties.  However, 
Latimer's most compelling claim and egregious error of fact is his description of 
Sandino's experience in Mexico.  The story was apparently originally told by Moncada, 
and it is unclear whether he was lying or grossly mistaken (Hodges, 1986).  As related in 
a previous chapter, Sandino worked in Mexico from 1923 to 1926, arriving some years 
after the end of Zapata's and Villa's revolts.  Nevertheless, Latimer ("Defeated Sandino..." 
1927: 5) tells the Times: 
Previously, according to his own words, the Admiral continued, Sandino 
had been in Mexico for twenty-two years and boasted that at one time he 
was a Lieutenant of Villa and that, in the event of American 'intervention' 
in Nicaragua, he would become a second 'Pancho' there. 
 
 This quote from Latimer is very important because it represents a first effort by 
US government officials to publicly tie Sandino to unrest in Mexico.  North American 
business was desperately concerned about Mexican moves to nationalize oil in that 
country, and the US government worried about the possibility of Bolshevism overtaking 
Mexico's political system.  In 1926 and 1927 when Latimer creates the above story about 
Sandino, US tension with Mexico is at a crisis level, and there are suggestions of war 
between the two countries.  The US ambassador to Mexico was telling the State 
Department that there was evidence that Mexico was doing Moscow's bidding and that 
the Liberal revolt in Nicaragua was caused and encouraged by the Mexican government 
(Smith, 1972). 
 Sandino and his cause are more directly tied to the Bolsheviks in this same 
article.  The mining engineers report that "people ...who formerly were friendly to 
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Americans and worked contentedly in the mines are now anti-American and have been 
converted to 'radicalism and Bolshevism' by General Sandino" ("Rebellion Spreads..." 
1927:  3).  Such statements do not simply cast a negative light on Sandino and his 
struggle nor do they only accuse Sandino of being a threat to American business in 
Nicaragua.  Instead, here he becomes an ideological threat to the United States marking a 
very interesting contradiction as others, such as Admiral Latimer, dismiss him. 
 Sandino's importance increases in the fall of 1927 as the New York Times reports 
that "government sources" and "American mining engineers" state that Sandino's efforts 
have passed from "banditry into a state of insurrection" ("Rebellion Spreads..." 1927:  3).  
The term "insurrection" brings new status to Sandino's fight and to the marine 
occupation.  The new term comes as Sandino is reported to control most of three northern 
departments and to be gaining support among Nicaraguans in the north.   
 While the New York Times is running articles tying Sandino to Mexican 
revolutionaries, radicalism and Bolshevism, it is also printing stories telling of the 
troubles of US oil companies in Mexico.  Pantepec Oil Company, the president of which 
is William F. Buckley, is embroiled in a $28,000,000 lawsuit against Transcontinental 
Oil, a subsidiary of Standard Oil ("Receiver Restored..." 1927).  Standard Oil of New 
York then announces it is leaving Tampico ("To Remove Tampico..." 1927).  All the 
while, Mexican president Calles is encouraging Mexican nationalism and instituting 
national control over resources through legislation such as the Petroleum Law and the  
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Alien Land Law.33  Believing and making Sandino a part of Mexico's "Bolshevik" 
tendencies made US intervention in Nicaragua legitimate in the eyes of US government 
officials and, hopefully, in the eyes of the American public. 
 Next, the Times reports that the US is supporting Moncada's election as president 
of Nicaragua while giving several column inches to Moncada's criticisms of Sandino.  
The paper reports that the State Department "would be satisfied to see [General Moncada] 
elected [as Nicaraguan president] ("Moncada Approved..." 1927:  8). The article goes on, 
in some detail, to explain the legal legitimacy of his candidacy and to discuss Moncada's 
request that the US government "organize a constabulary under American officers in all 
parts of Nicaragua" ("Moncada Approved..." 1927:  8).  It will become more important 
later that the creation and development of the constabulary be presented as a request from 
Nicaraguans.  Moncada then proceeds to call Sandino a "bandit," a "fanatic," "not regular 
Army," a "thief," a "smuggler," and a "courageous outlaw"  (“Moncada Approved..." 
1927:  8).  This name-calling seems intended to distance Moncada from Sandino and is 
further reinforced by Moncada's statements that he never commissioned Sandino during 
the Liberal rebellion, that he told Stimson at Tipitapa that he could not control Sandino 
and that Sandino has no current support from any political group ("Moncada 
Approved..." 1927:  8). 
 The New York Times ends 1927's reporting on Nicaragua with brief stories 
outlining Nicaragua's request for a two million dollar loan from Bankers Trust and J & W 
                                                 
33 These laws restricted foreigners from owning certain types of land and stated that foreigners 
could not own controlling interest in land development companies.  Of course, US mining and 
petroleum companies, in particular, were extremely threatened, and the US government was under 
extreme pressure by the companies to reverse Mexico's nationalist direction (Smith, 1972). 
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Seligman (“Nicaragua Requests..." 1927:  14).  The United States State Department will 
appoint an American financial adviser to supervise the Nicaraguan government in 
connection with the loan, and proceeds from the loan will pay claims on damages 
resulting from recent unrest in the country ("Nicaraguan Loan..." 1927:  35;  "Nicaragua 
Discusses Loan," 1927:  35). 
A “Bamboo War” 
 Sandino's importance again increases in the presentation of him to the American 
public.  At the beginning of 1928, the US sends 1,000 additional marines to Nicaragua as 
Admiral Sellars explains that Sandino's forces have offered stiffer resistance than 
expected.  He also explains that this increase in marine strength in Nicaragua will put a 
strain on the corps as there are also thousands of marines occupying China and Haiti and 
on board warships around the globe ("1000 Additional Marines..." 1928). 
 Meanwhile, US Senators again debate, as they did the year before, whether 
Coolidge's policy on Nicaragua is correct.  Again Republicans support the President, and 
Democrats, led by Senator Wheeler, call the policy immoral and unconstitutional 
("Nicaragua Fighting Rouses..." 1928:  1).  Reports of these debates and a handful of 
other articles or quotes in the Times let the US public know that, in spite of the official 
anti-Sandino history being constructed in the US, there are some North Americans who 
do not accept the official view.  
 On the same day that one of these stories of Congressional debate appears, 
another story relates an interview with Nicaraguan intellectual and Sandino supporter, Dr. 
Pedro Zepeda, who says that Sandino has been unjustly labeled a bandit and "has done 
nothing more than interpret national Nicaraguan sentiment" ("Sandino Exalted..." 1928:  
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2).  Later, Senator Nye (R-North Dakota) heavily criticizes the presence of marines in 
Nicaragua arguing that money spent on the occupation forces would be better spent on 
farm relief in the US.  He also argues that the war in Nicaragua is meant to support US 
corporate interests at the expense of failing to meet people's needs in the US ("Nye, Here, 
Assails Force..." 1928). 
 Various stories appear in the issue dated 6 January 1928 and include several 
stories about marine activities in Nicaragua and analysis of Sandino's motives.  There is 
also a story quoting General Lejeune, Commandant of the marines, as repeating Admiral 
Latimer's report that Sandino served with Pancho Villa.  This time the story includes a 
claim that Sandino was part of a Mexican raiding party that attacked a town in New 
Mexico ("Says Sandino with Villa..." 1928:  3).  John Carter (1928:   178) identifies 
Sandino as “one of Villa’s anti-American lieutenants” as he bristles against “the charge of 
imperialism now brought against our Latin American policy” by critics.  With these 
stories, Sandino is not only a threat to American interests on Nicaraguan soil but now 
seems more of a direct threat to US territory. 
 Another article continues the creation of a violent, revolutionary image of 
Sandino but also attributes his violence to a petty, self-centered streak in him as well as 
an uncontrollable temper. The article again places Sandino in Villa's army also analyzing 
his motives for revolt in Nicaragua.  This time, the story says that Sandino was taken by 
his parents to Mexico as a boy and later served under Villa and, this time, the story casts 
doubt on the likelihood of a relationship with Villa. More importantly, the article relates a 
version of the story of how Sandino came to be involved in the Liberal rebellion and then 
to continue in spite of Moncada's peace treaty.  It says that persons who know Sandino 
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state that he was ready to lay down his arms but became furious and changed his mind 
when General Moncada neglected to introduce Sandino to Henry Stimson.  The story 
continues that his pride was so wounded that he decided to exact revenge in the form of 
armed rebellion and now American as well as Nicaraguan lives are being lost due to 
Sandino's reaction to Moncada's slight ("Slight to Sandino..." 1928). 
 Harold Norman Denny begins to report from Nicaragua for the New York Times 
in early 1928 and, specifically, covers the war, Sandino and the marines.  Denny began 
working for the Times in 1922 and by 1926 was war correspondent for the paper.  His 
assignment in 1928 to cover the war in Nicaragua was his third as war correspondent, and 
he spent it following the marines all over the Nicaraguan countryside by all modes of 
transportation including muleback and canoe ("Harold Denny, 56, Journalist, Dead," 
1945).  Denny's impression of the Nicaraguan situation was so profound that, in 1929, he 
published a book entitled Dollars for Bullets that told the history of US intervention in 
Latin America and defended that history ("Harold Denny..." 1945;  "Denny, Harold 
Norman," 1948).  Another American journalist, Carleton Beals, called Denny "an 
unusually brilliant reporter...who confided...that he had dared not send out a single word 
which was not 'official'" (Beals, 1932: 305).  Denny, however, never interviewed 
Sandino. 
 The contradictions regarding the importance of Sandino continue in Denny's 
work.  Articles referring to Sandino throughout the rest of 1928 include reports of 
Sandino's death and then the announcement that he is, in fact, alive (Denny, 1928a; 
1928b).  Then reports are that Sandino's army has been crushed and is of no serious 
consequence anymore in spite of the fact that the marines are sending reinforcements to 
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the front (Denny, 1928c). Reports are that Nicaraguans fear Sandino, thereby making him 
seem isolated among his own people and his struggle less valid.  For example, Denny 
reports that well over 2,000 refugees have left their homes in Jinotega and Matagalpa for 
fear of an attack by General Sandino's troops (Denny, 1928d).  The article also contains 
mention of the threat to coffee haciendas and coffee production by Sandino's activities.  
 By February 1928 a most common term used for Sandino is "elusive" or 
sometimes, "wily" (Denny, 1928e: 2; 1928f:  2; 1928g: 9).  Use of these terms illustrate 
the frustration of marines and their commanders caused by their inability to locate and 
destroy Sandino's mountain hideout, El Chipote.  The frustration finally decreased when 
the marines discovered El Chipote and captured it although Sandino's army already had 
abandoned it (Denny, 1928h: 24).  It is also in February when Denny writes a feature 
story in which marines "make light" of the their difficulties in Nicaragua.  "'This is only a 
bamboo war,'" Denny quotes a marine captain yet also says that the marines understand 
that killing is serious business (Denny, 1928i: V.4).  Nevertheless, there is a constant 
suggestion throughout the article that the war in Nicaragua is not a "real" war as was 
World War I. 
 In stark contrast to Denny as a reporter and to Denny's work, journalist Carleton 
Beals writes a series of articles relating his interview with Sandino.  Beals' articles appear 
in The Nation, a paper with a very small circulation compared to the New York Times, so 
his image of Sandino gets less exposure than Denny's image.  However, Beals' series is 
later reprinted in some larger daily papers, and certainly, contributes to the construction, 
or at least, the debate about, Sandino's image in the United States. 
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 Carleton Beals received a wire in early January 1928 from Oswald Garrison 
Villard, the editor of The Nation, asking him to go immediately to Nicaragua to write 
exclusive stories for the periodical.  Villard wanted articles on American policy and the 
marine occupation as well as Nicaraguan public opinion on the subjects.  Most 
importantly, Villard wanted Beals to secure the first interview of Sandino conducted by a 
US journalist (Britton, 1987).  
 Beals had spent much of the 1920s living in Mexico City observing the aftermath 
and institutionalization of the Mexican Revolution and developing relationships, both 
working and personal, with US liberals and leftists also living in Mexico City.  During 
this period, Beals wrote several articles for various publications critical of US policy in 
Mexico, which Beals considered to be imperialistic.  He also criticized US companies 
that failed to comply with Mexican law (Britton, 1987). 
 By the time Villard asked Beals to go to Nicaragua, Beals had long before 
formed an extremely dim view of US policy toward Mexico, in particular, and Latin 
America, in general.  He knew of Sandino and had already wondered why the North 
American press had accepted "the official Washington propaganda line" that Sandino was 
a bandit and outlaw and had "made no attempt to get his side of the story" (Beals, 1965: 
83).  So, twenty minutes after receiving Villard’s request, Beals sent a reply accepting the 
assignment (Beals, 1970).   
 Oswald Garrison Villard, grandson of abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, 
became the sixth editor of The Nation in 1918 and bought the magazine in 1923.  Under 
his direction, The Nation's circulation increased from 7,200 in 1918 to 38,000 copies in 
1920 in spite of, or because of, numerous articles criticizing or exposing US policy and 
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action in post-World War I Europe and the Caribbean.  Therefore, Villard's influence 
upon the construction of Sandino's image is critical as Beals' articles were reprinted in the 
New York Herald Tribune (a Hearst paper), El Sol in Madrid and other large and small 
newspapers in the US, Europe, and Asia, and they were translated into numerous 
languages (Beals, 1965).  Villard looked upon the publication of Beals' interview with 
Sandino, and The Nation's other articles about the Caribbean, "with unbounded 
satisfaction," and as being worth "all the time and money I put into The Nation” (Villard, 
1939:  485). 
 Beals begins his "With Sandino in Nicaragua" series by noting, with slight 
mockery directed toward the US marines, that he had not been harmed in all the time 
spent with Sandino's followers or in Sandino's camp in spite of the fact that he is Anglo-
Saxon (Beals, 1928a).  He then records Sandino's parting words to him.  "’Tell your 
people,' he returned, 'there may be bandits in Nicaragua, but they are not necessarily 
Nicaraguans'" (Beals, 1928a: 204). 
 The above introductory paragraph to the series sets the tone for Beals' 
observations of Sandino, his followers and his cause.  The first three parts of the series 
are simply a chronicle of Beals' difficult journey to reach Sandino and conduct the 
interview.  However, along the way, Beals meets many of Sandinos' supporters and tells 
the story of how they are "risking all in the Sandino cause" as well as how he listened to 
their stories of American atrocities (Beals, 1928b:  233). As Beals is telling the story of 
his travels to meet with Sandino, he mentions that he passes through the Department of 
Nueva Segovia, which Sandino had declared to be a republic the previous day and where 
people call Sandino “‘San Digno’ - Worthy Saint’” (Beals, 1928b:  232).  The statement 
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of Sandinista General Juan Colindres, reprinted verbatim in The Nation, allows a look 
into a loyal follower's view of Sandino's early interpretation of the events that lead him to 
revolt and that gave him the firm conviction that “the first duty of a patriotic Nicaraguan 
was to establish his country's sovereignty in the face of the world and make foreign 
invasion impossible"  (Beals, 1928c:  261). At San Rafael del Norte, Beals learns from 
the townspeople that the Sandinistas are not the bandits that the marines say they are.  
Sandino’s first order upon arrival was that any of his men touching anything not 
belonging to him would be shot.  The shopkeepers confirmed that the Sandinistas were 
absolutely orderly and paid for everything they wanted (Beals, 1928e:  316).  Among 
Sandino’s soldiers, Beals reports that Sandino “has stimulated a fierce affection and a 
blind loyalty and has instilled his own burning hatred of the invader” (Beals, 1928d:  
289).  The author also observes that Sandino’s sayings are oft repeated by his army. 
 The last three articles of Beals' series tell of Sandino himself and largely present 
a positive picture of him although Beals is not averse to mentioning some negative 
impressions of the General.  The Sandino presented by Beals to the American public is 
without vices, has a deep sense of justice, has a sincere concern for the welfare of every 
one of his soldiers, has a deeply spiritual side, is humble, does not seek personal gain and 
loves his country (Beals, 1928d).  Beals also found Sandino to be very articulate and very 
ordered in his discussion of his mission.  Sandino addressed all of Beals' questions 
forthrightly.  However, while Beals found Sandino to be self-assured in military matters, 
he also described Sandino as "a bit flamboyant and boastful and with a tendency to 
exaggerate his successes" (Beals, 1928d:  314).  In fact, Beals states that Sandino’s 
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accounts of battle results "are as exaggerated as those of the marines..." (Beals, 1928e:  
340). 
 In describing Sandino's followers and the relationship they have with the 
General, Beals was positively impressed.  He was particularly interested in discovering 
the truth behind US claims that Sandino is nothing more than a bandit taking advantage 
of and mistreating peasants and his followers across Nicaragua.  Sandino explained to 
him several times that reports of banditry by his men were untrue.  The General made a 
point of saying, in several ways, that he has never stolen, broken a promise, or been in 
financial debt.  As Beals interviewed shopkeepers and peasants in the countryside, he 
found Sandino's claims to be true.  He was told that Sandino's troops were always orderly 
and paid for everything they wanted (Beals, 1928d).  Beals also experienced firsthand the 
generosity of Sandino's followers as they fed Beals while going without food themselves.   
 Sandino showed Beals the pledge that all of his soldiers must sign upon 
enlistment.  The pledge is generally an agreement that the soldier will maintain the 
sovereignty of Nicaragua and protect its people, respect all civilians, maintain discipline, 
expect no salary, and obey Sandino.  His point in showing Beals the pledge was to say 
that their cause is a moral obligation furthered by an army "composed of workers and 
peasants who love their country" (Beals, 1928e: 340).  On the other hand, the United 
States uses protecting American lives and property as a pretext to extract wealth from 
Nicaragua, according to Sandino.  Beals ends the last two articles with Sandino turning 
the tables on Washington.  "...Send the bill [for the expenses of  Sandino's army] to 
President Coolidge, who is to blame for this violation of my country,"  says the General 
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(Beals, 1928d: 317).  Then Beals ends the series with Sandino arguing "We are no more 
bandits than Washington" (Beals, 1928e:  341). 
 New York Times reports of the Nicaraguan situation through the rest of 1928 
include stories of marines searching for Sandinistas, marines defeating Sandinistas in 
battle, and General Lejeune predicting peace soon ("Gen. Lejeune Predicts..." 1928).  By 
April 24th, Sandino has reappeared in northeastern Nicaragua and seizes two US-owned 
gold mines, one of which is owned by La Luz y Los Angeles Mining company, the 
company represented by Philander Knox and that formerly employed Adolfo Díaz 
("Sandino Captures..." 1928).  The next day Denny reports that Sandinistas have captured 
and murdered the assistant manager of the mine (Denny, 1928j).34  
 During this first half of the year, the image of Sandino and his followers put forth 
by US officials and presented in the New York Times is one of a man who is violent, 
unreasonable and arrogant if not somewhat deluded. Examples of these traits include the 
seizure of mines and the destruction done to them by the Sandinistas ("Raiders Dynamite 
Mines..." 1928; "Owners Say Mine is Wreck," 1928), implications that Sandinistas 
distributed flyers to Nicaraguans calling on them to kill Americans ("'Kill All 
Americans,'..." 1928) and the publication of a letter "purporting to be from Augustino 
Sandino" that contains "what amounts to a declaration of war against Americans 
individually" (Denny, 1928k: 4).  As evidence of his arrogance, Denny reports that, after 
destroying the La Luz mine, Sandino declared that "he could gather 1,500 men whenever 
he wished and welcomed the fact that marines were on the way to the mines because they 
                                                 
34 George Marshall apparently really died of malaria while in Sandinista hands (Macaulay, 1985). 
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would be where he wanted them and he could wipe them out whenever he wished" 
(Denny, 1928k:  4).   
 Another emphasis of reports on Nicaragua is that marines, specifically, and the 
US government, in general, must protect Nicaraguans.  First, US officials continue to 
insist that US officials must supervise the Nicaraguan presidential election and to 
implement their plans to do so.  In spite of the fact that the Nicaraguan Congress defeats a 
bill allowing American supervision of the election, President Diaz signs an executive 
decree ordering such supervision (Denny, 1928l;  1928m).  Second, the US Marine Corps 
is now saying that it is the Corps' mission to "protect the welfare of the native 
population" (Denny, 1928n: 27).  The mission previously was to protect US lives and 
property.  These new orders come in response to accusations that the marines were 
destroying Nicaraguan property and visiting unjust treatment on Nicaraguans innocent of 
participating in Sandino’s revolt. 
 Finally, a number of articles in 1928 discuss the economic relationship between 
the US and Nicaragua.  Nicaragua requests a $6 million loan, but bankers await the 
outcome of the Nicaraguan elections ("Discuss Nicaragua Loan," 1928).  By June the 
American official charged with customs collections in Nicaragua declares that customs 
revenues have increased in spite of the Liberal uprising and Sandino's revolt ("Nicaragua 
Had Gain..." 1928).  Again, it seems that Sandino is of little consequence.  Then Denny 
writes a lengthy article describing the large role that US bankers have played in the 
Nicaraguan economy.  He reports that the relationship has been unsatisfactory for the 
bankers due to criticisms, originating from within Nicaragua and the United States, of the 
bankers' operations while being largely helpful to the Nicaraguans (Denny, 1928o).  This 
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article provides for the reading public a logical explanation for the exit from Nicaragua of 
Brown Brothers and J & W Seligman that will occur in 1929. 
 As mentioned previously, Denny elaborates this theme in his 1929 book Dollars 
for Bullets.  In the foreword of the book, Denny (1929b) states , "In Nicaragua the author 
visited every part of the Republic and came to know not only the chief figures in the 
many-sided struggle, but all classes of Nicaraguans of all shades of opinion..."  
Unfortunately, the author did not come to know Sandino nor did Denny interview him.  
Nevertheless, he includes a chapter about Sandino in which he credits Sandino with 
intelligence, an extraordinary personality that inspires devotion in others, "wild 
patriotism," and megalomania (1929b: 332).  It seems that Denny recognizes Sandino's 
charismatic qualities.  In this list, he also observes that perhaps the greatest significance 
of Sandino "was that he served as a focal point for all the undoubted dislike and jealousy 
and distrust in Latin America for the United States" (Denny, 1929: 336).  However, any 
compliments to Sandino are far outweighed by Denny's defense of US economic and 
political domination (Denny's word, author's italics) of Nicaragua.  According to Denny 
(1929b: 13): 
The real motives for America's moves...are rooted in the basic strategy of 
America's national defense...bolstered by America's one principle of 
foreign policy the Monroe Doctrine.  However mistaken and blundering 
and unethical, or however righteous and magnanimous, has been the 
behavior of the United States in Nicaragua, it can be judged 
understandingly only in relation to those major considerations which 
have dictated it. 
 
 The image of Sandino created by United States diplomatic and military officials 
and the New York Times in 1927 and 1928 continues through the next several years of 
Sandino's revolution.  Of course, the details of the image change somewhat, but the 
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characterization of Sandino in 1929 from these sources still labels him and his followers 
as bandits and emphasizes the idea that they are operating in disorganized, roving bands 
throughout the countryside ("Marines to Fight..." 1929;  "Hunger Emboldens..." 1929;  
"Sandino Still a Peril..." 1929).  These articles discredit Sandino by categorizing him as a 
common criminal and by suggesting he is a coward when they make statements like "The 
bandits never fight in the open" ("Hunger Emboldens..." 1929, 20).  He is also discredited 
by the emphasis in 1929 articles on reported splits in Sandino's ranks ("Sandino Breaks 
with Turcios," 1929; "Says Aides Quit Sandino," 1929).  Finally, newly elected President 
Moncada makes a point of saying that Sandino is a fanatic who has brought great 
destruction to Nicaragua and to himself ("Sandino Provokes..." 1929). 
 It is also in 1929 when Nicaraguan officials report that Sandino has left 
Nicaragua and has been welcomed into Mexico ("Nicaragua Asserts..." 1929;  "Sandino 
Welcomed at Merida" 1929).  Before going to Mexico, the Times gives some space to 
negative reaction to Sandino's vision for Nicaragua and Latin America.  One article 
summarizes an editorial in an Argentine newspaper that designates Sandino's call for a 
Latin American congress to discuss Nicaragua's situation as a "Central American joke." 
("Argentine Press Sees Sandino..." 1929: 6).  While Sandino is in Mexico, the paper calls 
Sandino "the exiled Nicaraguan leader" and prints two stories about the Mexican 
communist party accusing Sandino of accepting a $60,000 bribe to leave Nicaragua 
("Sandino Welcomed..." 1929: 4; "Investigate Story Sandino Took Bribe," 1929). 
 Meanwhile, the marines proclaim that peace is being successfully restored in 
Nicaragua due to the efforts of the marines with the support of the Nicaraguan National 
Guard and due to US supervision of "a free and fair election" ("Marines Proclaim..." 
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1929: 7).  marine officials are moving to repatriate refugees to northern Nicaraguan 
where most fighting occurred and to begin reconstruction there while law enforcement is 
ever more turned over to Nicaraguans ("Plan Construction..." 1929;  "Nicaraguans 
Plan..." 1929).  Things are apparently so peaceful that General Feland could return to the 
US in May to report to Washington.  He told reporters that Nicaragua "was never so 
peaceful and orderly as now" although it is still premature to withdraw the 3,500 marines 
occupying the country ("Gen. Feland Returns..." 1929: 27).  By September a marine 
colonel returning to the US assures reporters that the peace in Nicaragua is permanent 
("Peace in Nicaragua..." 1929).  Harold Denny agrees that peace reigns in Nicaragua and 
credits Henry Stimson and General Frank McCoy, who supervised the elections, with 
ushering in this new era.  Further, Denny states that "...whatever mistakes that the United 
States had made in the past in its dealings with Nicaragua, it at last had vindicated itself" 
(Denny, 1929a: IX, 1).    Meanwhile, US investment bankers J & W Seligman and 
railroad manager JG White & Company resign their Nicaragua connections by the end of 
1929.  Reasons given for the severing of these relationships were disagreements with the 
Moncada government and small profits.  It is unclear what role either Sandino or the 
October 1929 stock market crash had on these decisions (Buell, 1930b). 
 In spite of declarations of peace by US and Nicaraguan officials, criticisms of US 
policy continue from within the US although these viewpoints do not receive as many 
column inches in the New York Times as those that support United States policy.  
Democratic Senators continue to try to block funding that would keep the marines in 
Nicaragua and won one such battle in February 1929.  Senator Dill of Washington had 
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the votes to block such funding as he and his supporters argued that the US "was 
imperialistic in its Nicaraugan policy" ("Senate Acts to Ban..." 1929: 1). 
 Perhaps the most stinging and surprising criticism of US policy in Nicaragua 
came at the end of 1929 from a Marine Corps general who had served in Nicaragua.  
General Smedley Butler, in line to one day become Marine Corps Commandant, was 
quoted in the Times as having said "The opposition candidates in Nicaragua were 
declared bandits when it became necessary to elect our man to office" ("Asks Gen. 
Butler..." 1929:  1).  Navy officials immediately called Butler to Washington to explain 
his remarks, and others called for an inquiry into his claims that marines "were used to 
override the election laws of Nicaragua" and "force [the Nicaraguan population] to accept 
Marine-picked candidates" ("Call for Marine Inquiry" 1929: 3).  Publicly, the 
government downplayed the incident and accepted Butler's explanation of it but did not 
divulge the content of his explanation in the paper ("May End Butler Incident" 1929;  
"Accepts Butler's Version" 1929). 
 General Smedley Butler had been involved in US military expeditions, including 
three missions to Nicaragua, from 1898 through the 1920s. He won two Congressional 
Medals of Honor and was very popular with the American public.  His tendencies to be 
outspoken got him into trouble with the military and political establishments.  After 
Butler criticized Nicaraguan elections, he was "passed over for the marine Corps 
commandancy" in spite of being the Corps' highest ranking officer (Schmidt, 1987:  1).  
In 1931 President Hoover ordered him court-martialed, but public outcry convinced the 
government to drop the charges (Schmidt, 1987; Thomas, 1933). Butler took great 
offense at the reprimand.  "This is the first time in my service of thirty-two years that I've 
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ever been hauled on the carpet and treated like an unruly school boy.  I haven't always 
approved of the actions of the administration, but I've always faithfully carried out my 
instructions," he told the Secretary of the Navy charged with issuing the reprimand 
(Schmidt, 1987:  300).   
 Butler retired soon after these incidents and became a spokesperson against the 
use of US military to protect US business interests overseas.  In this capacity, Butler was 
even more outspoken and published War is a Racket (1935b) from which excerpts were 
reprinted in periodicals such as The Reader's Digest (1935a) and The Forum (1934).  The 
thesis of Butler's book is that  war is conducted so that a few may make huge fortunes 
from it while the general public pays the bill in terms of economic instability, death,  
injury and mental disorders.  Specifically, he charges that business sells faulty or useless 
products or oversells to the government in wartime, and Butler cites numerous specific 
examples from World War I.  In summary, Butler firmly believes that America's wars are 
fought to preserve Wall Street's interests at the expense of the American public and the 
populations of the countries where the wars occur. 
 January 1930 begins with the promised return of Sandino from Mexico to 
Nicaragua and assurances from US and Nicaraguan authorities that there is no cause for 
worry.  Very brief articles quote Sandino saying, "'I will struggle against the United 
States intervention and dominion in Nicaragua as long as I have an atom of life in 
me...Only death will prevent me from returning to my country to terminate my duty 
there'" ("Sandino to  Fight On" 1930: 10;  "Sandino Plans Return," 1930).  In May the 
Times reports rumors of Sandino's return but also makes a point of saying that "officials 
are not alarmed by the news" and that his return "will not materially affect the situation, 
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which is well controlled" ("Believe Sandino in Nicaragua" 1930;  "Nicaragua 
Unstirred..." 1930:  15;  "Sandino Fighting Again..." 1930). 
 One possible reason for downplaying Sandino's return to Nicaragua, in addition 
to   simple arrogance, is that US attention is being drawn ever more to the restlessness in 
Europe.  Fears of possible German takeover of Polish territories, Great Britain's hands-off 
policy on the matter, and French nervousness over the situation heightened the debate 
about US intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean as an effort at stabilization of 
those countries.  The idea is that the US should intervene in this hemisphere and 
encourage political stability while building a middle class "to act in the nature of a shock 
absorber between the small group at the top and the countless peons at the bottom," as 
Whiting Williams puts it (Stark, 1930:  20).  The result should then be a stable North and 
Latin America that can resist any attempted German onslaught. 
 Continuing this theme of the US encouraging and maintaining economic and 
political stability is an article by Raymond Leslie Buell (1930a).  In this Times article, 
Buell tries to do away with racist stereotypes applied by North Americans to Latin 
Americans.  Yet he also defends the North American intervention in Latin America, 
particularly in Nicaragua, as a necessity saying that US officials are operating efficiently 
and fairly.  He offers this defense in spite of his admission that President Moncada's 
administration is the most repressive in Central America.  Two papers written by Buell 
and published in Foreign Policy Reports add detail that, curiously, does not appear in the 
Times.  In addition to arguing that US intervention is necessary, Buell criticizes that the 
US-sponsored election process is fair to Conservative and Liberal candidates but not to 
third party candidates, that it breeds a spirit of Nicaraguan servility to US wishes rather 
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than self-reliance and that no anti-American can become President of Nicaragua (Buell, 
1930b & c).  These points did not appear in the Times article read by a wider variety of 
North Americans than might read a foreign policy journal. 
Marines to Withdraw 
 In 1931 pressure within the US to recall the marines increases dramatically 
("Recall of Marines..." 1931).  Concerns about the European situation are also increasing 
while the Great Depression deepens.  Reports of marines being killed in Nicaragua 
continue, but the New York Times still supports marine occupation there ("Our Policy in 
Nicaragua," 1931:  16).  Nevertheless, strong hints that the US government is changing 
its policy toward Nicaragua appear in January and February with stories that Secretary of 
State Henry Stimson has called the American Minister to Managua and the marine officer 
who commands the Nicaraguan National Guard to come to Washington ("Stimson To 
Discuss..." 1931; "Marines to Reduce..." 1931).  Stimson finally makes the announcement 
in mid-February saying that the marines will be completely withdrawn from Nicaragua in 
1932 with most leaving in the next few months ("Marines Will Quit Nicaragua..." 1931).  
Stimson's reported reasons for this change of mind are that there is no longer as much 
need for the marine presence because the National Guard is ready to take over and that he 
believes that it is simply "time for Nicaragua to clean up the bandit situation itself and be 
responsible for law and order in the republic" ("Marines Will Quit Nicaragua..." 1931:  
3). 
 According to New York Times articles, reaction to Stimson's announcement is 
generally supportive in the US and filled with skepticism in Latin America.  The Times, 
which voiced its continuing support of marine occupation on January third, publishes an 
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editorial on February fourteenth supportive of the withdrawal ("Withdrawing the 
Marines" 1931).  It also reports a reversal of opinion for Nicaraguan officials who now 
support National Guard replacement of marines in spite of repeated published statements 
by Moncada that he wants the marines to stay ("Nicaragua favors Marine Withdrawal" 
1931).  A handful of Americans who have questioned or opposed the marine occupation 
now get the opportunity to also agree with Stimson.  For example, Buell's analysis in the 
Times applauds the change in US policy as "an effort to improve Pan American relations" 
(Buell, 1931:  IX, 7). 
 Unfortunately, a devastating earthquake destroys Managua on April 1, 1931 
leaving over 1,000 dead and thousands injured ("Managua is Destroyed..." 1931).  News 
of the earthquake becomes an opportunity to praise the US military and to discuss US 
business.  After the initial news story is printed, other stories about the catastrophe focus 
on the aid given to Nicaragua by US Marines and Navy as well as the status of the 
approximately 2,500 US citizens in the country ("Ships at Canal..." 1931;  "The Marines" 
1931;  "2,500 Americans..." 1931).  A somewhat detailed description appears in the April 
1 issue outlining the effects of the earthquake on the estimated $13,000,000 of American 
investments in Nicaragua ("Our Investments..." 1931, 3). 
 Meanwhile, plans for the marine withdrawal continue.  Several articles quote 
Stimson saying that the marines will leave combat areas by June and warning US citizens 
that the US government will no longer offer protection to them if they choose to remain 
in Nicaragua ("Despite New Clash,..." 1931; Oulahan, 1931; "Stimson Issues Warning" 
1931).  Stimson then has to spend much time defending the new policy against what he 
calls "misinterpretation" indicated by a storm of criticism that the Hoover administration 
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has abandoned Americans ("Stimson Defends Change..." 1931; 1).  One of Stimson's 
arguments for the withdrawal is that the problem in Nicaragua is different than it was in 
1926 when the troubles began.  At that time, he says, the two opposing armies were 
abiding by the rules of warfare.  However, now, "the menace is from outlaws under 
General Sandino who are moving through the jungle upon scattered settlements, bent 
upon murdering and looting" ("Stimson Defends Change..." 1931:  1). 
 In addition to Stimson's implication that the marines are pulling out because 
Sandino does not fight fairly, reports to the US public continue to paint Sandino as 
unreasonable, violent, and elusive. A letter said to be written by Sandino is published and 
threatens that "in order to save Nicaragua, it is necessary to destroy it "exemplifying his 
unreasonable and violent streak” ("Threatens to Burn..." 1931: 2).  Denny (1931:  12) 
writes a feature article chronicling Sandino's activities since Tipitapa dismissively calling 
Sandino's efforts "another 'bamboo battle'...in that unimportant little area in the most 
backward corner of Central America..."  Within the article, Denny notes how Sandino has 
managed to suddenly become an "international problem" and elude marines for four years 
(Denny, 1931: 12).  Furthermore, Sandino's forces are taking advantage of problems in 
the Moncada administration, capturing or threatening US business concerns, and killing 
Americans ("Sandino Rebels Take Port..." 1931;  “Thirty Reported Killed" 1931;  Denny, 
1931).  President Hoover publicly states his support for the new policy and expresses 
confidence that the Nicaraguan government will bring Sandino, who “has placed himself 
outside the civilized pale,” to justice (“Hoover Denounces Sandino...” 22 April 1931:  1). 
 In 1932 editions, Sandino again promises to continue his fight until the marines 
have gone, and the US government continues to promise withdrawal of the marines by 
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January 2, 1933 ("Sandino is Reported..." 1932;  "Sandino Tells of Battles," 1932;  "Date 
Fixed for Ending..."  1932).  More specifically, Sandino is reported to have said that upon 
the withdrawal of the marines, "he will convert Nicaragua into a 'land of bandits'...since 
he is called a bandit..."  and Nicaraguan coffee planters are leaving their plantations in 
fear of the rebels ("Sandino Voices Threat," 1932:  6;  "Nicaraguan Planters Quit" 1932).  
On the other hand, December and the imminent departure of the marines bring 
suggestions from a Sandino supporter that Sandino will make peace with Sacasa in 1933 
and that Sacasa will likely adopt Sandino's proposed policies (Calhoun, 1932). 
 Other than continuing to present Sandino in the now standard ways, articles 
appear that praise the abilities of the Nicaraguan National Guard.  Such comments have 
appeared periodically over the years, but in 1932 the Guard is touted in the Times as a 
"model little army" (“Nicaraguan Guard..." 1932: III, 8).  By December, the US marine 
officers who have been commanding the Guard are replaced by Nicaraguans ("Natives 
Take Over..."  1932).  News that will become of utmost importance later is also offered.  
An extremely brief article reports that "General Anastasio Somosa [sic] has been 
appointed assistant chief of the Guardia Nacional to assume the office of chief...when the 
United States marines depart...he...has always been friendly to Americans..." ("Somosa 
[sic] to Head..." 1932:  4). 
 The other prominent news of 1932 is that American supervised elections have 
again been held, and Juan B. Sacasa is the new president.  The election is reported to 
have occurred without major disturbances, and a Times editorial takes a paternalistic tone 
and says that "the United States...has taught Nicaraguans how to hold an election" 
("Nicaragua's Election," 1932:  18).  Furthermore, US officials seem to congratulate 
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themselves as one proclaims that Nicaraguans consider the election to have been 
conducted legally and efficiently, in freedom and fairness and without bias 
("Constructive Era..." 1932). 
Sandino “Gives Up” 
 Within days of the departure of  the last of the marines, rumors of Sandino's wish 
to make peace appear in the New York Times in January and the paper covers his visit to 
Managua in February ("Sandino to Yield Arms..." 1933;  “Sandino Seeks Peace,” 1933;  
"Sandino Proposes Truce" 1933;  "Sandino Visits Managua," 1933).  In reporting the 
withdrawal of the last marines on January 2, the lengthy Times article never mentions 
Sandino, implying that their departure has nothing to do with his struggle against them 
("Washington Ends Task..." 1933; "Last of Marines..." 1933).  Sandino's appearance in 
Managua on February 2 is reported ("Sandino Visits Managua," 1933). 
 During the efforts of Sandino and Sacasa to negotiate, Sandino is characterized 
by a New York Times writer as a "Nicaraguan outlaw for more than five years" who had 
come to the capital to make peace ("Sandino Emerges..." 1933: 1).  However, Sandino is 
not characterized as a peacemaker.  Instead, the Sandinistas are characterized as 
"give[ing] up" ("1,800 Sandinistas..." 1933: 16).  Additionally, a Times editorial boldly 
states, "It was the carrying out of Mr. Hoover's policy that stabilized Nicaragua and 
prepared the way for the submission of Sandino" ("Sandino Submits,"  1933: 14).  This 
statement appears in spite of the fact that the marines left Nicaragua before Sandino 
comes to negotiate peace and that they left without defeating Sandino. 
 As negotiations continue between Sandino and the government, a front page 
story in the New York Times reports that Sandino, along with three of his aides, has been 
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"suddenly seized and executed" by the Nicaraguan National Guard ("Sandino is Killed..." 
1934: 1).  Sandino and his party had been leaving the presidential palace in Managua 
when they were seized, forced into a truck, taken to the airport and shot by guardsmen.  
The story makes a point of saying that President Sacasa is not implicated in the killings 
and that the Nicaraguan government condemns the killings as acts of individual 
guardsmen. Most importantly to the construction of Sandino in the US, the Times also 
implies that Sandino brought his murder on himself when it says that his criticism of the 
National Guard irritated Guard members. 
 A biography of Sandino printed on page four of the same issue seems to paint 
Sandino as a bit of a romantic but pathetic figure with its headline "Leader of Lost 
Causes" (1934:  4).  This biography finally corrects a few errors about Sandino, such as 
his age, that have appeared previously.  On the other hand, it perpetuates the report that 
he served under Pancho Villa.  A summary of his struggle against United States 
domination and marine occupation of Nicaragua is explained in about two and a half 
column inches.  The last half of the article is devoted to telling his activities since the 
marines left the country.  For example, it recounts the agreement made with the Sacasa 
government that 100 of Sandino's followers be given government financial help to begin 
a cooperative farming project.  Sandino, in turn, surrendered most of his arms and 
promised to refrain from seeking office.  Finally, the story reports that reaction from 
some of Sandino's followers has been to call for immediate reorganization of the Guard. 
 Other stories in the February 23 issue outline the military struggle between 
Sandino and the marines emphasizing the marine point of view by telling that 130 
marines were killed in the five and a half years of Sandino's revolt ("Marines Hunted 
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Sandino 5 Years," 1934).  It also explains that the number of occupying marines varied 
with the degree of "banditry and Sandino's bushwhacking operations" ("Marines 
Hunted..." 1934:  4).  Another article calls Sandino a "popular hero" in Latin America 
(“Salvador Is Indignant" 1934; 4).  A third article discusses the possible dangers to 
Nicaraguan peace and the possible assassination of President Sacasa ("Sacasa Is 
Declared..." 1934).  Interestingly, a fourth article warns of possible revolution following 
Sandino's murder while also noting that General Somoza, commander of the Guard, is 
former President Moncada's nephew ("Revolt Is Predicted" 1934). 
 In the aftermath of Sandino's assassination, widespread violent revolt does not 
erupt in Nicaragua.  Nevertheless, the sum of stories involving the murder seem to imply 
repeatedly that Sandino somehow deserved it or brought it on himself.  At first, President 
Sacasa blames the killing on poor management of the National Guard, and reports say 
that the guilty Guardsmen will be executed immediately ("Nicaraguan Guard Blamed..." 
1934;  "Guardsmen to Die..." 1934).  Three days after the killing, an explanation is 
offered for the killlings saying that guardsmen who went to Sandino's residence 
encountered gunfire, returned the fire and killed Sandino's brother and then kidnapped 
and killed Sandino ("War Council To Act..." 1934).  A week after the murders, stories 
appear accusing Sandino of plotting a revolt against the Sacasa government.  In addition, 
the New York Times reports that Nicaraguan newspapers blame Sandino for his own 
murder because he did not surrender weapons and criticized the Guard ("Sandino 
Accused..." 1934).  Finally, there is a story that a National Guard unit, searching a 
farming community, found a large numbers of weapons and letters belonging to 
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Sandino's group showing that he "was laying the foundation through propaganda for a 
Communist State" ("Arms Cache Found..." 1934). 
The Somozas Rise to Power 
 Meanwhile, Sacasa takes more direct control of the National Guard in an attempt 
to curtail Somoza’s power, but his control is short-lived as the guardsmen accused of 
Sandino's murder are cleared of all charges, and by August receive amnesty from the 
Nicaraguan Chamber of Deputies ("Sacasa Directs Guard" 1934;  "Cleared in Sandino 
Death" 1934;  "Killers of Sandino..." 1934).  Earlier in the summer, Somoza has 
expressed his interest in becoming president, and a news story quotes Sandino's mother as 
supporting him but also mentions that Sandino's father accused Somoza of their son's 
murder ("Sandino's Mother..." 1934).  Moncada has also boldly and publicly expressed 
his approval of Sandino's murder as an act of patriotism ("Moncada Rejoices..." 1934). 
 A somewhat critical analysis in the Times of the aforementioned articles 
published after Sandino's death looks at explanations of Sandino's death as "numerous 
and often amusingly absurd" ("Varied Tales Told..." 1934:  8).  It highlights the 
"campaign in the Nicaraguan press to justify the elimination of General Sandino" but 
does not analyze similar stories and presentations in the New York Times.  This story 
goes so far as to question the authenticity of the letter from Sandino's mother that 
endorses Somoza for president.  What the story fails to mention in its analysis is that the 
New York Times itself places stories like Sandino's mother backing Somoza for president 
on page one while relegating the story of Sacasa blaming the Guard for the murder to 
page twenty-two.  Of more interest is that a story buried on page forty-four telling of the 
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release of the particular guardsman accused of Sandino's murder was by order of the 
United States Secretary of Labor ("Man Named as Killer..." 1934). 
 Even though Sandino is dead, the image of a violent Sandino and violent 
followers continues.  Brief Times reports in 1935 focus on National Guard pursuit of 
Sandino's followers because the Guard says that the Sandinistas are looting and torturing 
plantation owners ("Bandit is Active Again" 1935).  In particular, the paper reports 
pursuit of Sandino's general Pedro Altamirano and emphasizes his cruelty by crediting 
him with inventing the "cut of the coat," a practice of cutting off the arms of victims 
either while killing them or after killing ("Bandit is Active Again,” 1935:  8). 
 While Sandino’s followers are still reported hunted in 1936, the emphasis in the 
New York Times is on Somoza’s activities to take over the Nicaraguan government.  
First, Somoza and his Guardsmen take control of the east coast of the country as well as 
four major towns because, Somoza says, the move was necessary to prevent disturbances 
(“Army Rebels Hold...Towns,” 1936).  Specifically, Guard spokesmen say that the 
people of the country are unhappy because a political agreement has left the selection of 
the next Liberal party presidential candidate solely to President Sacasa and General 
Emiliano Chamorro ("Nicaragua Army..." 1936).  Meanwhile, the Sacasa government 
accuses Somoza of replacing civil authorities with his own supporters in order to ensure 
Somoza's candidacy ("Nicaragua Army..."  1936).  However, Somoza denies that his 
actions are aimed toward taking over the government but instead are to calm public 
agitation resulting from popular discontent with the current government and electoral 
procedure ("Army Head Denies..." 1936).  Nevertheless, days after this denial, the Times 
reports guardsmen unsuccessfully attacking the presidential palace with machine guns 
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after Somoza "replaced virtually all civil authorities with National Guardsmen" 
("Nicaraguan Guard Balked in Battle..." 1936:  6). 
 The next day, Somoza releases a statement declaring that he controls Nicaragua, 
not only in a geographic sense, but also banking and infrastructure ("Managua is 
Tense..." 1936).  Within a few more days, Somoza overtakes Leon and the Sacasa 
government succumbs and goes into exile ("Nicaraguan Fort..." 1936; "Sacasa 
Betrayed..." 1936).  Interestingly, the Times reports that the United States' newly formed 
policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of American nations is reaffirmed and 
fully in force, according to Secretary of State Cordell Hull ("Washington Shuns..." 1936).   
As expected, Somoza wins the nomination for president as a candidate of the Liberal 
party, and this particular story notes that Somoza "easily seized power" in Nicaragua a 
month prior to his nomination ("Nicaraguans Choose..." 1936:  17).  Three months later, 
a very brief column announces that Somoza has published his book El verdadero Sandino 
(The True Sandino) and that it contains information taken from Sandino's archives.  The 
Times paraphrases Somoza’s claim that Sandino’s own archives show that Sandino was 
plotting an overthrow of the Sacasa government and planned to establish communism 
("Issues Book on Sandino" 1936).  The article does not question the validity of Somoza's 
claims in any way;  it seems to accept the statements about Sandino as fact. 
 President Anastasio Somoza was assassinated in September 1956, and his killer, 
Rigoberto López Pérez, was immediately shot and killed.  The two New York Times 
articles telling of Somoza's death emphasize his complete control of Nicaragua and call 
him a dictator but also call him "extremely popular with many of his countrymen" 
(Kennedy, 1956;  "Somoza's Nation..." 1956:  3).  In recounting Somoza's life, the Times 
 201
mentions that Somoza's political career began in Moncada's government as Minister of 
War and later became Commander of the National Guard.  As it tells this story, it notes 
that the US Marines and the National Guard fought a "long and bitter struggle against a 
diminutive and extremely elusive revolutionary leader, Augusto Cesar Sandino" 
("Somoza's Nation ..." 1956:  3).  It further states that Sandino was executed by National 
Guardsmen, noting that Somoza was the Guard Commander, but attributing no blame to 
Somoza for the killing.  The picture of Somoza here is that he stabilized a country racked 
by revolution and political upheaval even though his exercise of power was somewhat 
heavy-handed and that he was an energetic and enjoyable fellow.  President Dwight 
Eisenhower praised Somoza as a constant friend of the United States who was murdered 
in a "dastardly attack" ("Eisenhower Expresses Regret..." 1956:  3). 
 In a look back at United States involvement in the Sandino revolt, Marine Corps 
historian Bernard Nalty reinforces the now familiar image of Sandino as constructed by 
US officials, military and journalists but also identifies specifically charismatic 
characteristics.  Nalty (1962:  17) notes that Sandino was a bandit and outlaw but also 
says that he "was more than an outlaw."  According to Nalty, Sandino was a "zealot," a 
"fanatic," an "inspirational leader" and the "most feared man in Nicaragua" (1962: 16, 
29).  Nalty said that his followers were under "his magic spell," and also characterized 
them as "fiercely loyal to Sandino" (1962:  17, 25).  He also referred to the followers as 
"extremists" and several times as "Sandino's horde" yet conceded that they fought under 
"superb discipline" (1962: 21, 32).   The article also contains an admission that US 
officials failed to understand and take seriously Sandino's military strength as well as the 
zeal of his followers. 
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 Nalty's history features marine activities in Nicaragua but includes some political 
analysis as well.  He admits that the Coolidge administration did not favor the Liberals 
and the original Sacasa government of 1926 because they "began imposing annoying 
taxes on American firms" (1962: 13).  Then he says that the killing of an American and 
perceived threat to American lives and property convinced Coolidge to send military 
force and to sell arms to the Diaz government.   At the end of the article, Nalty considers 
what the US accomplished with this intervention.  He believes that the US actions did, in 
fact, protect American lives and property, improved financial stability in Nicaragua and 
kept the Europeans from becoming involved.  Yet, the marines failed to bring peace to 
Nicaragua because "Sandino's die-hards were never brought to task" (1962:  34).  
Furthermore, he notes the intervention offended many Latin Americans all over the 
hemisphere to the detriment of US policy.  Nevertheless, he believes that the marines left 
two great legacies - the National Guard and electoral law - but that neither survived due 
to Somoza's dictatorship.  An important achievement of the intervention for Nalty was 
that the marines gained experience put to good use in World War II and that marine 
airmen and infantry learned to work as a team. 
 Twenty years after Henry Stimson brokered the peace agreement in Nicaragua, 
fourteen years after Sandino’s murder, and after eleven years of Somoza’s dictatorship, 
Stimson publishes a new account of Nicaraguan events and his view of Nicaraguans 
including Sandino.  The North American who contributed heavily to the constructed 
image of Nicaragua and of Sandino in the US shows no real change in his opinion in 
1947.  He continues to believe that Nicaraguans wanted the US to mediate the war and 
supervise elections.  He repeats that he was very favorably impressed with Moncada.  He 
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states that the marines came to Nicaragua to save lives and that they did a good job 
(Stimson & Bundy, 1947). 
 .For Stimson, Sandino remains a disruptive force to Nicaraguan peace and US 
activities in the country and also remains an essentially bad man.  He uses “bandit leader” 
in reference to Sandino and still cites Sandino’s alleged history of banditry in Mexico.  
Sandino was simply “one of the Liberal leaders who failed to honor his personal pledge” 
to disarm (Stimson & Bundy, 1947:  114). Stimson views Sandino’s Nicaraguan support 
as small but that he gained uncritical support in other parts of Latin America and the US.  
The view of Sandino that remains for Stimson is that he was “plainly unprincipled and 
brutal” and that, while Sandino was “a skillful guerrilla,” the “violence and 
irresponsibility” of his activities, “helped to destroy his reputation as a great patriot”  
(Stimson & Bundy, 1947: 183).  So, the official largely responsible for the image of 
Sandino presented to the American public leaves Sandino as the bloodthirsty bandit who 
was somewhat isolated from his own people but who was ultimately, and rightly, 
vanquished by US efforts to pacify Nicaragua. 
The United States on Sandino 
 The North American presentation of Augusto César Sandino, detailed in Chapter 
Five, is quite distinct from the presentation offered by Sandino, his followers, and 
sympathizers.  The New York Times’ first mention of Sandino is on May 14, 1927 as it 
reports that all Liberal generals except for Sandino have signed the Tipitapa agreement.  
In that article, Henry Stimson characterizes him as a local problem and a bandit who will 
be handled by the US Marines and the native constabulary.  That characterization will 
remain throughout Sandino’s struggle, but other characteristics will be added as well.  
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Periodically, articles or editorials criticize US intervention in Nicaragua, but these articles 
are very much in the minority. 
 From May 1927 through January 1928, the presentation of Sandino by US 
government officials and the US military, as told to the New York Times, will be of a 
man who is acting far outside the norm for Nicaraguans and for civilized people.  He is 
also largely treated as a nuisance of troublesome but little consequence.  In July 1927 
articles alone, Sandino is defiant and in rebellion against the government of Nicaragua.  
He is an outlaw isolated among his own people, a bandit, and a bloodthirsty coward.  
Sandino preys on the country and terrorizes his own people as he is a cold-blooded, cruel 
predator.  Furthermore, he is a braggart who is only a hero to a horde of malcontents.  
These images persist in articles published after July, but another important characteristic 
is added in October.  The Times suggests that Sandino is likely a Bolshevik since he 
spent time in Mexico.  By January 1928 he becomes petty, self-centered and has an 
uncontrollable temper. 
 After January 1928 and until January 1933, the constructions of Sandino in the 
Times turn from casting him as an outlaw pest to treating him as more of a force, albeit a 
small force, with which the marines must contend.  Essentially, the marines must begin to 
explain why they have not contained or defeated Sandino yet.  He is called elusive and 
wily but suffers great military defeats while still having all of the negative personality 
characteristics above.  In 1929, Sandino is also becoming an international issue and is the 
focal point of Latin American dislike and distrust of the US.  He is a threat to US 
business in 1931.  Finally, Sandino is a bandit who will ruin the entire country of 
Nicaragua. 
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 Discussion of Sandino changes again in January 1933 with the marine 
withdrawal.  One article does say that he seeks peace.  However, other articles dismiss 
any role he may have played in the decision to withdraw the marines.  In fact, stories of 
the withdrawal do not generally speak of Sandino at all, implying that the withdrawal has 
nothing to do with Sandino’s efforts.  When not ignored, the Times articles say that 
Sandino gave up his fight and, therefore, lost.   
 After Sandino’s murder, stories imply that Sandino brought his murder on 
himself as he criticized the Guard.  In reviewing who he was, they mention that he was a 
bandit and was running bushwhacking operations.  Once Somoza takes over the 
Nicaraguan presidency in 1936, articles explain that the US has adopted a non-
interventionist policy toward Nicaragua and will not, therefore, address Somoza’s ousting 
of President Sacasa.  After Somoza is assassinated in 1956, the paper reports that Somoza 
brought stability to Nicaragua. 
Sandino, History & Charisma 
 The construction of Nicaraguan history and of Sandino is quite present-oriented, 
at least as it is presented in the New York Times.  What historical construction there is 
casts Nicaragua as a rather politically and economically immature place that has not been 
able to solve its own problems and thus needs US guidance.  Stimson notes that the US 
has periodically lent assistance.  US Senator Wheeler and sociologist Whiting Williams 
offer minority voices to counter the State Department’s and US military’s construction as 
they identify a history of US economic and cultural penetration into Nicaragua. 
 Any recognition of Sandino’s charismatic qualities is generally left to The 
Nation’s Carleton Beals.  Beals remarks on the devotion of Sandino’s followers, the risks 
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they bear, their willingness to forego material reward and the fact that they are not 
coerced or mistreated.  He also notes Sandino’s deep sense of justice, devotion to his 
cause and his followers and his disinterest in personal gain.  Quite surprisingly, the New 
York Times reporter Harold Denny does take note one time of Sandino’s charismatic 
traits.  He mentions that Sandino has an extraordinary personality, inspires devotion in 
others, is wildly patriotic and is a megalomaniac 
In charismatic terms, wildly patriotic can mean that he is devoted to his mission, and 
megalomania can be authoritative and single-minded from a follower’s perspective. 
 The construction of Sandino by US officials and reporters is generally one-
dimensional, with some exceptions, and does not grant Sandino much of a personal 
history.  The one feature of Sandino’s background that is mentioned several times by US 
officials is that he lived in Mexico and made revolutionary and Bolshevik ties there.  This 
feature is one of many that demonstrate that Sandino is a bad man.  Clearly, a one-
dimensional, ahistorical Sandino suits North American purposes nicely.  A complex 
enemy is more confusing and demands more consideration than does a simply bad man.  
On the other hand, the US presentation of Sandino does contain some contradictions 
whereas Somoza García’s construction of Sandino will not, in any way, allow 






SANDINO’S OFFICIAL DECLINE:  SOMOZA & HIS OFFICIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF NICARAGUAN HISTORY 
 
 
 As quickly as he could after Sandino’s death, Anastasio Somoza García presents 
his construction of recent Nicaraguan history to the literate public.  In 1936 Somoza 
publishes his version of the struggle between Sandino, the United States Marines and the 
Nicaraguan National Guard in a book entitled El verdadero Sandino o el calvario de Las 
Segovias (The True Sandino or the Calvary of Las Segovias).  This construction of 
Sandino’s struggle is extensive with numerous supporting documents, including many 
from files taken from Sandinista archives. Not surprisingly, Somoza continues the North 
American image construction of Sandino by emphasizing the rebel General as violent and 
a bandit.  In addition, Somoza extends the US presentation of Augusto Sandino by also 
characterizing the General as vain, of poor character, and a traitor. 
 Anastasio Somoza García was born in 1896 to Anastasio Somoza Reyes and his 
wife, Julia García.  Tacho’s (Somoza García’s nickname) father was a member of the 
Conservative party, even serving as a Conservative senator, although the previous 
generation had Liberal affiliations.  Apparently, Tacho’s father was even a signatory on 
the Bryan-Chamorro treaty.  Nevertheless, Tacho decided to become a Liberal.  However, 
Somoza was sent to study at a business school in the United States in order to keep him 
out of trouble after he confessed to getting one of the family maids pregnant.   
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 While in the US, he learned to speak English very well, learned American culture 
including slang, and met Salvadora Debayle, who was Juan Bautista Sacasa’s niece and 
would become Tacho’s wife.  Somoza held a number of jobs to support himself and his 
new wife.  He was a car salesman, a sports referee, an electric meter reader, a toilet 
inspector, and a counterfeiter.  His lack of success and/or interest at any of these jobs led 
him to consider politics and the military as the Constitutionalist war began in 1926. His 
fortunes improved when Henry Stimson came to Nicaragua to convince Moncada to sign 
the Tipitapa treaty.  Stimson took Somoza as his interpreter, which led to Somoza 
becoming President Moncada’s aide.  Somoza managed to earn Moncada’s trust by 
helping him to cover his indiscretions with women, and he also managed to establish a 
positive relationship with the Marines.  When Managua suffered the earthquake, Somoza 
took advantage of the situation by inciting a transportation strike and then negotiating the 
settlement of it.  Somoza’s greatest opportunity came when Salvadora’s uncle, Juan 
Bautista Sacasa, was elected president of Nicaragua, and the US marines withdrew 
shortly thereafter.  Of course, the Marines left after training the National Guard to take 
their place and after training their newly appointed chief, Anastasio Somoza García 
(Diederich, 1989;  Walter, 1993). 
 Sandino was a man of “violent character” and “violent temperament,” according 
to Somoza García (1976: 33, 34).  The author of El verdadero Sandino assures readers 
that Sandino’s men carried out numerous cold-blooded murders with the approval of 
Sandino himself (Somoza García, 1976).  In order to provide evidence of not only the 
murderous tendencies of Sandino but of his brutality, Somoza includes in the book 
“many photographs of Sandino’s victims so that one can see the inhuman way in which 
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they were killed” (Somoza García, 1976:  70).  Of the 134 photographs included in the 
book, twenty-six of them depict dead or maimed persons whose death or injuries Somoza 
attributes to the Sandinistas.  Many of the pictures of cadavers show dismembered or 
decapitated bodies.  Supplementing the twenty-six pictures of cadavers, other photos 
taken while their subjects were still living have captions saying that the person in the 
photo was ultimately murdered by Sandinista forces. 
 El verdadero Sandino includes various testimonies by alleged victims of Sandino 
and/or his forces in order to make Somoza’s points about the violence, insensitivity and 
capricious nature of the Sandinistas.  For example, José María Siles, “full of horror,” tells 
Somoza how a Sandinista bandit patrol murdered his father, early in the morning, by 
several machete blows to the head (Somoza García, 1976: 130).  Apparently, Sandinistas 
had threatened the family earlier due to the father’s participation in helping locally with 
the election of 1928.  There is also the story of Rubén Brown, who, “at great risk,” tells 
how he was held prisoner by Sandinistas and forced to teach children in spite of the fact 
that he was unqualified.  At times, he was denied food and clothing.  Finally, he was 
moved to Sandino’s camp and became a cook where Sandino’s wife, Blanca Aráuz, 
befriended him.  Brown continues that one day Sandino simply called for four men to 
shoot Brown for no clear reason until Doña Blanca intervened with her husband and 
saved Brown’s life (Somoza García, 1976: 278). 
 Immediately after relating Rubén Brown’s story, Somoza reinforces his point 
about Sandino’s bloodthirsty character by describing Sandinsta methods of  killing their 
victims.  These methods are shocking and meant to shock by their cruelty.  For example, 
the corte de chaleco (vest cut) involves cutting off the victims’ head and then the arms 
 210
just below the shoulders.  Lastly, a cut is made across the abdomen to show where  the 
bottom of a vest would fall.  The corte de cumba (bloomer cut) was achieved by cutting 
off the victims’ legs just below the knees and allowing the victim to bleed to death.  
Somoza says that these killing methods were conceived by Sandino and his general, 
Pedro Altamirano, “of whose satanic invention the authors can boast” (Somoza García: 
1976: 280). 
 Somoza also presented Sandino as an extremely vain man.  “Sandino wanted at 
all costs,” Somoza writes (1976:  46), “to draw public attention to his name.” Somoza 
provides the example of Sandino’s renaming of the small town of El Jícaro to Ciudad 
Sandino and statement of Sandino’s intent to make the town the capital of the future 
Republic of Nueva Segovia. 
 Publicity was a major weakness for Sandino, argues Somoza (1976).  According 
to him, the propaganda spread by Sandino and his followers was largely composed of lies 
constructed to lead people, especially outside Nicaragua, to think that Sandino was more 
successful militarily than he actually was and that he had more followers than he actually 
did.  He argues that it was the propaganda that was successful.  It succeeded in turning 
Sandino into a “legendary figure” (Somoza, 1976:  88). 
 Perhaps most importantly, Somoza discredits the famous interview of Sandino by 
North American journalist Carleton Beals.  He admits that the interview had a 
tremendous impact on North American public opinion toward sympathizing with 
Sandino’s cause.  However, Somoza (1976:  82) writes that Sandino told Beals many 
“stories of pure invention,” and that Beals was in no position to sort out the truth as he 
only spent a few days with Sandino. 
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 Numerous words and accusations used by Somoza García in El verdadero 
Sandino create an image of Sandino as a man seriously lacking in morals and good 
judgment.  For example, Somoza notes that Sandino is not a reflective individual.   This 
characterization suggests that he is incapable of judging his own actions and, therefore, 
incapable of admitting mistakes and expressing regret.  It makes Sandino seem amoral.  
This idea of an amoral Sandino is also suggested by Somoza when the author relates 
stories such as Somoza’s version of the battle at Ocotal.  “Sandino fled leaving behind the 
body of his brave follower [Rufo Marín]...,” writes Somoza (1976:  51) thus suggesting 
cowardice, insensitivity, and a lack of loyalty on Sandino’s part. 
 Somoza makes much of the idea that Sandino is extremely distrustful of everyone 
around him, and his examples conjure an image of a paranoid man.  The author relates 
that Sandino went to bed late, slept very little and awoke before his men because he was 
so distrustful.  Somoza says that Sandino would usually prepare his bed in one place and 
sleep in another, which varied night to night, to avoid treachery by his own men.  
According to Somoza, Sandino did not trust his own personal staff and would routinely 
read their personal mail. 
 The image of Sandino exercising poor judgment largely rests on Somoza’s 
criticism of Sandino for waging any war at all against the United States Marines and the 
Nicaraguan National Guard.  Somoza (1976:  43) calls Sandino’s fight “Quixote-esque.” 
The author also mentions that there were opportunities for peace constantly offered to 
Sandino that included offers of amnesty for his soldiers and himself, and Sandino 
foolishly, stubbornly and repeatedly rejected such offers. 
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 Finally, Somoza García casts Sandino as a traitor and therefore, casts Sandino’s 
struggle as illegitimate.  In Somoza’s presentation of the issue, General Moncada was the 
great patriot who put aside his own selfish interests for the good of the country and 
signed the agreement with US representative Stimson.   Here, Moncada wanted to avoid a 
war that he knew would be disastrous for Nicaragua.  However, Moncada also set aside 
any quest for an heroic place in the nation’s history books. “I have no wishes for 
immortality, that is to say, I don’t want to be a second Zeledón,” he quotes Moncada 
(Somoza García, 1976:  23). 
 On the other hand, Somoza (1976:  37) calls Sandino a “triple traitor.”  He 
became a traitor to the Liberal party, a traitor to his commander General Moncada and a 
traitor to Nicaragua when he refused to abide by the Tipitapa agreement negotiated by 
Moncada, a legitimate military authority in Somoza’s view.  He argues that, as a traitor, 
Sandino was always looking for excuses to continue the fighting.  First, Sandino 
continued the war because he said that he would not accept Adolfo Díaz as president.  
Later, he said he was fighting against foreign intervention and even later, that he would 
continue to fight because the newly elected president General Moncada was the traitor.  
Then Sandino said that he would continue because the Nicaraguan National Guard was a 
creation of the United States.  By 1933, Somoza (1976:  36) argues, Sandino continued in 
his assaults and murders of defenseless Nicaraguans in spite of the fact that Díaz, 
Moncada, the US marines and the US National Guard officials had all left the scene. 
 When the second edition of Somoza García’s book was published in 1976, a new 
prologue not only called Sandino a bandit and a violent, savage man, but emphasized and 
elaborated Somoza’s implications that Sandino was mentally unbalanced. The prologue’s 
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author, Francisco A. Mendieta, claimed that Sandino’s mental problems were caused by 
his involvement with spiritism, his dabbling with eastern beliefs in karma, his adherence 
to theosophy, and a belief in clairvoyance.  Mendieta (Somoza, 1976:  VIII) states, “And 
simply, [Sandino] was  a crazy man who had the opportunity to bathe his own country in 
blood and desolation, while he roamed free.” 
 According to Mendieta, Sandino’s main mental problem was megalomania.  The 
writer (Somoza, 1976:  I, V) claims that Sandino “believed himself predestined to defeat 
the most powerful army in the world” and that he was “the greatest hero of the Americas, 
the champion of Indo-hispanic freedom, defender of the sovereignty of Nicaragua...”  So 
he does recognize here what Sandino believed about himself.  Mendieta’s image of 
Sandino rests on the belief that Sandino’s desire and intent was to become the only and 
ultimate political and military authority in Nicaragua.  Therefore, Mendieta can easily 
explain Sandino’s fate.  “The inevitable happened.  He had to disappear because 
otherwise, Nicaragua would fall into the most tremendous chaos brought on by the 
Sandinista hordes,” concludes the prologue (Somoza, 1976:  iv). 
 Another firsthand account written by a former National Guardsman gives some 
support to Somoza’s argument but also credits Sandino with significant accomplishment.  
Domingo Ibarra Grijalva’s book The Last Night of General Augusto C. Sandino 
chronicles the Sandinista revolt from its beginnings at Tipitapa in 1927 to Sandino’s  
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murder in early 1934.35  Ibarra (1973:  vii) was an officer in the National Guard for 
fifteen years but resigned and then went to live in “exile...as an open adversary of the 
political and military regime of Anastacio [sic] Somoza.”    
 As have others, like Sandino’s representative to the peace talks, Ibarra discusses 
Sandino’s intelligence.  He says that Sandino’s peasant mother taught him to read, and 
he, of course, never had the opportunity for higher learning.  Ibarra mentions that, during 
the Constitutionalist War, Sandino’s intellect was no match for the other officers in 
Moncada’s Liberal Army who were physicians, lawyers, engineers, and journalists.  In 
fact, Ibarra (1973:  194) says that the General had a “mentality a bit less than mediocre” 
and was not a politician.  “But Sandino,” he writes, “who was a novice at war, had 
something which those who surrendered their weapons lacked” (Ibarra, 1973:  53).  
Apparently, the “something” is a combination of courage, an unwillingness to 
compromise, and a disinterest in personal reward, and Sandino always expresses these 
qualities with eloquence and determination.  Additionally, Ibarra notes that Sandino 
(1973:  42) issued numerous communiqués during the war and that “some were very 
inspiring and some were absurd.”  He says that the absurd ones were written by Sandino, 
and the others were written by Sandino’s more learned advisors.  Nevertheless, Ibarra 
(1973:  43) asserts that Sandino’s intellectual mistakes are extremely insignificant 
compared to his status of “unimpeachable patriot” and his accomplishment of  
                                                 
35 Ibarra does not publish his book until 1973, almost 20 years after the murder of Sandino.  
Therefore, his testimony is offered after years of considering the subject and not during the period 
of the murder and Somoza’s ascent to power.  Nevertheless, it is a firsthand account that 
corraborates some of Somoza’s claims while also recognizing the charisimatic leadership of 
General Sandino. 
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“challenge[ing] the colossus reverberated throughout the world,” and “today he is the 
symbol of the resistance of a people against all foreign domination.” Clearly, Ibarra very 
much admires his former enemy. 
 Ibarra expresses his admiration for some of Sandino’s officers and his extreme 
abhorrence of others.  The author admires General Ortéz as brave, honest and very 
intelligent.  On the other hand, Ibarra (1973:  19, 23) describes Major Sergeant Marcial 
Rivera Zeledón as a “cruel assassin, rapist and arsonist” and Generals Pedro Altamirano, 
Simón González and Pedro Antonio Irías as “human tigers” who “inhaled with enjoyment 
the odor of the blood and licked their lips with delight at seeing the wounds of their 
victims.”  However, of Sandino, Ibarra (1973:  24) says more than once that Sandino 
never spilled any blood except in combat, “fighting like a soldier, exposing his own life 
on the battlefields.” 
 In spite of his admiration for Sandino and his distaste for Somoza’s methods and 
intentions, Ibarra attributes some blame to Sandino for his own assassination.  He 
outlines an argument similar to one that Somoza makes saying that Sandino was deceitful 
as he negotiated peace while at the same time he made a “public and well defined 
decision of using arms to again re-light the war” and that he wanted to take that war to all 
of Central America (Ibarra, 1973:  197).  The Central American Union would have its 
own army, headed by Sandino.  Coupled with the criticisms that the National Guard is 
unconstitutional, the belief that Sandino would not surrender his arms and would restart 
the war makes Sandino a clear threat to men like Ibarra and Somoza.  The author also 
believes that President Sacasa was, at least, tolerating Sandino’s designs or, at most, 
supporting them.  Given this view, Ibarra concludes that Sandino was a clear threat to 
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Nicaragua’s stability, as well as to Somoza’s authority, and thus gave Somoza no choice 
but to eliminate the threat.  Ibarra then goes on to strongly criticize the way in which 
Sandino was eliminated and, ultimately, he leaves the Guard and Nicaragua due to his 
strong opposition to Somoza.   
 Meanwhile, Somoza has announced his presidential candidacy in 1935 and 
surrounds the presidential palace with Guardia in 1936 forcing the resignation of 
President Sacasa.  Somoza then convinces the Nicaraguan Congress to appoint his choice 
as interim president until Somoza wins the presidential election and takes office in 
January 1937. During the election campaign, Somoza casts himself as the one who 
brought peace and order to Nicaragua.  He promises land reform in favor of the peasants, 
programs for workers, and more schools, among other promises.  Somoza also criticizes 
the traditional parties and promises a new type of government with a new type of leader 
(Walter, 1993).  It is during this period that he releases El verdadero Sandino, which is 
his construction of the Sandinista struggle.  Even so, the Sandinista movement 
sporadically attempts a comeback though it was largely dormant during and after this 
period. 
 Hence, Sandino’s struggle did not entirely end with his death in 1934.  His 
general, Pedro Altamirano, began the struggle anew a year after Sandino’s murder.  
Altamirano’s activities had been more of a nuisance than a real threat until he increased 
those activities in 1937.  The Guardia was occupied with “exterminating the remnants of 
Sandinismo” while the Sandinistas, without Sandino’s political and military leadership, 
were becoming more isolated, poorly equipped and their living conditions more 
precarious (Blandón, 1981:  10).  But by 1937, Altamirano’s forces were threatening to 
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capture towns such as Jinotega, and the Guardia was unable to defeat them in open 
combat.  Apparently, the Guardia recruited three former Sandinistas and some prostitutes 
to infiltrate the general’s camp.  Altamirano was normally surrounded by numerous 
trusted family members, but one of the prostitutes persuaded the general to spend the 
night with them, according to one account.  Another simply says that a traitorous 
Sandinista slept near him.  All accounts agree that he was then murdered in his sleep by 
the three Guardia agents, who also decapitated him and brought his head back to 
Managua (Millet, 1966; Blandón, 1981; Clark, 1992).  A National Guardsman says that 
Altamirano’s skull was sent as a present to US President Franklin Roosevelt (Ibarra, 
1973).  Altamirano’s forces dissolved and thus was Sandino’s movement silenced for 
several years. 
 In 1938 a very brief publication of “Biographical Facts” about President Somoza 
appeared (Aquino, 1938).  After Sandino’s death, not only was there a general, forceful 
effort to present Sandino as a villain but also to present Somoza as a good and heroic man 
of the people.  In some ways, it might be said that Somoza was working to become what 
Sandino had been to many people.  Toward these ends, the biographer begins with facts 
about Somoza’s birth and the beginnings of his career.  Then he observes that as the last 
US Marine transport left in 1933, the nation “was surprised in the face of a success that 
would have had very grave consequences without the opportunistic and energetic 
intervention of General Somoza” (Aquino, 1938: 6).  The author further says that 
Nicaragua was on the verge of chaos when President Sacasa’s presidency was threatened 
by some young army officers and that Somoza talked them out of their thoughts of 
insubordination.  Apparently, Somoza explained to them that disrupting the peace of the 
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nation would not only bring dishonor to the army but would also show that Nicaraguans 
were not capable of governing themselves thus bringing a new armed intervention by the 
United States (Aquino, 1938:  7). 
 Of Sandino, Aquino (1938:  8) calls his activities “banditry” and a “cancerous 
tumor” that threatened the life of Nicaragua.  Further, he says that President Sacasa was 
trying to reach an agreement with Sandino but marginalized Somoza and the Guard in the 
effort.  Nevertheless, Somoza and the Guard cooperated with the President, but this 
cooperation was interpreted by Sandino as weakness, and he plotted against the Guard as 
evidenced by Somoza in The True Sandino.  Then “at this truly burning point in the 
nation’s life, General Somoza appears as the legitimate Peacemaker of Nicaragua...” 
(Aquino, 1938: 9).  Aquino (1938:  9) continues that thus ends “this short epilogue of 
blood; and we say epilogue because with the death of Sandino thus ended once and for all 
the bloody chapter that would have been presented to the world...”  There is no 
explanation of how Somoza achieved this peace or elimination of Sandino’s threat and no 
explanation of how Sandino died. 
 The brief biography of Somoza goes on to laud his work to develop Nicaragua 
and to list his awards.  Most importantly, it states that President Somoza has the “[support 
of] the majority of the Nicaraguan people and the approval of both political parties who 
wish for peace and order toward the achievement of national well-being” (Aquino, 1938:  
10).  The author (1938: 11) ends by saying that Somoza’s development efforts have been 
accomplished “at great risk” and are distinguished as a “work of reconstruction” by 
General Somoza. 
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 In 1940 the Somoza regime sentences several young people to prison or hard 
labor for reproducing and distributing the famous photograph of Somoza embracing 
Sandino and accusing Somoza of Sandino’s murder (Walter, 1993).  Luis Cardenal 
(1961) says that there was no revolutionary activity between 1944 and 1948 because the 
government had very effectively shut down all opposition.  Then another of Sandino’s 
generals, Juan Gregorio Colindres, attempts to restart the struggle against Somoza and the 
Guardia Nacional in 1948.  Colindres’ rebellion even has Conservative support, but it is 
quelled when the Guardia killed Colindres that same year.  There is an armed revolt 
against the regime in 1954 led by Conservatives and former Guardia members.  The 
revolt fails, and government repression is swift and vicious (Millett, 1966; Walter, 1993). 
 The rule of Anastasio Somoza García came to an abrupt end with his 
assassination by Rigoberto López Pérez in 1956.  It seems that the assassination was the 
aim of a very small conspiracy organized outside the traditional opposition party 
structure.  López was a student who had decided to kill Somoza knowing that he himself 
would be killed in the effort.  Nevertheless, the government was in no danger of falling as 
Somoza’s son, Luis, immediately steps to the presidency and largely continues his 
father’s policies while Anastasio Jr. (Tachito) becomes director of the Guardia (Walter, 
1993). 
 Somoza’s presentation of Sandino as villain, bandit and disrupter of Nicaragua’s 
peace and tranquillity is continued in backhanded fashion through the funeral speeches 
given in Somoza’s honor.  The eulogies, of course, make no mention of Sandino and 
credit Somoza with saving the country from foreign interests and bringing hard-won 
peace.  Dr. Manuel F. Zurita, Deputy to the National Congress offers this praise: 
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[Somoza] turned the noise of war into the noise of peace...He 
transformed misery into bread, and sickness into health and ignorance 
into light.  He rescued the national wealth from foreign hands...” 
(Discursos Oficiales Pronunciados...1956). 
 
Similarly, priest Don Luis Enrique Mehía y Fajardo lauded Somoza by saying, “We are 
before the body of the peacemaker of las Segovias...”  (Discursos Oficiales 
Pronunciados...1956). 
 The murder of their father brings repression by the sons, Luis and Anastasio Jr.  
Thousands of members of the opposition are jailed and interrogated.  Conservative 
journalist and La Prensa editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro is among those arrested and 
jailed as he had been for the 1954 coup attempt.  University students and future FSLN 
founders Carlos Fonseca and Tomás Borge are also jailed as conspirators.  Borge spends 
two and one-half years in jail and then is released to house arrest but escapes to 
Honduras.  Chamorro is also arrested just hours after the shooting.  He spends the next 
forty months as a prisoner and victim of torture until his escape to Costa Rica with his 
wife Violeta. 
 Chamorro’s book, Estirpe Sangrienta (Bloody Lineage), written during his 
captivity and published in 1959, provides a non-Sandinista, non-Somocista view of the 
dictator and of Sandino.  In the book’s preface, Sandino sympathizer Gregorio Selser 
writes of Chamorro (1959:  viii.),  
In spite of being a Conservative and a Catholic, as simply a Nicaraguan 
who loves his country, Chamorro recognizes that the general Augusto 
César Sandino was not the bandit that the Yankees and Somocistas say 
he was, but a patriot that loved Nicaragua and fought for her with arms in 
hand until he was defeated by betrayal and iniquity.  
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Chamorro (1959:  45) writes that “Somoza had made all of Nicaragua his own great 
feudal estate” and that Somoza began his long career in 1934 “when he ordered the 
killing of Sandino.”   
 In exposing the cruelty and corruption of the Somoza regime, Chamorro also 
recognizes the posthumous popularity and charisma of Sandino.  First, he writes of the 
suspension of human rights during Somoza’s time in power, illegal imprisonments, 
torture by the Guardia and Somoza’s corruption and domination of the economy.  
Additionally, he writes of Somoza’s efforts at contrived charisma as he tells of ports, 
towns and streets named after Somoza or his family members.  He also mentions the 
presence of portraits and statues of Somoza throughout Nicaragua and the ever-present 
slogan, “Nicaragua marches with Somoza in the lead” (Chamorro, 1959: 45).  Then, 
Chamorro’s description of being transported to the Military Court after the assassination 
speaks to Sandino’s continued hold on the people over twenty years after his death and in 
spite of Somoza’s efforts to erase Sandino from the collective memory.  He relates that 
while being transported, “the van went down a street that Somoza when alive, baptized 
with the name Roosevelt and that the people called Sandino...” (Chamorro, 1959: 161). 
 In 1958 one of Sandino’s lieutenants, Ramón Raudales (then sixty-two years old) 
and others, launch a new revolution from Honduras.  Inspired by Castro’s efforts in Cuba, 
Raudales leads forty armed men into Nueva Segovia.  The plan was to take a Guardia 
post in the small town of El Corozo.  They fail to capture the garrison, and Tachito sends 
anti-guerrilla troops after the group, killing Raudales only a month after the old 
Sandinista had returned to Las Segovias.  The small revolutionary force was completely 
defeated in 1961 (Blandón, 1981;  Booth, 1985;  Dierderich, 1989).  In spite of the 
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immediate failure of Raudales, the new generation of revolutionaries, such as Fonseca 
and Borge, were inspired by Raudales’ efforts and martyrdom at the hands of another 
Somoza (Diederich, 1989). 
 Again in 1959 Conservatives attempted a coup d’etat against the Somoza regime. 
Pedro Joaquín Chamorro was involved along with other elites such as Luis Cardenal.  
This time the attack was launched from Costa Rica and involved 112 men, none of them 
founders of the future Sandinistas. The force was better organized than previous efforts, 
but Tachito, as director of the Guardia Nacional, was also well prepared and took 
advantage of the group’s mistakes.  The revolutionaries did not find support among 
average Nicaraguans, and soon surrendered.   
 Luis Cardenal’s book, Mi Rebelión (My Rebellion) (1961), relates his view of 
the Somozas and of the attempts at their overthrow as well as his involvement in those 
attempts.  As one who knew the family well, Cardenal stated: 
Tacho has a deformed conscience...It’s not that he cannot distinguish 
good from bad;  he had a good education, and he understands perfectly.  
What happens is that he tries to convince himself and those around him 
that what is convenient for him, even though it is bad, is the best 
(Cardenal, 1969:  44). 
 
Of Anastasio Jr., Cardenal (1961) wrote that he believed that Tachito was mentally 
disturbed but that he generally liked Cardenal. 
 Cardenal’s analysis (1961) of the various efforts to remove the Somozas from 
power, including the 1959 attempt, is in terms of success and failure.  He cites the 
organization of the efforts of the late fifties as a success but the political and military 
aspects as failures.  He recognizes that while the people suffer, they are tired of being 
exploited and betrayed by the political parties and so do not respond to any calls from 
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any parties.  Hence, the 1959 coup attempt did not attract popular support.  He is also 
aware that groups such as the Frente Cívica and the Frente Interno lacked proper 
organization and relied on elites without organizing the people. 
 Periodically, there were other armed attacks on the regime or the National Guard, 
but the Somozas were always able to quell them.  By 1960 any hemispheric attention 
given to the plight of average Nicaraguans under the Somoza dictatorship was shifted to 
the Cuban revolution and Castro.  Meanwhile, Tachito spent many hours garnering and 
maintaining the support of his own men through training, salaries and material 
compensation, and a policy of receiving any Guardsman to hear suggestions and 
complaints (Diederich, 1989). 
 As one reads of the various attempts to rid Nicaragua of the Somoza dictatorship, 
whether from the observer’s or the participant’s perspective, the focus is very much 
situated in the present.  The argument is always that the Somozas must go because they 
are cruel, repressive and too powerful.  References to the past concentrate on cruelties of 
the Somozas.  The issue for writers like Cardenal and Chamorro seems to be simple 
overthrow because the Somozas are bad.  There is not much discussion of how to run the 
country differently nor much mention of the historical relationship between the United 
States and Nicaragua.  The other part of their message seems to be that a Conservative 
coalition with a  few Liberals conspired over several years to overthrow the Somoza 
dynasty and failed.  There is no evidence that these elites tried to gain popular support for 
their efforts and extremely rare mention of Sandino. Contemporary Sandinista Blandón 
(1980) cites the cause of their failure as the tremendous gap between well-equipped urban 
Conservatives and ill-equipped peasants and workers who could have made the 
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difference.  Certainly, these revolutionaries do not appear to view their efforts as any sort 
of continuation of Sandino’s struggle.  If they are part of a  continuation of any other 
historic Nicaraguan struggle, they are part of one of those nagging forces that perpetually 
plague the nation as elites displace elites for control of the country.  The 1959 coup 
attempt fits the historical pattern of Liberal/Conservative power struggles to dislodge one 
another from office.  However, Cardenal and Chamorro do not view their role in this 
pattern as a problem; instead, it is the solution.  They are very time-bound in their present 
of solving the single problem of Somoza rule, and there is no wholesale reconstruction of 
history. 
Constructing Nicaragua’s Official History 
 Obviously, Somoza García was able to construct an official national history 
because he had the power to do it.  His takeover of the Nicaraguan government and 
control of the means of violence - the National Guard - gave him the ultimate bully pulpit 
for sending any message he wished.  The question becomes how did the Somozas 
construct history and relay it and how did they frustrate the opposition and erase 
Sandino? 
 As mentioned in Chapter Two, access to and use of communications systems and 
technology are crucial to the social movement attempting to reconstruct history.  In any 
society, there will be an official history, perhaps various versions of it, that is generally 
sanctioned by the dominant group.  By definition, the dominant group has the power to 
maintain their versions of history as consensual and true.  If movement participants 
construct a counterpast but are unable to get their message out, then the movement will 
be ineffective in terms of achieving a re-ordering of society.   
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 For decades, the Somozas were able to maintain an official history that made 
Somoza a hero and disparaged Sandino but largely erased him.  They further were able to 
eliminate or suppress attempts to remind the population of him and to silence the non-
Sandinista opposition to their regime as the examples above demonstrate.  The 
combination of putting forth an official history of Nicaragua and suppressing other 
versions of history is highly dependent on control and use of communications systems 
and education. 
 Communications and education are two obvious means for distributing official 
history.  In each case, specific messages and facts are relayed to an audience.  Control of 
which messages and facts are distributed and in which context certainly aids the 
construction of history.  In Nicaragua, the Somozas enjoyed extensive control over the 
communications networks and media and certainly had almost exclusive control over the 
content and delivery of education. 
 As previously mentioned, Somoza published his story of Sandino’s revolt within 
two years of Sandino’s death.  The book served to establish an official account of 
Nicaragua’s most recent history and also served to begin to legitimate Somoza’s rise to 
power. El verdadero Sandino focused on vilifying Sandino but allowed for Somoza to 
eventually be presented as a true patriot and peacemaker who stood in the way of 
Sandino’s bloody rampage and his inevitable attempt to install himself as Nicaragua’s 
caudillo.  Such were the images of Somoza portrayed in public as exemplified in the 
biographical sketch and funeral speech cited previously. 
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Communications in Somoza’s Nicaragua 
 In spite of the powerful message of Somoza’s book, most of Somoza’s power to 
control the construction of history lay in his control of mass media.  Central American 
rulers have been notorious for media control and censorship, and the Somozas were no 
different.  Nichols (1982:  182) notes that much of the Latin American media “were 
founded and continue to serve as collaborators with specialized power contenders in 
society, usually political factions” or operate in a “tradition...of political advocacy”  
(Rudolph, 1982:  157).  In other words, the party or persons in power will favor and will 
be favored by the media that support them.  Likewise, opposition media will suffer 
negative consequences such as censorship, harassment, closure, or worse. 
 An important aspect of Somoza’s ability to construct Nicaragua’s history was the 
enormously high rate of illiteracy in the country.  Official estimates are that between 50% 
and 60% were illiterate, and unofficial estimates place the number at between 60% - 70% 
of the population.  Therefore, the Area Handbook for Nicaragua (Ryan, et al, 1970:  189) 
observes that Nicaragua has more of a “class media” than a mass media since it is largely 
the upper classes that are consuming information from newspapers and Somoza’s book.  
This phenomenon cuts both ways;  the majority of the Nicaraguan population does not 
read of Somoza’s abuses or of Sandino, but neither do they read Somoza’s view of the 
world. 
 Probably due to the high illiteracy rate, there was a small circulation of daily 
newspapers throughout the Somoza period.  In fact, in 1964 the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) reported that the 
distribution of newspapers was 6.6 copies per 100 Nicaraguans compared to 32.6 papers 
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per 100 in the United States and 9.4 per 100 Costa Ricans.  All of the dailies were 
privately owned, and most were sold on the streets of Managua.  Those sold outside of 
Managua were by subscription (UNESCO, 1966).  The number of dailies grew from 1937 
to 1950 and then declined (Lapple-Wagenhals, 1984).  Nicaragua had no news agency of 
its own and, therefore, relied on the Associated Press and United Press International from 
the US for international news and on local newspaper reporters as well as press 
departments of government agencies for domestic news (UNESCO, 1966). 
 As noted above, Latin American newspapers were generally allied with a 
particular political interest.  In 1970 there were six dailies in Nicaragua. (Merrill, et al, 
1970).  Three of them were owned by the Somozas, and two were controlled by the 
family.  Only La Prensa, owned by the Conservative Chamorro family, was the 
exception.   
 Nicaragua’s first newspaper of significant duration was founded in 1835 by 
President José Zepeda and used as a political tool (Ryan, et al, 1970).  Other papers 
followed.  Somoza’s Partido Liberal de Nicaragua (PLN) established La Hora in the 
1930s followed in 1936 by Novedades, a daily owned by the Somoza family.  Somoza 
began Novedades to counter La Prensa’s opposition (Diederich, 1989). 
 In the tradition of collaborative journalism, La Prensa was a major player in 
Nicaragua favoring the Conservative party against Somoza and the PLN.  Its editor, 
Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, descended from a long line of Conservative party 
faithfuls that included four Nicaraguan presidents.  His father, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro 
Zelaya, bought La Prensa in 1930, and the son became publisher in 1952.  La Prensa was 
relentless in printing editorials opposing the Somoza regime and articles that exposed 
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government corruption.  That is, the paper published such things when it was not 
censored. 
 Censorship was routinely used by the Somozas in their effort to suppress 
presentations of Nicaragua’s past and present contrary to their own and to put forth their 
construction of history. During Tacho’s regime, the press was under strict censorship.  He 
created laws that restricted the type of information that could be printed prohibiting 
anything that might disrupt public order or criticize the principal institutions of 
government, especially the Guardia Nacional (Walter, 1993;  Diederich, 1989).  At times, 
newspaper offices were closed by the government and/or newspaper employees arrested.  
In fact, the manual used by US military personnel to familiarize themselves with 
Nicaragua says that “the opposition press was effectively silenced during the 
governments of the elder Somoza” (Ryan, et al, 1970: 189).  Newspapers were not even 
allowed to state that they were being censored.  Therefore, La Prensa developed a 
creative way to let its readership know when it was being censored.  Editors replaced 
censored articles with photos of Ava Gardner, and readers recognized their meaning 
(Nichols, 1982). 
 As mentioned previously, the younger Chamorro was arrested numerous times 
for participating in anti-government activities.  Other journalists were arrested at various 
times and accused of crimes  against the state including attempting to assassinate the 
president. For example, members of the Robleto family, executives of the opposition 
paper La Flecha, were also arrested and tortured by the National Guard (Nichols, 1982).  
However, it was Chamorro and La Prensa that consistently persisted in efforts to criticize 
and expose Somoza despite the relentless pressure from the regime.  In fact, La Prensa’s 
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opposition was often useful to the government as Somoza could cite its operation as proof 
of press freedom (Nichols, 1982).  It worked.  Merrill, Bryan and Alisky (1970:  190) 
note that “the Inter-American Press annually cites this republic as having press 
freedom...”  They (Merrill, et al, 1970:  190) also observe that it “is true technically in 
that no censors remain on duty at the newspapers” but that the censors are also 
unnecessary as most editors support the Somoza regime. 
 After Tacho’s assassination, Luis Somoza relaxed censorship somewhat.  One 
example of this reduction of pressure on the press was the government’s consent to the 
opening of a school of journalism affiliated with the National University of Nicaragua 
and funded by the Fulbright Commission.  US college professor and former news 
correspondent Marvin Alisky was founding director of the school that opened in 1960.  
Three La Prensa editors became faculty and taught investigative journalism among other 
topics.  However, as newly graduated reporters went to work, the University, under 
pressure from the Minister of Education, ended the school’s affiliation.  However, the 
Jesuit university welcomed the school into its program (Alisky, 1981). 
 Both Luis and Tachito relied less on overt, formal censorship than had their 
father.  Instead, the younger Somozas made it very difficult for the opposition to publish 
by restricting access to necessary materials like newsprint, machinery and spare parts, as 
well as restricting access to official news sources (Nichols, 1982; Lapple-Wagenhals, 
1984).  Of the opposition press, only La Prensa remained fully functional, and it 
remained so in spite of  the additional annoyance of legal harassment from Tachito 
(Nichols, 1982). 
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 Chamorro’s continued opposition and Somoza’s continuing harassment of La 
Prensa (and Chamorro) brought Chamorro to the international attention of news 
organizations and human rights groups.  Chamorro won international awards for his 
leadership in press freedom thus providing him with outside support to further criticize 
the Somoza regime.  In the early seventies, coverage of government corruption following 
the 1972 earthquake and Sandinista activities brought renewed censorship.  Somoza’s 
actions only intensified international criticism and pressure from groups such as Amnesty 
International and even US President Jimmy Carter.  Somoza responded by easing 
restrictions, and Chamorro unleashed some of his most vicious critiques (Alisky, 1981; 
Nichols, 1982;  Diederich, 1989).  Therefore, Chamorro’s assassination in 1978 was 
assumed everywhere to be the work of Somoza and ignited the final insurrection. 
 Radio was even more severely censored than the print media.  It was first 
introduced to the country by US companies beginning in 1921 with Tropical Radio 
Telegraph Company owned by United Fruit.   However, it was not a broadcasting 
endeavor. The company’s services were routinely used by New York Times’ reporters to 
send their stories of the Sandino rebellion back to New York.  Similarly, Radio Nacional 
was introduced by the US Marines and the Guardia Nacional to connect guardposts in 
response to Sandino’s attacks on telephone and telegraph lines (Lapple-Wagenhals, 
1984).  The first real radio broadcasting began in 1934. 
 The government dominated radio from the 1940s until 1979.  Radio Nacional 
and Radio Equis were all owned by the Somoza government or the Somoza family.  Of 
the eighty-two licensed radio stations operating in 1969, forty-seven of them were part of 
the Radio Nacional system (Ryan, et al, 1970).  Radio Católica (owned by the Catholic 
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Church), Radio Deportes and Radio Mundial (both privately owned) were other 
important stations operating in the 1960s and 1970s (Lapple-Wagenhals, 1984).   
 Control of radio broadcasting through ownership, management and licensing 
certainly afforded the Somozas the opportunity to put forth their construction of 
Nicaraguan reality.  Again, illiteracy was extremely high in the country so the population 
depended on radio for news.  Each household was likely to have a cheap transistor radio, 
and Ryan, et al (1970:  191) observes that “radio reache[d] more people in Nicaragua 
than any other medium, except, without doubt, word of mouth.”  In fact, nine of ten 
households got their news from radio (Merrill, et al, 1970).  Therefore, it was extremely 
important to control radio and what the government could not control directly, it 
controlled through censorship.  Government censors were stationed at Radio Mundial and 
Radio Noticias after each consistently broadcast stories critical of the government.  Since 
Radio Mundial held the largest news audience in the nation, government censorship of 
this privately owned station was crucial for Somoza.  After 1962, all independent news 
stations were subject to censorship (Alisky, 1981).  Meanwhile, Somoza’s stations 
provided upbeat and uncritical news and programming such as Radio Nacional 
broadcasting agricultural news (Alisky, 1982). 
 Control of the television industry was similar to that of radio.  The first television 
station began operation in 1955 as a commercial enterprise by the Somoza family.  This 
television station was the only one for several years and was housed in the same building 
with Somoza’s Radio Equis and his newspaper, Novedades (Merrill, et al, 1964).  By mid 
1967, two stations were owned by the Somozas, and three were owned by others.  
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Apparently, the Sacasas were the only family that gave the Somozas any serious 
competition in this arena (Lapple-Wagenhals, 1984).   
 Television was unlikely to be a news source for the vast majority of Nicaraguans 
because most could not afford to buy one.  In addition, access to electricity was limited 
(Lapple-Wagenhals, 1984).  However, this upper class phenomenon was still an 
important avenue for the government to relay its presentation of the nation.  Not 
surprisingly, broadcast news was heavily censored by the government (Nichols, 1982; 
Merrill, et al, 1970).  Yet most programming was entertainment anyway with only two 
percent of it being news, and stations were on the air for only five to eight hours per day 
during the Somoza period (UNESCO, 1966).   
 The most common form of communication was word of mouth.  Postal, telegraph 
and telephone were all operated by the National Guard and had no private competition.  
Usage of these services was low anyway due to illiteracy, lack of affordability, and poor 
availability.  On the other hand, word of mouth was widespread due to communication 
between extended family members across the country.  In addition, public gatherings 
such as community festivals brought people together to hear speeches as well as 
celebrating (Ryan, et al, 1970). 
Education in Somoza’s Nicaragua 
 Education has always been valued in Nicaragua, but it has been viewed and 
administered in light of its Spanish and religious roots as a phenomenon of the upper 
classes.  In the 1940s, the government became more directly involved in education.  The 
1950 Nicaraguan Constitution declared that education was a primary responsibility of the 
government, and even private schools were under the jurisdiction of the State (Ryan, et 
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al, 1970).  Nevertheless, illiteracy rates during the Somoza period ranged from between 
50% and 70% as stated previously. 
 Middle- and upper-class children had the means to enter and continue in school 
through the secondary level and even to college in many cases.  However, for most rural 
and lower class children, social tradition and their economic situation meant that they 
would only complete one or two years of school.  Even though school was technically 
free to citizens, related costs and foregoing income from a child’s labor caused many 
families to withdraw children after only a year or two.  In fact, “in 1964 only 7.2 percent 
of registered first grade students completed the six years of primary school” (Ryan, et al, 
1970: 115).  After 1950 literacy did increase, as did secondary enrollment, but overall 
literacy rates and secondary enrollment remained low (Ryan, 1970).    
 The Nicaraguan Ministry of Education controlled virtually every aspect of 
education, public and private.  It created the curricula, supervised examinations, 
appointed teachers and specified the design of facilities among other things (Ryan, et al, 
1970).  Neither teachers nor school administers were allowed to make changes to the 
nationwide, standardized curricula and testing.  While private schools had control over 
their own finances and policies, even they were under the supervision of the government.  
This centralized control of education accounted, to some degree, for the concentration of 
schools and students in the urban areas, especially in Managua (Ryan, et al, 1970;  Kraft, 
1983). 
 An example of the Somoza government’s control of curriculum and, therefore, 
official history, is a 1946 teacher’s guide published by the Ministry of Public Education.  
The guide is fairly detailed in its coverage of language, arithmetic, hygiene, home 
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economics, agriculture, geography, history and something called social, civic and moral 
education.  Of particular interest to this study is the presentation of Nicaragua’s history.  
This section focuses on the culture of indigenous people before European contact, the 
arrival of Columbus and the Spanish conquest of Central America.  Then there is quite a 
lengthy exposition of the “National War,” which refers to the ousting of the filibuster 
William Walker who had imposed himself as President of Nicaragua.   Sara Barquero, 
educator and author of the guide, names a small number of men who the teachers are to 
discuss with students.  In the chapter about the National War, the book celebrates José 
Dolores Estrada as the model Nicaraguan hero for his role in turning back the filibusters 
on the field of battle and showing Nicaraguans that foreign invaders are not invincible.  
The last chapter, called “Principal Governors and Notable Men in Nicaragua,” identifies 
only eleven such men.  Most were past presidents of Nicaragua.  Of particular interest 
given Somoza’s press censorship, is the appearance on the list of Don Fernando Guzman 
who “gave freedom to the press, that consists of allowing journalists to freely express 
ideas” (Barquero, 1946:  235).   
 Of course, Sandino’s name does not appear, but Somoza García receives high 
praise and more than half a page of attention though the others merit only a few lines.  
The first sentence immediately legitimizes Somoza by saying that he became president by 
popular vote.  Further, he is consistently called “General Somoza” by Barquero and is 
appreciated throughout the piece for his progressive policies and accomplishments while 
president. The last sentence declares, “General A. Somoza is considered the most 
progressive governor that Nicaragua has had” (Barquero, 1946:  237). 
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 A second example of the regime’s efforts to control curriculum is the 1952 Plan 
of Study and Program for the Rural Schools of Nicaragua produced under the supervision 
of Crisanto Sacasa.  The plan outlines material to be covered in the classroom including 
the subjects of language, math, social science, natural science, health, and home and 
community education.  The plan is part of the government’s national literacy campaign 
and, interestingly, only covers first and second grade. 
 Some mandates of the 1952 plan are general.  For example, it states that “this 
program should not be interpreted in a rigid sense and should take advantage of the 
interest and understanding of the children…” (Ministerio de Educación Pública, 1952: 
21).  On the other hand, it dictates that “the only official text for teaching reading is the 
National Literacy Campaign booklet” (Ministerio de Educación Pública, 1952: 23), and it 
also mandates a schedule, with specific times and subjects delineated for each weekday. 
 In 1967 the Somoza government enacted numerous reforms such as increasing 
educational funding and standardizing the school-year calendar.  Nevertheless, control of 
each aspect of education was still controlled by the regime.  For example, Somoza 
himself made numerous corrections and suggestions in red pencil when reviewing the 
new curriculum that was part of the reform process (Kraft, 1983).   
 The government launched a National Plan for Education in 1971, which included 
a study of the reasons for the extremely high dropout rate.  Kraft (1983:  90) found that 
the major reason for the phenomenon throughout the country was “the fact that schools in 
many rural areas ended at the third grade so that students had no further school to attend.”  
In spite of funding increases and US aid for education, materials were lacking and 
teachers were poorly trained.   
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 Corruption and inefficiency severely hindered education and contributed to the 
dropout rate (Kraft, 1983). Only a part of the problem was funding not getting to the 
proper people so that teachers could be adequately trained, equipment and textbooks 
provided and facilities built and maintained.  In addition, the regime might reward some 
bureaucrats with non-existent teaching jobs, which allowed them to collect double 
salaries. Some supporters were rewarded with international scholarships, and teachers 
were fired for questioning the status quo (Nichols, 1982). 
 United States’ influence on the Nicaraguan educational system was extensive.  
The US began technical assistance to education in 1950 including programs for 
vocational education and rural education.  The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) had great power over education planning in order to gear the 
Nicaraguan educational system toward meeting the labor needs of a country that even 
Somoza admitted was dependent on the US for markets and capital (Kraft, 1983).  
 Textbooks are critical to any educational system and, in addition to the teacher’s 
communications with the students, serve to not only teach traditional school subjects but 
to present a specific view of the world or construct an official history. As Arnove (1980) 
notes about education, students learn not only what is taught but also learn attitudes, 
feelings and self-concepts.  In Nicaragua’s case, USAID recruited US educators to work 
with Nicaraguans to develop texts.  Not surprisingly, much of the material in the texts 
was biased toward North American values but the texts were deemed to be adequate by 
many professionals (Arnove, 1986).  Somoza also personally authorized the publication 
of Nicaraguan historical document collections and historical narratives. Thus, 
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Nicaraguans heard and learned largely what the government wanted them to hear and 
learn, but also learned how to think about and feel about Somoza’s rule. 
 In 1954 the first volume of Documents on the History of Nicaragua from the 
“Somoza Collection” was published.  Most of the documents were selected from Spanish 
archives and some from the Nicaraguan national archives.  The collection begins with a 
letter from Christopher Columbus to the King and Queen of Spain and ends with 
documents about the independence of Central America in 1852. As stated earlier, Somoza 
García himself authorized the collection and publication of these documents as well as all 
the funding needed for the project.  He also names Andrés Vega, Nicaragua’s ambassador 
to Spain,  as manager of the project. 
 Vega explains very generally the method of document selection.  “We omit that 
which falls into the area of interpretation or judgment...” presenting only the documents 
for others to interpret and study (Vega, 1954:  ix).  He, of course, does not consider that 
such a selection process involves interpretation and judgment.  Vega also provides a copy 
of Somoza’s authorization of the collection, which includes his and/or Somoza’s view on 
the role of history in the present: 
Considering that the national history should be the motivation of 
constant study and investigation, since through knowing the past one 
acquires a better awareness of the people’s present...a knowledge wider 
than its idiosyncrasies and an orientation more defined for the future of 
the nation and the progressive development of its material and spiritual 
possibilities (Vega, 1954:  xi). 
 
 In 1955 the reprinting of two narrative histories were approved as part of the 
“Somoza Collection.”  One was entitled History of Nicaragua and was a reprinting of a 
book by Tomás Ayón first published in 1882 and authorized by then President of 
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Nicaragua, Joaquín Zavala.  The act signed by Somoza authorizing its reprinting states 
that it is the duty of the State to preserve and make available material that contribute to 
the “true history of Nicaragua,” which this narrative apparently did in Somoza’s mind.  
Interestingly, the act noted that the book has “some historical errors and deficiencies” but 
that “it will contribute to the strengthening” of Nicaraguan patrotism (Ayón, 1956:  7). 
 Ayón outlined his methodological concerns in 1882 about writing Nicaragua’s 
history.  “To write the history of a people is to uncover from within the darkness of the 
past the entirety of its ideas, aspirations, virtues and vices,” he writes as he assumes that 
the past can be discovered in its entirety (1956:  10).  Ayón also struggles with the lack of 
data available as he admits that there are few archives, and most of his information is 
from general works about American Indians and Spanish exploration and conquest.  
Perhaps most interesting to this present study is Ayón’s (1956:  11) discussion of the 
politics of history: 
Another of the dangers to which the one who writes about history is 
exposed is that of attracting to oneself the anger of those who have not 
examined enough of the resources in order to confirm an act or establish 
an opinion; they are scandalized when a thing is said that does not 
conform to their wishes or that collides suddenly with national pride. 
 
 In each of the aforementioned works in the “Somoza Collection,” a major focus 
is the initial Spanish conquest of Nicaragua by Captain Gil González Dávila.  The 
documents and narrative tell of the conquest from Gil González’ perspective, which 
includes a positive view of Nicaragua or Nicarao, the Indian chief who submitted to the 
Spanish without a fight as well as agreeing to baptism for himself and his thousands of 
followers.  Uncooperative chiefs like Diriangén and Tenderi are cast negatively.   
 239
 The second narrative history approved in 1955 was Historia de Nicaragua by 
José D. Gámez.  This book attempts to treat the indigenous people of Nicaragua before 
European contact.  Gámez admits the difficulty of collecting data about that period saying 
that he must rely on the “imperfect traditions of the aborigines” and Spanish records.  He 
notes that the Spaniards were interested in justifying the conquest in their writings and 
thus included some “absurd fables” (Gámez, 1889:  18). 
 Gámez’ account of Gil Gonzalez’ activities is still from the Spanish perspective 
but seems a bit more detached than does Ayón’s work.  The narrative concludes with 
1860 after spending six chapters telling the story of North American filibusterer William 
Walker’s failed attempts to conquer Nicaragua.  Gámez ends by telling the story of 
Walker’s execution after his capture and makes the US seem silly in its effort to distance 
itself from Walker’s activities (Gámez, 1889). 
 Published in 1968, Apuntes de historia de Nicaragua (History Notes About 
Nicaragua) was a textbook approved by the Somoza regime that followed the lead of the 
history books above.  In telling the story of Gil González,  the text noted the power of 
Chief Nicaragua but that Gil González did not hesitate to confront him.  Gil González 
sent envoys to him proposing peace if Nicaragua submitted to the Catholic faith and the 
King of Spain or war if he did not.  Nicaragua accepted the Captain’s proposal and 
“received the Conquistador with a lot of pomp and solemnity” (Quintana, 1968:  25).  On 
the other hand, Diriangén, the chief who called Nicaragua a traitor to his people because 
of his submission to the Spaniards and who raised an army against Gil González, is called 
“savage” and “impetuous” (Quintana, 1968:  28). 
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 This same text covers modern Nicaraguan history and mentions Sandino as well 
as Somoza’s ascent to power.  Of course, Sandino is characterized as a troublemaker, and 
Somoza García is presented as the man who saved the nation.  The text says that Sandino 
arrived in Nicaragua on a boat sent by the Mexican government to help General Moncada 
in the Revolution of 1926.  He had left his home country of Nicaragua because, as a 
young man, he had to “abandon Nicaragua since he was mixed up in the death of an 
individual” (Quintana, 1968:  191).  In three years he worked three jobs in three different 
countries.  In Mexico, Sandino “became completely conversant in nationalistic and 
revolutionary ideas” as he watched the struggles between the Mexican people and the US 
oil companies (Quintana, 1968:  191).  Then Sandino arrived in Nicaragua to fight in the 
Revolution but refused to lay down his arms after the peace treaty of Tipitapa is signed 
by Moncada.  Thus he began “the guerrilla war that would assault the country for seven 
long years” (Quintana, 1968:192).   
 Sandino’s war is summarized in a paragraph entitled “The Pain of Las Segovias.”  
Interestingly, the text blames both the Sandinistas and the US marines for the suffering.  
“The unhappy inhabitants of Las Segovias suffered a double martyrdom:  on the one 
hand the Sandinista hordes, headed by Pedrón Altamirano, - brutal and merciless - and on 
the other hand the excesses of the Yankee Marines,” according to the text (Quintana, 
1968:192).  Also interesting is that the paragraph seems to place more blame for the 
carnage on Sandino’s subordinates than on him. 
 The text goes on to relate the peace negotiations between Sandino and the 
government, but in the next paragraph says that when “terrorists set fire to the war arsenal 
that was stored in Campo de Marte [National Guard headquarters] it was the beginning of 
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what was about to happen” (Quintana, 1968: 194).  After dinner with President Sacasa at 
the Presidential Palace, Sandino and his generals Estrada and Umanzor are detained by 
the Guard and shot.  The section entitled “Death of Sandino” admits that Sandino’s story 
lives on (Quintana, 1968:  194): 
With the death of Sandino, another bloody chapter of the History of 
Nicaragua is closed.  The figure of Sandino is blown out of proportion 
with the embellishments of Legend;  and the myth extends its wings, 
over the profile of the warrior, but the Segovian mountains, scene living 
in pain;  still they tremble in anguish, before the memory of what they 
have lived. 
 
 Meanwhile, the introduction of Somoza García in the midst of Sandino’s story is 
entitled “Somoza in the Panorama of History.”   He is introduced as President Sacasa’s 
choice to head the newly created National Guard.  After Sandino’s death, Somoza 
requests Sacasa’s resignation and wins the presidential election that follows.  “With 
Somoza an era of peace and progress is begun in Nicaragua, the Country, was guided on 
the paths of order and work,” states the text (Quintana, 1968:  195).  The section goes on 
to praise Somoza’s social and economic achievements as historic progress.  It even 
admits that Somoza has “achieved works of undeniable progress, through continuous 
Constitutional reform, perpetuating himself in Power...for the prosperity of democratic 
Nations” (Quintana, 1968:  195). 
 Interestingly, the story of the Liberal revolt of 1926 told by Somoza in speeches 
and in textbooks had become, with time, a revolt that was less about ousting the 
Conservatives and more about ousting the Yankees.  In 1926 the Liberals were not 
talking about the Yankees as an insult to their sovereignty.  Only Sandino was using that 
type of rhetoric.  When the “Somoza Collection” was published, Dr. Crisanto Sacasa was 
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the Minister of Education who, technically, oversaw the project.  At Sacasa’s funeral in 
1964, Nicaraguan Luis Somoza Debayle told stories of Sacasa’s bravery during the 
Liberal revolt of 1909.  This bravery occurred in spite of the fact that “...foreign troops, 
from a country [the US] of incomparable power, intervened...” (Homenaje..., 1965:  15).   
Later, Sacasa distinguished himself again in 1926 when the US once again intervened and 
the majority of Nicaraguans defended their rights.  Crisanto Sacasa represented the 
Liberal party as its peace negotiator in the 1933 resolution of Sandino’s struggle.  A few 
years after that revolt, Somoza named Sacasa as Minister of Education (Homenaje..., 
1965). 
 During Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s rule, a new book was published that told, 
once again, the heroic story of his father.  Somoza, el lider de Nicaragua (Suarez, 1971) 
provided a biographical sketch of Somoza García that was, at first, somewhat matter-of-
fact and even a bit humble.  It simply relates that he took part in the 1926 revolution 
against the Conservative government and then tells the positions he held including being 
named Chief Director of the National Guard.  Sandino is not mentioned in this section. 
 In a section called “Somoza, Guarantee of Peace,” Sandino is mentioned, swept 
aside, and Somoza is praised.  According to the book, Sandino and his followers were 
bringing great suffering to Nicaragua, and it was Somoza who provided the leadership 
necessary and brought peace to the troubled Segovias region.  “Until that moment he 
[Somoza] had no ambition to govern the destiny of the homeland.  It was in Granada 
where celebrating the advent of peace and the end of banditry that he proclaimed his 
presidential candidacy...”  (Suárez, 1971: 22).  The author then calls Somoza a man of 
peace and claims that Sandino and those like him destroy time itself. 
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Somoza loves peace...he was a witness to the hellish horrors of the 
Segovian tragedy, that the evils of civil war are incalcuable and that they 
not only fall over the generations that blindly promote them, but also 
over those that come later, destroying the present, erasing the past and 
frustrating the hopes of tomorrow”  (Suárez, 1971, 23). 
 
Then finally, it is Somoza who is the man of history.  “No one but he [Somoza] in the 
past or present has served the citizens so gallantly, efficiently, and transcendentally,” 
concludes the author (Suárez, 1971:  27).  It is during this same time that there is a re-
issue of Somoza García’s book, El verdadero Sandino. 
 A largely uneducated and uninformed citizenry fit well with the Somoza model 
of governance.  As Miller notes, “The dictatorship’s economic model depended upon 
large numbers of unskilled, docile farm workers...Education for these groups was neither 
required nor encouraged...” since widespread participation in decision-making was not at 
all what the Somozas wanted (Miller, 1982:  246).  Neither did this group read of or hear 
dissent from media such as La Prensa due to the elite nature of media as well as 
Somoza’s control of it. 
 The following year, 1972, brings the devastating Managua earthquake.  As 
outlined in a previous chapter, the inefficiency and corruption of the Guard in the 
handling of international aid to earthquake victims was obvious not only to Nicaraguans 
but to the global community as well.  The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 
had been formed in 1961 and was menacing the Guard.  In 1973 a former National 
Guardsman published The Last Night of General Augusto C. Sandino and told about the 
abduction and murder of Sandino and implicated Somoza as giving the final approval for 
the murders.  The FSLN captured the National Palace in 1974, and the Sandinistas were 
victorious in 1979. 
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 Somoza’s construction of an official history for Nicaragua appears to have been 
rather successful for many years.  Yet, somehow the contemporary Sandinistas managed 
to reconstruct the nation’s history and successfully disseminate that reconstruction in 
spite of Somoza’s control of policy, communications, education and the means of 
violence.  The story of Sandino, while becoming a whisper during the Somoza period, 
was told and heard by someone able to use that story to bring about the downfall of one 
of the most enduring dynasties in Latin America. 
Somoza on Sandino 
 El verdadero Sandino provides a clear picture of Somoza’s official reconstruction 
of Sandino, and it overlaps heavily with the North American presentation.  As outlined in 
Chapter Six, in Somoza’s official Nicaragua, Sandino had a violent character and is 
bloodthirsty, was capricious in his use of violence, was insensitive to suffering and was a 
murderer of the defenseless.  He was also vain, a publicity monger, and selfish.  Sandino 
did not trust his own men, was stubborn and lied.  Somoza also charges that Sandino was 
amoral, that he was a traitor and that his fight against the United States was foolish and 
illegitimate.  In Somoza’s official history, Sandino was not even misguided; he was 
recklessly putting his own interests first at the expense of human lives and peace.  The 
author of the book’s prologue adds that Sandino suffered from a mental disorder and is a 
megalomaniac who imagined himself as the only political and military authority in the 
nation.   
 At least one Guardsman, Ibarra, presents Sandino as a patriot, however 
misguided, and as a man disinterested in personal gain.  However, Sandino was not very 
intelligent and was a clear threat to the government so he had to be eliminated.  Ibarra 
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agrees with Somoza that President Sacasa was probably supporting Sandino at the 
expense of the National Guard. 
 The official presentation of Somoza, on the other hand, is that he saved the nation 
when the Marines left.  Nicaragua was going to drift into chaos again, and Sandino was 
the likely cause.  Therefore, Somoza was a peacemaker and reconstructed Nicaragua, 
making it a nation of peace and progress, order and work.  His outstanding leadership had 
the support of the majority of Nicaraguans, and he was the most progressive governor 
that Nicaragua had ever had. 
 The Nicaraguan press had difficulty presenting an image of Somoza alternative 
to the one described above due to censorship or direct control of it by the Somozas.  
Meanwhile, Nicaraguan history books supported the official history.  So Somoza was a 
good president, even a hero.  Sandino was generally absent in history or mentioned in 
order to make a point praising Somoza.  However, one book recognizes that his legend 
continues to some degree but also says that Sandino is blown out of proportion.  Those 
same histories speak in very positive ways of Spanish conquistador Gil González Dávila 
and chief Nicaragua who welcomed the Spanish and allowed himself to be baptized.  
Chief Diriangén, who resisted the Spanish, was a savage.  Likewise, they speak well of 
General Moncada, who signed the Tipitapa agreement with the US, and ignore or 
criticize Sandino. 
 The military activities of the United States in Nicaragua are generally ignored in 
Somoza’s official history.  At times, there is mild criticism, but a great amount of 
criticism is heaped upon the filibusterer William Walker who imposed himself as 
Nicaragua’s president in the 1850s.  Walker is presented as a clear example of US 
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interference, but other examples are scarce.  However, there is some mention of the 
marines excesses in fighting the war, but their presence in Nicaragua is not necessarily 
questioned. 
 When Carlos Fonseca, Tomás Borge, and Silvio Mayorga are growing up in 
Nicaragua, the preceding history is what they know of Nicaragua, of Somoza, and of 
Sandino.  They will hear some whispers about Sandino and will learn of Marxism.  They 
will also determine that the traditional Nicaraguan political system, in which Somoza and 
Chamorro have been key players, perpetuates the domination of Nicaragua by local elites 
and the United States. 
Somoza’s Construction of History and Sandino’s Charisma 
 Not surprisingly, this chapter is the shortest of the four chapters that relate 
historical constructions of Nicaragua and Sandino.  It is relatively short because the 
Somozas briefly demonized Sandino and then rarely spoke of him again.  Obviously, as 
the rulers of Nicaragua, they had the power to impose their construction of history as the 
official one. 
 Somoza García had to explain the emergent event of his own rise to power and 
did so by disparaging Sandino, making himself a heroic patriot and withholding criticism 
of the United States.  According to the Somocist construction of history, the United 
States had generally been friend to Nicaragua although had, at time, overstepped the 
bounds of friendship.  Filibusterer William Walker was the prime example of 
overstepping, but the US marine occupation beginning in 1925 was another.  
Nicaraguans, such as Chief Nicarao and General Moncada, who made peace agreements 
with dominant powers like the US, were national heroes.  Those who did not and resisted, 
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like Chief Diriangén and Sandino, were reckless and dangerous.  In fact, Sandino’s 
struggle was characterized as a civil war that destroyed the present, erased the past and 
frustrated the future (Suárez, 1971). 
 Somoza certainly negated Sandino using a multitude of negative nouns and 
adjectives to describe him.  On the other hand, there was fleeting recognition of 
Sandino’s charisma among people who were neither followers or even sympathizers.  
Former National Guardsman Ibarra mentioned some of Sandino’s charismatic qualities 
such as he sought no personal reward, was an unimpeachable patriot and challenged the 
colossus.  Pedro Joaquín Chamorro noted the continued hold that Sandino had on people 
twenty-two years after his murder.  Even Somoza (1979:  4, 549) admitted that Sandino 
was “a legendary figure” and that his followers considered him “an apostle.”  But, again, 
Sandino essentially disappeared from history in Somoza’s Nicaragua. 
 In place of a charismatic Sandino, Somoza García was the compassionate leader 
of the Nicaraguan people.  He was the one, not Sandino, who assured the permanent 
withdrawal of the marines and “rescued national wealth from foreign hands” (Discursos 
Oficiales Pronunciados...1956).  He brought peace progress to the nation.  He named 
streets and buildings after himself.  Schools and media were filled with this image of 
Somoza.   
Yet, even though Somoza was successful in acquiring and maintaining wide-
ranging control of Nicaragua and significant loyalty from followers, his own “charisma” 
seemed manufactured.  The repression and coercion were certainly not indicative of 
charisma in the Weberian sense.  Alternatively, the loyalty of Sandino’s followers to 
Sandino continued after his death.  In spite of rather thorough historical elimination of 
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Sandino, Somoza was not thorough enough.  There were enough living witnesses to 
Sandino’s struggle and just enough written information available that some university 
students were able to learn of him and follow his example into a revolution that would 
succeed.  These students clearly understood the official history of Nicaragua but did not 
believe or agree with it.  They were able to discover enough evidence of a counterpast 








 Carlos Fonseca Amador sat for an interview in the Hotel Capri in Havana, Cuba 
in November 1970.  Fonseca (1981: 217) mentioned, almost as an aside, that in 1958, 
“for the first time in a long time the name of Augusto César Sandino sounds again in 
Nicaragua after a quarter century of darkness, of paralysis, of atrophy of the popular 
movement in Nicaragua.”  Later in the interview, the reporter asks what had happened to 
the memory of Sandino until 1958, Fonseca utters now famous words.  “The name of 
Sandino was a whisper,” he replied (Fonseca, 1981:  219).   
 According to Fonseca, Sandino’s name had all but disappeared due to the use of 
terror, purposeful obscuring of knowledge, the power of reactionaries and the 
conservatism of Nicaragua intellectuals.  The “official version about Sandino” was that 
he was “an outlaw,” but Fonseca said that the Nicaraguan people “were not fooled” 
(Fonseca, 1981:  219).  Fonseca himself first heard of Sandino when he was ten or twelve 
years old.  He was even told that he had a distant relative who had fought with Sandino 
and who had been murdered along with several other rebels (Fonseca, 1981).  However, 
it is not clear that Fonseca heard much more until a few years later.    
 Ultimately, it will be Fonseca who systematically recovers and distributes 
Sandino’s thought and story.  It will be Fonseca who insists that “Sandinista” be part of 
the name of the revolutionary force and who clarifies the links between Sandino’s 
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struggle and the contemporary Sandinistas.  Sandinista commander Jaime Wheelock 
Román (Fonseca, 1984b: ii) says:  
...[Fonseca] was pursuing the recovery [of Sandino’s thought] in the 
most precise political dimension, the epic, the thought and the historical 
magnitude of the General of Free Men, for so much time subjected to 
concealment, distortion, and enemy slander or to the folklore and 
caricature of hypocrites...Carlos assumed the role of conductor in the 
conscious responsibility of being the intermediary, bridge, interpreter for 
the new generations of the enlightening teachings of Sandino. 
 
 Carlos Fonseca Amador was born in 1936 in Matagalpa to unmarried parents.  
Like Sandino, his mother was a domestic, and his father was a man of some means. 
During his boyhood, he works at a number of jobs such as selling candies, selling 
newspapers, and delivering telegrams.  Fonseca is also very studious and, with his 
secondary school friend Tomás Borge, reads numerous books including John Steinbeck’s 
Grapes of Wrath.  Borge and Fonseca also discover Marx and Engels’ work.  By 1952, 
Fonseca is already demonstrating opposition to Somoza and joins the National Union of 
Popular Action (UNAP).  Meanwhile, he and his friends are reading literature from the 
Communist party and articles about the concerns of workers.  In the summer of 1955, 
Fonseca joins the National Socialist Party (PSN) (Fonseca, 1981; Borge, nd). 
 Fonseca moves to León, works at La Prensa, enrolls in Law School and, with 
Silvio Mayorga and Tomás Borge, forms a group to advocate on behalf of workers’ 
rights.  Six days after Rigoberto López Pérez assassinates Somoza García in 1956, 
Fonseca and Borge are arrested and Fonseca remains in jail for almost two months, while 
Borge remains for several more months (Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo, 1985).  
Neither Fonseca nor Borge were party to the assassination. 
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 According to Tomás Borge, it is in 1955 that Fonseca begins to study and 
organize Sandino’s thought.  It is likely that Borge was mistaken about the date because 
Fonseca’s writing does not mention Sandino until 1960.36  Nevertheless, the point that 
Borge makes about the recovery of Sandino remains even if the date is incorrect.  Borge 
(nd:  16).  recalls hearing Fonseca tell someone,  “‘Sandino,’ Carlos said on one occasion, 
‘is a kind of path.  It would be frivolous to reduce him to a category or to one more 
anniversary among yearly disturbances.  I think it’s important to study his thought.’” 
Borge remembers Fonseca’s joy and anger at discovering Somoza García’s book El 
Verdadero Sandino. Somoza’s efforts to delegitimize Sandino were precisely what 
appealed to Fonseca and the others.  They also studied Salvatierra’s book Sandino: o la 
tragedia de un pueblo, de Belausgoiguitia’s work Con Sandino en Nicaragua, and 
Calderón’s book Los últimos días de Sandino.  A few years later in 1957 - 1958, two 
more works were available - Sandino, General de Hombres Libres and El pequeño 
ejército loco - by Argentine author Gregorio Selser (Borge, nd; Fonseca, 1981).  It is 
unclear when Fonseca was able to see these books, but Fonseca (1981:  8) notes that it is 
interesting that “a person that has not one time breathed the air of Nicaragua, is precisely 
the one who has until now elaborated the most complete review of the facts surrounding 
of the Sandinista epic.” 
 Fonseca travels to the Soviet Union in 1957 as representative of the National  
                                                 
36 Matilde Zimmerman (2000) points out that, if Fonseca had truly begun studying Sandino in 
1955, Sandino would have appeared in Fonseca’s work much earlier than 1960.  She suspects that 
the recovery of Sandino began in 1959.  Zimmerman excuses Borge’s mistake because he was 
writing from prison where he was tortured and suffering solitary confinement and had no 
reference information including calendars. 
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Socialist Party (PSN).  Upon his return, he is questioned by agents from the Nicaraguan 
Office of National Security.  During this interview, Fonseca demonstrates the beginnings 
of a reconstructed history that blends Marxism with Sandino’s anti-imperialism although 
Fonseca is not here attributing it to Sandino.  Fonseca declares that he himself is not a 
communist but that he is a Marxist.  Furthermore, he says that “the solution to the 
problems that the Nicaraguan people suffer can be reached through a plan that achieves a 
policy that makes the country economically independent from North American 
imperialism and frees it from the pro-imperialist Nicaraguan forces” (Fonseca, 1981:  
168).   The book that results from his trip to the Soviet Union, Un nicaraguense en 
Moscú, offers lots of praise for the Soviet society but, again, does not mention Sandino. 
 Fonseca identifies the historical link between the current political discontent and 
Sandino in a 1960 document.  He rails against the Somoza dictatorship and denounces the 
semi-colonial economic system that supports the Somozas and is imposed by the US.  In 
particular, he focuses criticism on the National Guard, “the army that was created by the 
North American invaders” who were expelled by “the struggle of the Sandinista patriots” 
(Fonseca, 1981: 29).  “The national political movement headed by that [Army in Defense 
of the National Sovereignty] is the most powerful movement that has risen in the history 
of the country...” extols Fonseca (1981:  37).  He is even calling the new army the Army 
in Defense of the People - a name strikingly similar to the EDSNN.  Most importantly, 
Fonseca (1981:  38) declares, “We are the descendants of Sandino...” 
 In countless future documents, Carlos Fonseca and other contemporary 
Sandinistas will link themselves and their revolution to Sandino and his army.  They will 
decry the Somoza government and protest the United States’ support of that government, 
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linking these enemies to Sandino’s enemies.  In doing so, the Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional (FSLN) is reconstructing history in a way that gives their revolution 
historical meaning and continuity.  A handful of Sandinista documents written by Carlos 
Fonseca, Tomás Borge, Sergio Ramírez, and Humberto Ortega, supplemented by others, 
demonstrate this reconstruction. 
 The period of 1961 to 1969 was a time of slowly building the revolutionary 
organization after a failed military action against Honduran troops and the National 
Guard at El Chaparral in 1959 in which Fonseca was shot through the lung.  After El 
Chaparral, Fonseca decides that armed action is the only way to make revolutionary 
change in Nicaragua - a decision similar to the one made by Sandino after Ocotal 
(Fonseca, 1981).  Fonseca, Borge and friend Silvio Mayorga found the Revolutionary 
Nicaraguan Youth (JRN).  In a speech given in 1960, Fonseca and Mayorga pay homage 
to Sandino on the twenty-seventh anniversary of his assassination.  The speech identifies 
Somoza García as the murderer, laments that Nicaraguans have not been able to channel 
their discontent with the regime, and expresses admiration for the triumph of the Cuban 
Revolution and the Venezuelan people’s defeat of their dictator (Fonseca, 1981).  Of 
course, they also criticize the Conservative party’s failures to oust the Somozas as well as 
the United States’ repeated interventions “against the people and national sovereignty” 
(Fonseca, 1981:  50).  The speech concludes, “The Sandinista struggle demonstrated 
definitively that our people can deliver victorious battles against enemies that are 
materially very powerful” (Fonseca, 1981:  53). 
 Fonseca, Borge and Silvio Mayorga and several others form the New Nicaragua 
Movement in 1961.  Later that year in Honduras, Fonseca, Borge and Mayorga along 
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with Santos López, meet.37  Fonseca “suggests, fights for and wins” the argument that the 
new organization should be called the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Borge, 
nd:  28).38  Sandino’s name is used ever more frequently as the leadership, and then the 
membership, studies and incorporates more of Sandino’s thought and actions into their 
own efforts.  Often operating from just over the Honduran border, the FSLN robs banks 
for funds - “an act of economic recovery” - and periodically engages the Nicaraguan 
National Guard (Borge, nd:  41).  By 1961, Colonel Santos López is training the group in 
mountain guerrilla tactics.  Then in 1963, the group begins to organize labor, students, 
and intellectuals and to create clandestine cells.  They publish Trinchera, the first 
publication of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional. 
 Fonseca is captured and imprisoned in Nicaragua in June 1964.  From jail, he 
writes Desde la cárcel, yo acuso a la dictadura (From jail, I accuse the dictatorship), 
which was published as a pamphlet that year (Fonseca, 1981).  Fonseca lists numerous 
assassinations, beginning with the most recent, committed by the Somoza government.  
Finally, he cites “the shady assassination of Augusto César Sandino, Juan Pablo Umanzor 
and Francisco Estrada and hundreds of Sandinistas inside Wiwilí” (Fonseca, 1981:  232). 
While he says that the dictatorship accuses him of imaginary crimes, he accuses the 
Somozas of the specifically listed murders and of thirty years of assaulting  
                                                 
37 Santos López fought with Sandino and narrowly escaped being murdered by the National Guard 
at Salvatierra’s house the night Sandino was murdered. 
38 Borge’s brief telling of these events make it appear that he, Fonseca and Mayorga had a 
meeting, formed the organization and then decided to incorporate Sandinista into the name.  
However, it seems that it was actually a process over some time rather than a single event or 
within a few days (Zimmerman, 2000). 
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the Nicaraguan people for the purpose of personal gain.  Fonseca is turning the 
accusation around on the Somozas just as Sandino turned the label of ‘bandit’ back to the 
Yankee invaders.  Additionally, Fonseca signs his accusation with “Patria libre o morir!” 
which is Sandino’s traditional closing (Fonseca, 1981:  237). 
 The FSLN is quite small and largely engages in activity in the northern parts of 
Nicaragua.  From time to time, the Sandinistas attempt offensive action but are 
consistently defeated.  From 1963 to 1966, the FSLN takes the time to improve its 
organization among peasants and in urban areas while reducing its military efforts.  In 
December 1967 the FSLN concentrates in Pancasán in central Nicaragua and remains 
there for about a year.  The National Guard launches an attack against the Sandinistas in 
Pancasán that results in a brutal defeat for the FSLN and the deaths of several rebels 
including co-founder of the FSLN, Silvio Mayorga. (Fonseca, 1981).  After Pancasán, 
Borge (nd:  46) claims, “Our political destiny is sealed.  Sandino is no longer an 
anniversary, a yearly disturbance, but is a path.”   
 Fonseca produces two documents in 1968 that are interesting in that they are so 
different from one another.  One pays great homage to the General, and the other 
mentions him only briefly.  The first, an article that appeared in a Costa Rican newspaper, 
briefly outlines the misery of the Nicaraguan people, the political domination and 
manipulation by the Somozas and the imperialism of the North Americans.  The Somozas 
are “puppets chosen by imperialism,” and the US ambassador ordered the murder of 
Sandino (Fonseca: 1981:  249).  The FSLN now fights for the liberation of Nicaragua, the 
end of tyranny and imperialist domination and for a new life for the people.  The article 
concludes, “Today the glorious banner of Sandino is raised and receives...worldwide 
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support.  That banner will remain erect, in spite of all adversity, until the final victory” 
(Fonseca 1981: 250).  The second article is interesting in that it barely mentions Sandino 
at all, even though it is lengthy, and it is a bit defensive about him.  Sandino is mentioned 
as only one in a list of great revolutionary heroes and then later mentioned with 
Farabundo Martí.39  Fonseca defends Sandino in three sentences against criticism that 
Sandino was only interested in national independence and not in class equality (Fonseca, 
1981). 
 The Sandinistas issue two important documents in 1969 - important because one 
outlines the FSLN’s plans for the country and the other provides an organized, relatively 
brief statement by Fonseca of his sense of Nicaraguan history in terms of the present 
problem.  First, the FSLN issues the Historic Program of the FSLN.40  The Program 
(FSLN, 1982: 13) clarifies the current problem very nicely: 
The people of Nicaragua suffer under subjugation to a reactionary and 
fascist cabal imposed by Yankee imperialism in 1932, the year Anastasio 
Somoza García was named commander in chief of the so-called National 
Guard. 
The Somozist cabal has reduced Nicaragua to the status of a neo-colony 
exploited by the Yankee monopolies and the country’s oligarchic group. 
The present regime is politically unpopular and juridically illegal.  The 
recognition and aid it gets from the North Americans is irrefutable proof 
of foreign interference in the affairs of Nicaragua. 
 
The establishment of a revolutionary government is the solution to the problem, and it is 
the FSLN’s role to achieve the solution.  The Program then provides a rather exhaustive 
list of what, exactly, the FSLN plans to do once in power.  The FSLN’s assessment of the 
                                                 
39 Martí was Sandino’s secretary for a time until they parted ways because Sandino would not 
fully embrace communism.  Martí later became the symbol for the Salvadoran revolution. 
40 The Historic Program of the FSLN is unsigned by a specific person but is apparently Fonseca’s 
work. 
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historic problem is virtually identical to Sandino’s but with modern, and perhaps more 
marxist, language.  Most importantly for this study, the document never mentions 
Sandino, even in a list of Nicaraguan martyrs. 
 In the second document, Nicaragua: Hora Cero  (Nicaragua:  Zero Hour), Carlos 
Fonseca (1981) provides a much more detailed outline of Nicaraguan history that will 
appear in various versions throughout FSLN literature for years to come.  First, Fonseca’s 
statement of the problem is very similar to the one above, and he provides a lot of data to 
demonstrate the economic crisis and social problems in Nicaragua as well as 
demonstrating North American economic penetration and domination.  Then, he 
condemns the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA)41 as another Yankee tool 
to defend US business interests.  Finally, Fonseca identifies, within the document, four 
major historical points - 1) Nicaragua has long been a victim of foreign aggression and 
oppression, 2) the Nicaraguan people do rebel, 3) revolution is the solution, and 4) 
Fonseca owes it to history and humanity to achieve the solution (Fonseca, 1981). 
 Fonseca’s (1981:  78) first historical point is that “Nicaragua is a country that has 
suffered foreign aggression and oppression for more than four centuries.”  Initially, it was 
dominated by Spain. Then its east coast was controlled by England for 150 years.  
Finally, it “was chosen as the target of Yankee rapacity” and has been so for more than a 
century (Fonseca, 1981:  78).  He then lists fifteen acts of Yankee aggression that 
Nicaragua has suffered.  One of those acts tells the story of Sandino. He discusses 
                                                 
41 CONDECA was formed in 1961 and included all the Central American countries except Costa 
Rica.  Its principal purpose was to protect Central America against the spread of communism, 
particularly from Cuba, and to coordinate Central American military efforts with the US military 
(Booth, 1985). 
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Sandino’s refusal to accept Moncada’s agreement with Henry Stimson at Tipitapa in 
1927.  Sandino’s guerrilla army engages the occupation forces more than 500 times thus 
forcing the Marines’ evacuation.  However, before leaving Nicaragua, the North 
Americans train and leave a surrogate army called the National Guard, headed by 
Anastasio Somoza García.  The Guard, under Somoza’s supervision and with instructions 
from the US ambassador, murder Sandino, even though Sandino was engaged in peace 
talks. 
 Next, Fonseca argues that Nicaraguans have a rich tradition of rebellion and have 
often taken up arms to fight foreign aggression and oppression beginning with fighting 
for independence from Spain.  Interestingly, he does not mention the resistance of 
indigenous Nicaraguans during the conquest.  However, he argues that the rebellions 
have not been successful in a lasting way because they have always been led by 
individuals.  Therefore, when the individual leaders are absent, the movements cannot 
function and carry on the fight to a successful conclusion.  Ultimately, the problem is that 
Nicaraguans lack a “profound revolutionary consciousness” (Fonseca, 1981:  81).  In his 
analysis, the glory and the tragedy of the first Sandinsta resistance was that it was largely 
composed of peasants.  It was glorious because the most humble Nicaraguans were 
involved, but it was tragic because they lacked political knowledge.  Coupled with the 
illiteracy of the soldiers and many of the officers, Sandino’s elimination left a gaping 
hole in their efforts that could not be filled.  Other attempts to bring justice to Nicaragua 
between Sandino’s murder and 1969 also failed because they suffered from a lack of 
revolutionary consciousness. 
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 Now, the solution is, according to Nicaragua:  Hora Cero, revolution driven by 
the Sandinista National Liberation Front.  Previously, even the FSLN suffered from a 
lack of clarity of vision and unity of the revolutionary consciousness, says Fonseca.  
Nevertheless, the revolutionary leaders have the example of the Cuban revolution and 
understand how crucial it is to link revolutionary intellectuals to workers and peasants in 
order to build not only an organization with a revolutionary consciousness, but one that 
will not be dependent on one person.  Furthermore, the FSLN has made a concerted effort 
to establish links to outside revolutionary groups thus providing a larger support network.  
Fonseca (1981:  95) writes, “The frustration that followed the period of the Sandinista 
resistance does not have to be repeated today...These days are not like those in which 
Sandino and his brother guerrillas battled alone against the Yankee empire.”  Now, they 
are linked to other revolutionaries who are fighting against the “empire of the dollar” and 
“the aggression of the blond beasts” (Fonseca, 1981:  95). 
 Finally, Fonseca definitively links this current struggle to Sandino in a more 
personal way.  At various points in the document, Fonseca has already made many of 
those historical links.  For example, the last reference to North Americans as “blond 
beasts” is a term that Sandino used.  However, Fonseca (1981:  95) cements the link as he 
closes Nicaragua: Hora Cero: 
Before the image of Augusto César Sandino and Ernesto Ché Guevara, 
before the memory of the heroes and martyrs of Nicaragua, Latin 
America and all of Humanity, before history:  I place my hand on the red 
and black flag that signifies “Free Homeland or Death,”42 and I swear to 
defend with arms in hand the national honor and to fight for the 
redemption of the oppressed and exploited of Nicaragua and of the 
world.  If I fulfill this oath, the liberation of Nicaragua and all people will 
                                                 
42 The flag of Sandino’s army was red and black, and “Free Homeland or Death” was their motto. 
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be the prize; if I betray this oath, death in disgrace and dishonor will be 
my punishment. 
 
Fonseca’s view of history in Nicaragua: Hora Cero and the link to Sandino is important 
in order to understand more than Fonseca’s thinking.  The work is produced clandestinely 
on mimeograph and distributed.  Therefore, it is an account of history that the FSLN uses 
to explain themselves to each other (Fonseca, 1981). 
 In August of 1969, Fonseca is arrested and jailed in Costa Rica.  An attempt by 
Sandinistas to free him results in Humberto Ortega and another Sandinista being 
seriously wounded.  A campaign of international pressure - a campaign that includes Jean 
Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir - to free the men is successful in October 1970.  
Fonseca goes to Cuba and remains there for four years.  During that time, Fonseca writes 
several histories, analyses, and proclamations (Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo, 
1985). 
 Meanwhile, the FSLN has made great strides in becoming an insurgent force of 
some size and strength.  They have reorganized, named Fonseca as General Secretary and 
have built a significant support base among the peasants as they gain peasant trust by 
living full time in the mountains.  According to Borge (nd:  55), they “put on long pants 
to visit the mountains, hamlets, provinces, slums, factories, universities, institutes.”  
Therefore, the Sandinistas try another action at Zinica and, this time, the peasants supply 
them with intelligence about the National Guard.  The Sandinistas are buoyed because 
while Zinica was not a resounding military success for the FSLN, neither was it a 
humiliating defeat as had happened so many times before (Borge, nd;  Booth, 1985; 
Hodges, 1986). 
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 In 1969 and then again in 1970, Fonseca writes of Sandino as a Christ figure.  
The first document speaks of Christ and then likens Sandino to him.  This document is 
mimeographed and distributed as a clandestine flyer (Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo, 
1985). Fonseca writes, (1981: 267), 
Two thousand years ago there was a redeemer who...said that his 
brothers were those who did the will of he who was in heaven...That is 
my brother and my sister, said that redeemer.  Brother; Augusto César 
Sandino called those who accompanied him, pointing the warrior’s gun 
in resistance against the Yankee aggressors. 
 
In the 1970 document, he discusses the popular struggle between the years 1934 and 
1958.  When he mentions 1934, he calls it “the year of Augusto Cesar Sandino’s 
crucifixion” (Fonseca, 1981:  272). 
 The year 1971 begins with the publication of Fonseca’s oft cited biography of 
Sandino - Sandino, Guerrillero Proletario (Sandino, Proletarian Warrior).  “Augusto 
César Sandino, worker of peasant origin that engaged in armed combat against the North 
American invaders in Nicaragua...” is Fonseca’s opening sentence and opening 
description of Sandino (Fonseca, 1984a: 7).  The booklet focuses on outlining the earlier 
years of Sandino’s rebellion but also discusses the nature of Sandino’s soldiers, US 
Marine behavior and Sandino’s legacy. Fonseca briefly describes Sandino’s exposure to 
Zeledón’s fight against the Yankees, his exposure to social foment in Mexico and his 
employment by US companies.  He tells the story of Sandino’s decision to return to 
Nicaragua to fight with the Liberals and Henry Stimson’s manipulation of the Nicaraguan 
situation including Moncada’s betrayal of the nation.  However, “Sandino, the most 
illustrious son of the Nicaraguan people, stood erect before the betrayal and went on 
clutching his weapon,” continues Fonseca (1984a:  14). 
 262
 Fonseca writes of Sandino’s army.  The Ejército Defensor de la Soberanía 
Nacional de Nicaragua (EDSNN) was composed of peasants and depended on non-
combatant peasants for intelligence and other support.  The peasants thought so positively 
of Sandino’s soldiers that they affectionately called the soldiers los muchachos (the 
boys).  The soldiers gave food, clothing and medicine to the peasants when they could, 
and it worked in the soldiers’ favor in that “it developed patriotic resistance” among the 
peasants (Fonseca, 1984a:  22).  
 “In spite of material deprivation, the Sandinistas strengthened their spirit of 
sacrifice” and were honest whereas the invaders committed vandalism (Fonseca, 1984a:  
23).   Because the Yankees were so frustrated with their inability to eliminate the 
Sandinistas, they engaged in cruel and arbitrary repression against the population, says 
Fonseca.  He tells of specific tortures and mutilations perpetrated by the Marines.  Of 
course, Fonseca (1984a:  28) mentions the creation of the “armed mercenary force that 
was named the National Guard.”  He does note that some Nicaraguans in some of the 
Guard units revolted against Yankee commands. 
 The legacy left by Sandino is twofold, according to Fonseca.  First, Sandino 
knew that defeating the military part of Yankee imperialism was not the same as ridding 
the country of Yankee economic and political interference.  That work was still to be 
done.  Second, Sandino had plans to form a third political party to begin that process in a 
limited way, but his murder destroyed those plans.  “The tragedy that fell over 
Nicaragua...has been prolonged for several decades and even today flagellates the people 
of Sandino,” says Fonseca (1984a: 48).  Nevertheless, now Nicaraguans are not alone as 
many peoples, including Vietnam and Cuba, rebel against Yankee imperialism.  Fonseca 
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(1984a:  49) closes Sandino, Guerrillero Proletario, “In this new battle, the young 
Nicaraguan generation, faithful to the legacy of Augusto César Sandino, proves with its 
blood, that it occupies a place of honor.” 
 Still in Cuba, Fonseca (1981) writes the Cronología histórica de Nicaragua 
(Historical Chronology of Nicaragua), but it is not published.  Even though followers do 
not see it before revolutionary victory, the study provides Fonseca’s view of history.  
Like all his other recitations of history, this one focuses on the political and economic 
history of Nicaragua.  It is organized in a list form with specific years marking points of 
interest.  Interestingly, the language and style of this work are rather matter-of-fact until 
he discusses the year 1932, which is where he mentions Somoza’s appointment as head 
of the National Guard.   
 There are three major themes in the chronology.  First, Fonseca identifies various 
efforts by foreign interests to dominate Nicaragua.  These efforts begin with the Spanish 
conquest and continue with Mexico’s effort to annex Nicaragua, and the British 
domination of Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast.  Of course, the culmination of the imperialistic 
activities is the repeated attempts and successes of the United States to control the 
country, beginning with William Walker and his filibusterers in 1855.43  Secondly, 
Fonseca cites numerous instances of Nicaraguan resistance to foreign intervention.  The 
first to resist is Diriangén.  The other individuals identified by name are President Zelaya, 
Benjamín Zeledón, Augusto César Sandino, Rigoberto López Pérez, General Ramón 
Raudales, and two contemporary Sandinista soldiers who were killed by the Somoza  
                                                 
43 Surprisingly, Fonseca does not mention the Monroe Doctrine in the chronology. 
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government.  There are other numerous mentions of nameless groups of Nicaraguans who 
resisted.  Third, Fonseca specifies several persons who operated from self-interest and not 
patriotism.  Interestingly, Fonseca mentions Sandino’s traditional enemies, Emiliano 
Chamorro, Adolfo Díaz and Moncada, without editorial comment but implies that 
President Sacasa had significant responsibility for Somoza taking power.  Not 
surprisingly, the Somoza family receives the most criticism in the chronology.  With the 
first mention of Somoza García, Fonseca’s fairly unemotional language turns to using 
terms like “electoral farce,” “tyrant,” and “barbarous” (Fonseca, 1981:  350). 
 The Managua earthquake occurs in December 1972.  The National Guard’s 
unprofessional behavior and Somoza’s greed in the quake’s aftermath were shocking and, 
finally, intolerable, to large numbers of observers.  Guardsmen looted or simply left their 
duties to attend to their own families.  When foreign aid poured into the country later, the 
Guard and Somoza pocketed or sold much of the aid.  These shenanigans were obvious to 
Nicaraguans and to other governments as well.  Even non-Sandinista groups in Nicaragua 
either began to organize or strengthened their organizations to demand change in the 
regime - either reformist or revolutionary (Booth, 1985; Bermann, 1986).  Of course, the 
FSLN also gained strength as it provided an alternative to Somoza. 
 Meanwhile, Fonseca is still writing from Havana.  One month after the 
earthquake, he writes a letter to Nicaraguan residents of the United States.  “We all 
lament the consequences of the recent earthquake in Managua,” writes Fonseca (1981:  
154), “but you have to consider that such consequences are more serious due to the 
insane city planning policy” and “daily oppression” ...of the Somoza tyranny...”  Then he  
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tells the expatriots that armed struggle will end in liberation “because the Sandinista 
Front is equipped with the ideals of Augusto César Sandino, ideals that day by day unite 
all Nicaraguans with a clean conscience” (Fonseca, 1981:  155). 
 In 1974 there are increased political demonstrations, labor unrest, and some 
hunger strikes demanding the release of Sandinista prisoners (Booth, 1985).  From Cuba, 
Fonseca writes Crónica secreta:  Augusto César Sandino ante sus verdugos (Secret 
Chronicle:  Augusto César Sandino before his executioners), but it is only published in 
Cuba (Fonseca, 1981).  Apparently, his purpose in writing the piece is to correct the lack 
of analysis of Sandino’s participation in the peace talks with the Sacasa government.  It is 
also a bit of apologia regarding criticisms that Sandino was naive about the danger 
surrounding him and about the trustworthiness of Sacasa and Somoza.  Fonseca repeats 
several times that Sandino was fully aware that he was in danger and that he was wary of 
the peace process.  However, Sandino participated as a point of personal honor and 
because he was acutely aware that the people desperately wanted peace. 
 The Crónica secreta differs from Fonseca’s other treatments of Sandino in that it 
does treat the last moments of Sandino and his peace efforts.  It is helpful to this study in 
that Fonseca (1981) addresses the official history of Sandino created after his murder.  He 
says that the official history was created by the reactionary elements in Nicaragua and 
was spread by the press.  This history says that Sandino was never a patriot and that the 
Yankee intervention was only a pretext that Sandino used so that he could commit 
crimes.  Furthermore, the story goes, Sandino was no more than an advocate of war for 
war itself. 
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 Fonseca’s (1981) position is that US diplomats Matthew Hanna and Arthur Bliss 
Lane wanted Sandino killed and that Somoza and Crisanto Sacasa were complicit.  In 
addition, the murder of Sandino had a classist aspect.  “Generally only the assassination 
of the patriot that is the warrior Sandino is seen, but not seen is the assassination of the 
representative of the exploited and humiliated that is also the worker Sandino,” explains 
Fonseca (1981:  419). 
 Instead of the Sandino of official history, the actual Sandino was unwilling to 
and uninterested in resting on his laurels, according to Fonseca.  The Crónica secreta 
reminds readers that Sandino adopted a realistic attitude and sincerely worked for peace.  
Even after his murder, he remained in the memories of the “worthy Nicaraguan peasants 
who accompanied him from victory to victory” until he became a symbol of the Latin 
American struggle against Yankee imperialism (Fonseca, 1981: 415).  For many years, 
organized popular resistance did not materialize, “but Augusto César Sandino remains as 
a clandestine national hero” (Fonseca, 1981: 424).  Fonseca’s (1981:  426) finale to the 
Crónica reads, “Although there’s little left to do, the rattling of the foundations of 
imperialist domination in Latin America, in Africa, in the whole world feels like never 
before in history.  It is the ‘proletarian explosion’ that Augusto César Sandino dreamed 
of.” 
 Sergio Ramírez Mercado, one of Nicaragua’s leading intellectuals, made two of 
the most significant contributions to the understanding of General Sandino’s life and 
thought.  From 1973 through 1975, he wrote El muchacho de Niquinohomo and edited El 
pensamiento vivo.  El muchacho de Niquinohomo (The Boy from Niquinohomo) is a 
biography of Sandino, beginning with his birth and childhood, but focusing on the last 
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seven years of his life.  Much of the same information in Fonseca’s various renditions of 
Sandino’s life are also included in Ramírez’ account.  However, Ramírez’ work is less 
clinical in expression and, therefore, makes Sandino appear to be more of a complex 
human being.  This work also differs from Fonseca’s work in that Ramírez interspersed 
the story of Sandino with information about what was also occurring in the United States, 
at the time.  For example, Ramírez mentions that public opinion in the US was turning 
against the Marine action in Nicaragua as more Marines were being killed.  He also 
mentions debates in Congress as some Senators questioned whether Marines should be 
used to control “bandits” in Nicaragua when they were not performing the same service 
in Chicago against mobsters like Al Capone (Ramírez, 1988). 
 El pensamiento vivo in two volumes is a collection of writings by Augusto César 
Sandino.  As editor, Ramírez tackles a monumental task of collecting and organizing 
these original letters, manifestos, articles and essays into two volumes that provide a 
firsthand look, without interpretation, at the General himself.  Ramírez saves his own 
interpretation for the brief epilogue at the end of the second volume; however, the 
epilogue is not written until just after the revolutionary victory.  Nevertheless, it provides 
Ramírez’ point of view, even though he was one who was not involved with the military 
aspect of the FSLN.   
 Ramírez, of course, notes the colonial history of Nicaragua and the history of 
foreign intervention in the country.   However, he pays particular attention to the role of 
the local elites in those interventions. “The dominant intermediate groups” never “baldly 
presented the Yankee interventions,” writes Ramírez (1981: 426), “they came wrapped in 
ideological cellophane, in a cultural-ideological-political justification.”  The occupations 
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were presented “as saving, as civilizing” (Ramírez, 1981: 426).  When Sandino appears, 
his task then is anti-oligarch and anti-imperialist and not as champion of working class 
interests.  Conflict between the working class and capitalists is not the history of 
Nicaragua, according to Ramírez.  Instead Nicaragua’s history is about Yankee 
intervention, the complicity of Nicaraguan oligarchs in that intervention, and the factional 
fighting between local oligarchs.  Sandino “introduces for the first time the popular 
variable” (Ramírez, 1981:  430).  He “is rescuing” the values of “sovereignty, autonomy, 
nationality to oppose imperialism in the concrete historical circumstances in which 
Nicaragua finds itself” (Ramírez, 1981:  436).  Furthermore, the most concrete expression 
of Sandino’s thought is that he was anti-National Guard because he sees immediately the 
Guard as a factor in Yankee power over Nicaragua, and his opposition to the Guard cost 
him his life.  Most importantly, Sandino’s anti-imperialist thought is thought with 
popular roots.  Sandino struggle is on behalf of the humble, including workers, “who 
speak through his mouth” (Ramírez, 1981:  439). 
 Throughout 1974 the FSLN is again on the offensive thanks to increased 
organizational strength in both rural and urban areas as well as much more military 
experience (Booth, 1985).  In December, the Frente accomplishes its most spectacular 
action to date.  According to Bermann (1986:  256) “The Sandinista Front for National 
Liberation (FSLN) burst onto the world stage in December 1974 with a daring raid on a 
Christmas party given in honor of [US ambassador] Turner Shelton...”  The Sandinistas 
were highly organized and apparently, well rehearsed because they rather easily took all 
the guests hostage within a short period of time after Shelton had left.  The FSLN held 
their hostages for just over three days and won freedom for several Sandinista prisoners, 
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one million dollars in ransom, the reading of Sandinista proclamations over broadcast 
media and a flight to Cuba for the freed prisoners and the hostage-takers (Bermann, 1986;  
Booth, 1985).  Ironically, after thirteen years of study, organizing, training, fighting and 
dying, the FSLN had become an overnight success.  Unfortunately, with the success came 
three years of repression by Somoza (Bermann, 1986). 
 Two written works are completed in 1975, but neither is published until after the 
FSLN victory.  One, by German Pomares Ordóñez, is his story of becoming one of the 
first members of the FSLN and of being a Sandinista guerrilla.  Pomares was born poor in 
the Chinandega countryside in 1937.  He remembers hearing, at age nineteen, of Somoza 
García’s death and that Somoza’s official history had taken hold with some Nicaraguans.  
“Some people said poor thing [that he was killed], he was the one who brought peace to 
Nicaragua, others [said] that it was a good thing...” he recalls (Pomares, 1989:  18).  He 
opposes the Somozas so he joins the Conservative Youth, but the leader treats him and 
his friends poorly out of a prejudice against rural people.  Pomares hears of another group 
that is against the country’s entire political system of Conservative versus Liberal, and he 
joins them.  The result is that he meets Carlos Fonseca, travels to Cuba, meets Castro and 
ultimately becomes one of the FSLN’s comandantes. 
 Pomares never mentions Sandino in his book.  However, he is well aware of the 
Sandinista link to the past through his relationship with Colonel Santos López.  He meets 
Santos López in Cuba.  Upon his return to Nicaragua, Pomares “goes to the mountain” - 
the term Sandinistas use for entering the guerrilla force - where López becomes his 
commander (1989:  32).  Pomares mentions López numerous times as he describes 
several military actions, and speaks of him with great personal respect.  “Colonel Santos 
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López speaks of the conditions on the mountain and the training consists of mock 
ambushes: [the last patrol] lies in ambush and [the] others [keep walking] without 
[getting involved in] what’s happening with [the patrol behind],” explains Pomares 
(1989:  38).  This tactic is one used repeatedly by Sandino’s forces and now taught to the 
FSLN by their direct link to Sandino.  López is not only his teacher, but he is the one to 
give Pomares his code name - El Danto.44  Pomares (1989: 56) also mentions that there 
was contact with other “Old Sandinistas” when possible.   
 Tomás Borge clarifies the historical link provided by Santos López.  In his book 
(to be discussed later), Borge (nd:  31) makes clear that Fonseca’s recruitment of López 
was extremely purposeful, and the purpose was to make that historical link to Sandino:  
And so, two generations of Nicaraguans came together, linked by the 
historic presence of Sandinista thought...The relationship between Carlos 
and Colonel Santos López was not coincidental.  The old and new 
generations of Sandinistas sought each other out in those dark times and 
found one another at the precise political moment. The old Sandinistas 
passed on their experiences, and we nurtured them in fields hungry for 
seeds and new perspectives.  What was really taking place was the 
transference of all that which had been written about Sandino’s struggle 
in the flesh, bones and words of the surviving veterans. 
 
Colonel Santos López dies in 1965 in Havana due to an illness.  Germán Pomares, El 
Danto, dies in May 1979, just one and one half months before the Sandinista victory. 
 The second work from 1975 is a biography of Sandino that is lengthier and more 
detailed than any Fonseca has previously written.  Viva Sandino (Long live Sandino) is 
Carlos Fonseca’s last major work regarding the General of Free Men.  While the piece is 
written in Cuba in 1975 - 76, it is not published until after the FSLN’s victory over  
                                                 
44 A danto is a type of Central American bird. 
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Somoza.  Essentially, it is an elaboration of the Cronología histórica de Nicaragua of 
1972, which is addressed previously in this chapter.  The first mention of Sandino is in 
the first sentence as Fonseca relates that it was Sandino whose image was before the First 
Conference of Solidarity of the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America in 1966.  The 
major portion of the book tells the story of Nicaraguan history, according to Fonseca, and 
begins with Columbus’ arrival in the Americas.45  It ends with Sandino’s murder in 1934 
with a brief note about the hope finally offered to Nicaragua by the Cuban revolution and 
the Frente Sandinista (Fonseca, 1984b). 
 The first third of Viva Sandino is devoted to pre-Sandino history and the 
remainder devoted to again telling the story of Sandino’s resistance.  Throughout, the 
major themes are once again, foreign aggression and oppression in Nicaragua and a 
history of Nicaraguan resistance.  This time, though, there are some new names 
mentioned as Nicaraguan heroes and a more consistent mixing of Sandino with class-
conscious language.   One of Fonseca’s key points in Viva Sandino is that Sandino had 
widespread popular support.  In fact, Sandino was the expression of Nicaraguan 
indignation against more than a century of deceit and betrayal.  “Sandino is the apex of 
that ire,” writes Fonseca (1984b:  75) as Sandino stands against the Yankees and the 
oligarchs. 
 Of course, Fonseca notes that Spain, England, Mexico and the United States have 
historically dominated and/or interfered in Nicaraguan affairs.  In addition, Nicaraguans 
have always resisted, but generally without a lot of success yet with many martyrs and  
                                                 
45 Interestingly, Fonseca has not mentioned Columbus in the previously discussed works. 
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heroes.  He names heroes that he has listed before such as Chief Diriangén, Benjamín 
Zeledón, and, of course, Sandino.  For the first time, he tells the story of Cleto Ordóñez, 
“a name that certainly has not received the just place that he deserves in the memory of 
the country’s past” (Fonseca, 1984b:  19).  Ordóñez led the Nicaraguan rebellion against 
Mexico’s annexation of Nicaragua and Central America in 1821.  Fonseca (1984b:  20) 
says that Ordóñez led a popular rebellion and that “the classist nature of the rebellion is 
indisputable.”  Fonseca also makes mention, for the first time, of the “Indian war” of 
1881 in which mestizo peasants mounted an insurrection against the business people who 
were taking advantage of them.  He cites Higinio Campos and Santos Martínez. “names 
ignored by the official history,” as leaders of that rebellion (Fonseca, 1984b:  39).  
Interestingly, he (1984b:  40) then says, “The ‘Indian war’ of 1881 should be noted as the 
antecedent of the colossal guerrilla war that almost half a century later Augusto César 
Sandino headed.”  Most interesting is Fonseca’s story of another fighter who, as did 
Sandino, refused to lay down his arms after Moncada signed the agreement with Stimson. 
The difference between Sandino and Francisco Sequeira is that Sequeira was soon killed 
by Yankee soldiers (Fonseca, 1984b). 
 Viva Sandino certainly outlines Yankee imperialism and betrayals by 
Nicaraguans who support the North Americans or, at least, fail to oppose them.  General 
Moncada receives the routine criticism as do Emiliano Chamorro, Adolfo Díaz, Crisanto 
Sacasa, President Juan Bautista Sacasa and US Secretaries of State Elihu Root and Henry 
Stimson.  Obviously, Somoza García is a member of the list of enemies of the Nicaraguan 
people, but his name does not appear until the last third of the book after Fonseca notes 
that the US forces the creation of an “armed mercenary force, practically a regular army 
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of occupation, known as the National Guard” (Fonseca, 1984b: 109).  Fonseca also 
spends significant space detailing atrocities committed by the US Marines during the war 
with Sandino.  For example, he tells of the drawing and quartering of children for sport 
and says that it was the Yankees who invented and first practiced the corte de chaleco 
(Fonseca, 1984b). 
 Perhaps most interesting to this study of how the past is reconstructed is 
Fonseca’s discussion of Sandino and his efforts using Marxist terms.  Fonseca is clear 
that Sandino was definitely not a communist; he even criticizes the Mexican communists 
for their treatment of Sandino.  He does not specifically claim that Sandino was a 
Marxist, but regularly calls Sandino a “worker-peasant” (Fonseca, 1984b: 73).  Many of 
the quotes from Sandino that Fonseca chooses to use in this work focus on workers. 
 Carlos Fonseca Amador dies in combat at Zinica in November 1976.  He had 
returned to Nicaragua a year before and gone to the mountains.  The National Guard 
detects Sandinista movements in September 1976 and attacks with helicopters.  Fonseca 
suffers a wound in his leg.  Almost two months later, Fonseca and several other 
Sandinistas confront a Guard unit.  Fonseca and two others are killed in that encounter 
(Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo, 1985). 
 Carlos, el amanecer ya no es una tentación (Carlos, the dawn is no longer a 
temptation), written in 1976 from prison, is Tomás Borge Martínez’ tribute to his friend 
and co-founder of the Frente Sandinista.  Borge recognizes Fonseca as the intellectual 
father and visionary of the contemporary Sandinistas. As Fonseca did, Borge also clearly 
understands the Frente’s historical links to Sandino and mentions Sandino frequently 
throughout the book.  He speaks of the earliest days when “we wrote vaguely but 
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fervently of Sandino” and how Sandino’s murder defeated the popular will and left 
Nicaraguans without a revolutionary consciousness (Borge, nd:  9).  “It was in this instant 
that Carlos Fonseca appeared,” says Borge (nd:  16). 
 Borge’s book is, again, generally, a tribute to Fonseca and focuses on Fonseca as 
leader while recounting events in the development of the FSLN as an organization and of 
the revolution.  Throughout this chapter, Borge’s words have been cited several times as 
he is one of the best sources about Fonseca.  It is Borge who repeats Fonseca’s speech 
that ‘Sandino is a kind of path’ and Borge who emphasizes that Colonel López ties the 
FSLN to Sandino.  However, Borge’s task is to praise Fonseca and so he does while often 
also paying tribute to Sandino.  When Borge recognizes Fonseca’s death, he mentions 
them in the same breath.  “The revolution that gave birth to Fonseca is a mother who 
carries in her womb new and definitive answers:  the victory of Sandino, the victory of 
the blood of Carlos, the victory always, heroes and martyrs,” declares Borge (nd:  78). 
 The final document produced by an FSLN leader during the revolution that is 
considered here is by Humberto Ortega Saavedra.  50 años de lucha sandinista (50 Years 
of Sandinista Struggle) is written by Ortega in 1976 and published that year.  Ortega’s 
version of the Sandinista struggle is organized into three stages beginning with Sandino’s 
revolution and its roots, then the period of revolutionary decline after Sandino’s murder, 
and finally, the rebirth of revolutionary activity after López Pérez’ assassination of 
Somoza García and lasting until the writing of this book. 
 Ortega is quite clear that Sandino and his followers have not only left a legacy of 
proven military and political tactics and strategy, but they have left an ideological legacy.  
“In the Nicaraguan historical context the Sandinista struggle represents a belligerent 
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expression of class struggle and clarifies the identification of the foreign invader with the 
oppressor,” explains Ortega (1979:  10).  He says that, as the anti-imperialist 
consciousness developed, so did a popular class consciousness, and he also calls Sandino 
a “worker-peasant” as did Fonseca.  Furthermore, Sandino was a visionary as he saw the 
need for Latin American unity to “contain the imperialist conqueror” (Ortega, 1979:  30).  
Sandino’s ideology had a “substantial revolutionary class component,” and the 
revolutionary movement relied on “a true proletarian director at the head of the oppressed 
and exploited fighting against local and outside reactionary forces,” writes Ortega (1979:  
32, 33).  He also claims that Sandino’s army was able to count on mass participation in 
their efforts. 
 For Ortega, as for other Sandinistas, the FSLN continues Sandino’s task.  After 
Sandino’s murder, the surviving Sandinista forces “were maintained to such an extent 
within the country as if they were with him” and were ready at any moment to 
immediately rejoin a revolutionary movement (Ortega, 1979:  95).  The student 
movement of the 1950s then raised the image of Sandino and began to combine Marxist-
Leninist doctrine with the Sandinista experience, and the FSLN was born.  From their 
beginning to 1967, Ortega says that the contemporary Sandinistas came to understand 
and appreciate their history.  Now, he continues, the FSLN has the same form as the 
EDSNN and is supported by the thought of Sandino and his strategy of popular 
revolutionary war (Ortega, 1979). 
 Pedro Joaquín Chamorro is assassinated in early 1978, igniting a general uprising 
against the Somoza government.  Then the Sandinistas accomplish their most spectacular 
military action in 1978.  Two dozen Sandinistas enter the National Palace and take 
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around two thousand hostages.  Their hostages include high-ranking government 
officials, some Somoza family members and reporters.  They won the release of dozens 
of Sandinista prisoners, cash and escape to Panama.  The action again brought 
unmeasurable amounts of attention to the Sandinista cause (Booth 1985).   
 Support for the FSLN grew substantially, and in July 1979 the Frente Sandinista 
de Liberación is victorious over the Somoza regime.  The Sandinistas take power as 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle leaves the country.  Sandino’s legacy has been fulfilled at 
last. 
Communicating Nicaragua’s Counterpast 
 Once the Sandinista Revolution succeeds, the winners are free to construct and 
impose any history they like.  However, the revolutionaries must reconstruct a past and 
communicate it before they are victorious.  In fact, that reconstructed past must directly 
counter Somoza’s official history if the Sandinistas are to succeed at all.  The question is 
how did they accomplish this task. 
 The first part of this chapter details how Sandinista leaders, particularly Carlos 
Fonseca Amador, recovered Sandino’s story and thought and incorporated them into their 
own revolutionary interests.  Fonseca and others repeatedly and consistently tell a story 
of ongoing foreign aggression and oppression - most often perpetrated by the United 
States - and of Nicaraguan resistance to the oppressors, emphasizing Sandino’s efforts as 
the foremost example.  However, Sandino is more than simply an example;  he is the 
practical and ideological father of their contemporary revolution.  Fonseca did not 
vacillate on that point.  Yet agreement about Sandino’s pre-eminence among a few FSLN 
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leaders alone does not constitute a counterpast that can necessarily fuel and sustain a 
revolution.  The leaders must spread that word. 
 As discussed in Chapter Six, the Somoza regime tightly controlled the use of 
communications systems and technology as well as the education system.  Additionally, 
the US government and US companies played some part in giving direction to 
communication and education in Nicaragua, and the US supported the Somozas.   Thus 
the Somozas had made vigorous efforts to first vilify General Sandino, then to praise 
themselves and finally, to erase Sandino from the national consciousness.  To a great 
degree, the regime was successful in those efforts.  However, stories of Sandino never 
quite died, and the stories became a reconstructed history to counter the official history of 
the Somoza era. 
 Tomás Borge (1986:  49) captures simply the FSLN’s formula for reaching the 
masses with their counterpast:  study, propaganda, and organizing the exploited and 
oppressed masses.  Over eighteen years, the Sandinistas were able to accomplish these 
tasks.  While eighteen years seems like a long time, they had to “radically alter the 
treatment that has been given to this crucial period of fifty years [1926 - 1976] of our 
history,” explains Humberto Ortega (1979:  9).  According to Ortega, the dominant 
classes had built a history full of falsifications and spread it through mediocre textbooks 
and essays.  That radical alteration had to confront the Somozas’ official history of 
Sandino and Nicaraguan history and had to, at least, take into account the North 
American view of it since the Sandinistas argue that the US historically interferes with 
their sovereignty.   
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 The Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional began slowly to communicate its 
reconstruction of Nicaragua’s past by 1) FSLN leaders studying and writing about 
Sandino’s thought and actions, 2) forming small clandestine study circles, 3) publishing, 
and 4) mass education later in the struggle.  Of course, simple word-of-mouth helped 
spread the message as did any publicity that the Frente was able to garner.  The first 
portion of this chapter traces Fonseca’s and the FSLN’s reconstruction of Sandino and of 
Nicaraguan history as they studied and wrote.  Fonseca and all other Sandinista leaders, 
like Borge, Ramírez, Ortega, and Wheelock, internalized this counterpast, built upon it 
and spread it. 
 After the leadership acquired knowledge of the Sandinista counterpast, they then 
often participated in study circles.  The period 1960 through 1967 was a time of birth and 
experimentation for the Frente, according to Ortega (1979).  During this time, the FSLN 
created several clandestine operations in urban areas.  These operations were conduits for 
the diffusion of propaganda and allowed the Sandinistas to run small training schools 
(Ortega, 1979).  Beginning in 1963, the FSLN used Popular Civic Committees and its 
student arm, the Student Revolutionary Front (FER), to reach more and more people.   
 Omar Cabezas was recruited to the FSLN just after his high school graduation by 
FER member Leonel Rugama.  Interestingly, Rugama spoke to him first of Marxism-
Leninism and Ché Guevara.  “I know and came to Sandino through Ché,” testifies 
Cabezas (1985: 12), “...you have to be a Sandinista.  There is no other path for the 
revolution in Nicaragua.”  He joined Rugama’s study circle and spent three months 
studying, and then began organizing his own study circles and using them to recruit for 
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the FSLN.  Cabezas (1985: 19) reports having “seven study circles going at one time” 
and then “running off study pamphlets” until dawn. 
 The experience of Francisco Rivera Quintero’s recruitment into the Frente was 
quite different from that of Cabezas.  Rivera’s father had always expressed opposition to 
Somoza’s regime and, when drunk, was likely to insult Guardsmen and shout something 
about death to Somoza and long live Sandino.  Mostly, though, Rivera was attracted to 
Sandino and the FSLN through the example provided by his older brother.  Filemón 
Rivera was once expelled from school for mentioning the name of Sandino and for saying 
that Nicaraguan history books hid the truth about Yankee intervention in Nicaragua.  
Filemón even gave a speech in which he said that Nicaragua’s problem would only be 
solved by the “magic sword of Sandino” (Ramírez, 1989:  38).  Francisco says that, when 
he joined the Frente, he was placed in a study circle and began reading Marx and learning 
of Sandino.  Until that point, he knew only that Sandino was a forbidden name and that 
his father went to jail for saying it.  Rivera (Ramírez, 1989:  52) explains further: 
...[my father and brother] explained to me that Sandino had fought 
against the Yankees, that had invaded Nicaragua, and that Somoza had 
murdered Sandino. 
The sons of Somoza stayed in power, backed by the Yankees and the 
clandestine organization to which my brother belonged was called the 
Frente Sandinista; and he, for wanting to change the situation of the 
poor, they looked for him as if he were a murderer...To say Guard, to say 
Somoza was not a crime, and to say Sandino, to say Sandinista fighter 
was bad.  Therefore, I was understanding on which side to be, on the side 
of the persecuted. 
 
The next year, Rivera studied the history of Nicaragua in Havana under Fonseca and 
Ortega and Marxism under Wheelock. 
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 The Sandinistas begin publishing a periodical as early as 1962.  In 1961 various 
Sandinista groups joined together - Nationalist Revolutionary Youth, New Nicaragua 
Movement, Combatants of the Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of 
Nicaragua.   The new group immediately saw the need for a publication but were not able 
to publish until 1962.  Trinchera was “the vehicle through which we got our war cry to 
the people,” says Escobar (1978:  2).  They published about 200 issues of Trinchera on a 
weekly basis, when possible, for seven years.    Obviously, the process was difficult in 
that the Somoza regime was unfriendly to such activity, but even if conditions had been 
friendly, their resources were limited.  For example, those weekly issues were not even 
produced on mimeograph but on a wooden press and publication of Trinchera ceased in 
1969 but was renewed in 1978.  
 Trinchera’s form and content were as one might expect a revolutionary 
publication to be.  Especially in the early years, the copy was likely to be typed, and any 
graphics, including pictures and special lettering, were likely to be hand-drawn.  The 
quality of the graphics improved over the years.  The content certainly included written 
critiques of the Somoza government and news of Sandinista military activities.  It also 
included political cartoons and various inspirational sayings.  Of course, Trinchera made 
regular reference to Sandino with articles about him, the FSLN’s link to him and quick 
references to Sandino in brief quotes and slogans.   
 In a 1979 Trinchera issue, one quite lengthy article about Sandino appeared on 
the forty-fifth anniversary of Sandino’s assassination. The article tells the story of 
Sandino’s revolutionary struggle and how he was murdered by the “bloody founder of 
the Somocist dictatorship that even now exploits and oppresses our non-compliant 
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people” (Trinchera, 1979: 8).  It goes on to tell of how Sandino resolved to expel the 
Yankees from his homeland and how others betrayed it.  Then the writer makes the 
historical link between Sandino and the FSLN (Trinchera, 1979:  8): 
Apart from his extraordinary personality as a nationalist and anti-
imperialist, it is fitting to emphasize the indisputable historical 
contribution of General Sandino to the guerrilla war, becoming in a 
teacher of this method of revolutionary struggle that later would serve as 
a model for the world. 
[The Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional] recovered...the warrior 
flag of the General of Free Men...the FSLN and it combatants cover 
themselves with the glorious nationalist and anti-imperialist flag that 
General Sandino bequeathed to us. 
 
Another page in the issue is full of quotes from Sandino focusing on themes of 
nationalism, sacrifice, internationalism and anti-Yankee sentiments. Slogans read, “Long 
live Sandino’s people!”,  “To die for the Sandinista people is not to die, it is to plant in 
order to continue the harvest” and “Sandinistally fighting in the whole country” 
(Trinchera, 1979:  1, 4).  Sprinkled throughout the issue are small drawings of Sandino’s 
Stetson hat. 
 El Sandinista was also one of the official organs of the FSLN and filled some of 
the gap opened when Trinchera was out of publication.  It contained much of the same 
type of information as did Trinchera.  For example, a 1975 issue explains the current 
popular war as the result of a long “historical process whose highest expression was the 
patriotic and anti-imperialist war directed by Augusto César Sandino...” (El Sandinista, 
1975:  9).   The front page includes a drawing of Sandino holding a rifle.  However, El 
Sandinista has a more practical side as well.  There is an article that provides illustrated 
lessons on the types of arms suited to specific tasks and lessons on the types and 
preservation of food for guerrillas.  Reminiscent of Sandino’s orders, guerrillas are 
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specifically instructed not to take food from peasants no matter how great the hunger; 
Sandinistas must pay for food (El Sandinista, 1975). 
 The student arm of the FSLN, the Student Revolutionary Front (FER), had its 
own publication.  While difficult to document, it may be that FER’s publication, El 
Estudiante, had the most impact in spreading the FSLN’s message and its counterpast 
because it could be somewhat more freely distributed than other publications.  As 
autonomous entities, the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua at Managua and 
at León were off limits to the National Guard.  Therefore, students could openly publish 
Sandinista literature.  However, the publications could not leave campus unless smuggled 
out.  So, people passed pamphlets in things like cigarette packages or toilet paper rolls.  
Yet, even if the publications remained on the campus, students read them and carried the 
information off campus in their memories. 
 The first issue of El Estudiante appeared in July 1970.  It contained FER’s self-
definition - “an organization of study about the social, economic and political problem of 
our time” (El Estudiante, 1970: 17).  The issue also contained two articles about Sandino 
and/or his legacy.   Articles emphasizing the militant side of Sandino and his thought.  
“The Sandinista combatant is a social reformer that possesses a Political Moral 
superiority over all adversaries,” says FER in one of the articles (El Estudiante, 1970).  It 
goes on to mention that a ragtag army defeated, for the first time, the powerful North 
American imperialism through moral resolve.  Sandino’s quote - ‘I will not sell or 
surrender myself:  they have to defeat me’ - appears in order for the writer to then say 
that it typifies Sandinista militants.  A second article reprints one of Sandino’s letters in 
order to point out that one only has to change the names in Sandino’s letter, but the same 
 283
situation applies in both time periods.  Furthermore, the answer to Nicargua’s problem is 
in the historical process of the traditional political parties;  they have not changed and 
they do not work because of Yankee intervention.  Therefore, a third political force is 
necessary.  In Sandino’s time it was the Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of 
Nicaragua, and today it is the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (El Estudiante, 
1975). 
 Throughout various issues of El Estudiante, the writers tell a familiar story of the 
imperialism of the United States and the “blond beasts of the North,” and of oppression 
perpetrated by Somoza against average Nicaraguans and the complicity of Nicaragua’s 
oligarchy, the “knot of traitors” (El Estudiante, 1974:  6).  Moreover, “the Somoza’s 
dynastic regime” are the “faithful servants of imperialism” (El Estudiante, 1974:  1).  The 
publication describes “Sandino’s Heroic Exploit that...achieved a popular meaning” and 
reminds readers that “the shadow of Sandino is also projected over the people, their 
patriotic struggle and with more force than ever his unresigned war cry: ‘FREE 
HOMELAND OR DEATH” [original emphasis] (El Estudiante, 1974:  8).  In addition to 
essays explaining historical links between Sandino and the Frente, FER also often uses a 
phrase as a quick reference to make that link.  “THE FUTURE AND HISTORY 
BELONG TO US” [original emphasis], appears several times (El Estudiante, 1975: 13; 
1976:  17).  All of these issues of El Estudiante are punctuated by drawings of Sandino’s 
silhouette. 
 Production of this literature is clandestine as the dangers to those who publish 
and distribute it are considerable.  Beginning in the first years, Doris María Tijerino held 
major responsibilities in the Frente such as handling all the money, locating safe houses, 
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and she was in charge of publishing.  She oversaw the printing of “bulletins, leaflets, and 
various propaganda materials” (Heyck, 1990: 63).  For such activities, Tijerino was 
arrested, imprisoned and tortured several times. Rivera relates that his brother, Filemón 
kept a mimeograph machine hidden in the home of a carpenter (Ramírez, 1989).  The 
carpenter first provided the safe house where Filemón produced propaganda flyers and 
later collaborated with the FSLN.  Filemón was eventually killed by the Guard. 
 While the Frente is publishing and distributing its propaganda to Nicaraguans, it 
is also building  and utilizing a network of contacts in other countries.  Many of the 
articles and editorials that appear in Nicaraguan publications are reprinted in Sandinista 
publications abroad and vice versa.  For example, the Gaceta Sandinista is published in 
Cuba, Mexico, Honduras, and the United States.  Other examples are Sandino published 
in Costa Rica, Sandino Vive in Mexico, and Unidad Sandinista in Panama.  These foreign 
publications can be quite lengthy and technologically sophisticated since they are not 
bound by the same constraints as are Trinchera, El Sandinista and El Estudiante. 
 In their effort to educate the Nicaraguan population regarding their message and 
counterpast, the Sandinistas could not rely solely on printed publications since the 
illiteracy rate in Nicaragua was around 60% as noted in the previous chapter.  However, 
the study circles were clandestine and therefore, by definition, not widely available to the 
population.  Broadcast media were not available to the Sandinistas due to the stranglehold 
that Somoza had on these enterprises.  Nevertheless, the Sandinistas periodically were 
able to use radio to disseminate their message.  Through armed action, the FSLN would 
seize a radio station long enough to read a statement over the airwaves (Borge, nd; 
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Fonseca, 1981).  In addition, they would demand uncensored airtime to read statements 
as a condition of freeing Somocista hostages.   
 In 1978 the FSLN went on the air with Radio Sandino.  It had morning and 
evening broadcasts and counted professional journalists among its participants.  It 
provided news, made calls to join the revolution and even taught the population how to 
use weapons and make explosives (Rothschuh, 1986).  While the effectiveness of these 
efforts cannot be measured, they surely had significant impact of one type or another 
since, as stated in the last chapter, every household was likely to have a transistor radio 
and depended on the radio for news.  Again, “radio reache[d] more people in Nicaragua 
than any other medium, except, without doubt, word of mouth” (Ryan, 1970:  191).  
Mendieta (1979:  146) says that Radio Sandino became so strategically important that the 
National Guard “paid mercernaries in Costa Rica to trace and localize its frequency.” 
 Word of mouth transmission of the Sandinista message occured in several ways.  
Omar Cabezas writes of Sandinista efforts to spread the gospel of Sandino by making 
him relevant to listeners and tailoring their explanations to them.  For example, he 
(Cabezas, 1985: 37) reports great success in his work with Indians in Subtiava: 
And we started presenting the image of Sandino in Subtiava.  The 
Indians had a leader, a historical figure, who more than any other was 
representative of their people:  Adiac.  We presented Sandino as an 
incarnation of Adiac, then Adiac as an incarnation of Sandino, but 
Sandino in the light of the Communist Manifesto, see?  So from shack to 
shack, from Indian to Indian, ideas were circulating:  
Adiac...Sandino...class sturggle...vanguard...FSLN. 
 
In order to convince peasants, Cabezas (1985: 210) explains using a variation of the same 
approach: 
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We took hold of the campesinos’ hands, broad, powerful, roughened 
hands.  ‘Those callouses,’ we asked, ‘how did you get them?’  And they 
would tell us how they came from the machetes, from working the land.  
If they got those callouses from working the land, we asked, why did that 
land belong to the boss and not to them?  We were trying to awaken the 
campesino to his own dream.  We wanted to make him see that though 
the dream was dangerous - since it implied struggle - the land was their 
right.  And we began to cultivate that dream.  Through our political work 
many campesinos began partaking of that dream. 
 
 Another variation on word-of-mouth transmission of the Sandinista message was 
music. Carlos and Luis Enrique Mejía Godoy wrote songs that told the Sandinista story 
but also that had practical applications like instructions on how to use weapons 
(Rothschuh, 1986). Lyrics to the “FSLN Hymn,” written by Carlos Mejía Godoy 
appeared in an issue of Trinchera (1978:  6) and one verse reads: 
The children of Sandino 
do not ever sell or surrender themselves 
We fight against the Yankee 
enemy of humanity. 
 
According to Rothschuh (1986:  35), “These songs had a widespread national exposure 
and penetrated profoundly into the popular consciousness.” 
 Finally, pintas (grafitti) were an effective tool for sending the Sandinista 
message.  Cabezas (1986) says that students were the first to use pintas, but they were 
ultimately used in a systematic way as part of the political work of the FSLN.  Pintas 
began in Managua but soon spread throughout the country.  Their content might be 
threatening, humorous, informational or provide instructions.  Pintas had to be very 
direct and had to take into consideration the current consciousness level of the masses, 
explains Cabezas (1986).  For example, slogans about the FSLN specifically made more 
sense to people in 1978 than they would have in 1970.   
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 When Cabezas was in college, he first saw pintas that spoke of Sandino.  He 
walked out of his house one morning and saw “Viva Sandino” painted on a wall across 
the street. Cardenal (1990) recalls how striking it was the first time he realized that a 
pinta said “Sandino Vive” (Sandino Lives) instead of saying “Viva Sandino” (Long Live 
Sandino).  “Sandino Vive” has more meaning, and it is often coupled with “Sandino 
Lives, the Struggle Continues,” giving it a much more profound meaning than simply 
“Long Live Sandino” says Cardenal (1990).46 
 Cabezas (1986:  37) recalls that he wrote his first pinta “on the run, out of fear.”  
In the early years, spray paint was unavailable so they used paint and a brush.  One 
person painted while two others watched for National Guard.   When the Guard found 
pintas, they threw black tar on them.  It was one more form of censorship, says Cabezas 
(1986).  The pintas were a way for average Nicaraguans to express their displeasure with 
the regime, but also gave the FSLN something of a measuring stick for understanding the 
level of popular support for the Sandinista agenda - the more pintas, the more support for 
the FSLN.  Additionally, the number of pintas increased with growth of the FSLN’s 
influence.  According to Cabezas (1986:  37, 40), “...the pintas...tell the truth, the walls 
were always our accomplices” and “we took the walls away from the enemy.” 
 Clearly, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional was eminently successful 
in communicating its counterpast as it stood against Somoza’s official past.  The feat is 
quite remarkable given Somoza’s power advantage over the Sandinistas to impose and 
maintain his version of history.  During the last two years of the revolution, the popular 
                                                 
46 See Sandino in the Streets (1990) for an excellent photographic essay of pintas of Sandino.  The 
photographs were taken in the late 1980s so are not used in this work as data.  
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insurrection implied that Nicaraguans generally had come to, at least, reject Somoza’s 
history and, at most, come to accept the FSLN’s counterpast.  As Ernesto Cardenal and 
Omar Cabezas said, grafitti about Sandino specifically and the FSLN generally was not 
uncommon before the victory and was very common afterward.  A silhouette, a Stetson, a 
“Sandino Vive” or a “Patria libre o morir” were shorthand for recognition of the 
historical link between their own struggle and the struggle of a man forty-five years 
earlier. 
The FSLN on Sandino 
 In order to make any kind of argument for revolution, the Sandinistas must 
reconstruct Nicaragua’s past and present this counterpast to Nicaraguans.  Obviously, 
agreement with the official past will not fuel a revolution.  Neither will an argument that 
Somoza is simply a bad man who must leave the presidency.  That argument was made  
by Conservatives and did not attract followers outside their party nor did it accomplish 
their goals.  The eternal displacement of one political party by the other was Nicaragua’s 
history; it did not constitute a reconstructed history that would counter not only the man 
and the regime, but that would also call into question the entire system of Nicaraguan 
politics and economics.  Thus the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional offered a 
counterpast to Nicaraguans that had the potential to bring radical change. 
 Nicaraguan history, as reconstructed by Fonseca and the FSLN leadership, is 
understood and presented through a Marxist-Leninist filter.  Therefore, the Sandino who 
leads the FSLN is cast as the worker-peasant - a presentation not necessarily contrary to 
how he presented himself but he did not focus on it quite as much as does the FSLN.  
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However, the FSLN’s Sandino is still primarily nationalist and anti-imperialist, which is 
exactly how Sandino presented himself, and it is how Ramírez presents him. 
 There are a few things that the Sandinistas do not address about Sandino.  They 
do not discuss, or even really mention, his religious beliefs and practices.47  As seen in 
Chapter Four, Sandino was an unabashed spiritualist who was even proselytizing among 
his own officers.  They also ignore that he was a Mason as were Somoza and several 
other figures during the period.  Additionally, except for one document by Fonseca, the 
Sandinistas do not discuss Sandino’s peacemaking unless they use it to make a point 
about his good faith compared to Somoza’s bad faith.  Lastly, they generally neglect the 
softer Sandino - the one who sometimes spoke of love and who seemed to know about 
and care for each of his soldiers.  However, these images of Sandino were not necessarily 
useful to explain the FSLN’s present. 
 The FSLN’s reconstruction, as explained in this chapter, usually identifies four 
major historical points.  First, there is repeated foreign aggression and oppression 
perpetrated against Nicaragua.  These efforts at domination began with Spain and have 
included Mexico, England and, most importantly, the United States.  US interest in 
Nicaragua is self-serving in that the US is specifically interested in using Nicaragua to 
further its business aims within the country but also to assure stability in the country so 
that US business may operate unimpeded within Central America and the hemisphere.    
Historically, the US government has been unconcerned for the welfare of Nicaraguans 
and is, therefore, unmoved by any problems caused by its domination of Nicaragua.  
                                                 
47 See Donald C. Hodges, 1986 for discussion of Sandino’s spiritual beliefs. 
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Neither is the US concerned with Nicaraguan sovereignty and the numerous interventions 
by Marines to impose North American domination demonstrate this disrespect. 
 Second, there is a history of Nicaraguan resistance to the foreigners.  Chief 
Diriangén offered some resistance to the Spanish.  Nicaraguans, including Cleto Ordóñez, 
resisted Mexican annexation, and others resisted Walker’s attempt to bring Nicaragua 
directly under US domination.  There have been various peasant rebellions against 
business interests throughout history, and General Zeledón was killed resisting Marine 
occupation of Nicaragua.  In the successful assassination of Somoza García, López Pérez 
was the hero who brought justice to the dictator.  Of course, Sandino is the primary 
example of Nicaraguan resistance, captures the Nicaraguan spirit, and was the one to beat 
the unbeatable Yankees.  However, the spirit of resistance has not yet been combined 
with a revolutionary consciousness.  Therefore, while resistance has been valiant and 
sometimes met with a measure of success, there has not yet been a complete success as 
the efforts have been too limited in thought and participation. 
 Third, some Nicaraguans have collaborated with the foreign aggressors and 
oppressors.  Often it has been the Conservative party that has directly collaborated with 
the United States at the expense of average Nicaraguans.  The cycle of one political party 
ousting the party in power never solves the problems of average Nicaraguans and, 
therefore, plays into the hands of the United States as the US then must step in to solve 
the problem.  In Sandino’s time, the problem was certainly direct Marine intervention but 
also the complicity of Nicaraguans like Moncada in allowing the US to do as it wished.  
However, since Sandino’s death, the United States’ army of occupation is not US forces 
but its surrogate, the Nicaraguan National Guard.  In fact, Somoza is North America’s 
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puppet and the last Marine.  United States’ support of Somoza means that the US ignores 
Somoza’s abuses of power and the suffering of Nicaraguans.  Yet, the United States does 
not just passively ignore the situation, but also exploits Nicaragua for its own purposes. 
 Fourth, Sandino is a path as he provides the historical example of how to solve 
these problems, and the FSLN will follow the path to victory.  He was a worker-peasant 
of ordinary, humble origins.  He was a fervent nationalist and anti-imperialist.  Sandino 
was courageous, determined, politically astute and a brilliant military strategist.  He was 
the only military officer willing to stand against the blond beasts.  In spite of his 
enormous strength of will and character before an enemy, Sandino was kind and very 
attentive to his followers’ concerns.  He enjoyed the respect and loyalty of his soldiers, 
and was respected by the Nicaraguan people and had their support.  Of supreme 
importance to the Sandinistas’ case is that Sandino won. 
 Sandino was and is the redeemer, the path. He was the one who held the solution 
for Nicaragua, but his murder prevented him from implementing it.  Although Sandino 
was but a whisper for many years, he lived on through Nicaraguan resistance until now 
when he is reconstructed by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional to again lead 
Nicaraguans to defeat the oppressors. Besides, they can defeat the US because Sandino 
did.  In fact, the Frente will fulfill Sandino’s dream.  And the contemporary Sandinistas 
still speak of him as their leader and Nicaragua’s redeemer in a way that is more than 
respect for a fallen national hero.  If Sandino were still alive, he would be pronounced 
charismatic. 
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Competing Reconstructions of History 
 Four understandings of Nicaragua’s history, especially as the history pertains to 
General Augusto César Sandino, have been presented in these pages.  Each one is directly 
relevant to the development, and even victory, of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación 
Nacional in 1979.  Sandino and his followers present an image of the General that serves 
as a standard of comparison for all other constructions of him.  The United States 
presents an image of Sandino that legitimates its behavior but that will also serve as basis 
for Somoza’s construction of an official history.  Somoza presents understandings of 
Sandino and the United States that will support the legitimacy of his own regime.  
However, the FSLN reconstruction of history as a counterpast to Somoza’s official 
history is the particular focus here, and within that focus, the adoption of a deceased 
Sandino and his cause and the posthumous attribution of charisma to him.   
The Reconstructed Sandino 
 The contemporary Sandinista movement was born in response to what they 
perceived to be more than significant problems in their nation.  In the processes of birth 
and development of their movement, the FSLN reconstructed a past in the Meadian sense 
of the term.  Widespread distress or grievances had already existed for many years, and 
there had been some efforts at calling attention to the distress and acting to resolve it.  
However, an emergent event worthy of sparking the reconstruction of a past that would 
fuel a movement did not occur until the late fifties.  Once that event occured and the 
Sandinistas collected, interpreted and organized evidence of a counterpast, then the 
Sandinistas were able to use that counterpast to drive a revolution that would ultimately 
be successful. 
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 The situation in Nicaragua in the 1950s was more than difficult for the average 
Nicaraguan.  The problem had been evident and identified for some time.  The distress 
plaguing Nicaragua was identified by Conservatives like Pedro Joaquín Chamorro and by 
old Sandinistas, and the distress had been a constant for many years.  Then came a small 
group of men, led by Carlos Fonseca, who not only articulated the distress but later 
reconstructed a past to explain it.  Fonseca (1981: 39) pinpoints the general problem in a 
1960 speech: 
The Nicaraguan people suffer one of the typical dictatorships of the 
oppressed countries of Latin America, with a semi-feudal and semi-
colonial economic system...The principal instrument that serves to 
sustain the dictatorship is the National Guard... 
 
Of course, they will identify the Untied States as the parent country to the neo-colony.  In 
addition to the neo-colonial status of Nicaragua under the control of the United States, 
Humberto Ortega specifies the role of the Somoza regime in the problem.  “The marked 
and constant repression and the vandalism done by the Somocist cabal to the 
administrative order” as well as the exploitation of workers in urban and rural areas are 
consistent problems, according to Ortega (1979:  87).  Variations of Fonseca’s and 
Ortega’s outline of the problem to be solved appear in almost any and every Sandinista 
attempt to tell their story. 
 Mead says that a reconstruction of the past is triggered by an emergent event that 
must then be explained.  In the case of the Sandinista reconstruction of a counterpast, it 
seems that it was not a single moment in time or even a single event that constitute the 
emergent.  The emergent event for the Sandinistas did not bring the issue to their 
awareness;  as stated above, many Nicaraguans were already aware of the abuses of the 
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Somozas.  This emergent event simply brought everything into focus.  It is actually two 
events that blend together into one, and they occur only after the lengthy prelude of 
distress. First, the onset and victory of the Cuban Revolution constitutes an enormously 
important event for Fonseca and his colleagues.  They are keenly aware of Castro’s 
efforts and have a deep respect for Guevara.  However, the Sandinistas are not really 
concerned with reconstructing a counterpast that explains the Cuban situation.  Instead, 
they see Cuba as a country with a situation of foreign aggression and oppression like 
Nicaragua.  Furthermore, they, like many Latin Americans, are supremely impressed that 
the Cuban revolutionaries were able to defeat Batista who was supported by the United 
States.  In fact, the Sandinistas will be the only other revolutionary force, out of several, 
to come to victory like the Cubans.  Therefore, in the emergent event of the Cuban 
Revolution, the Sandinistas were using it to explain their own need for revolution.  
Fonseca (1981:  384) explains, “With the victory of the Cuban Revolution, the brilliance 
of the rebellious Nicaraguan spirit recovered.”  The Sandinistas harken back countless 
times to the success of the Cuban revolution.  They also know that the Cubans, 
particularly Ché Guevara, used Sandino as a model for their guerrilla war. 
 The second emergent event is peculiar in that it seems that it may have developed 
into an emergent event years after it actually happened.  The assassination of Somoza 
García in 1956 was unpredicted, quite novel and, therefore, an exception to standard 
interpretative categories in Mead’s terms.  Fonseca, Borge and Mayorga were already 
involved in anti-Somoza activities, but, given the multitude of references to Lopez’ act, 
the assassination was extremely significant in terms of fueling hope and planning - yet 
not at that time.  Apparently, the anti-violent activist group to which they belonged was 
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not in agreement with the assassination (Zimmerman, 2000).  Yet, by the time the FSLN 
is formed and throughout the revolution, Fonseca and other Sandinistas refer to the 
“setttling of accounts” with Somoza as a pivotal event.  There had certainly been 
previous attempts to oust Somoza.  The Conservatives had tried unsuccessfully  many 
times, and Sandinista General Colindres tried to mount a revolt in 1948.  Then in 1956, 
Rigoberto López Pérez succeeded where others had failed, but he succeeded in an 
unexpected way.  One of Fonseca’s (1981:  355) summaries of the event reads: 
In an action of extraordinary heroism the patriot Rigoberto López Pérez 
sacrifices himself settling accounts with the tyrant A. Somoza G.; such 
an action is justified in a period in which the tyranny is prolonged while 
the popular struggle suffers a  serious state of atrophy... 
 
It was not only surprising that López Pérez succeeded in his attempt, but that he did so 
knowing that he would be killed.  Until this time, Somoza’s enemies tried to eliminate 
him while preventing any harm from coming to themselves.  Therefore, López Pérez was 
attacking the same old problem but with a novel approach; and he was successful.  Of 
course, his success was limited in that he did not eliminate the Somoza government.  
Nevertheless, the Sandinistas refer innumerable times to this historical event, sometimes 
seeking to explain it historically and sometimes using it as part of the explanation of the 
present.48  The repression that followed the assassination may have added to the sense of 
it as the emergent event that Mead discusses. 
 It seems that the success of the Cuban revolution was the pivotal event for 
encouraging the Nicaraguans to emulate that success but with a Nicaraguan signature.   
                                                 
48 Interestingly, Sandinistas rarely discuss Rigoberto López Pérez as a person; he is usually only a 
representation of his act of assassinating Somoza García. 
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Yet, now Fonseca and the Sandinistas can bring López Pérez’ unexpected behavior and 
success in 1956 together with Castro’s remarkable success in 1959 and the years leading 
to it, and they can reconstruct a Nicaraguan past that makes sense of López Pérez’ feat 
and events in Cuba but in a Nicaraguan context.  The past will include oppression by a 
dictator who deserves to be killed and a government that deserves to be overthrown.  
Ultimately, the reconstructed past will include the United States’ role in the oppression 
and General Sandino’s role in originally successfully opposing the oppressor.  Once the 
Sandinistas begin to incorporate Sandino into their own history, they will provide a 
history to explain the long ago emergent event of Sandino’s murder. 
 Second, Carlos Fonseca, Sergio Ramírez, Tomás Borge, Humberto Ortega and 
many other Sandinistas have a wealth of evidence on which to base their counterpast.  
They begin with the whispers of Sandino mentioned by Fonseca (1981).  Borge’s father 
and Camilo, Humberto and Daniel Ortega’s father were both part of Sandino’s struggle 
(Borge, 1990:  81).  Cabezas (1985), Tijerino (Heyck, 1990), and Rivera (1989) all report 
hearing about Sandino from someone in their youth.  The whispers about Sandino were 
likely to be sketchy, but they indicate that there were still witnesses.  Furthermore, the 
Sandinistas had the examples of old Sandinistas like Generals Colindres and Raudales 
who each attempted military action against the dictatorship.  Most importantly, they had 
the person and testimony of Colonel Santos López to tell them of Sandino and his 
struggle and to train them in Sandino’s method of guerrilla fighting. 
 Beyond the whispers and testimonies, Fonseca and the others had access to some 
written works about Sandino.  The works of Somoza García (1976), Salvatierra (1934), 
de Belaustegoiguitia (1934), Calderón (1934), and Selser (1981, 1986) were available to 
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and studied by the Sandinistas in the 1950s (Borge nd).  Fonseca (1981) even notes the 
particular importance of Somoza’s and Selser’s books in his understanding of Sandino.  
Later, they were able to study interviews with Sandino and documents written by him.  
These sources were all crucial as there was other evidence that did not exist.  There was 
no body, no grave, virtually no official history and people closest to Sandino were likely 
to be dead also. 
 Mead argues that the reconstruction of a past provides causal explanations for the 
emergent event.  The distress or grievance being suffered by the Nicaraguan people was 
the tyranny of the Somoza regime, and the combination of Somoza García’s assassination 
and the victory of the Cuban Revolution provided the emergent event to spawn or 
accelerate Fonseca’s construction of a counterpast.  At the heart of the causal explanation 
for Nicaragua’s distress and for the emergent event is the exploitation of Nicaragua by 
the United States, particularly US capitalist interests.  Quoted above is Fonseca’s 
comment made in 1960 identifying the current distress as the tyranny of Somoza, the 
semi-colonial status of Nicaragua and the use of the National Guard to maintain this 
system.  Then Fonseca links these three problems to the exploitation of Nicaraguans 
perpetrated by Yankee monopolies and the Nicaraguan capitalist class.  Through the 
years, the Sandinistas will identify US Marine occupation of Nicaragua as simply a tool 
of US capitalist interests to keep Nicaragua in line;  Sandino said the same thing.   
 The Sandinistas also identify Nicaraguan collaborators as sharing in the blame 
for the poor conditions in the country.  Initially, Sandino cited General Moncada and 
Adolfo Díaz as the collaborators.  The contemporary Sandinistas name them too but 
actually hold responsible the Liberal and Conservative parties they represent, 
 298
respectively.  Both Sandino and the contemporary Sandinistas find the continual ousting 
of one party from power by the other to be tiresome, dysfunctional for the country and 
serving the interests of the United States.  Of course, the most searing criticism is held for 
the Somoza family and the National Guard.  As stated before, the Guard constitutes a 
surrogate army of occupation for the United States, and Somoza is the “last Marine” 
(Bermann, 1986). 
 The final piece of the causal explanation for the emergent event is Sandino’s 
assassination, which certainly flows from Yankee domination and the complicity of the 
Nicaraguan elite.  However, the Sandinistas argue numerous times that, had Sandino not 
been murdered, Nicaragua would not be suffering as it is.  They mention countless times 
that Nicaraguan resistance to domination was silenced, except for a few interruptions, 
until the advent of the FSLN.  While the resistance is quiet, the exploitation can continue 
unabated.  Hence, a problem that was on the verge of improving, instead worsened 
because Sandino was eliminated from the mix. 
The Importance of the Reconstructed Sandino 
 Obviously, Sandino's life and struggle is but one portion of Nicaragua's past.  
However, the manner in which the Sandinistas have reconstructed him and re-attributed 
charisma to him makes Sandino a focal point of their revolution that symbolizes a great 
deal more than the life of one man.  As Mead suggests, the Sandinistas have 
reconstructed a past that provides meaning for their current circumstances, gives them a 
sense of continuity and order, and implies future direction.  Once again, their writings 
provide a wealth of data. 
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 As stated previously, Carlos Fonseca purposely reconstructed Sandino's thought 
so that it could become the driving ideological force in the newest phase of the 
Nicaraguan struggle against the Somozas and North American imperialism.  According to 
Borge (nd), Fonseca gathered most of his information about Sandino from several written 
works, including Somoza’s biography of Sandino.  FSLN Commander Jaime Wheelock 
(1980b) laments the fact that Sandino's own writings regarding his political thought are 
fragmentary, consisting primarily of letters and written instructions to his officers.  In the 
introduction to Fonseca's book about Sandino, Wheelock (1982:  13) discusses the 
difficult task which Fonseca set for himself in recovering Sandino’s thought.49  Wheelock 
continues and compliments Fonseca's historiography.  Commander Tirado (1980: 125) 
calls Fonseca's study of Sandino "meticulous, scrupulous."  In summary, the Sandinistas 
recognize the critical role played by Fonseca in the presentation of Sandino to 
Nicaraguans.  They also seem to assume that he was correct and complete in his 
interpretation. 
The Reconstructed Sandino and Sandinista Ideology 
 A primary reason that Fonseca rescued Sandino's thought was to provide the 
Nicaraguan revolutionary movement of the 1950s with an ideology.  Fonseca 
"proclaimed before the entire revolutionary movement that Sandino's ideas were forceful" 
(Tirado, 1980: 125). For Fonseca, Sandino's ideas culminated in an ideology that was a 
crucial mix of anti-imperialism, nationalism, and Marxism-Leninism.50 
                                                 
49 See first page of this chapter for Wheelock’s comments. 
50 For a thorough discussion of Sandinista ideology, including the incorporation of Sandino’s 
thought, see Donald C. Hodges, 1986.  See also Donald C. Hodges, 1992. 
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 The Sandinistas use Sandino to firmly establish their anti-imperialism as an 
historical position.  "The resistance against Yankee aggression and greed is born in the 
depths of the history of our people," states Fonseca (1983: 289).  That history includes 
"the image of Sandino as the symbol of traditional anti-imperialist struggle of Latin 
America" (Fonseca, 1982: 167).  Furthermore, Escobar (1980) writes that Nicaraguans 
should study Sandino's anti-imperialism in order to fully understand what North 
American policy toward Latin America really represents.  
 In Sandino:  Guerrillero Proletario, Fonseca (1984a) argues that, by the age of 
seventeen, Sandino understood that the degree of United States' intervention in Nicaragua 
was increasing.  Carlos Fonseca also teaches that Sandino's work experience with US oil 
companies in Mexico and the San Albino mine in Nicaragua sharpened his hatred of US 
imperialism.  Fonseca's characterization of the peace treaty of 1927 between Nicaraguan 
liberals and US representatives as an act of treason and surrender to the Yankee empire 
provides Sandino with the historical opportunity to defeat imperialism. 
 Sandino's anti-imperialism became part of a past that provided meaning for 
Fonseca's present.  However, the problem in Fonseca's time was not one of military 
occupation of Nicaragua by the United States as was the case for Sandino.  Nevertheless, 
the Sandinistas believed their country to be "occupied" by North Americans through the 
"last Marine" - Anastasio Somoza Debayle.  A writer for the Mexican Gaceta Sandinista 
asserts that paying homage to Sandino and his anti-imperialism is equivalent to 
condemnation of Somoza and his crimes against the people of Nicaragua (Salazar, 1975).  
Humberto Ortega (1979:  10) offers the following historical linkage: 
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The Army for the Defense of the National Sovereignty of 
Nicaragua.followed...an aggressive strategy and policy that boldly 
proved its effectiveness, that also left us with fundamental ideological 
motives.  In the Nicaraguan historical context the Sandinista struggle 
represents a belligerent expression of class struggle and makes a clear 
identification of the foreign invader [the US] with the oppressor 
[Somoza], creating the  awareness of the same enemy, an awareness that 
feeds the passion of our people, since tyranny is nothing other than a 
mask of imperialism in Nicaragua... 
The Honduran Gaceta Sandinista (1976) notes that the Somoza dynasty has made it 
unnecessary for the United States to mount a new invasion of Nicaragua.  Similarly, 
Sandinistas argue that not only US support of Somoza constitutes the new Yankee 
imperialism but also involved are North American corporations "from the famous United 
Fruit to the not less famous business of the recently deceased Howard Hughes" (Pierre-
Charles, 1977).  Therefore, the present problem of Somoza and US multi-national 
corporations engenders an anti-imperialist stance by Sandinistas, and, for Sandinistas, 
this anti-imperialism is directly related to Sandino's ideology. 
 An ideology of anti-imperialism implies an ideology of nationalism.  The 
reconstructed Sandino provides the contemporary Sandinistas with a nationalistic past.   
Jaime Wheelock (Fonseca, 1984b:  III)introduces Fonseca's book about Sandino with an 
explanation of why Fonseca chose to study Sandino's ideology: 
 
Carlos first decided on an ideology of Sandino precisely because the new 
generations of Sandinista soldiers in the great majority young people, 
peasants, exploited by the cities or students of humble origin, 
fundamentally aware of the depressing economic and political situation 
in Nicaragua, and of the necessity to raise arms against the dictatorship, 
needed primarily moral teaching, of dignity, of patriotism; in other 
words, of practical ideology reborn of the same roots as the struggle of 
the defense of the national sovereignty. 
Escobar (1980:  73) agrees that Sandino's legacy to the Sandinistas was a fundamental 
principle "to arm theoretically and practically the national liberation movement."  
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Commander Humberto Ortega (1980: 13) makes clear that Sandinista ideology is 
nationalist in its origin:  "[Sandinismo] was not a phenomenon brought theoretically or 
extracted from books, because Sandino precisely, without extracting from books 
extracted from the people their needs, made them his, interpreted them and he himself 
through his struggle, through his action, made theory, that which we have recovered." 
 Wheelock agrees that Sandino acquired his ideology directly from assuming the 
needs and oppression of the Nicaraguan people.  However, Wheelock and others extend 
this nationalism to include all of Central America and/or Latin America.  Wheelock 
(1982:  54) argues that Sandino's assumption of the problems of Nicaraguans matured 
"until [he was] elevated to the unquestionable category of founding father of Latin 
American anti-imperialism together with such figures as Bolívar, San Martín, José Martí, 
Betances, Camilo, y Che..."  This great love of country and willingness to sacrifice for 
the good of the country expressed through Sandino provides the Sandinistas with an 
ideology as well as an example to emulate. 
 In addition to providing an ideology of anti-imperialism and nationalism, the 
reconstructed Sandino has accommodated Marxist-Leninist ideology.  The idea that 
Sandino adhered to a Marxist-Leninist philosophy is controversial because there seems to 
be no direct evidence that he was a Marxist.  Nevertheless, the Sandinistas regularly 
connect him with Marxists and Marxist ideas.  For example, Carlos Fonseca (1981:  66) 
writes to university students that they should take a decisive stand in favor of revolution 
just like "the great revolutionaries of history:  Karl Marx and Augusto César Sandino, 
Camilo Torres and Ernesto Che Guevara."  Fonseca also reminds his readers of Sandino's 
working relationship with Farabundo Martí, the self-declared Marxist for whom the 
Salvadoran revolutionary is named.  At one point, Fonseca clearly admits that Marxism 
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did not gain a real foothold in Nicaragua until after the Cuban revolution of 1959.  The 
reason that Marxism did not arrive earlier in Nicaragua or Central America was that the 
Marxist ideas were "without the finishing touch of domestication" which a reconstructed 
Sandino eventually provided (Fonseca, 1981: 85). 
 The Sandinistas generally avoid calling Sandino a Marxist, but they write of his 
motivations and orientations in Marxist terms.  Escobar (1980:  80) even discusses 
Sandino's ability, "without being a Marxist" to apply nationalism in a revolutionary way.  
Wheelock (1980: 115) also acknowledges Sandino's novel approach to fighting the war 
of 1926: 
 
If the "constitutionalist" war of 26 appears at first glance like any other 
conflict between factions of the dominant class, its real driving force and 
that which will permit it to later transform itself into a struggle of 
national and anti-imperialist liberation, is precisely the active 
participation, of classes of agricultural laborers, peasants, and workers - 
among these last the participation of the mine workers that constituted at 
that time the most united group of that sector is decisive. 
 
 In addition to leading a class struggle, Sandino understood the concept of class.  
According to Fonseca (1982), Sandino represented popular interests.  Humberto Ortega 
(1980) argues further that the Army for the Defense of the National Sovereignty 
Nicaragua and Sandino were not simply fighting to oust the Yankees.  They were also 
slowly gaining a class consciousness in order to find a real historical alternative to the 
deplorable conditions in Nicaragua. According to the Sandinistas, Sandino gained his 
"worker consciousness" through his own experience and contact with miners and banana 
plantation workers (Pierre-Charles, 1977; Fonseca, 1980).   
   Wheelock (1980:  52) finds it surprising that Sandino acted in such close 
accordance with the "most advanced social ideas of the time, and [obtained an] 
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ideological-practical identification with a scientific conception of social processes that, 
given the backwardness of revolutionary ideas in the country and the incipient nature of 
the worker's movement,  [while] not knowing its rigorously doctrinal aspect..."  Ortega 
(1979: 33) declares Sandino to be "the true proletarian leader of the oppressed and 
exploited."   Sandino's class experience and vision "were crucial at the moment of 
correctly explaining the issue of the composition of the anti-imperialist vanguard" 
(Wheelock, 1980).  For Escobar (1980: 79), it is clear that Sandino was class conscious in 
the Marxist-Leninist sense, and "the idea that Sandino only wanted to expel the North 
Americans from the country and leave the political work to others" is completely false. 
 In conclusion, the contemporary Sandinistas faced the problem of providing 
meaning for their activities by developing a strong intellectual position. In Sandino's 
thought, they found an ideology that neatly meshed with their own ideas of anti-
imperialism, nationalism, and Marxism-Leninism.  Fonseca personalized, in a sense, for 
the average Nicaraguan the struggle against Somoza by spreading the FSLN's intellectual 
past back to a Nicaraguan who had waged a similar struggle.   
The Reconstruction of Sandino and Continuity 
 The contemporary Sandinistas have succeeded in demonstrating that their 
situation is a continuation of Sandino's circumstances.  The problem of US intervention 
continues albeit in a form different from Sandino's time.  The struggle against Yankee 
hegemony continues.  In addition to reconstructing a past which brings continuity, the 
Sandinistas have imposed order on their past.  They have integrated the activities and 
goals of the Sandinista National Liberation Front with a past in a way that legitimizes 
their present. 
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 It is clear to contemporary Sandinistas that the problems they face in the 1960s 
are a continuation of the problems that plagued Nicaragua in the 1920s.  According to 
one Nicaraguan who lived during Sandino's war, the situation in contemporary Nicaragua 
is "the same, the same, the same" with the National Guard "burning, killing, this and that, 
here and there" (Hernández, 1986).  Just as Sandino's concern was to expel the 
occupation force of US Marines from his country and restore Nicaraguan sovereignty and 
self-determination, Carlos Fonseca seeks to do the same.  Even though there is no 
contingent of Marines occupying Nicaragua in the 1960s, Fonseca (1981: 75) identifies 
the Somozas and the National Guard as surrogates for the US government.  Somoza 
García "surrenders the country to imperialist interests," and he represents no one but the 
National Guard and Yankee interests (Wheelock, 1980: 10).  His son, Somoza Debayle, 
is a "gorilla" and a "puppet" whose "immoral actions are always directed toward pleasing 
Yankee imperialism, which is what maintains him in power" (Fonseca, 1981: 249).  
Wheelock (1983: 62) notes that "the struggle against Somoza was a struggle against 
empire; not a struggle against the United States as a country but struggle against an 
imperialist conception in the United States government, because Somoza was a creation 
of imperialism."   
 In addition to fighting the surrogate US occupation forces - Somoza and the 
National Guard - the Sandinistas face the continuing problem of the presence of North 
American economic interests.  Fonseca (1981: 75) summarizes the problem by saying 
that foreign interests exploit Nicaragua's resources while "the surrender of the national 
wealth to Yankee monopolies has continued to increase."  He characterizes the extraction 
of Nicaragua's minerals by US companies as "the Yankee assault on our minerals 
 306
perpetrated without interruption for more than fifty years" (Fonseca, 1981: 231).  Once 
again, he is noting the continuity of the problem. 
 Just as the US military supports its surrogates in the National Guard, North 
American business utilizes the Nicaraguan business community.  The Nicaraguan upper 
class "has counted not only on the financial backing of great North American capital, but 
principally on the support of military, diplomatic, cultural, and policing interventions by 
North American imperialism" (Wheelock, 1980: 147).  Commander Wheelock continues 
by listing powerful US financial institutions that back the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie - 
Chase Manhatten Bank, Wells Fargo Bank, and First National Bank of Boston.  Morales 
Avilés (1980: 16) lists seven US banks with tremendous investments in Nicaragua after 
stating that "in Nicaragua there does not exist one single [public works] project, a project 
for production, programs for production...that is not financed by loans."   
 The Sandinistas also view regional alliances as contemporary tools of the 
continuing problem of US exploitation in Nicaragua.  Salazar (1975) argues that the 
Central American Defense Council (CONDECA) is simply an arm of the Pentagon 
intended to control the Central American population.  President Kennedy's Alliance for 
Progress is a "masquerade of reformist demagoguery" supported financially by the 
Nicaraguan bourgeoisie and by multinational corporations (Wheelock, 1980: 127).  For 
Nicaragua, the Alliance means further integration into the economic hegemony of the 
United States, further foreign support for Somoza's military dictatorship, agrarian reform 
which only serves to expand internal markets for capitalists, and the "massive 
establishment of North American industrial firms that not only monopolized ownership 
of new manufacturing plants, but surrendered control of a large part of the traditional 
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industries operating in the country" (Wheelock, 1980:  128).  In the final analysis, 
Wheelock (1980: 133) believes that Nicaragua and Central America are reduced to 
providing a "base of operations" for the United States.  As such, according to Wheelock, 
the US encourages internal repression and invests heavily in Nicaragua in order to 
maintain control of the country. 
 Not only has the problem of North American domination of Nicaragua continued 
since Sandino's time, but the struggle against that domination continues.  Of course, the 
Sandinistas view their war against Somoza as the continuation of Sandino's guerrilla 
against the US Marines.  Humberto Ortega (1979: 73) draws a clear connection:   
This revolutionary task, for which Sandino, Umanzor, Estrada and the 
rest of the soldiers fell, is that which currently continues in conditions 
more favorable to the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement, the 
SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FSLN). 
 Ortega (1979) accuses the Somoza regime of hiding and lying about the true 
history of Sandinista struggle since the initiation of Sandino's war in 1926 until the 
present.  Ortega's purpose then is to correct this lapse in historical truths as he states: 
 
...the war of General Sandino in the mountains of Segovias...far from 
being exhausted in a moment of the process that was developing during 
the period mentioned, has been permanently igniting the struggle of the 
last fifty years, and is serving without doubt to ignite once again, the 
historic crusade of our people, with its political and military at the head, 
in order to demolish tyranny. 
Fonseca (1981:  137) delights in his observation that "in the country and even more so in 
the mountains Sandino is a part of the present," and provides, therefore, a fertile ground 
for recruiting soldiers and soliciting support for the FSLN.  Most importantly, the 
Sandinistas place themselves and their struggle in an historical context which allows 
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them "to take advantage of...all and each one of Sandino's teachings and apply them to 
new social situations" (Tunnermann, 1983: 33). 
 The Sandinistas claim that the assumption that the death of Sandino signaled the 
end of Sandinista struggle is a false one.  In fact, Mendieta (1979) claims that the 
toppling of Somoza García’s regime began when he ordered the execution of Sandino.  
"After they killed General Sandino, the Yankees believed that all was finished, but it was 
not so..." according to one Sandinista (Rugama, 1986: 294).  In fact, after Sandino's 
murder, "the regrouping of the popular forces, notwithstanding, is slowly being 
accomplished since the end of the decade of the fifties, even forming a vanguard of anti-
somocist struggle which, in dedication to General Sandino, takes the name Sandinista 
National Liberation Front." 
 The current struggle continues to be violent as was Sandino's war.  Baltodano 
(1977: 16) mentions that Sandino "create[d] an army of the people in which we fight 
today."  Fonseca (1981: 251) warns President Lyndon Johnson that "the machete of 
Augusto César Sandino and Pedro Altamirano will be lifted again over the heads of the 
monsters that torture the humbled people."  In very broad terms, the Sandinistas view all 
violent conflicts against US-supported Latin American governments as extensions of 
Sandino's efforts. 
 The establishment of continuity between the contemporary revolution and 
Sandino provides an historical anchor for the Sandinistas, but it also provides a sense of 
temporal order.  Citing the initiation of Sandino's struggle as the initiation of their own 
struggle provides the revolution with an historical beginning.  The Sandinistas have also 
designated a middle phase and an end of the struggle.  Consequently, their past assumes a 
logical order which can be understood and communicated.  
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 When Sandinistas speak of a history of North American intervention, they often 
begin in the 1850s with the invasion by William Walker.  However, Sandinistas generally 
trace the beginning of their revolutionary conflict to 1927 - the year that Sandino began 
his fight.  The primary example of this phenomenon is Humberto Ortega's book, 50 Years 
of Sandinista Struggle.  Ortega (1979: 11) defines the beginning of the Sandinista 
revolution and predicts victory by stating, "...in an hour that we believe is not very far 
away, the process of nationalist, popular, and anti-imperialist struggle initiated by 
General Sandino fifty years ago, must soon enter a new victorious phase..."   However, 
this first phase of the revolution ended prematurely when "the criminal hand of Anastasio 
Somoza García and the North American government, cut short Sandinista aspirations, the 
night of February 21, 1934" (Gaceta Sandinista, 1978:  1). 
 The middle phase of the Sandinista revolution begins after the assassination of 
Sandino.  Fonseca (1980: 32) writes, "The tragedy that fell over Nicaragua from the 
crime of February 21, has been prolonged for several decades and still today flagellates 
Sandino's people."  In response to a reporter's question about what happened to Sandino's 
memory between 1934 and 1958, Fonseca (1981) answered that his name was a whisper 
and that those years were spent in darkness and terror.  In essence, the period from 1934 
to 1958 is confused, directionless, and without leadership.  The situation begins to change 
with the death of Somoza García in 1956. 
 The Sandinistas date the third and current phase of their struggle from one of two 
different events.  At times, they claim that the period of darkness ends with the shots fired 
by Rigoberto López Pérez in 1956. Wheelock (1980:  58) says that López' action "opens 
for Nicaragua a new period of hope and liberty" and "marks the renewal of Sandino's 
struggle."  On the other hand, Carlos Fonseca sets the date for the third phase in 1958 for 
 310
two reasons.  One reason is that news of the Cuban revolution was having an increasing 
influence on restless Nicaraguans.  However, Fonseca (1981:  217) cites a second reason: 
 
In that year 58...for the first time in a long time the name of Augusto 
César Sandino resounds again, after a quarter of a century of darkness, of 
paralysis, of atrophy of the Nicaraguan popular movement.  In 1958 
there is also the first guerrilla action in the country headed by a survivor 
of the old guerrillas of Sandino:  Ramón Raudales, who died in that 
battle. 
 Of course, this last stage is characterized by the leadership of the FSLN.  The 
years of darkness were simply an interruption, but now Nicaraguans "have substituted the 
Army for the Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua...with the glorious 
SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT" (Salazar, 1975:  20).  In fact, Borge 
(nd:  50) argues that "the FSLN was an historical answer" to Nicaragua's problems. 
 In summary, the members of the Sandinista National Liberation Front view their 
efforts as the historical continuation of General Sandino's struggle against foreign 
domination of his homeland.  For the Sandinistas, the original problem facing 
Nicaraguans continues.  The United States continues to dominate Nicaraguan politics and 
economics, although the domination is achieved through a Nicaraguan and economic 
penetration rather than military occupation.  Due to the continuing problem, the 
Sandinistas continue to fight on behalf of Sandino in order to find a solution.  Finally, the 
Sandinistas have ordered their past in such a way that they can identify specific phases of 
the conflict and causal conditions. 
The Reconstruction of Sandino and the Future 
 Establishing that the FSLN's present derives meaning and continuity from a past 
that focuses on Sandino as the central character, Nicaragua's future becomes somewhat 
predictable.  The contemporary Sandinistas can take Sandino and the past that they have 
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reconstructed around him and project a victorious future.  The FSLN will defeat their 
enemies militarily, and they will usher in the fulfillment of Sandino's dream for 
Nicaragua.   
 The contemporary Sandinistas laud Sandino's military victory over the United 
States Marines.  They then extend this past into a future military victory over Somoza 
and the National Guard.  Carlos Fonseca (1980: 23) recognizes Sandino's determination 
to win a victory:  "With simple language [Sandino] explained to the peasant warriors that 
the people would definitively defeat Yankee imperialism."  The reward for Sandino's 
determination was indeed a military victory.  Humberto Ortega (1980:  10) states, 
"Sandino does not sell himself to the empire, he continues to fight until he achieves the 
expulsion of the invader in 1933." 
 The FSLN continually and directly links Sandino's victory to their own predicted 
victory.  For instance, "...Sandino, interpreting the feeling of the great masses of the 
people, takes up arms and launches his manifesto to the nation...the guidance that would 
drive the struggle of the Nicaraguan people and that today inspires the battles of 
Nicaragua's revolutionary organization" (Pierre-Charles, 1977:  5).  Jaime Wheelock 
(1982:  59) explains specifically: 
 
The challenge fell to the new generations to fulfill the Sandinista heritage 
and advance the program of national liberation completed in its military 
aspect by Sandino who threw out the invading North American troops in 
1933.  Because of that, the prime objective - and precisely the task that 
Sandino planned to complete as an immediate step - for the revolutionary 
movement of today is the defeat of military tyranny...The defeat of the 
Somozas presents itself as a historical continuation of the Nicaraguan 
revolutionary process... 
 Not only is military action like Sandino's effort likely to bring victory to the 
FSLN, but it is the only road to victory.  According to Fonseca (1980:  33), "The national 
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emancipation of Nicaragua, will be obtained through armed action, sustained by the 
popular masses and guided by the most advanced revolutionary principles."  Tirado 
(1980: 126) confirms that Fonseca taught that armed struggle was the only means of 
victory and that Fonseca "adopt[ed] this idea from Sandino."  However, Fonseca (1981:  
95, 125) does not forget that Sandino's victory was thwarted by Somoza García: 
 
The frustration that followed the period of Sandinista resistance does not 
have to be repeated today.  Now the times are different.  These days are 
not like those in which Sandino and his warrior brothers fought alone 
against the Yankee empire. 
 
We believe that the heroic military feat that Augusto César Sandino 
commanded is insuperable.  We must say that whatever the dimension of 
the military of the current belligerent situation, they will always be less 
than the dimension reached by Sandino's deeds...It could be said that in 
its entirety the situation in which the Nicaraguan revolutionary struggle 
occurs today is more advantageous than it was in the days of Sandino... 
 
In fact, the United States will not return to defeat the Nicaraguan people because the US 
would not only be fighting a guerrilla movement like that of Sandino "but an entire 
nation that is willing to fight to the last man" (Wheelock, 1983:  72). 
 The ultimate military victory over the US-backed Nicaraguan dictator will allow 
Sandino's dream for his people to be fulfilled.  However, Sandino's dream is no longer 
just his;  his dream has become the dream of the Nicaraguan people.  The Gaceta 
Sandinista (1976:  3) explains, "[Sandino's]  ideal of making Nicaragua a free homeland 
is planted in the heart of the Nicaraguan people..."  Another edition of the Gaceta (1978:  
1) carries this statement:  "At last it will be possible to reach the objectives traced by 
Sandino and recovered by the people themselves." 
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 Of course, Sandino's vision was to liberate Nicaragua from Yankee domination 
for the good of the Nicaraguan people.  This very practical vision remains the same.  
Fonseca (1981: 257) remarks, "The Sandinista National Liberation Front, FSLN, 
continues the path traveled by Sandino...as the only way to stop the crimes, the hunger, 
the illiteracy, and the misery...Before the sacred image of its martyrs [the people] swear 
once more to not lay aside their guns and to drive the revolutionary struggle for the 
people's happiness." 
 In addition to being practical, the Sandinistas also become romantic when writing 
of fulfilling Sandino's dream.  Fonseca (1980: 32) writes that after Sandino's murder and 
"during a quarter of a century of pain and combat, around 25,000 children of Nicaragua, 
fertilized the holy ground, that will one day see the relentless flowering of liberty and 
justice."  Similarly, Borge (nd:  78) comments: 
Tomorrow, some day, soon, a greatly changed sun will shine and 
illuminate the land that our heroes and martyrs promised us;  land with 
abundant rivers of milk and honey where all fruits flower, except the 
fruit of discord and where man will be brother to man and love, 
generosity, and heroism will reign and at whose doors our people will be 
a guardian angel that with a sword of fire will prevent the return of 
selfishness, arrogance, vanity, corruption, violence and cruel and 
aggressive exploitation of some against others. 
 
 In essence, the Sandinistas have spread their present backward into a victorious 
and visionary past that they then project into the future.  Consequently, they speak and 
write of a future Nicaragua that will be a place of which Sandino could only dream.  The 
FSLN will make this dream into a reality through the promise of military victory based 
on Sandino's military legacy. 
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Sandino and Posthumous Charisma 
 The contemporary Sandinistas harbor a strong allegiance to General Sandino.  
Clearly, they deeply respect him as a national hero.  They also admire his 
accomplishment of moving from miserable beginnings to leading a powerful and 
successful military force.  They appreciate his dignity as a man.  However, there is so 
much more to it than respect, admiration, and appreciation.  For the Sandinistas, Sandino 
is the Nicaraguan people, and they are Sandino.  There is a loyalty to him, not just to his 
memory.  While Sandinistas know that Sandino is dead and even recognize the 
anniversary of his death each year, they keep him alive by speaking of him as if he were 
alive.  If he were alive, these phenomena might indicate that he is a charismatic leader.  
But he is dead.  Nevertheless, Sandinistas make innumerable statements that indicate 
exceptional or even divine qualities, his continuing authority over them, and an emotional 
commitment to him.  Therefore, the question arises as to whether there may be a variation 
of Weber’s charisma. 
The Exceptional Sandino 
 Sandino was, at the very least, quite exceptional in the eyes of contemporary 
Sandinistas.  He is, at the very most, divine.  He was and is a David before Goliath 
(Selser, 1981).  He was and is the "synthesis of a people's desire for liberty" (Ortega, 
1983: 19).  "The roving General traversed the conscience of the Asian and African 
peoples," writes Borge (1984: 163).  These comments indicate that Sandino is a person 
which Sandinistas perceive as capturing the soul of the oppressed peoples of the world.  
 The Sandinistas also describe Sandino and his actions in terms that imply a 
divine nature.  Fonseca (1982: 42) swears to defend his homeland "before the image of 
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Sandino."  In addition, Sandino was a part of the "redemption of the enslaved peasant" 
(Fonseca, 1983: 238).  The Sandinistas count time from his death much as the western 
world does from Christ's death (Ortega, 1979; Blandón, 1981; Wheelock, 1982).  He also 
is described by Sandinistas as having done things in ways that are strikingly similar to 
Christ's actions.  For example, Ramírez (Sandino, 1981: 31) describes a scene not unlike 
Christ's prayer in the Garden of Getsemane: ". . . Sandino separates himself from his men 
so that they will mot see him crying, while he bitterly meditates on the eternal destiny of 
the nation . . ." 
 The images most strikingly similar to Christ are those concerning Sandino's 
death.  Some of the references made to his death and immortality are couched in very 
secular terms but sound religious.  For example, the Gaceta Sandinista (1976) states, 
“After forty-two years the immortal Sandino, emerged with more vital force and his 
figure feels closer as that moment complete his work comes closer.”  More specifically, 
FSLN co-founder Tomás Borge (1985: 106) speaks of the group's history: 
Those who killed Sandino believed they had killed the revolution.  They 
believed they had killed even the possibility of a revolution. . . 
Nonetheless, history . . . is regulated by laws that operate independently 
of the will of individuals.  So, in this concrete case, those who sought to 
wipe out the memory of the man who became even more than the 
architect of the Nicaraguan people were mistaken once again . . . Hence 
the bullet that killed Sandino did not mark the end but rather the 
prologue to a new principle . . .  
In other words, Sandino is just as powerful, if not more powerful, after death.  The "laws" 
that Borge mentions are, like "destiny," eternal forces that control the situation. 
 The references become more religious than Borge's comment.  Sergio Ramírez 
(Sandino, 1981: 31) recounts that Sandino decided to resist Yankee invasion, "with the 
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desire to sacrifice himself as a future example rather than with pretensions of military 
victory."  In addition to self-sacrifice, Sandino has other Christ-like qualities according to 
his followers.  He is reported by Sandinistas to have made a comment which is very 
similar to one that Christ made to his disciples before death on the cross.  Sandino said, 
"Take courage Nicaraguans!  I will be with you in an hour that is close at hand" 
(Wheelock, 1982: 153).  Fonseca (1981:  272) specifically refers to 1934 as the year of 
Sandino’s “crucifixion.”  Daniel Ortega (1983: 19), while president of Nicaragua, wrote 
that when the United States once again invades Nicaragua, "Then the vigorous figure of 
Augusto César Sandino will rise up" to lead the Nicaraguan people to another victory 
against the invaders. 
 In a prayer written to Sandino, Sandino sits at "the right hand of Father Bolívar," 
the liberator of five Latin American countries in the 1800s (Valdes, 1935: 228).  He is 
also resurrected and lives within "the work of liberation," "the workers of the earth," "the 
immense effort of the Revolutionary Government," "the city workers, mine workers, 
fishermen," "the Popular Sandinista Army," "the National Police," and "the Sandinista 
militias" (Wheelock, 1980: 2). 
 Yet though Sandino has exceptional, even divine, qualities, much of his appeal 
resides in his ordinariness.  Conger (1989) argues that the charismatic leader has a unique 
sensitivity to the constituents’ needs, and that connection is mentioned many times by 
followers (IES, 1986).  The FSLN also identifies Sandino’s connection to ordinary 
people as they speak of him as a worker, a peasant, and a Nicaraguan.  The followings of 
other Nicaraguan leaders who were not perceived as somewhat ordinary and, therefore, 
connected to the people, were smaller and were not as broad-based as that of the 
Sandinistas.  Of course, the contradiction is that the charismatic leader is both 
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extraordinary and ordinary.  Again, Conger (1989:  22) says that the charismatic leader is 
able to articulate an “extraordinary vision rather than ordinary goals,” is able to build 
trust in his/her vision among constituents and then convince followers that they can 
achieve the vision. 
 
 In summary, the Sandinistas speak of Sandino as if he were the only human that 
could understand and represent the Nicaraguan people even today.  In part, he can 
accomplish that task because he is one of them.  They also speak of and to him as if he 
has conquered his own death and continues to lead and watch over them.  There is no 
evidence that Sandinistas truly believe Sandino was physically resurrected, but they seem 
to believe in his spiritual resurrection thus imputing a divine quality to him.  As a 
contemporary Sandinista proclaims, "Sandino yesterday, Sandino today, Sandino 
forever!" (González, 1985: 98).  This quote is strikingly similar to a biblical quote from 
Hebrews 13:8, "Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever!" 
Sandino’s Authority 
 Sandino's authority over followers seems to remain intact after his death even 
though he cannot give direct orders.  Sandinistas often mention that Sandino's thought 
and teaching are the foundation for their involvement in the renewed armed struggle 
against imperialism (Tirado, 1980; Fonseca, 1981; Wheelock, 1982; Fonseca, 1983).  
Borge (1984: 143) says that, in the triumph of the current revolutionary movement, 
Sandino still "plays a decisive role." 
 Contemporary Sandinistas claim to have inherited Sandino's authority.  
Therefore, they invoke his name and authority as one means of driving a revolution.  For 
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example, Daniel Ortega (1985: 203) claims, "A new Sandinista consciousness . . . makes 
us worthy sons of Sandino." According to the Gaceta Sandinista (1978:  21), Silvio 
Mayorga was a son of Sandino who “would be a follower of Sandinista thought and 
would fulfill the sacred duty of fighting for a free Nicaragua.”  Humberto Ortega (1980: 
13) asserts that the Sandinistas neither invented the fundamental aspects of their 
revolution, nor did they derive Sandinismo from theories or books; they retrieve from 
Sandino himself "those fundamental elements that permit us to place ourselves at the 
front of the people and carry the people to freedom . . ." 
 One of the most telling comments by Sandinistas which points to Sandino's 
continuing authority discusses how the FSLN purposefully instills it in the people.  The 
FSLN views it as necessary to its own development to impart Sandino's thought to its 
core members as well as to the masses.  They admit, "In this way, the Sandinista morality 
gained strength among the people, and rescued our national values in order to bring them 
face to face, as a stronger force against imperialism and its instrument of penetration and 
oppression:  the military dictatorship of Somoza" (Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo, 
1982: 81). 
 Perhaps Carlos Fonseca best describes the acceptance of Sandino's authority by 
past and present Sandinistas.  The following previously cited quote by Fonseca (1980: 
65) compares Sandino to Christ and alludes to Sandino’s perceived divinity as well as his 
authority: 
Two thousand years ago there was a redeemer who...said that his 
brothers were those who did the will of he that was in heaven where 
according to him, came justice and truth. 
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That is my brother and my sister, said that redeemer.  BROTHER, 
Augusto César Sandino called to those who accompanied him 
brandishing the warrior's gun in the resistance against the Yankee 
aggressor. 
 
Fonseca continues that the Sandinistas of the 1970s are also obligated to be Sandino's 
"brothers."  Fonseca (1983: 263) makes his point directly by stating, "We obey the 
international rallying cry launched by Augusto César Sandino from the mountains of 
Segovias.” 
 In conclusion, past and present followers and enemies of Sandino recognize that 
Sandino wields extraordinary authority over his followers.  These followers are ready to 
sacrifice a family life for him.  They are ashamed when found to be in disobedience to 
Sandino's authority. Sandino’s disciples still are ready to die under his orders.  “...the 
people of Sandino will fight to the death but full of faith in the victory,” promises El 
Estudiante (1976:  21). 
Commitment to Sandino 
 The emotional commitment to Sandino and his cause seems as strong after his 
death and in contemporary Nicaragua as it was in Sandino's time.  Not long after his 
death, a man writes,  
Edified by your apostolate and martyrdom, I give homage to your 
memory, outlining your outstanding countenance and how it is engraved 
in my spirit, with indelible respectful admiration and containing a brief 
history of the resplendent epic poem of your life.  
(Fabela, 193?: 39) 
These words not only depict overwhelming emotional commitment to a deceased leader, 
but they also demonstrate that the commitment springs from a belief in Sandino's 
exceptional or divine qualities and vice versa. 
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 It appears that the Sandinistas are committed to Sandino and his cause if by no 
other means than by their adoption of his name.  For example, Borge (1984: 143) 
enumerates Sandinista views concerning the relationship between nationalism and 
internationalism and concludes, "All this is summarized for us by the name Augusto 
César Sandino, and the fact that we call ourselves Sandinistas."  Ortega (1979) notes that 
the FSLN continues the revolutionary task begun by the fallen Sandino, and the FSLN 
also believes in Sandino's strategy for revolution.  Wheelock (1980b) agrees that, even 
after so many years have passed, Sandino's method of revolution is extraordinarily 
relevant. 
 The Sandinistas not only have a strong emotional commitment to Sandino today, 
but believe the commitment will remain.  Fonseca (1980) reveals the depth of current 
commitment by writing that young people are willing to prove with their blood that they 
are faithful to Sandino's legacy.  Perhaps Tomás Borge (1982: 139) best captured 
Sandinista sentiments: 
 
Sandino's cause has indeed gone on living, and the Sandinista front did 
no more than take it up again under different material conditions and 
with the guidance of a revolutionary theory.  Sandino's cause defied 
dangers and betrayals and turned the vacillators into pillars of salt.  
Sandino's cause lives and will go on living. 
 
 Therefore, emotional commitment to Sandino and his fight against foreign 
intervention is still meaningful to contemporary Sandinistas as it was to Nicaraguans of 
the 1920s and 1930s.  His followers from then and now profess great loyalty to him and 
offer him words that sound worshipful.  They take his struggle seriously enough to 
continue it decades after his death.  In addition, the Sandinistas during the revolution 
continue to demonstrate their submission to Sandino's authority by expressing their belief 
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in him and by risking their personal safety in order to obey his call to the struggle.  
Finally, Sandino's past and current followers record their thoughts of him as being 
uniquely qualified, either due to his superhuman or divine qualities, to lead Nicaragua 
into freedom from foreign intervention.  He is not simply a great national hero.  For 
Nicaraguans who are Sandino's followers, he is the incarnation of their hopes and dreams 
and cultural values. 
Conditions for Posthumous Charisma 
 After establishing Sandino’s continuing charisma, one must wonder which 
conditions make this phenomenon possible.  The solution can only be inferred through 
the manner in which Sandinistas write about Sandino.  What subjects are important to 
Sandinistas?  There seem to be four prevalent topics of discussion in Sandinista literature 
that may constitute conditions for the rebirth of charisma for a deceased charismatic 
individual: 
 1.  Sandino’s personal success in ousting the Marines. 
 2.  Sandino’s assassination and martyrdom. 
3.  The return of the initial problem - foreign intervention - after Sandino’s    
death. 
 4.  Carlos Fonseca purposely reminded the country of Sandino and his struggle. 
These four conditions seem to combine neatly to provide Sandino with renewed 
charismatic qualities. 
 Of course, Sandinista literature records innumerable accolades to Sandino for his 
success in ridding Nicaragua of the United States occupation forces.  They use the most 
lavish praise for Sandino when describing Sandino’s act of successfully “begin[ning] the 
struggle against intervention, opening the phase of national liberation (Wheelock. 1981:  
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192).  In his book Victorious December, Wheelock (1982:  99) continues to praise 
Sandino’s success as the “heroic rebellion of the General of Free Men...who...for the first 
time in Latin America defeated the power and ability of the Marine infantry of the United 
States of America.”  Sandinistas are in awe when extolling their belief that the United 
States “could not defeat Sandino” (Tunnermann, 1983:  9). 
 The Sandinistas admit that they either hoped to or did emulate Sandino’s success.  
Fonseca (1982:  250) raises “the glorious banner of Sandino” and is driven by the “deep 
anti-imperialist conviction of General Sandino” that expelled the Yankees from 
Nicaragua.  Commander Carrión (1980:  53) tells students that the FSLN has inherited, 
“not by coincidence,” the traditions, ideals, and objectives of Sandino and his army who 
managed to defeat the greatest military power of the time. 
 Such admiration of Sandino’s success is more than common in Sandinista 
literature.  Obviously, the point is extremely important to them noted simply by the 
extensive references to it in their rhetoric and writing.  In order to understand the 
relevance of success to Sandino’s posthumous charisma, consider Zeledón.  Zeledón 
preceded Sandino by only a few years in protesting and fighting the Marine occupation.  
However, Zeledón was killed before his cause gained widespread adherence and, 
certainly, before he had an chance of succeeding.  Consequently, Zeledón is remembered 
by Sandinistas as a hero but  nothing more.  Commander Wheelock (1982: 76) makes the 
point clear: 
...the heroes of 1912...under the command of General Benjamín Zeledón 
made tenacious resistance against the Yankee invade...now it is 
necessary to complete the work of Sandino and the Nicaraguan patriots 
who succeeded in 1933 in expelling the American troops... 
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Zeledón is to be remembered, but Sandino continues to live through the people who 
continue his work.  It is important to this analysis that Wheelock recognizes that Zeledón 
and Sandino had the same goal, yet he says that the Sandinistas must “complete the work 
of Sandino.” 
 Willner (1984) asserts that the person who overcomes overwhelming obstacles is 
likely to be elevated to heroic or charismatic status.  She also mentions that, in addition to 
successfully completing the difficult task, another factor may increase its perceived 
difficulty.  If others, such as Zeledón, have made “previous and unsuccessful attempts...to 
accomplish the task,” then success such as Sandino’s becomes extremely important and 
awe-inspiring.  Willner (1984) continues that the leader who challenges the status quo not 
only opens himself/herself to particular risks but also is usually challenging a system 
stronger than himself/herself.  Heroes are often those who pit themselves against 
overwhelming odds.  As noted previously, Sandinistas identify Sandino as a type of 
David against the Goliath United States. 
 Therefore, it seems to be a fundamental condition for Sandino’s continuing 
charisma that he was successful in driving the Marines out of Nicaragua.  Willner (1984) 
writes that even a defeated charismatic leader may continue to command a following.  
However, it seems important to the Sandinistas, and thus to Sandino’s posthumous 
charisma, that Sandino succeeded.  Even if, in reality, the Marines left for other reasons 
in addition to Sandino’s opposition, as Booth (1985) asserts, it is central to the attribution 
of charisma that the Sandinistas credit the withdrawal of the Marines to the success of 
Sandino’s struggle. 
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 Concerning the second condition, the Sandinistas constantly make reference to 
Sandino’s assassination and martyrdom.  It is of course, also useful to place the blame for 
his murder on the United States and/or Somoza and his National Guard.  For example, on 
the second anniversary of the 1979 Sandinista Revolution, Borge (1982:  134) asked, 
“Who assassinated Sandino and celebrated in an orgy of champagne and blood?” 
 The twenty-first of February - the date of Sandino’s murder - is recognized each 
year in Nicaragua.  Using the date to recall Sandino’s murder provides the Sandinistas 
with a yearly opportunity to focus the attention of their people on Sandino’s sacrifice for 
them.  Sandino’s sacrifice then stands as an example to be imitated in the struggle against 
imperialism.  The Nicaraguans must remember that “the tragedy that fell upon Nicaragua 
due to the crime of February 21 has been prolonged for several decades and even today 
tortures the life of Sandino’s people” (Fonseca, 1980:  71). 
 The murder of Sandino provides an ultimate symbol of decades of suffering for 
the Nicaraguan people.  Fonseca (1980:  71) reiterates many times, “The despicable 
assassination of the Nicaraguan hero is the culmination of twenty-five years of crimes 
committed by the Yankee aggressors and the traitorous oligarchy...”  As a symbol of their 
suffering and of injustice, the manner of Sandino’s death serves as a call to unity among 
Nicaraguans against the perceived source of their suffering.  They keep Sandino alive by 
promising to right the wrong committed against him and them. 
 The assassination of Sandino threw his followers into confusion for a few years, 
thus achieving Somoza’s short term goal of ridding Nicaragua of a troublemaker.  
However, the act also elevated Sandino to the status of martyr, and it is extremely 
difficult to fight against a martyr.  His followers extolled and romanticized Sandino’s 
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good and charismatic qualities more after death than before.  The last verse of a 
Nicaraguan poem written after Sandino’s death illustrates the point: 
You have fallen, last great American chief, but wounded in the back, 
assassinated in a cowardly way in the night shadows, assaulted by the 
same sons of the earth that accompanied the Yankee in search of you 
when, from the mountains you pronounced the Ten Commandments of 
honor to the entire human race (Calero, 1983:  226). 
 
 In spite of Sandino’s success in ousting the Marines, Sandino’s death and the rise 
of the National Guard brought Nicaragua back to the pre-civil war conditions of 
tolerating foreign intervention.  As indication of the third condition, contemporary 
Sandinistas fill pages and books exposing the terrible excesses and cruelty of the Somoza 
regime and the regime’s deference to the will of the United States. 
 While Nicaragua was no longer occupied by US forces, it was still dominated by 
US interests.  Fonseca (1980:  29) laments, “Although Sandino defeats the military 
intervention of Yankee imperialism, it is not possible for him to avoid the continuation of 
economic and political domination.”  On the other hand, Wheelock (1982:  70) takes the 
argument one step further and calls the National Guard a “true army of occupation.”  
Borge (1984: 155) adds to the argument that not only was the National Guard a new army 
of occupation, but the United States purposely “looked for and found the formula which 
would assure continued domination over Nicaragua.”  The formula was, of course, the 
National Guard. 
 Because conditions of foreign intervention returned or continued, the struggle 
had to continue in spite of Sandino’s death.  Therefore, it was useful to keep Sandino’s 
memory alive through the FSLN.  Sandino’s death became martyrdom and was 
transformed by the Sandinistas into a beginning rather than an end.  According to Borge 
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(1984:  52) “...the shots that killed Sandino were not an end but prologue to a new 
beginning, to a leap that begins with a calling to persistence, to found the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front.”  Consequently, the FSLN is fulfilling its duty to Sandino of 
“denouncing before the Nicaraguan people and the world the shameful situation and the 
abuses suffered by Nicaraguans at this moment” (Wheelock, 1982:  87). 
 Even before Sandino’s murder but after the signing of the peace treaties, 
Sandinistas were less than optimistic about the abilities of the US and the national 
oligarchy to allow Nicaragua its sovereignty.  General Estrada (1983:  171) warned, 
“...one day...we will have to return to the fight...”  Apparently, Estrada knew the future 
that Ramírez lived.  Ramírez (1985: 332) addresses an audience saying:   
But Sandino is very much a part of the contemporary scene.  His actions 
were not separate from the historical circumstances in which he lived; 
they were the direct result of a contradiction, a confrontation between 
Nicaragua and imperialism.  And since this contradiction has not 
disappeared, the man and his deeds live on. 
 
 Given Weber’s statement that charismatic leaders arrive in times of distress, it is 
understandable that regression to imperialistic times in Nicaragua provided the stage for a 
charismatic actor.  Interestingly, it was a dead charismatic leader who filled at least some 
of the void.  Lenin filled a similar vacuum.  Tumarkin (1983: 267) notes that “the cult of 
Lenin developed during a desperately confused period in early Soviet history.”  She 
continues that by following a deceased leader, the followers need not suffer Lenin’s 
abuse of power.  The cult is also useful to the government as a means of legitimizing 
Soviet policy and glorifying the nation while distracting notice of defect in the Soviet 
system. 
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 Although she is speaking of living leaders, Willner (1984) agrees that charismatic 
leadership promotes the growth of a nation and national unity.  The leader provides a 
tangible embodiment of the abstract and remote entity known as the state.  Therefore, the 
imputation of charisma to a deceased Sandino in the face of renewed foreign intervention 
serves to unify the Nicaraguan people in the name of a man who they view as caring 
enough for them to die for them.  Contrary to Willner’s statement, Sandino cannot 
provide the tangible embodiment of the Nicaraguan state or even the revolution.  
However, he does provide all his charismatic qualities, his well-known sacrifice, and 
most importantly, his cause which is to relieve Nicaragua of the source of its distress.  
Lastly, he provides a faithful disciple, Carlos Fonseca, who can become the embodiment 
of Sandino and his revolution. 
 Constituting the fourth condition, Carlos Fonseca Amador was responsible for 
rescuing the ideas of Sandino from obscurity.51  Sandinistas admit that Sandino’s cause 
was devastated by his murder.  They often cite the assassination of Somoza García as 
“the resumption of Sandino’s struggle” (Wheelock, 1980:  58).  However, in a country 
without “direction, nor organization, nor revolutionary conscience,” the oligarchy and the 
US exercised hegemony over political activity in Nicaragua.  Fortunately, “in that 
moment Carlos Fonseca appeared” (Borge, 1984:  19). 
 Apparently, Fonseca was inspired by the example set by Fidel Castro and the 
Cuban revolution against oligarchy and foreign intervention.  Fonseca envisioned a 
similar revolution in Nicaragua but tailored to Nicaraguan needs and culture.  Thus,  
                                                 
51 For a more thorough study of Carlos Fonseca, see Matilde Zimmerman, 2000. 
 328
Fonseca dedicated himself to the recovery of Sandino’s thought.  In the 1960s, Foneca’s 
goal was not only to rescue Sandino’s political and revolutionary legacy, but to start a 
new revolutionary movement based on Sandino’s ideas.  Wheelock (1983) adds that 
Fonseca was obsessed by his work of continuing Sandino’s struggle through the FSLN. 
 Borge (nd) also reminds the reader that Fonseca was not the only founder of the 
FSLN.  A group of men studied Sandino’s thought and analyzed it.  However, he still 
credits Fonseca with being the force behind the recovery and for making Sandino’s 
doctrine relevant to contemporary Nicaragua.  “I believe, and I am absolutely 
convinced...that by converting Sandinismo into the doctrine of the Frente, Carlos found 
the key and the originality of the Nicaraguan revolution,” writes Borge (nd:  125).   
 Hodges (1986) points out that Fonseca used only those portions of Sandino’s 
thought useful to providing an ideology for a new revolutionary movement.  It seems that 
Fonseca neglected Sandino’s more bizarre ideas.  However, ignoring unattractive aspects 
of the charismatic leader is typical of followers.  Hodges does admit that the Institute for 
the Study of Sandinismo (created after the FSLN’s 1979 victory) has been making public 
a more realistic image of Sandino.  Nevertheless, Sandinismo is still the driving force 
behind the Nicaraguan evolution, and “Sandino’s patriotic ideas and example prevail in 
matters of ideology” (Hodges, 1986:  196). 
 A logical question at this point would concern the possibility of Fonseca being 
charismatic.  While this study does not systematically analyze those data, the matter of 
Fonseca’s charisma seems questionable.  While he receives extraordinary credit and even 
praise from Sandinistas, the more personal and emotional aspects of the charismatic  
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relationship do not seem to be present.  Sandinistas call Fonseca a great leader and 
extremely intelligent but do not speak of personal loyalty to him or of having a unique 
relationship with him.  However, whether he was or was not charismatic, what affects 
Sandino’s posthumous charisma is the fact that someone - in this case Fonseca - retrieved 
Sandino’s name and thought from oblivion and helped to recreate its charismatic 
qualities. 
 On the other hand, perhaps Fonseca was charismatic and derived some of his 
charisma from Sandino’s charisma.  Willner (1984:  63) believes that the charismatic 
leader “is seen as the contemporary personification of one or more of the pantheon of 
dominant culture heroes and in turn, he becomes a culture hero.”  It must also be 
remembered that Sandino’s charisma did remain among his followers - as demonstrated 
in the many poems, songs, letters, and books of the 1930s - for a few years immediately 
after his death and before his name became a whisper. In any case, it was necessary that a 
living person present Sandino’s ideas in order to initiate the new revolution. 
 Regardless of who derived charisma from whom, Fonseca was instrumental in 
using Sandino’s thought as a catalyst for the FSLN movement.  Fonseca’s political and 
organizational skills provided the hands and feet for Sandino’s charisma and its revival.  
Tumarkin (1983:  258) notes that “the revived cult Lenin took shape speedily and with 
careful orchestration.”  This orchestration was the result of what Cobb and Elder (1972:  
79) call “the manipulation of symbols” as a means of rationalizing some action.  
Fonseca’s revival of Sandino’s doctrine gave legitimacy to his efforts to instigate 
revolution against the Somoza regime.  The symbol of Sandino not only legitimizes the 
Sandinista cause but also demonstrates “the ineptness of a major power” (Kearl & 
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Rinaldi, 1983:  695).  In other words, Sandino’s success in 1933 became highly relevant 
in the 1960s and 1970s as it provided hope for toppling the Somoza regime, and hope is 
essential to gathering support for a revolution.  Fonseca skillfully used Sandino to instill 
hope in the weary Nicaraguan people.  For as Anderson (1982:  226) says: 
It is the function of political authority...to give hope.  Hope binds society 
together by the promise of a continuous future and the memory of a 
common past, allays fears of the unknown by providing connecting links 






 I have argued that the past plays a central role in the creation, maintenance, and 
success of social movements.  In fact, all social movements will reconstruct the past in 
such a way that it is a past counter to the official past proffered by the dominant group.  
A reconstruction of charisma may be one element of the process of reconstructing the 
past as social movement participants may attribute charisma to an historic individual as 
part of their reconstruction of the past.  In addition to a possible reconstruction of a 
charismatic movement leader, there are other pieces of the past to be reconstructed:  
historical enemies of the movement, each participant’s autobiographical account of 
becoming a part of the movement, and structural conditions affecting the creation of the 
movement.  Limitation of time and space leaves these questions for future study. 
 I have used the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement as a case study to focus 
upon the theoretical issue of the reconstruction of the past.  In addition, I have provided 
the various constructions of history in generally narrative form with only brief analysis so 
that each “speaker’s” story can unfold as they told it in various writings.  My conclusions 
regarding the role of the past in social movements and the phenomenon of posthumous 
charisma are based upon Sandinista descriptions of the importance of Augusto César 
Sandino to the revolution won by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional in 1979.  
Drawing inference from the writing of Sandino’s followers of the 1960s and 1970s, it 
seems that these followers impute charisma to the man after his death similarly to the 
imputation of charisma while he was alive.  These imputations of charisma to a deceased 
man are part of a larger past reconstructed to provide meaning to the current revolution 
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and, thus, to aid in solving the current problem of political, economic, and social 
oppression in Nicaragua. 
 Generally, sociologists do not address time and history as social phenomena.  As 
a consequence, there is a theoretical gap to be filled in social movement literature.  
George Herbert Mead’s theory of time accommodates this need.  In short, Mead states 
that as problematic situations arise, individuals and collectivities reconstruct a history for 
those situations in order to make sense of them and to solve them.  The problematic 
situation for Nicaraguans was the repressive Somoza regime, the extreme poverty of most 
of the population, and the domination of virtually all aspects of Nicaraguan life by the 
United States.  Consequently, Carlos Fonseca looked to a past which included Sandino 
and founded the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional as a remedy for Nicaragua’s 
problems. 
 Social movements theorists have largely failed to explain or to even consider 
cases such as the rescue of Sandino from near historical oblivion.  Movement theories 
might address Sandino as a symbol, a resource or as part of a narrative.  Yet, scholars 
argue that it is necessary for scholars to place the movement in its historical context.  
Such an understanding is unquestionably important for the researcher.  However, they 
neglect to consider how movement participants define themselves and their movement 
historically.  Furthermore, social movement scholars do not investigate how movement 
participants present what they understand their past to be. 
The Theory of the Counterpast & the FSLN 
 Reconstruction of the past among social movement participants makes historical 
sense of their grievance and of their collective response to it.  The counterpast is a history 
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constructed by social movement participants that explains and elaborates the history of 
the grievance and that opposes the official, consensual past supported by the dominant 
group.  While at first glance this phenomenon may seem like framing, it is not in that the 
construction of a frame, as presented by the theorists, is ahistorical.  As Polletta (1998) 
argues, frame analysis does not allow a movement to develop and reshape its story over 
time.  This study argues that neither does it allow movement participants to understand 
their situation in historical terms and to then build a counterpast.  On the other hand, the 
inclusion of narrative as a focus of social movement theory is welcome and overdue but 
still is limited in that it is more concerned with stories that largely focus on a movement’s 
own activities and may or may not be based in some sort of evidence.  Lastly, framing 
does not recognize that an emergent event, or several emergent events combined, will set 
this reconstruction of the past in motion.  In summary, framing and narrative are included 
within the reconstruction of the past. 
 In the case of the Sandinistas, they clearly identify their grievance as the 
unacceptable hegemony of the United States over Nicaragua.  A feature of that hegemony 
is US support for the repressive Somoza regime.  This abhorrent situation results in a host 
of social problems such as poverty, illiteracy and disease.  It also translates into a great 
lack of popular participation in Nicaraguan politics and the eternal cycle of Conservative 
and Liberal elites ousting each other from power with no improvement of the situation of 
average Nicaraguans.  The Sandinistas perceive this grievance to be the same grievance 
verbalized by Sandino in 1927.  Based on Sandino’s heroic and successful resistance, the 
FSLN proposes itself as Sandino’s legacy to eliminate US hegemony and Somoza as 
North America’s agent in maintaining domination. 
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 Chapter Seven also discusses how the movement’s reconstruction provides 
clarity for the movement, as mentioned above, but also a sense of continuity and order, 
ideology and a projected future.   Of course, each movement needs a clear message, even 
if it is a bit complicated.  A counterpast is a clear message of why the movement exists 
and how it came to be.  The movement obtains a sense of connectedness to the past 
thereby providing it with continuity.  A counterpast brings a sense of order as the 
movement participants view one thing as leading to another in such a way that they are 
ultimately linked in a rather linear chain and looking toward adding another link.  That 
link is a future projected by the movement.  However, the projection of the future is 
likely to be the possibility of two or more futures.  There is the future in which the 
movement is triumphant and the one in which the current grievance or distress continues.  
Polletta (1998) argues that such ambiguity actually appeals to participants as they wish to 
discover how the problem is resolved and/or perhaps participate in that resolution. 
 The Sandinistas reconstructed a history that included four basic components.  
First, Nicaragua had suffered a long history of foreign intervention, domination and 
oppression.  These problems began with the Spanish but were most vigorously exercised 
by the United States beginning in the 1850s.  Second, there have always been heroic 
Nicaraguans who have resisted foreign domination, even sacrificing their lives in many 
cases.  The most stunning case of resistance and success was General Augusto César 
Sandino and his Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua.  Third, the 
United States withdrew from military occupation of Nicaragua but left in its place a 
surrogate occupation force in the form of the National Guard under its repressive chief, 
Anastasio Somoza García.  Therefore, Somoza was the puppet of the US although he was 
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cruel and ruthless in his own right.  Fourth, Nicaraguan resistance has only succeeded to 
a limited degree, but Sandino’s example and guidance will be followed by the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberación Nacional to total victory. 
 Reconstruction of the past by social movement participants is useful for them.  A 
reconstructed and consensual past provides the movement with historical foundation, 
purpose, and hope. The Sandinistas latched onto the person of Sandino as one who was 
fighting such threats just as the FSLN was fighting them.  While admitting historical 
differences, the Sandinistas characterized their struggle as an extension of Sandino’s 
struggle.  For example, the FSLN viewed itself as facing the same overwhelming odds 
faced by Sandino.  They also viewed themselves as sharing purpose with Sandino.  The 
purpose of each struggle was to return Nicaragua to Nicaraguans.  Therefore, using 
Sandino as an example, the Sandinistas could understand and present themselves as 
patriotic Nicaraguans who represented the historical continuation of Sandino’s 
unflagging resolve on this issue.  A past which included such stubborn determination 
brings a message of hope to those who participate directly in the movement and to 
movement sympathizers.  The message is that determination and the consequent sacrifice 
can only bring victory. 
 Movements construct a past that stands in opposition to the official history of the 
dominant group with which the movement is concerned.  While Mead’s contribution to 
understanding the processes of reconstructing the past, as briefly discussed above, is 
enormously helpful in understanding the Sandinista Revolution specifically and social 
movements generally, it  does not address power as it relates to the reconstruction of 
history.   As Touraine argues, the movement struggles over the control of socio-cultural 
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patterns.  Clearly recognizing this point, Sandinista Ricardo Morales Avilés (1981) 
argues that intellectuals produce culture that pleases the bourgeoisie and serves the 
bourgeoisie’s domination.  Chapter Six demonstrates how Somoza constructed a history 
that legitimized his position and how he and other elites were able to maintain that 
construction.  On the other hand, just like workers and peasants, he says, intellectuals are 
unprotected from the Somoza regime’s power.  Morales (1981:  101) then argues that 
“the struggle for culture cannot be above the revolutionary struggle, not even parallel, it 
is an integrated part of it, it is one of the fronts of the revolutionary struggle.”  When 
Fonseca, Borge, and Mayorga begin their struggle as Sandinistas, they begin not only a 
struggle for political and economic power but also for the history and culture of the 
country.  Somoza’s suppression of all things Sandino has in many ways only served to 
enhance Sandino’s status as a cultural symbol of nationalism and anti-imperialism. 
 In the struggle over socio-cultural patterns, there must be, at least, two 
contenders.  In this study the principal contenders have been Somoza government, 
supported by the United States, and the FSLN, a revolutionary social movement.  More 
specifically to this study, the particular pattern under contention is the production of 
history.  The official production of Nicaraguan history is, of course, key to the perceived 
need to reconstruct history.  Beginning with Somoza García, official history was 
produced by first wresting power from President Sacasa in 1936.  Soon after, Somoza 
could publish his account of Sandino’s war and could construct Sandino’s image in such 
a way that Sandino was a bloodthirsty bandit while Somoza himself had saved the 
country by eliminating the bandit, bringing peace and properly governing Nicaragua.   
Then Somoza was able to historically eliminate Sandino - or so he thought. 
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 The production of knowledge, which includes official constructions of history, 
occurs within organizations.  The Somozas had the governmental organizations of the 
nation-state at their disposal to construct a past that legitimated their domination.  In the 
beginning of Somoza García’s rise to power, the National Guard was instrumental in 
producing knowledge about Sandino and his followers.  Later, he used media and 
educational organizations to produce history.  The US marines, the US State Department 
and US media organizations also produced knowledge about the General and his army.  
The power and resources commanded by these organizations give them the advantage of 
being able to present this knowledge as truth.  To dispute this truth is to confront very 
powerful entities. 
 Somoza was able to disseminate his official history through media and education 
since he largely controlled both.  The regime could control operation and content of 
media through direct ownership, regulation and censorship.  It was also to Somoza’s 
advantage that a large percentage of the population was illiterate and, therefore, could not 
read opposition press like Pedro Joaquín Chamorro’s La Prensa.  Similarly, Somoza was 
able to control education by personally editing proposed textbooks, selecting official 
histories of Nicaragua and controlling school funding.   Morales (1981:  95) notes, “...the 
dominant class prescribes education according to its interests and its educational and 
social ideals.”  Morales (1981) continues that since in Nicaragua the dominant class is 
centered in agricultural export, education contributes to making better agricultural 
workers, which does not require significant literacy skills nor critical thinking skills.  
Therefore, according to Morales (1981:  98), this economic domination becomes political 
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domination “through the oligarchy headed by Somocismo, and a deformation of national 
life and a backwardness of culture.”   
 Through controlling the production of history, the dominant group, the Somoza 
regime, manages ideological socialization.  This socialization legitimates the existing 
socio-cultural patterns and the dominant group’s place in it.  Therefore, the Somozas’ 
control of the state and its agencies, the media and the schools provides this one family 
with enormous power to shape Nicaraguans’ perceptions of their class and political 
stratification systems as understandable if not desirable.  By maintaining a largely poor 
and illiterate population, threat to this system is reduced as those groups lack various 
resources to mount significant resistance.  Apparently, exposure to Marxist ideas and 
Sandino’s struggle convinced a group of university students that this ideological 
socialization had to be eradicated and replaced. 
 The social movement participants will construct a counterpast, articulate it, and 
present it to their members and others as the true history. This construction implies 
negation of the official history and justification of the Sandinistas’ account of the 
counterpast.  When Fonseca and his co-founders of the FSLN began to study Sandino in 
the 1950s, thus began the reconstruction of Nicaraguan history and the historical figure of 
Sandino.  What Somoza explained as beneficial and necessary to Nicaragua’s welfare, the 
FSLN explained as oppressive.  Conservatives were not successful in changing the 
system because, in part, they did not fundamentally disagree with Nicaraguan official 
history and did not construct a counterpast.  US imperialism and domination and 
Somoza’s role in that domination were unacceptable to the Sandinistas.  Countless times 
in Sandinista writings, the United States and the Somozas are denounced.  The National 
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Guard is commonly called an army of occupation substituting for the US military.  
According to the Sandinistas, the true story is that Somoza’s friendly relationship with 
the US does not benefit Nicaragua, but actually harms Nicaragua and has for over one 
hundred years.  Furthermore, the FSLN believes that they are clearly the historical 
answer to this historical problem. 
 Obviously, a movement’s ability to reconstruct history and then to disseminate it 
is mediated by its access to data regarding a possible counterpast and to communications 
technology.  Through historical research, study circles, word-of-mouth testimony, seizure 
of radio stations, propaganda and graffiti, the Sandinistas were able to disseminate their 
reconstruction of the history of US domination and their resistance to it as Sandino’s 
heirs. In fact, given the great degree of control exercised by the Somoza regime over 
media and education, the Sandinistas did a more than remarkable job of widely 
presenting their counterpast. Many movements are not likely to withstand the dominant 
group’s response to the counterpast.  On the other hand, Somoza’s use of repression 
probably made the Sandinistas an appealing alternative to many.  Nevertheless, the FSLN 
was not simply an alternative to Somoza, they did turn much of the population to view 
Sandino as, at least, a national hero.  At most, many Sandinistas treat him as charismatic.  
So, in this case, the Sandinista counterpast, their reconstruction of history, includes 
attributing posthumous charisma to a reconstructed figure.  In fact, the concept of 
posthumous charisma is not only a possible feature of the reconstruction of the past, but it 
cannot exist without Mead’s theory of time. 
 While the reconstruction of a particular past may be of use to a particular social 
movement, evidence will support that past, according to Mead’s conception.  In other 
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words, the Sandinista past cannot be reduced to a creation, a myth, or a lie.  Certainly, 
they have their own subjective understanding of the past, and/or the evidence may be 
faulty.  Certainly, they have a specific need or emergent event with which to cope.  
Certainly, they will select some data and reject other data in reconstructing their past.  
Nevertheless, the FSLN, through the leadership of Fonseca, presents a history of 
Nicaragua and Sandino based upon documentation.  The documents on which Fonseca’s 
version of Sandino were based were produced by Sandino’s friends, enemies, and third 
parties such as journalists.  Maines, Sugrue and Katovich argue that social movements are 
particularly fond of creating mythical pasts in order to gain a power advantage.  They 
contend that “the mythical past does not have a material or objective basis, but it has a 
material and objective...” (Maines, et al, 1983: 168).  They make particular reference to 
revolutionary groups or groups founded by charismatic leaders.  This contention runs 
counter to Mead’s argument and is definitely not the case for the Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional. 
 Just as the Sandinistas reconstruct a past in response to an emergent event, 
Somoza responds to problematic situations by spreading his present backward.  However, 
the two pasts are quite different.  They differ not only in content but as elements of 
power.  While Somoza was in power, his reconstructed past was the official history of 
Nicaragua presented to Nicaraguan school children and the international news media.  In 
the official past, Sandino was a bandit and a butcher.  Among the populace, Sandino’s 
name was a whisper.  The stark contrast between Somoza’s Sandino and the FSLN’s 
Sandino places the issue of reconstructing a past in bold relief.  Mead’s theory answers 
the question of how and why the two pasts can be so different when they are at least 
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partially based on the same evidence.  The theory also implies that neither the official 
past nor the contending past is objectively correct or incorrect. 
Posthumous Charisma 
 The Sandinistas did not simply discover a man named Sandino.  They 
reconstructed a past around their revolution and made Sandino the focus of that past.  
Furthermore, they speak of Sandino in terms similar to the manner in which his 
contemporaries spoke of him.  In other words, FSLN members verbally treat Sandino as 
if he were alive (but never claim that he is physically alive) and as if he were still 
charismatic.  According to Weber, the charismatic leader is a person believed to possess 
supernatural or exceptional qualities and who answers a call to relieve widespread 
distress.  The reconstruction of an exceptional Sandino did respond to the distress of 
Nicaraguans. 
 An element of charisma not fully addressed in this discussion is the reciprocal 
relationship between the personal qualities of the charismatic person and the attributions 
made to him/her by followers.  Conger (1989) identifies qualities that exist in and/or are 
attributed to charismatic individuals.  The charismatic leader has a unique sensitivity to 
follower’s needs, is able to articulate “an extraordinary vision rather than ordinary goals,” 
is able to build trust in his/her vision among followers and then convince followers that 
they can achieve the vision.  In short, followers, based upon some sort of evidence, 
perceive the charismatic leader to be someone quite different from themselves in a very 
positive way and, therefore, superior to themselves in that s/he has the ability to lead 
them out of the distress.  Members of the Army for the Defense of the National 
 342
Sovereignty of Nicaragua as well as the Sandinista National Liberation Front speak of 
Sandino in just that way. 
 Although the contemporary Sandinistas refer to Sandino and attribute charisma 
as if he were alive, he is not.  Therefore, there is a qualitative difference between 
charisma and posthumous charisma.  Obviously, Carlos Fonseca, Tomás Borge, 
Humberto Ortega, Sergio Ramírez, Jaime Wheelock, and others had no personal exposure 
to or personal relationship with Augusto César Sandino.  Under these circumstances, the 
relationship of charismatic leader to followers is distinct.  The followers’ knowledge is 
based upon the testimony of intermediaries.  For example, Fonseca depended on the 
works of Somoza García, Salvatierra, Beals and other writers to provide him with a 
profile of the charismatic Sandino.  Similarly, many people depended upon Fonseca to 
reconstruct Sandino.  However, the relationship between contemporary Sandinistas and 
Sandino generally adheres to the indicators outlined by Weber and others.  Posthumous 
charisma is a variation of charisma as traditionally understood. 
 The attribution of charisma to a deceased Sandino by living followers proved to 
be very useful to a revolutionary movement battling overwhelming odds.  However, I am 
not suggesting that the revolution would have failed without Sandino’s posthumous 
charisma.  Neither does Weber suggest that movements fail for lack of a charismatic 
leader.  The indication is that movements often benefit greatly from charismatic 
leadership.  While I do not argue that Sandino’s charisma totally determined the 
revolution’s outcome, I do contend that reconstruction of the past (which subsumes 
posthumous charisma) is vital to any success achieved by social movements. 
 343
Research Program 
 Because there is a serious lack of attention by sociologists to the concept of time 
(especially in the area of social movements), there are numerous opportunities for further 
research.  Comparative studies are necessary to determine the generalizability of how the 
past is reconstructed by movement participants and, in particular, of the reconstruction of 
past charisma.  In the case of Nicaragua, many questions remain unanswered simply 
because they are outside the scope of my discussion. 
 Within the construction of a counterpast, negation will occur, and this study has 
not examined the process of negation that occurs within the reconstruction of a 
counterpast.  Clearly, in constructing a counterpast, the movement participants will enter 
into a negation process.  In the case of the Sandinistas, they negate US hegemony as well 
as the Somoza regime.  The Sandinistas’ reconstruction of the US role in Nicaragua 
stands in opposition to the reconstruction of General Augusto César Sandino as premier 
anti-imperialist and leader of their revolution.  The negation of the first and devotion to 
the other creates a helpful dichotomy for the movement and deserves much study.52 
 I have not only discussed the possibility of posthumous imputation of charisma, 
but also attempted to identify basic conditions for its imputation.  Analysis of Sandinista 
documents yielded four overriding topics of discussion which constitute these conditions.  
First, Sandinistas devote much attention to Sandino’s personal success in expelling the 
marine occupation force.  Second, Sandino’s assassination and martyrdom are 
significantly frequent topics.  Third, the return of foreign intervention after Sandino’s 
                                                 
52 For insightful discussion of negation and counter-system analysis, see Sjoberg, et al, 2003. 
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death is much discussed in Sandinista literature.  Fourth, Sandinistas credit Carlos 
Fonseca with reminding the country of Sandino and his cause. 
 The question remains concerning the generalizability of the conditions for the 
attribution of posthumous charisma.  Such generalizations are always risky when drawn 
from a specific case.  Charismatic authority is rather rare, and posthumous is surely even 
more rare.  Therefore, instead of claiming universal application, it would be prudent to 
suggest that similar phenomena be studied comparatively.  Several contemporary social 
movements in Latin America are built upon the ideas of deceased leaders.  The Martí 
National Liberation Front that fought in El Salvador follows the ideas of deceased leader 
Farabundo Martí (Montgomery, 1982).  Numerous peasant movements in Mexico have 
followed deceased leader of the 1910 Mexican revolution Emiliano Zapata (Bartra, 
1985).  In Chile, there was a counterrevolutionary movement involving followers of 
deceased Chilean president Salvador Allende (Chavkin, 1982).  Juan and Evita Perón, 
deceased leaders of Argentina, still have a substantial following in that nation.   
 Comparative study of the aforementioned movements and others would be useful 
in answering the question of the generalizability of posthumous charisma and its four 
conditions.  Willner (1984) suggests that it may be that charisma only arises in societies 
that sanction it through their culture.  Further study might include the possible links 
between attribution of posthumous charisma and cultural phenomena like religion.  For 
example, Roman Catholicism and the veneration of saints may influence the attribution 
of charisma to a deceased person in Latin America.  It would also be interesting to 
investigate the effects of language on the process.  For instance, Spanish can easily 
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accommodate the transition of “Sandino” to “Sandinista,” but English does not have that 
capability or, at least, is not often used in that way. 
 The particular case of the reconstruction of the past by the FSLN needs more 
attention than I was able to give.  Specifically, a study of what has happened to Sandino’s 
charisma since the revolution was successful and underwent a process of 
institutionalization would be helpful.  According to Weber, charisma wanes with 
institutionalization and rationalization.  An answer to this question requires a thorough 
review of Sandinista literature written from 1979 to the present.  Breaking those years 
into two time periods would also be useful since the Sandinistas were voted out of power 
in 1990.  Therefore, not only is there a question about Sandino’s role in the revolution 
after 1979, but there is also a question of how has the Sandinistas’ peaceful opposition 
status affected Sandino’s charisma. 
 A parallel research program involves a study of Fonseca.  This study has only 
lightly addressed the meaning of Carlos Fonseca to the Nicaraguan revolution.  
Sandinistas often name him with Sandino as a leader of the revolution.  In her discussion 
of Castro as a charismatic leader, Willner (1984) mentions that he was able to invoke the 
figure of José Martí and use Martí as a metaphor.  Certainly, Sandino is metaphor for 
Nicaraguan resistance and victory over the Yankees.  Yet why Fonseca was the person to 
bring Sandino out of the darkness, whether or not Sandino was charismatic while living, 
and how other Sandinistas viewed Fonseca after death are questions the answers to which 
will provide more information about the reconstruction of the past in this revolutionary 
movement.  Additionally, it would be useful to study what has happened to the memory 
of Fonseca since the revolution’s victory in 1979. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 In closing, it is evident that the past has played a critical role in the Sandinista 
revolution of 1979.  The historic figure of Augusto César Sandino has occupied a 
particularly important place in that past.  For Sandinistas, the charisma has outlived the 
man.  He promised that it would.  Borge (1982:  128) writes: 
[July 1969 and July 1979] fulfill the promise that Sandino made when he 
said, ‘I swear before our homeland and before history that my sword will 
defend the national honor and that it will mean victory for the 
oppressed.’ 
 
In July 1961, the sword of Sandino was unsheathed, and in July 1979 the 
promise of victory for the oppressed was kept. 
 
Even Somoza Debayle (1980:  93) recognizes Sandino’s posthumous charisma by saying, 
“The plague of the Sandinistas and the ghost of Sandino have already fallen upon 
[Nicaragua and] those Central American Republics.” 
 Years after achieving victory, the Sandinistas still present the reconstructed 
Sandino in meaningful ways.  For example, the successful nationwide literacy campaign 
implemented by the Sandinistas began with Sandino.  According to Marin (1984:  9): 
Sandino is revolution.  These were the first three words that more than 
four hundred thousand Nicaraguan peasants and workers learned to spell 
and write...during the great literacy crusade of 1980. 
The brief phrase was selected not only because it contains the five 
vowels of the alphabet but fundamentally because it synthesizes the long 
struggle of the people for their liberty.  Augusto César Sandino is the 
Nicaragua’s national hero and to evoke him is to refer to the past, the 
present and also the future of the popular revolution. 
 
 This example may not be surprising because the Sandinistas had won, had power, 
ran the literacy campaign, and it was so soon after their victory.  Yet, now that the 
Sandinistas are twenty-seven years from their 1979 victory and have been out of power 
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for fifteen years, they still invoke Sandino.  In 2004 the FSLN was denied even a single 
seat on the new directorate of the Nicaraguan Assembly.  There was a belief that the 
FSLN was shut out resulting from a deal that had been struck between members of the 
Assembly and the US ambassador.  FSLN General Secretary Daniel Ortega likened the 
agreement that shut out the FSLN to the Tipitapa agreement between Moncada and 
Stimson that gave the Yankees what they wanted.  FSLN deputy General Secretary 
Tomás Borge then “distributed tiny US flags along with the invitation to the new 
directorate to use them instead of the Nicaraguan flag itself” 




METHODOLOGICAL ESSAY:  Finding Nicaragua’s Past 
 
 
 In order to begin to understand the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement of the 
1960s and 1970s, one must appreciate the interplay of past and present as an integral part 
of social movements.  Specifically, it is important to discover how participants in a social 
movement shape the past in light of the present reality and then how this past affects the 
contemporary movement.  This question is particularly relevant regarding the efforts of 
Carlos Fonseca Amador and the contemporary Sandinistas to reach into Nicaragua’s 
history and bring Augusto César Sandino from the 1930s to the 1960s.  Fonseca’s aim 
was to use Sandino’s thought as a nationalist ideological foundation for revolution-
building.  However, it seems that Fonseca’s goal was not simply to present Sandino as a 
past national hero and successful revolutionary.  His task was also to shape the past 
according to present reality by “reworking Sandino’s thought so that it might become the 
national vehicle, the carrier of Marxism-Leninism in Nicaragua”  (Hodges, 1986:  163).  
The importance of the rescue and presentation of Sandino’s thought from history and 
obscurity cannot be underestimated as vital ingredients of the Nicarguan revolution. 
 The research question posed in this study is how did the contemporary 
Sandinistas - chiefly Carlos Fonseca - reconstruct Nicaragua’s past and present a 
deceased and relatively forgotten Augusto César Sandino to Nicaraguans in order to help 
drive a revolution?  The theoretical and empirical issues focus then on the idea that 
Fonseca and others spread backward their present of dissatisfaction with the social, 
political, and economic conditions in Nicaragua.  The result was Fonseca’s identification 
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of Sandino as the national ideological father of the contemporary Nicaraguan struggle.  
Additionally, this study investigates how Fonseca’s reconstruction compares to other 
impressions about Sandino. 
 The methodological questions which arise from such a research project are 
legion.  To complicate matters further, there are methodological questions to be raised on 
at least two levels.  Due to the nature of the research problem, we can ask the same 
methodological questions of both the social scientist’s and of Fonseca’s work.  Just a few 
of the many methodological issues are discussed here. 
Level of Analysis 
 A broad array of theories explaining various facets of social movements and 
numerous studies of movements focus on macro levels of analysis.  A study of the 
reconstruction of the past among social movement participants requires a micro level of 
analysis.  In Mead’s world, it is necessary to view the world from the actor’s perspective 
in order to understand the actor’s behavior.  Therefore, this study of Sandino and the 
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional seeks to understand the thinking and claims of 
General Sandino and those who presented him to a variety of publics.  Of course, the 
study found that the presentation of Sandino and the reconstruction of Nicaragua’s 
history varied across actors as their interpretations of their presents varied. 
 In order to study how social movement participants define and present a history 
counter to the official one, the researcher must understand the official history and the 
process of movement participants’ construction of a counterpast.  The participants must 
define their situation and their own interests.  Thus far in social movement theory, frame 
analysis offers the most developed opportunity to allow actors to define their situation 
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and interests as much social movement theory addresses the movement at the structural 
level. When using structural analysis, it is the social scientist who places the movement 
and its participants into history without regard to how movement participants view the 
past.  “In application, structuralist theory nevertheless becomes the omniscient writer-
theorist with his or her notions about group and class interests of the historic actors and 
what decisions and choices they had inevitably to make...” argues Oberschall (1993:  36).  
He continues, “Structural analysis forces a rigid determinism on historic events, whereas 
methodological individualism confronts the issue of human agency head-on” (Oberschall, 
1993: 36).  There are currently innumerable structural analyses of the Sandinista 
Revolution. 
 A similar issue arises with regard to the question of relying on subjective 
meaning created by individuals rather than structural analysis.  Kurzman (1997) argues 
that such methodology calls into question the researcher’s place as observer.  In addition, 
“if perceptions can outweigh structures, then protest may not be predictable...” (Kurzman, 
1997: 76).    Placing the observer status of the social scientist and the chance to establish 
predictability in jeopardy is a risk that this study takes in order to understand the 
constructions of Nicaraguan history by the various actors. 
 This study has relied on the actor’s perspective as it is crucial to understanding 
the reconstruction of history and a counterpast by the Sandinistas.  To that end, data 
presented to understand the histories constructed by Sandino and his followers, the 
United States, and the Somozas have been presented in a somewhat narrative form with 
light analysis along the way and more analysis at the ends of chapters and at the end of 
the work.  In that way, the producers of the data are allowed to present their definitions of 
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the situation in a more raw form than if the data had been presented to provide examples 
of the analysis.  By presenting the data in this manner, the narratives are data in 
themselves setting the scene for analysis at the end.  This type of analysis is not possible 
from a structural view.  Certainly, sociological analysis is the point of this exercise, but it 
has been a mere thread throughout their historical constructions until all four stories have 
been presented.  Then, more in-depth analysis occurs in the final portions of the study. 
Nature of Data 
 The nature of the data used in the study of the contemporary presentation of a 
historical figure suggests several methodological issues.  The types of documents for the 
study of Sandino and Fonseca chiefly include biographies, histories, and political 
propaganda.  The propaganda include letters, manifestos, booklets, pamphlets, and 
periodicals.  These different types of data serve different purposes in the research.  The 
propaganda is the vehicle by which the Sandinistas present Sandino to Nicaraguans in the 
1960s and 1970s.  Biographies of Fonseca and histories of Nicaragua illuminate the 
process by which Fonseca reconstructed Sandino.  Biographies of Sandino, interviews 
with him, as well as Nicaraguan histories, provide clues about a Sandino perhaps 
different from Fonseca’s Sandino. Sandino’s own writings provide further evidence 
making possible comparison of one view of Sandino with another.  The political 
propaganda published, sold, and distributed by the Sandinistas provides the richest and 
most obvious data source for discovering that contemporary presentation of Sandino. 
Propaganda written by Sandino sheds light on Sandino’s presentation of self and perhaps 
his evaluation of himself.   
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 In spite of the obvious usefulness of propaganda to this study, this type of 
document is rarely used by sociologists and is even ignored in sociology as indicated by 
its lack of mention in standard texts on research methods.  Further, it receives severe 
criticism from writers such as Gottschalk (1945: 16) who calls it “apologia” and he says, 
“Propaganda is perhaps the worst example of deliberate perversion of truth out of a desire 
to benefit a cause” (1945: 40).  Such views make questionable assumptions about 
political propaganda.  They assume that there is some sort of consensual truth out there 
and that propagandists deliberately pervert it.  Perhaps writers of propaganda argue in 
favor of their cause according to their sincere belief in their view of the “facts” 
surrounding that cause.  Interestingly, Gottschalk considers government documents as 
separate from and more credible than propaganda without quite identifying the difference 
between the two.   Currently, movement scholars studying narrative seem the group most 
likely to employ propaganda as data. 
 Political propaganda may not be useful for many research projects, but it serves 
the purpose here quite nicely.  Study of Fonseca’s writings and of the other revolutionary 
leaders yields a composite of their vision of Sandino.  It is the subjectivity that is 
interesting.  In the revolutionary propaganda, Sandino is “the most outstanding founding 
father” (Fonseca, 1981: 26), “the immortal patriot” (Fonseca, 1981:  412), and “the most 
illustrious son of the Nicaraguan people” (Fonseca, 1980:  13).  Infinite description of 
Sandino in Sandinista propaganda provides rich data regarding the image of a past 
reconstructed as an extension of a present in revolutionary turmoil. 
 The biographies and narrative histories provide bases for comparing the Sandino 
of propaganda to a Sandino described by friends and other witnesses, historians and 
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social scientists.  For example, probably many biographies of Sandino will corroborate 
many of the details of his life mentioned in propaganda.  However, biographies and 
histories often add details not found in propaganda.  For instance, propaganda, 
biographies, and histories agree on the circumstances of Sandino’s birth, but propaganda 
does not usually mention that Sandino fled Nicaragua as a young man after shooting 
another (Booth, 1985; Hodges, 1986; Macaulay, 1965).  Nor does Sandinista propaganda 
discuss Sandino’s affiliations with freemasonry spiritism, and the Magnetic-Spiritual 
School as do Hodges (1986; 1992), Navarro-Génie (2002) and Sandino’s own writings 
(1981).  Whether these omissions from propaganda were deliberate perversions or not 
does not diminish the usefulness of each type of document for discovering the various 
reconstructed Sandinos. 
 Recognizing the political affiliation of the documents’ authors is important in 
understanding the purpose of the documents and the reconstruction of the particular past 
contained therein.  Documents produced by Sandinistas of any time period will 
understand different “facts” and reconstruct different pasts than will Somocista writers or 
writers outside Nicaraguan politics.  The difference in the author’s group affiliation 
becomes a methodological problem for the researcher of Sandino when reading 
biographies and histories.  Platt (1981:  55) recognizes that the researcher needs to be 
aware “of whether some documents should be treated as more important than others.”  In 
other words, the researcher cannot necessarily assume that Sandino’s biography by 
Carlos Fonseca (1984) is any more or less important or accurate than El Verdadero 
Sandino written by Anastasio Somoza García (1936).  Neither can s/he automatically 
assume that the biography written by American journalist Carleton Beals (1932) or New 
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York Times articles written by Norman Denny are somehow more objective and, 
therefore, more authoritative than the Sandinista and Somocista accounts.  The study of 
Sandino is again a comparison of presentation, not “truth” contained in that presentation. 
 In addition to recognizing the group membership of an author, the researcher 
must realize what importance s/he may grant to a document on the basis of which person 
authored the document.  Rock (1976:  361) writes that documents “are given their fullest 
meaning when the identity and world of their authors are known...”  Conversely, Platt 
(1981) warns against concentrating on documents which have been highly valued for 
various reasons including authorship.  Admittedly, the researcher of this study is guilty of 
concentrating on Fonseca above all other contemporary Sandinistas.  Of course, the 
reason for giving such importance to Fonseca is that he seems to be the first of the 
contemporary Sandinistas to study and write about Sandino in a purposeful and 
systematic way (Borge, 1980;  Hodges, 1986). On the other hand, the comments of 
Sandinistas other than Fonseca are important to understanding posthumous charisma for 
charisma is a relationship that includes more than two persons.  It may be the duty of the 
researcher only to recognize an emphasis on a perceived leader rather than to avoid it. 
 In summary, some of the traditional concerns of researchers relying on 
documents as data do not apply to this research.  Again, the purpose of this research is to 
determine how Carlos Fonseca spread his present backward to identify and present 
Sandino to Nicaraguans.  Therefore, the use and the subjectivity of political propaganda 
is not only not a problem, it is desirable.  Authorship of the document does not 
necessarily make one document more credible than another.  However, authorship, date, 
and purpose of the documents are important for purposes of categorizing them as 
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propaganda, histories, or biographies. Yet, strict attention to traditional prescriptions for 
understanding “proper” uses of data (e.g. - Gottschalk’s recommendations) may be 
damaging to gaining knowledge.  As C. Wright Mills (1959: 120) advises, a particular 
philosophy of science “is of some use to working social scientists...But its use ought to be 
of a general nature;  no social scientist need take any such model very seriously.” 
Availability of Data 
 The third general methodological issue to be addressed concerns the researcher’s 
access to data which will aid in demonstrating the presentation of a past Sandino to 
contemporary Nicaraguans.  Such a study depends heavily upon possibly unavailable 
data.  These data are unusually subject to the whim of the power structure.  It also 
involves data which may never have existed in material form due to widespread illiteracy 
among the Nicaraguan population. 
 Acquiring biographies, narrative histories, and political propaganda that have a 
bearing on the research problem in question becomes extremely difficult when persons in 
power wish to suppress such data.  The researcher’s problem is twofold in this case.  In 
Somoza’s Nicaragua, Sandinista literature was destroyed and suppressed.  After the 
success of the Sandinista revolution, works critical of Sandino have suffered suppression 
until recently (Hodges, 1986).  Thus, the impressions that Nicaraguans had and have of 
their past depend largely upon the present power structure in Nicaragua. 
 Curiously, many methodological discussions do not explicitly recognize 
suppression of data within a power structure.  For example, neither Gottschalk (1945) nor 
Skocpol (1987) deal effectively with the problem.  Dibble (1963) alludes to the lack of 
treatment of this problem, “...there is always the implicit assumption that documents are 
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produced by individuals and not by social systems.”  However, he then launches into a 
discussion about accessible and existing documents and not about documents hidden, 
restricted or destroyed due to the nature of the social system.   Rock (1976) and Mills 
(1959) both identify official and unofficial secrecy as problems for gaining data.  In 
Nicaragua, the problem has not been so much one of secrecy but of persons in power 
trying to rid their social system of, at least, an annoyance, and at most, a threat. 
 Mills (1959:  158) identifies “the history-making unit [as] the dynamic nation 
state...”  Even though his comments are not directly addressing methodology, Mills 
recognizes the ability of persons in power, such as Somoza or the Sandinistas, to create 
an official and “real” past in light of their understanding of the present.  If the researcher 
conforms to the nation-state’s idea of history, s/he will not be interested in data 
suppressed or destroyed by that powerful system.  It is probably more likely that the 
existence of suppressed data potentially useful to a study will not occur to the researcher 
than it is likely that the researcher will be disinterested.  As mentioned previously, 
Touraine warns of dominant group control of the production of knowledge, which could 
include production of data. 
 Another problem in researching a revolutionary movement is the ephemeral 
nature of much of the data.  This problem overlaps with suppression of data because 
much of the data is deliberately destroyed.  However, the point here is one of data lost 
because it is destroyed by weather, war, or is simply not taken seriously enough for 
anyone to systematically collect and archive. 
 Graffiti is an excellent example of data lost to weather, fire, war, building repair 
or remodeling.  Fortunately, one photographic study of Sandinista graffiti exists in 
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published form, but the photos were taken well after 1979.  Nevertheless, this information 
is helpful because it provides data depicting what type of revolutionary propaganda the 
average Nicaraguan might have seen daily since Cabezas (1985) argues that pintas were 
very important to the revolution. 
 Leaflets, pamphlets, flyers or posters are also ephemeral data sources.  It is 
extremely unfortunate that such is the case because, like grafitti, these documents are 
likely to be the ones most often seen by the populace.  However, such documents are 
relatively easy for their recipients to ignore or discard.  They may also be purposefully 
destroyed by the recipient for fear of repression.  A supreme effort such as smuggling it 
out of the country may be required in order to save such data.  Much of this type of data 
is apparently scattered in individual homes. 
 A third problem in acquiring the desired documents regarding Sandino is that the 
Nicaraguan population was largely illiterate prior to the Sandinista victory in 1979 (Ryan 
et al, 1970).  Therefore, either the data were never recorded because the potential creators 
were illiterate or because the potential readership was illiterate.  Furthermore, publication 
technology is somewhat linked to the literacy rate (Shafer, 1980).  If there is a limited 
amount of potential readership, then there may be little reason to develop production and 
distribution techniques on a wide scale.  Consequently, documents are simply not 
available due to a lack of production equipment or transportation.  Additionally, it has 
been rather well-documented that the Somozas neglected social needs of Nicaraguans 
such as literacy and used their ownership of the communications industry to control the 
populace and make a profit (Ryan et al, 1970).  Therefore, the Nicaraguan 
communications technology was developed only enough to provide service to a small 
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portion of the Nicaraguan population.  Sandinistas certainly did not have liberal and 
regular access to such Nicaraguan technology inside Nicaragua. 
 The availability of data required to study the various reconstructions of Sandino 
is limited by suppression of documents by the reigning power structure, the ephemeral 
nature of much revolutionary propaganda, and social conditions such as illiteracy and 
inadequate production techniques.  Other problems may inhibit the availability of data, 
but these three are especially applicable to the Nicaraguan case. 
Interpretation of the Data 
 In the process of data interpretation, researchers interpret data through the filters 
of their personal and professional values, the context of the data and the research process, 
the goals of the research and his/her vision of time.  The issue of value judgment has 
warranted countless published discussions.  Therefore, it is unnecessary to treat the 
general topic again here.  Yet, as this study considers a culture different from the 
author’s, the role of cultural bias is a factor.   
 Mills (1959) mentions that the researcher of cultures other than his/her own must 
make a concerted attempt to gain knowledge regarding the history and cultural nuances 
of the society under study.  Shafer (1980) argues that even though cultural empathy is 
necessary, the researcher need not abandon his/her own values but simply try to think and 
believe like his/her subjects.  Therefore, understanding Sandino and his value to 
contemporary Sandinistas requires that the researcher pay special attention to Nicaraguan 
documents and guarded attention to foreign views of the subject. 
 Similarly, when reading a document that is data, the researcher must understand 
the words.  The point seems obvious.  However, understanding the words in a literal 
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sense and their real or oblique sense are methodologically important.  A simple example 
of this issue is the phrase “Sandino lives!” written commonly in Sandinista literature.  
The Sandinistas do not believe that Sandino is physically alive; it is a symbolic statement.  
However, lacking familiarity with the culture could result in misinterpretation.  Shafer 
(1980:  150) notes, “Sometimes this problem is complicated by language foreign to the 
reader, or by obsolete or technical terms, odd spelling, a lack of punctuation, or the use of 
abbreviations.”  Clearly, the researcher should understand Spanish (and Nicaraguan 
Spanish) well so that s/he does not have to guess at the literal or real meaning of 
Sandinista phrases within the context of the documents. 
 The context of the data within the society is also important and is very similar to 
a combination of cultural and situational empathy.  The researcher must understand that 
pre-1979 Sandinista political propaganda was produced during a time of insurrection and 
ultimate violent revolution.  It was often produced outside Nicaragua and distributed 
under threat of violent reprisal by the National Guard. 
 Similarly, we need to understand the social context of the individual producing 
the data.  Mills (1959:  161) writes, “...we must understand the significance and meaning 
of the roles [the individual] has played and does play; to understand these roles we must 
understand the institutions of which they are a part.”  In Fonseca’s case, he was not only 
the founder of a social movement; he engaged in violent guerrilla activity with the 
purpose of eliminating the dominant power structure in Nicaragua.  Viewing Fonseca’s 
role contextually as a threat to the existing system sheds much light on the meaning of his 
written works.  The researcher must remember such contextual circumstances when 
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sifting through these documents in order to more fully appreciate their literal and real 
meanings. 
 The producer of the research plays a role in a specific context just as writers of 
documents do.  This problem certainly overlaps with that of value judgment.  However, it 
is important to also note, as does Bendix (1984:  7), “that social scientists, as well as their 
socio-political data, are a part of the historical process.”  Assumptions that researchers 
gain control over empirical variation not only make the data ahistorical but also remove 
the researcher from participation in history.  As part of history, the researcher is subject 
to influence by his/her culture, by institutions, and by the emergent events identified by 
Mead. 
 The goals of the researcher influence the interpretation of data as well.  For 
example, searches for cause influence analysis differently than do efforts to describe.  
Skocpol (1984) identifies three goals of research - developing a grand theory of society, 
identifying causal relationships, and interpretation through use of concepts.  Using 
research to prove or develop a general theory may lead the researcher to ignore, dismiss 
or normalize particular or deviant data.  Using concepts to interpret history involves 
special attention to cultural context and requires a topic and arguments that are 
“culturally or politically ‘significant’ in the present” (Skocpol, 1985:  368).  Focusing on 
causal regularities identifies specific variables as independent rather than dependent.  
Therefore, three studies with three different goals regarding the reconstruction of Sandino 
will result in three distinct interpretations of data.  This situation is not necessarily 
problematic but must be recognized. 
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 The last issue to be treated here with regard to data interpretation is the 
researcher’s concept of time.  Perceiving time as a linear progression will affect data 
analysis differently than if the researcher views time as cyclical.  For example, 
Wallerstein (1982) and Mills (1959) do not envision time as linear, but rather time 
consists of trends and cycles.  Wallerstein believes that only the concept of cyclical 
history permits proper analysis of long-term, large-scale social change.  So Wallerstein’s 
interpretation of data, given his view of time, finds social change to belong to a world 
system.  If he viewed time as linear, he claims that he could not accomplish such macro-
analysis because “the drive to perpetual accumulation creates such contradictions that its 
growth cannot be unremittingly linear and still be capitalist (Wallerstein, 1982:  106). 
 Bendix (1984) raises another interesting point regarding the methodological 
problem of time.  He says, “By looking at past events from a contemporaneous viewpoint 
we create a dynamic picture, or by looking backward at the results we create a static 
picture” (Bendix, 1984:  56).  The question for data interpretation becomes whether the 
contemporary presentation of Sandino is a portion of an ever-changing society or a 
highly situational, time-bound slice of Nicaraguan history.  Mead’s theory precludes a 
static view of history. 
 Another approach to time is Mead’s idea already outlined in this work  In this 
view, individuals live in a present and spread the past backward and the future forward 
from that present.  Interestingly, Gottschalk supports Mead’s approach.  Gottschalk 
(1945: 67) writes, “...successive generations reinterpret the past...and rewrite history.”  
Bendix (1984:  9) states it another way, “...man’s interest in truth changes, and hence 
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knowledge of society is not cumulative...”  It has already been stated what this view of 
the nature of the past means for interpreting Sandinista documents. 
Conclusion 
 George Herbert Mead’s ideas concerning temporal processes spawn numerous 
methodological questions as the researcher attempts to link this theory to data.  Several of 
these questions are particularly relevant to the substantive issue of the contemporary 
Nicaraguan revolution.  In studying Carlos Fonseca’s attempt to reconstruct a historical 
Augusto César Sandino for purposes of fueling that revolution, we find that the level of 
analysis, and the nature, availability and interpretation of the required data are serious 
considerations for the social scientist.  Such a study is dependent upon varied and 
sometimes unusual data sources, upon suppressed, ephemeral, and non-existent data, and 
on data interpretation according to the values and goals of the researcher as well as the 
social context of the data and researcher. 
 Collecting data to discuss a particular hypothesis or theory is not a simple task.  
Mills (1959:  125) states, “The problem of empirical verifications is ‘how to get down to 
facts’ yet not get overwhelmed by them; how to anchor ideas to facts but not to sink the 
ideas.  The problem is first what to verify and second how to verify it.”  In this case, the 
“what” is that Mead’s idea of the past as an extension of the present is applicable to 
Fonseca’s rescue of Sandino from history.  The “how” is the study of political 
propaganda, biographies, and narrative histories about Sandino.  In particular, the point is 
to know how the Sandinistas’ reconstruction of Sandino in propaganda compares to the 
other presentations of Sandino, including Somoza’s official history of Sandino. 
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 While this essay very briefly discussed a few issues of data such as the level of 
analysis, and the nature, availability and interpretation of data, it has neglected many 
other methodological issues.  Certainly, they deserve treatment.  Nevertheless, in 
whatever manner the researcher chooses to answer the methodological questions, Mead’s 
theoretical question should not be ignored with regard to social movements including 
revolution.  Hsieh (1975:  87) eloquently summarizes this point, “While historians have 
the right to choose the viewpoint they consider adequate, it would seem that the omission 
of the time dimension from the complex process of the Revolution does violence to 
historical discipline.”  Fonseca also recognizes the importance of time and linking past 
and presents. The last paragraph of Sandino:  Guerrillero Proletario reads:  “in this new 
battle, the young Nicaraguan generation, faithful to the legacy of Augusto César Sandino, 
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